FRANK DEGENNARO VS. PHILO CHAPMAN L-0250-17, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4782-17T3
FRANK DEGENNARO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PHILO CHAPMAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
Argued May 16, 2019 – Decided July 8, 2019
Before Judges Whipple and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. L-0250-17.
Michael T. Novick argued the cause for appellant
(Brown, Novick & McKinley, attorneys; Michael T.
Novick, on the briefs).
John V. Mallon argued the cause for respondent
(Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, PC,
attorneys; John V. Mallon, of counsel and on the brief;
Kelly A. Weber, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Frank DeGennaro appeals from a May 25, 2018 order entered by
Judge Timothy W. Chell granting summary judgment to defendant Philo
Chapman based on the court's finding that plaintiff was unlicensed, uninsured,
and therefore barred from bringing a claim for economic and non-economic
losses under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). We affirm.
I.
We discern the following undisputed facts from the record and view the
facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
party against whom summary judgment was entered. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
On June 6, 2015, plaintiff and defendant were involved in a motor vehicle
accident in Buena during which plaintiff suffered injuries. At the time of the
accident, plaintiff was operating a vehicle owned by his former girlfriend,
Brandie Moore, a Texas resident, and he was uninsured for medical expenses
benefits coverage as required under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, -3.3, and -4. He resided
in Texas with Moore for two years before moving to New Jersey. Plaintiff did
not have a valid driver's license on the date of the accident, and Moore's vehicle
was not insured or registered in this State. According to plaintiff, Moore gave
him permission to use her vehicle, while she was incarcerated in Texas at the
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time of his accident. Previously, Moore insured her vehicle in Texas with Old
American County Mutual Fire Insurance Company, and she was listed as the
sole driver on the policy. The coverage was cancelled on May 4, 2015, thirty-
one days before plaintiff's accident.
Prior to the accident, plaintiff had been residing with his girlfriend Denise
Roach in Mullica Hill for approximately two months. Plaintiff testified that
Roach owns several vehicles but he had no information as to whether they were
insured. Before that time, plaintiff was residing with his father in Salem for six
months; therefore, plaintiff was residing in this State for at least eight months
prior to the accident. Plaintiff alleges he had no knowledge that Moore's
insurance policy was cancelled. At the accident scene, plaintiff turned over
insurance information to the investigating officer; and the state insurance
identification code and policy number provided did not match Moore's cancelled
policy information, which bore a Texas registration number. 1 At his deposition,
plaintiff testified his New Jersey driver's license was suspended because of a
driving while intoxicated conviction but at the accident scene, he stated to the
officer that he "ha[s] a Texas license, but I don't know if it was legit." The police
1
Moore's policy number was TEJ741034. Her policy was originally set to
expire on June 4, 2015, but had been cancelled as of May 4, 2015.
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report stated that plaintiff's address was 1801 Sunnydell Avenue, Waco, Texas,
which he confirmed was his address prior to moving to New Jersey.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff was
barred from bringing suit under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). The judge granted the
motion and found:
[P]laintiff was living in New Jersey for approximately
eight months prior to this accident and during that time,
he exercised control over the vehicle. The [c]ourt finds
that he utilized it for his own personal reasons, filling
the vehicle with gasoline as needed and maintaining the
vehicle in operable condition. The [c]ourt finds that
although Ms. Moore may have been the registered
owner of the vehicle, plaintiff was effectively the
beneficial owner of, and clearly had an interest in, the
vehicle as he had possession and control of the vehicle
at all times relevant to this motion. The [c]ourt finds
that as the beneficial owner of the vehicle, plaintiff
failed to register and insure the vehicle in New Jersey,
and this precludes plaintiff from contributing to the
New Jersey PIP [2] system. The [c]ourt finds that,
therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to pursue a claim for
bodily injury.
The judge also noted that:
There is no doubt that if the Legislature intended that
an applicant for insurance be the title owner or the
registered owner [then] the statute would explicitly say
so. One must assume, in interpreting statutes that the
Legislature chooses its words carefully. Therefore, the
fact that the word "owner" was used rather than "title
2
Personal Injury Protection.
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owner" or "registered owner[,"] and the fact that it can
be assumed that the Legislature was aware of prior
judicial construction given to the word "owner," are
clear indications that the [L]egislature intended that the
word owner could mean any person having an interest
in the vehicle, even if that person was not the title or
registered owner of the vehicle.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the judge erred in granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment by improperly applying N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) to
bar plaintiff's claim; plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated; and the judge
improvidently relied upon N.J.S.A. 39:3-17.1, which is inapplicable since he
was not a beneficial owner of Moore's vehicle under the explicit language of
N.J.S.A. 39:3-15.
II.
We conduct a de novo review of the trial court's decision on defendant's
motion and apply the same standard as the trial court for granting a motion for
summary judgment. Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405
(2014). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non -moving
party, determine if there are any genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and
decide whether the motion judge correctly found that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brill, 142 N.J. at 540. Issues of law are
subject to the de novo standard of review, Manalapan Realty, LP v. Manalapan
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Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), and we "do not defer to the trial court's
. . . interpretation of 'the meaning of a statute[.]'" Davis, 219 N.J. at 405 (quoting
Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013)).
When interpreting a statute, we are required to determine the "intent of
the Legislature[,]" Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 101 (2009), and must
first consider the plain language of the statute because that is the best indicator
of legislative intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). We are to
"ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning
and significance, and read them in context with related
provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a
whole." [Hardy, 198 N.J. at 101.] . . . Courts are
cautioned against "rewrit[ing] a plainly-written
enactment of the Legislature or presum[ing] that the
Legislature intended something other than that
expressed by way of the plain language." [Ibid.] If the
language is "clear on its face," courts should "enforce
[the statute] according to its terms."
However, "where a literal interpretation would create a
manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the
spirit of the law should control." [Hubbard v. Reed,
168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001).] . . . Accordingly, "when a
'literal interpretation of individual statutory terms or
provisions' would lead to results 'inconsistent with the
overall purpose of the statute,' that interpretation should
be rejected." [Id. at 392-93.]
[Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193, 200-01 (2006)
(second, third, and fourth alterations in original)
(citations omitted).]
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Plaintiff does not contend there were any genuine issues of material fact
in dispute that precluded the proper granting of defendant's motion for summary
judgment. He asserts only that the court erred in its legal conclusion that
plaintiff's claims against defendant are barred under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a)
because of plaintiff's admitted failure to maintain medical benefits expense
coverage. We therefore turn our attention to the court's application of the statute
to the undisputed facts here.
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) provides:
Any person who, at the time of an automobile accident
resulting in injuries to that person, is required but fails
to maintain medical expense benefits coverage
mandated by [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4], [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1],
or [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3] shall have no cause of action
for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss
sustained as a result of an accident while operating an
uninsured automobile.
There is no question that plaintiff failed to maintain the mandated medical
expense benefits coverage required under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). He argues
however, that he should be exempted from the statutory bar to suit because he
had no reason to know he was uninsured on the date of the accident, he believed
it was fully insured with A-Max Insurance in Texas, he had no knowledge
Moore's policy with Old American was cancelled thirty-two days before the
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accident, he was not married to Moore, he had no interest in her vehicle, had no
beneficial interest in her vehicle, and he owned no car of his own. We disagree.
We are satisfied that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) bars
plaintiff's claims against defendant. The statute expressly provides that a
person, such as plaintiff, who "fails to maintain medical expense benefits
coverage . . . shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or
noneconomic loss[.]" N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). Plaintiff does not argue the
language is ambiguous and acknowledges that "[o]n its face, the statute deprives
an uninsured motorist of the right to sue for any loss caused by another [.]"
Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J. 587, 598 (2011).
If the words of a statute are clear, a court should not infer a meaning other
than what is plainly written in the statute. Hardy, 198 N.J. at 101. "Only 'if
there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible
interpretation' do we turn to extrinsic evidence, such as 'legislative history,
committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.'" Aronberg, 207 N.J. at
598 (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93). We are convinced that because
it was undisputed that plaintiff was uninsured at the time of the accident, the
court correctly concluded that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a)
required the dismissal of plaintiff's claims.
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New Jersey's No Fault Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35, was
"intended to serve as the exclusive remedy for payment of out-of-pocket medical
expenses arising from an automobile accident." Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am.,
178 N.J. 460, 466 (2004). The protections provided by the Act were meant to
completely replace the court-oriented fault system that was perceived to be too
inefficient. Id. at 467.
The Legislature had four objectives in reforming the
automobile accident tort system: (1) providing benefits
promptly and efficiently to all accident injury victims
(the reparation objective); (2) reducing or stabilizing
the cost of automobile insurance (the cost objective);
(3) making insurance coverage readily available for
automobile owners (the availability objective); and (4)
streamlining judicial procedures involved in third-party
claims (the judicial objective).
[Ibid.]
The original legislation, which did not include N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5, was
not successful in slowing the rise of insurance costs or lessening the burden on
the court system. Id. at 467-68. To address the issue of rising costs, the
Legislature created the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice
and Cost Containment Act (Cost Containment Act), which "gave motorists the
option of reducing insurance premiums by increasing deductibles and reducing
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benefits" and excluded some categories of motorists from claiming PIP benefits.
Id. at 468.
The Cost Containment Act did not sufficiently reduce insurance costs. As
a result, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5. Id. at 469. The original
version of the statute required motorists to meet a $1500 medical-expense
threshold in order to sue for noneconomic damages, and a 1988 amendment to
the statute changed the requirement to a verbal threshold. Id. at 469-70. In
1997, the Legislature amended the statute to its current form, creating a
complete bar to recovery for certain motorists, including those who operate an
automobile without having medical expense benefits coverage. Id. at 470.
"N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5[(a)] advances a policy of cost containment by
ensuring that an injured, uninsured driver does not draw on the pool of accident-
victim insurance funds to which he did not contribute." Id. at 471. In finding
the statute was constitutional, the Court in Caviglia declined "to second-guess
the Legislature's common-sense reasoning that section 4.5[(a)] has the potential
to produce greater compliance with compulsory insurance laws and in turn,
reduce litigation, and result in savings to insurance carriers and ultimately the
consuming public." Id. at 477.
A-4782-17T3
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N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) does not include a requirement that an uninsured
motorist have a culpable state of mind and does not exempt motorists who have
a good faith belief that they have medical expense benefits coverage. The
requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) are triggered where the "owner or
registrant of an automobile registered or principally garaged in this State that
was being operated without personal injury protection coverage[.]" N.J.S.A.
39:6A-7(b)(1) (emphasis added). With regard to residency and timing, N.J.S.A.
39:3-17.1(b) requires that:
Any person who becomes a resident of this State and
who immediately prior thereto was authorized to
operate and drive a motor vehicle . . . in this State as a
nonresident pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:3-15] and
[N.J.S.A. 39:3-17], shall register any vehicle operated
on the public highways of this State within [sixty] days
of so becoming a resident of New Jersey, pursuant to
[N.J.S.A. 39:3-4] or [N.J.S.A. 39:3-8.1].
Our jurisdiction supports an interpretation of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 whereby
strict, title ownership is not necessary to support a finding of ownership under
the statute. See Verriest v. INA Underwriters Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 401, 409 (1995)
("Despite the lack of legal title, the true owner is the person who maintains
'possession and control of the automobile.'" (quoting Bohannon v. Aetna v. Cas.
& Sur. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 848, 850 (1985))); Dzibua v. Fletcher, 382 N.J. Super.
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73, 78 (App. Div. 2005) (holding the statutory language "owner or registrant"
implies that the owner may not be the registrant).
In short, "[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a)] bars the culpably uninsured (those
vehicle owners required by statute to maintain PIP coverage but who have failed
to do so) when injured while operating an uninsured vehicle." Craig & Pomeroy,
New Jersey Auto Insurance Law, § 15:5-2 (2019); Perrelli, 206 N.J. at 208
(declining to accept plaintiff's argument that her belief the vehicle was insured
was enough to preclude the operation of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a)).
Furthermore, New Jersey has a "strong public policy against the
proliferation of insurance fraud[.]" Palisades Safety & Ins. Ass'n v. Bastien,
175 N.J. 144, 151 (2003). The State also has a strong public policy of
compensating third parties for losses sustained in automobile accidents. See id.
at 152; Fisher v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 224 N.J. Super. 552,
557-58 (App. Div. 1988). We have noted "[a] strong public policy favors the
protection of the Fund's financial integrity, and thus, the Fund must 'be
administered in a fashion to assure that only those persons legitimately entitled
to participate in its benefits are paid therefrom.'" Esdaile v. Harsfield, 245 N.J.
Super. 591, 595 (App. Div. 1991) (citation omitted) (quoting Douglas v. Harris,
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35 N.J. 270, 279 (1961)), rev'd on other grounds, Esdaile v. Angle, 126 N.J. 426(1992).
Here, the judge correctly determined that plaintiff was required to
maintain insurance because he was the constructive and beneficial "owner" of
the vehicle, he exercised dominion and control over Moore's vehicle at the time
of the accident, and plaintiff drove the vehicle daily for eight months leading up
to the accident. Plaintiff argues that Dziuba stands for a much narrower
proposition limited to the facts of that case, wherein two married plaintiffs were
deemed constructive "owners" of the vehicle, even though only one spouse
registered the vehicle in their individual name. We reject plaintiff's narrow
interpretation of the holding in Dziuba. Our decision was not based on the
parties' marital status, but merely applied the well-accepted principles of
constructive ownership in respect of a married couple. Dziuba, 382 N.J. Super.
at 78.
III.
Next, plaintiff argues that his constitutional rights were violated because
he has a "constitutionally protected right to redress from the negligent driver
who caused him significant losses." In support of his argument, plaintiff
contends Caviglia, a case raised sua sponte by the judge, supports the
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proposition that the class of persons intended to be excluded from the statutory
right to sue is "narrowly tailored" and that "plaintiff . . . simply does not fit that
narrow category." We disagree. The Caviglia Court recognized the
Legislature's "comprehensive" expansion of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). We
emphasize that plaintiff cannot even be considered a permissive user here
because he did not possess a valid driver's license.
In further support of his theory, plaintiff relies upon Perrelli, where our
Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) precluded recovery to an
individual who was a passenger in an uninsured vehicle she owned at the time
of the accident. 206 N.J. at 208. Plaintiff contends Perrelli stands for the
proposition that our Legislature only intended to penalize individuals who
owned uninsured vehicles. We reject plaintiff's claim because unlike Perrelli,
he was an unlicensed driver and not a passenger, he was a beneficial owner of
Moore's vehicle, and ownership is not congruent with title ownership. Moore's
constitutional rights to her vehicle were not violated as argued by plaintiff, who
lacks standing to assert a claim on her behalf, and no legal authority has been
cited by plaintiff to advance this argument.
Plaintiff next argues that the judge erroneously expanded the class of
citizens meant to be penalized by the statute, and plaintiff cites to Rojas v.
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Depaolo, 357 N.J. Super. 115 (Law Div. 2002). Rojas involved a Pennsylvania
resident, who was driving an uninsured vehicle in this State and he was involved
in a collision. Id. at 117. The court found that the plaintiff was not subject to
the penalty provision set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 because that language is
expressly limited to owners of vehicles registered or garaged in this State, and
is inapplicable to an out-of-state plaintiff, and our Legislature did not intend to
exclude out-of-state drivers from "deemer" protections, concluding it would be
inappropriate to "add" out-of-state residents to the category of those uninsured
vehicles barred by the statute. Id. at 120.
Plaintiff also cites to two other cases in support of his argument, Camp v.
Lummino, 352 N.J. Super. 414, 418 (App. Div. 2002) (declining to "enlarge the
scope" of the statute because the action was a social host theory against a
homeowner who served alcoholic beverages to a minor, and did not implicate
motor vehicle coverage), and Mody v. Brooks, 339 N.J. Super. 392, 394 (App.
Div. 2001) (holding the statutory bar does not extend to property damage
claims).
Rojas is not binding precedent, and the holdings in Camp and Mody are
factually distinguishable because they do not address the pivotal issue of
plaintiff being a constructive owner of the Moore vehicle. Moreover, the judge
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correctly distinguished Rojas as irrelevant because it involved a nonresident.
Furthermore, Lummino and Mody are not analogous because different types of
damages and legal theories are presented in these cases having no factual or
legal bearing on the issue of constructive or beneficial ownership of a vehicle.
IV.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the judge erroneously relied upon N.J.S.A.
39:3-17.1 in dismissing his case because that section of the statute only applies
to vehicle owners. Once again, plaintiff's argument is devoid of any merit
because the judge properly determined that plaintiff was the beneficial owner of
the Moore vehicle. Plaintiff cites to the Touring Privileges statute, N.J.S.A.
39:3-17, and argues that the word "owner" as referred to in the statute, could
only refer to a title owner, and our State does not allow an individual to register
a vehicle which they only "constructively" own.
Our insurance statutes, subject to certain exceptions, defines an "eligible
person" who can obtain auto coverage under the terms of the Fair Automobile
Insurance Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 17:33B-13 to -21, as follows: "'Eligible person'
means a person who is an owner or registrant of an automobile registered in this
State or who holds a valid New Jersey driver's license to operate an
automobile[.]" N.J.S.A. 17:33B-13. Similarly, a portion of the insurance
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regulations similarly defines the qualifications of an "eligible person" in
N.J.A.C. 11:3-34.4 with the following language, subject to certain exceptions:
(a) An "eligible person" is a person who is an owner or
registrant of an automobile registered and principally
garaged in this State or who is a resident and holds a
valid New Jersey driver's license to operate an
automobile[.]
....
(b) An "eligible person" includes a person who is an
owner or registrant of an automobile registered in this
State or who holds a valid New Jersey driver's license
to operate an automobile and is domiciled in this State
who is temporarily residing out-of-State and whose car
may be principally garaged in another state while the
person either is a full time student or is in the military
service and is stationed out-of-State.
[N.J.A.C. 11:3-34.4(a) and (b).]
These provisions arguably signify that, absent possession of a valid New
Jersey driver's license, an individual is not an "eligible person" unless he or she
has an automobile that is both "registered" and "principally garaged" in this
State. The fact remains that plaintiff was an unlicensed driver operating an
unregistered and uninsured vehicle. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) has been described
as a "blunt tool" that may result in harsh outcomes, but that is because "[t]he
statute's self-evident purpose" is "to give the maximum incentive to all motorists
to comply with this State's compulsory no-fault insurance laws." Aronberg, 207
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N.J. at 599, 601. Harsh consequences, however, do not permit a departure from
the express language in the statute because "[i]t is not within [the court's]
province to second guess the policymaking decisions of the Legislature when no
constitutional principle is at issue." Id. at 602.
We conclude that the remaining arguments—to the extent we have not
addressed them—lack sufficient merit to warrant any further discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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