J.C. VS. R.W.E. (FV-13-1586-13, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMOUNDED) ( 2017 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1875-16T2
J.C.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
R.W.E.,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted May 31, 2017 — Decided June 29, 2017
Before Judges Koblitz and Rothstadt.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth
County, Docket No. FV-13-1586-13.
Weinberger Law Group, L.L.C., attorneys for
appellant (Jessica Ragno Spraque, on the
briefs).
John C. Feggeler, Jr., attorney for
respondent.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff J.C. (Judy)1 appeals from the January 6, 20172 order
denying her motion for reconsideration of an October 2016 order
allowing R.W.E. (Randy) two hours of supervised parenting time per
week with the parties' now five-year-old daughter. No visits
occurred between the October and January orders. The January
order directed supervision on the first six occasions by the
"Monmouth County Superior Court Probation Division supervised
parenting time program at Monmouth Medical Center."3 If the
program did not provide the court with any report of "negative
concerns," the two-hour sessions would continue supervised by
Randy's mother and stepfather. We affirm based substantially on
the reasons expressed by Judge Angela White Dalton in her sixteen-
page written statement of reasons attached to the order denying
reconsideration.4
On June 7, 2013, after a two-year dating relationship and the
birth of their daughter, a Final Restraining Order under the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, was
1
We use initials and pseudonyms for the parties because of the
underlying domestic violence litigation. R. 1:38-3(d)(13).
2
The actual order provided was prepared on January 9 to correct
the January 6 order.
3
The trial court ordered that an initial meeting with Randy's
mother and stepfather in attendance take place at a local mall.
4
We accelerated this appeal by order of February 2, 2017.
2 A-1875-16T2
entered against Randy based on his admission to Judy's sole
allegation of harassment, involving threatening comments. Randy
was provided five hours a week parenting time supervised by his
stepfather. During the next several years, Judy had concerns
about physical abuse of the child during Randy's parenting time.
Judy brought the child for medical treatment twice for perceived
non-responsiveness after a visit with Randy.
Different judges were involved in the litigation that ensued.
In August 2014, a psychological evaluation of the parents was
ordered. The judge directed that upon receipt of the report,
either party could request a plenary hearing. Instead, in May
2015 a consent order was entered granting Randy nine hours per
week of therapeutic parenting time, supervised by the Healing
Hearts program. At the end of April 2016, that program closed and
was unable to continue to provide those services. The program
furnished detailed reports to the court concluding: "Overall,
interactions between [Randy] and [the child] are appropriate and
appear natural." Additionally, the judge's opinion relates that
plaintiff was diagnosed as "hyper-vigilant" concerning the child.5
After the close of the Healing Hearts program, Randy filed a
motion seeking continued and increased parenting time. Upon the
5
Neither party has provided us with the court-appointed
psychologist's report.
3 A-1875-16T2
request for reconsideration of the order granting supervised
visitation with Randy's parents as supervisors, Judge Dalton
reviewed the Healing Hearts parenting time reports and the
psychologist's report provided in response to a prior court order.
She noted that her aim was for the child to have a "meaningful
relationship with both parents."
We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration pursuant
to Rule 4:49-2 for abuse of discretion. Cummings v. Bahr, 295
N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996). Reconsideration is
appropriate only in those cases "in which either 1) the [c]ourt
has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or
irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did
not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of
probative, competent evidence." Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J.
Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Fusco v. Bd. of Educ.,
349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544(2002)), certif. granted, ___ N.J. ___ (2017). The proper object
of such a motion is to correct a court's error or oversight, and
"not to re-argue [a] motion that has already been heard for the
purpose of taking the proverbial second bite of the apple." State
v. Fitzsimmons, 286 N.J. Super. 141, 147 (App. Div. 1995), remanded
on other grounds, 143 N.J. 482 (1996).
4 A-1875-16T2
Additionally, we customarily do not second-guess the factual
findings of judges, particularly judges in the Family Part, given
the Family Part's expertise in matters that involve domestic
relations and the welfare of children. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.
394, 411-12 (1998). Ordinarily, a plenary hearing is appropriate
before the entry of an order affecting the custody of a child.
See, e.g., Entress v. Entress, 376 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (App. Div.
2005). Where a prior court order exists specifying the terms of
residential custody and parenting time, as is the case here, a
parent seeking to alter those terms has the burden of demonstrating
a material change in circumstances that would justify such
alteration. Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div.
2007); Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 115-16 (1978). "A plenary
hearing is required [only] when the submissions show there is a
genuine and substantial factual dispute regarding the welfare of
the children." Hand, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 105. Absent such
a factual dispute, a plenary hearing is not required. Id. at 105-
06; see also R. 5:8-6 (requiring plenary hearings in custody
matters only where the contested issues are "genuine and
substantial"); cf. Barblock v. Barblock, 383 N.J. Super. 114, 124
(App. Div.) (no plenary hearing was required to authorize mother's
relocation of her children out of state, over the father's
5 A-1875-16T2
objection, where no material factual disputes were demonstrated),
certif. denied, 187 N.J. 81 (2006).
Judy was insistent that a plenary hearing was necessary prior
to resuming Randy's supervised parenting time with his parents.
We are satisfied that Judge Dalton had sufficient reports from
neutral sources to support her decision and reviewed at length the
findings of the prior judges involved with this family. We affirm
substantially for the reasons set forth in her thorough opinion.
Affirmed.
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