CHERYL A. GALLO VS. ROBERT A. GALLO (L-0058-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4095-15T2
    CHERYL A. GALLO,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ROBERT A. GALLO,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    —————————————————————————————-
    Submitted August 1, 2017 – Decided           August 11, 2017
    Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-
    0058-16.
    W. James Mac Naughton, attorney for appellant.
    Scura, Wigfield, Heyer, Stevens & Cammarota,
    LLP, attorneys for respondent (David E. Sklar,
    on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Cheryl Gallo appeals from an April 22, 2016 Law
    Division order dismissing her complaint against her ex-husband,
    defendant Robert Gallo.           Plaintiff argues (1) defendant gave no
    consideration for a promise to dismiss an earlier action with
    prejudice, and (2) a previous payment did not constitute an accord
    and satisfaction of a $50,000 note.            After a review of plaintiff's
    contentions in light of the record and applicable legal principles,
    we affirm.
    I.
    On   August    8,   2008,   plaintiff's         mother   lent    $50,000    to
    defendant.    On October 19, 2008, plaintiff's mother lent $300,000
    to defendant and plaintiff.        Plaintiff's mother lent defendant and
    plaintiff an additional $30,000 on June 27, 2009.                Plaintiff and
    defendant divorced in January 2015.              In their Dual Judgment of
    Divorce (DJD), the parties agreed to list their property for sale.
    Upon sale of the property, "the parties agree[d] to pay . . . the
    monies due [to plaintiff's] mother in an amount to be agreed upon
    by the parties."
    After filing a complaint against plaintiff and defendant for
    the $380,000, the mother's attorney sent a letter to defendant’s
    attorney, stating he would "file . . . a dismissal of this action
    with prejudice provided the premises . . . is sold," and his client
    "receives $286,170.14 . . . no later than close of business
    September    30,   2015."    The       next   day,   on   September    26,   2015,
    plaintiff's mother assigned her "right, title and interest in" the
    $50,000 note to plaintiff for $1.
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    On    September    28,    2015,    plaintiff's       mother      received      the
    $286,170.14 at closing.              On November 25, 2015, the trial court
    dismissed the mother's complaint for lack of prosecution, pursuant
    to Rule 1:13-7.        On December 2, 2015, the mother's attorney filed
    a stipulation of dismissal under Rule 4:37-1(a), stating she
    "hereby stipulates to the dismissal of this action with prejudice."
    Plaintiff then filed her complaint against defendant based
    on   the     $50,000   note.         Defendant     filed   a    motion     to    dismiss
    plaintiff's      complaint      because     plaintiff's        mother      had   already
    dismissed the claim with prejudice.                 The trial court agreed and
    dismissed plaintiff's complaint.                Plaintiff now appeals.
    II.
    "Settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy."
    Nolan v. Lee Ho, 
    120 N.J. 465
    , 472 (1990) (quoting Jannarone v.
    W.T. Co., 
    65 N.J. Super. 472
    , 476 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    35 N.J. 61
       (1961)).     "Public        policy    favors     the    settlement        of
    disputes."       Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave.,
    L.L.C., 
    215 N.J. 242
    , 253 (2013).                 In furtherance of the strong
    policy of enforcing settlements, "our courts 'strain to give effect
    to the terms of a settlement wherever possible.'"                          Brundage v.
    Estate of Carambio, 
    195 N.J. 575
    , 601 (2008) (quoting Dep't of
    Pub. Advocate v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util., 
    206 N.J. Super. 523
    , 503
    (App.   Div.    1994)).         We   therefore     will    honor     and    enforce     an
    3                                          A-4095-15T2
    agreement to settle a lawsuit in the absence of fraud or other
    compelling circumstances.    Pascarella v. Bruck, 
    190 N.J. Super. 118
    , 124-25 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    94 N.J. 600
    (1983).
    A settlement of a legal claim between parties is a contract
    like any other contract.      
    Nolan, supra
    , 120 N.J. at 472.        A
    settlement agreement is subject to the ordinary principles of
    contract law.    Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 
    190 N.J. 359
    ,
    379 (2007).     Interpretation of a contract is a question of law.
    Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med.
    & Physical Therapy, 
    210 N.J. 597
    , 605 (2012). The court's ultimate
    goal is to determine the intent of the parties, as expressed in
    the language they used in the contract.   Onderdonk v. Presbyterian
    Homes of N.J., 
    85 N.J. 171
    , 183-84 (1981); Celanese Ltd. v. Essex
    Cty. Improvement Auth., 
    404 N.J. Super. 514
    , 528 (App. Div. 2009).
    In divining the parties' intent, we read the contract as a whole,
    in "accord with justice and common sense."         Cumberland Cty.
    Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., 
    358 N.J. Super. 484
    , 497
    (App. Div.) (quoting Krosnowski v. Krosnowski, 
    22 N.J. 376
    , 387
    (1956)), certif. denied, 
    177 N.J. 222
    (2003).
    Plaintiff argues her mother never received consideration for
    her promise to dismiss because defendant was already legally
    obligated to pay the amount he did.       Paragraph 29 of the DJD
    states, "[T]he parties agree to pay . . . the monies due [to
    4                              A-4095-15T2
    plaintiff's] mother in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties,"
    but the DJD never established how much the couple would pay
    plaintiff's      mother.      The       mother's   attorney     and   defendant's
    attorney exchanged letters disputing the amounts owed, and they
    eventually settled on $286,170.14, which she received.                     We cannot
    conclude plaintiff's mother never received consideration without
    rendering all settlement agreements unenforceable as a matter of
    law — an absurdity clearly against public policy.                         See 
    Nolan, supra
    , 120 N.J. at 472.
    Plaintiff only raised the issue of accord and satisfaction
    on appeal.    We address issues raised for the first time on appeal
    only when they are "of sufficient public concern."                         State v.
    Churchdale Leasing, Inc., 
    115 N.J. 83
    , 100 (1989).                    Plaintiff's
    mother sued plaintiff and defendant for $380,000.                     Through her
    attorney, plaintiff's mother communicated a settlement offer to
    the   parties,    then     attempted     to   assign   part    of   her    claim    to
    plaintiff for $1 before receiving the agreed-upon payment, and
    then dismissed her complaint with prejudice.                  Plaintiff contends
    defendant still owes the assigned claim, but we discern no public
    interest in this issue.
    Affirmed.
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