STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. HAMEED S. BROOKS(14-12-3721, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1535-15T3
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    HAMEED S. BROOKS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________________
    Submitted March 28, 2017 – Decided July 6, 2017
    Before Judges Messano and Grall.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey,   Law   Division,  Camden County,
    Indictment No. 14-12-3721.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
    for appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Deputy Public
    Defender, II, of counsel and on the brief).
    Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
    attorney   for   respondent   (Jason   Magid,
    Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Following a jury trial, defendant Hameed S. Brooks was found
    guilty of third-degree escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a), and sentenced
    to a five-year term of imprisonment with a two-and-one-half-year
    period of parole ineligibility.       The evidence adduced by the State
    revealed that on January 31, 2014, defendant was a resident of
    Hope Hall, a "transitional" halfway house in Camden.              Hope Hall
    is operated by a non-profit agency and accepts prisoners from the
    Department   of   Corrections       (the   DOC),    providing    them     with
    counseling and employment services in a residential setting.
    Defendant entered Hope Hall on January 7, having previously
    been incarcerated at Bayside State Prison.                Upon entering the
    facility, defendant was advised of its rules and regulations, one
    of which prohibited any "[e]scape or unauthorized absence from
    work assignment or the facility."            Defendant signed a copy of
    these rules and regulations.1
    Hope Hall's program manager explained that the facility's
    alarm sounded at 12:45 a.m. on January 31, 2014, signaling an
    emergency exit side door had been opened. A count of the residents
    revealed defendant was missing.            A search of defendant's room
    indicated his personal belongings were gone.
    Although a one-and-one-half-story-high fence surrounded the
    facility, one gate was always kept open.            Hope Hall maintained a
    midnight   curfew,   and,   while   residents      were   sometimes   granted
    furloughs to work, and there were frequent comings and goings from
    1
    The document was admitted into evidence at trial but is not part
    of the appellate record.
    2                               A-1535-15T3
    the facility, defendant was not eligible for furlough because he
    had been at Hope Hall for such a short time.         He was not permitted
    to leave the facility at all.             Hope Hall contacted DOC, which
    issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant never returned,
    and the Camden County Police Department apprehended him on April
    1.
    Defendant   elected   not   to       testify.    During   the    charge
    conference, defense counsel requested the judge charge the jury
    on obstructing the administration of law or other governmental
    function by flight.   See N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) ("A person commits
    an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the
    administration of law or other governmental function or prevents
    or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing
    an official function by means of flight . . . .").        Defense counsel
    acknowledged that obstruction was not a "lesser-included" offense
    of escape.   Rather, he argued the jury could reject the State's
    contention that defendant was in custody, while at the same time
    concluding defendant's absence "shut down the facility for a while
    and so he obstructed [its] ability to function as a government
    agency."
    The judge determined there was "no rational basis" for the
    charge "based on the facts" of the case.          She denied the request.
    3                              A-1535-15T3
    In summation, defense counsel argued, among other things,
    that defendant may not have "kn[own] he was in custody," or simply
    missed curfew.   He argued the written rules of the facility were
    ambiguous, and DOC imposed administrative discipline on defendant
    for his unauthorized absence, suggesting defendant was unaware he
    could be subject to criminal charges.
    The judge's jury instructions essentially followed verbatim
    Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5a" (2006).
    The jury found defendant guilty of the sole count in the indictment
    charging him with escape.
    Before us, defendant argues in a single point:
    THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS DECISION TO DENY
    DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A JURY CHARGE ON THE
    LESSER   OFFENSE  OF   OBSTRUCTION  REQUIRES
    REVERSAL OF THE ESCAPE CONVICTION.
    Having considered this contention in light of the record and
    applicable law, we affirm.
    "Whether an offense is an included offense of another charge
    requires a comparison of the statutory elements of each charge."
    State v. Thomas, 
    187 N.J. 119
    , 129 (2006).   Defendant acknowledges
    obstruction is not a lesser-included offense of the crime of
    escape.
    "In contrast, related offenses are those that 'share a common
    factual ground, but not a commonality in statutory elements, with
    4                          A-1535-15T3
    the crime[] charged in the indictment.'"     State v. Maloney, 
    216 N.J. 91
    , 107 (2013) (quoting 
    Thomas, supra
    , 187 N.J. at 132).      "A
    court may instruct on a related offense when        'the defendant
    requests or consents to the related offense charge, and there is
    a rational basis in the evidence to sustain the related offense.'"
    
    Id. at 108
    (quoting 
    Thomas, supra
    , 187 N.J. at 133). "The evidence
    must present adequate reason for the jury to acquit the defendant
    on the greater charge and to convict on the lesser."      State v.
    Brent, 
    137 N.J. 107
    , 118-19 (1994).
    In pertinent part, an actor commits the disorderly persons
    offense of obstruction if he "purposely obstructs, impairs or
    perverts the administration of law or other governmental function
    . . . by means of flight."   N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (emphasis added).
    In this case, to justify charging the jury on obstruction, the
    evidence must have supported the jury's finding beyond a reasonable
    doubt that defendant fled Hope Hall, for the purpose of obstructing
    a governmental function and, his flight, actually obstructed a
    governmental function.   Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Obstructing
    Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function, N.J.S.A.
    2C:29-1" (2000).
    Under our Criminal Code, "[a] person acts purposely with
    respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is
    his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
    5                          A-1535-15T3
    cause such a result."         N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1).           "Where an offense
    requires purpose, the result must be the kind of result designed
    by the actor[.]"        Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated,
    comment 4 on N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3 (2016-17).
    Here,    there    was   no   evidence         to   rationally   support    the
    conclusion that defendant's "conscious object" in fleeing Hope
    Hall was to obstruct the operation of the facility.                      Instead,
    after being in the facility only a few short weeks, defendant left
    during the early morning hours through a side entrance, took all
    his belongings with him and never returned.                    All the evidence
    pointed to defendant's singular purpose being his escape, without
    concern for what, if any, effect it would have on Hope Hall or its
    staff.   Moreover, there was scant evidence that the operation of
    the   facility    was   impaired     in       any   significant   way,   or     that
    defendant's escape impacted other residents of Hope Hall.
    In short, we agree there was no "rational basis in the
    evidence to sustain the related offense" of obstruction by flight.
    
    Maloney, supra
    , 216 N.J. at 108 (quoting 
    Thomas, supra
    , 187 N.J.
    at 133).      The judge, therefore, did not err by refusing to give
    jury instructions on that offense.
    Affirmed.
    6                                A-1535-15T3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-1535-15T3

Filed Date: 7/6/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021