STATE IN THE INTEREST OF R.B.(FJ-15-531-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2017 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5178-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE
INTEREST OF R.B., A JUVENILE.
________________________________________________________
Submitted June 19, 2017 – Decided July 6, 2017
Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean
County, Docket No. FJ-15-531-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant R.B. (Ruth E. Hunter, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Joseph D. Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent State of New Jersey
(Samuel Marzarella, Supervising Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel; William Kyle Meighan,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
R.B., a juvenile,1 was charged with three counts of juvenile
delinquency which, if committed by an adult, would constitute
first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1),
1
At the time of the conduct in question, R.B. was fifteen and his
female victim was six years old.
second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), and third-
degree child endangerment, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The juvenile
agreed to plead guilty to the second charge in exchange for both
the dismissal of the other charges and the State's agreement to
recommend a three-year probationary period. The juvenile agreed
to other conditions, including the preparation of a predisposition
report and his submission to a sex offender evaluation.
Following its preparation, defense counsel provided to the
prosecutor and the probation department a redacted copy of a
psychosexual evaluation. The State, however, requested turnover
of an unredacted copy, to which the juvenile's attorney objected.
Consequently, the judge conducted an in camera review and
determined the prosecutor and probation department were entitled
to see and consider the unredacted evaluation. The judge's June
6, 2016 turnover order barred the future dissemination or use of
the unredacted report for any other purposes.2
Pursuant to his agreement with the prosecutor, the juvenile
acknowledged his delinquent conduct and was placed on a three-year
probationary term. The order of adjudication, also entered on June
6, 2016, incorporated the protective order.
2
The order specifically stated that "information contained in or
derived from said report shall not be disclosed to any other person
for any other reason nor disseminated or made public by any means,
direct or indirect[.]"
2 A-5178-15T1
The juvenile appeals, arguing in a single point that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
JUVENILE PRODUCE AN UN-REDACTED COPY OF THE
JUVENILE'S "PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION," WHICH
CONTAINED INCRIMINATING AND CONFIDENTIAL
STATEMENTS BY THE JUVENILE. THEREFORE, THIS
COURT SHOULD VACATE THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
AND REMAND FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER FORBIDDING
THE FUTURE USE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION.
We reject both parts of this argument.
First, whether the judge correctly ordered the release of the
unredacted report to the prosecutor or the probation department
was rendered moot once the report was turned over. Even assuming
we were to agree the turnover order was erroneous for any of the
reasons asserted in this appeal, there is no practical remedy
available to the juvenile. See State v. Ross, 441 N.J. Super. 120,
125-26 (App. Div. 2015); Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 382
N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006).
Second, the juvenile argues we should remand for entry of a
protective order. The judge, however, did enter a protective order
that barred any further dissemination of the report. This argument
is, thus, moot for the reason that the relief sought on appeal was
already provided by the trial court.
The appeal is moot and, therefore, dismissed.
3 A-5178-15T1