GDBT 1 TRUST 2011-1 VS. DENARD C. TRAPP(F-11243-13, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1489-15T4
    GDBT 1 TRUST 2011-1,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    DENARD C. TRAPP,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________________
    Submitted May 25, 2017 - Decided July 5, 2017
    Before Judges O'Connor and Mawla.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Monmouth County, Docket No.
    F-11243-13.
    Denard C. Trapp, appellant pro se.
    Parker McCay P.A., attorneys for respondent
    (Gene Mariano, of counsel; Stacy L. Moore,
    Jr., on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Denard C. Trapp appeals from a writ of possession
    entered on November 2, 2015, following entry of a final judgment
    of foreclosure on September 22, 2014, in favor of plaintiff GDBT
    1 Trust 2011-1.    Defendant's appeal is without merit and out of
    time.   For the reasons stated herein, the appeal is dismissed.
    The following facts are found in the record.     Defendant is
    the owner of a residential property located in Tinton Falls.       On
    November 30, 2006, he executed a note with FGC Commercial Mortgage
    Finance, DBA Fremont Mortgage for the sum of $420,000.   Defendant
    executed a mortgage with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
    Inc., as nominee for FGC Commercial Mortgage Finance, DBA Fremont
    Mortgage, which served as security for repayment of the debt.    The
    mortgage was recorded on December 21, 2006, and subsequently
    assigned on August 11, 2008, to Southstar III, LLC.      Southstar
    III, LLC assigned the mortgage to SRP 2010-6, LLC on March 18,
    2011, which assigned the mortgage to Goshen Mortgage, LLC on July
    18, 2012.   The mortgage was then assigned to plaintiff on March
    13, 2013.    All assignments were duly recorded, including the
    assignment to plaintiff, which was recorded on April 4, 2013.
    On March 1, 2012, defendant defaulted on the note and since
    has made no payments.   A notice of intent to foreclose was sent
    to defendant by SRP 2010-6, LLC on April 24, 2012.       After the
    final assignment, plaintiff recorded the mortgage, and filed a
    foreclosure complaint on April 5, 2013.   Defendant filed an answer
    on June 5, 2013.   Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on October
    2                          A-1489-15T4
    3, 2013.        The trial judge deemed the motion unopposed because
    defendant's cross-motion was not timely.
    On November 21, 2013, the trial court granted summary judgment
    in plaintiff's favor and struck defendant's answer with prejudice.
    Thereafter, on April 30, 2014, defendant filed a complaint in
    federal court to "quiet title."           The District Court dismissed
    defendant's complaint, denied his motion for reconsideration, and
    the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
    On September 22, 2014, a final judgment of foreclosure was
    entered    in    the   amount   of   $386,301.73.   The    property    was
    subsequently sold at Sheriff's sale on June 8, 2015.           The court
    issued a writ of possession on November 2, 2015.          On December 28,
    2015, defendant filed a notice of appeal, which he later amended.
    Defendant twice sought to stay removal, which this court denied.
    The Supreme Court also denied a request to stay his removal.
    Defendant was removed from the property on April 13, 2016.
    Although defendant has appealed from the writ of possession,
    he attacks the final judgment of foreclosure.         Specifically, he
    challenges plaintiff's standing to file a foreclosure because
    plaintiff is not licensed or registered to do business in New
    Jersey; thus he claims plaintiff is not permitted to utilize the
    New Jersey courts.       Also, defendant asserts plaintiff committed
    fraud upon the court, voiding the entry of summary judgment in
    3                           A-1489-15T4
    plaintiff's favor and the foreclosure judgment.           Next, defendant
    argues the trial judge violated his due process rights when she
    did not consider his cross-motion and opposition to plaintiff's
    motion for summary judgment.        He further claims the foreclosure
    action was invalid because his cross-motion asserted a meritorious
    defense, namely, the mortgage was a predatory loan.                  Lastly,
    defendant asserts because the mortgage note is lost, plaintiff is
    not   entitled   to   enforcement   of   the   note   because   it   has   not
    established possession of the documents necessary to foreclose.
    In response, plaintiff argues defendant's claims lack merit
    and none of the issues he raises were set forth in the notice of
    appeal.   Plaintiff contends defendant's brief presents arguments
    pertaining to the 2013 entry of summary judgment, yet his appeal
    is limited to the writ of possession.          Plaintiff notes if we reach
    the merits of defendant's claims, the trial judge appropriately
    exercised her discretion by declining to consider defendant's late
    cross motion.
    Rule 2:5-1(f)(1) states:
    A notice of appeal to the Appellate Division
    may be in the form prescribed by the
    Administrative Director of the Courts as set
    forth in Appendix IV of these Rules.
    . . . .
    The notice of appeal to the Appellate Division
    shall have annexed thereto a Case Information
    4                               A-1489-15T4
    Statement as prescribed by subparagraph 2 of
    this rule.
    "While the rule does not in terms so provide, it is clear
    that it is only the judgments or orders or parts thereof designated
    in the notice of appeal which are subject to the appeal process
    and review."    Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt.
    6.1 on R. 2:5-1(f)(1) (2017) (citing Sikes v. Twp. of Rockaway,
    
    269 N.J. Super. 463
    , 465-66 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 
    138 N.J. 41
    (1994), (rejecting review of the trial court's denial of a request
    for special interrogatories because the issue was not listed in
    the   notice   of   appeal)).     Also,   for   example,   "if   the    notice
    designates only the order entered on a motion for reconsideration,
    it is only that proceeding and not the order that generated the
    reconsideration motion that may be reviewed."          
    Ibid.
     (citing W.H.
    Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 
    397 N.J. Super. 455
    ,
    458-59 (App. Div. 2008)).
    Defendant's original and amended notice of appeal state he
    challenges the November 2, 2015 writ of possession, not the
    November 21, 2013 summary judgment order or the September 22, 2014
    judgment of foreclosure.        Conversely, defendant's brief addresses
    the summary judgment order and the final judgment of foreclosure,
    not the writ of possession.        For these reasons, pursuant to Rule
    2:5-1(f)(1), we decline to review defendant's requests as they
    5                                A-1489-15T4
    pertain to the summary judgment order or the foreclosure judgment.
    More importantly, the time to appeal both the entry of summary
    judgment and the foreclosure judgment has long passed.     See R.
    2:4-1(a).
    Lastly, we note a writ of possession is a means to enforce a
    judgment by granting a successful plaintiff possession of the
    property to satisfy its judgment, see Black's Law Dictionary 1750
    (9th ed. 2009).   Defendant may not use an attack on the post-
    judgment writ of possession to have us review determinations he
    failed to timely challenge.     Defendant's brief purports to have
    us "vacate . . . all judgments," which is also time barred.       R.
    2:4-1(a) (mandating appeals shall be filed within forty-five days
    of entry of trial judgments or orders).
    The appeal is dismissed.   R. 2:8-2.
    6                         A-1489-15T4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-1489-15T4

Filed Date: 7/5/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021