SARAH ABED VS. ROBERT FARAGÂ (FM-18-922-14, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2443-15T4
SARAH ABED,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT FARAG
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued June 1, 2017 – Decided June 28, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes, Carroll and Farrington.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Somerset County, Docket No. FM-18-922-14.
Robert Farag, appellant, argued the cause pro
se.
Ihab Awad Ibrahim argued the cause for
respondent (Ibrahim Law Firm, attorneys;
Thomas Kim, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
The parties were married in 2007 and have twin children who
were born in 2011. Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in May
2014. On March 23, 2015, the parties placed an oral settlement
agreement on the record that was thereafter incorporated into an
amended final dual judgment of divorce (JOD) entered on May 11,
2015. The record reflects that the parties appeared in court with
counsel on May 11, 2015, reviewed an audio recording of certain
portions of the March 23, 2015 oral settlement that were in
dispute, and then signed and affixed their consent to the JOD.
Approximately two weeks later, on May 29, 2015, defendant
moved for reconsideration. Specifically, defendant sought: (1)
reconsideration of the JOD due to plaintiff's alleged
misrepresentation concerning an inheritance fund left by
defendant's mother for the children's future college education;
(2) enforcement of an August 29, 2014 pendente lite order regarding
allocation of the parties' Mercedes automobile; (3) enforcement
of the August 29, 2014 order concerning the allocation of certain
personal items, including jewelry and photographs; and (4) a
paternity test. Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved to
enforce various provisions of the JOD.1
On July 13, 2015, Judge Margaret Goodzeit issued an order
denying defendant's motion and granting most of the relief sought
by plaintiff. Pertinent to this appeal, in her detailed eleven-
1
Plaintiff's cross-motion is not included in either party's
appendix. Rather, the reliefs sought by plaintiff are gleaned
from the trial court's July 10, 2015 order and attached statement
of reasons.
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page statement of reasons, the judge explained:
The parties' [JOD] provides: "The parties
will establish college funds for their
children utilizing $150,000 from plaintiff's
Magyar Bank account."
As the parties agreed to the [JOD], the
[c]ourt cannot "reconsider" same. The parties
"reached an agreement that was spread upon the
record in open [c]ourt," and the [c]ourt
approved of same. The parties later reduced
their oral settlement to writing and signed
the [JOD]. Same provides: "[t]he parties
affirm by their signature below their consent
to this Order." Further, the [c]ourt does not
find that defendant has demonstrated that the
[c]ourt should vacate the portion of the
parties' [JOD] regarding the children's
college account. Defendant does not provide
any proof showing that "plaintiff arbitrarily
altered the inheritance monies." Further,
defendant does not provide any proof showing
that "plaintiff's counsel misrepresented the
inheritance monies left by defendant's late
mother as $150,000." If defendant believed
that such amount was incorrect, defendant was
able to correct plaintiff's counsel prior to
signing [] the [JOD]. Indeed, defendant
provides a letter from his prior counsel dated
April 8, 2015, prior to the date the parties
signed the [JOD], stating that the amount of
the inheritance monies was not $150,000 but
$180,000. Notwithstanding same, on May 11,
2015, defendant signed the [JOD], agreeing to
establish college funds for the children in
the amount of $150,000. Both parties were
represented by counsel at the time of the
parties' divorce, and such counsel advised the
parties as to their respective rights and
obligations.
Accordingly, the [c]ourt does not find
that it is appropriate to "reconsider" or
vacate the parties' [JOD], and defendant's
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request for an Order reconsidering the
parties' [JOD] is DENIED. Plaintiff's request
for an Order enforcing all terms of the
parties' [JOD] is GRANTED.
Next, the judge noted that defendant relied on the August 19,
2014 pendente lite order in support of his argument that plaintiff
should reimburse him fifty percent of the value of the Mercedes.
Citing Bauza v. Bauza, 201 N.J. Super. 540, 543 (App. Div. 1985),
the judge found that the JOD extinguished any pendente lite
obligations that were not expressly preserved in it. Here, the
JOD did not direct plaintiff to reimburse defendant fifty percent
of the value of the vehicle, and accordingly the judge denied
defendant's request to enforce the August 19, 2014 order. For
similar reasons, the judge "[did] not find that plaintiff's
obligation to turn over to defendant the jewelry defendant
inherited from his mother was preserved in the parties' [JOD]."
Rather, the parties agreed in the JOD to submit their jewelry
dispute to binding arbitration. Finally, the judge found
defendant's belated request for DNA testing "disingenuous" and
devoid of merit.
Defendant now appeals the JOD and the July 13, 2015 order.
Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred: in not
confirming the accuracy of the inheritance monies and an accounting
stated on the record by plaintiff's counsel; in not addressing
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alleged errors in plaintiff's Case Information Statement and her
failure to disclose two alleged secret bank accounts; in ordering
the payment of child care expenses and awarding plaintiff
attorney's fees; in not confirming the accuracy of defendant's
religious holidays in the parenting time schedule; and in
previously entering a final restraining order (FRO) against
defendant absent evidence of harm to plaintiff and her father.
We begin by stating the well-known principles that inform our
review. We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings
of fact because of that court's special expertise in family
matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Thus,
"[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual findings
undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by
adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record."
MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (quoting N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007))
(alteration in original). And, while we owe no special deference
to the judge's legal conclusions, Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan
Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), "we 'should not disturb the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless
. . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or
inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible
evidence as to offend the interests of justice' or when we
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determine the court has palpably abused its discretion." Parish
v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare,
supra, 154 N.J. at 412). "We reverse only to 'ensure that there
is not a denial of justice' because the family court's 'conclusions
are [] "clearly mistaken" or "wide of the mark."'" Id. at 48
(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88,
104 (2008)) (alteration in original).
We are also mindful of the high value our courts place on the
settlement of disputes, particularly those involving family
matters. Slawinski v. Nicholas, 448 N.J. Super. 25, 32 (App. Div.
2016). We apply contract principles to a settlement agreement,
even in the family area, and shall not make a better agreement
than the parties made for themselves. See Quinn v. Quinn, 225
N.J. 34, 45-47 (2016). As in other contexts involving contracts,
a court must enforce a matrimonial agreement as the parties
intended, so long as it is not inequitable to do so. Quinn, supra,
225 N.J. at 45 (citing Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265-66
(2007)).
Finally, a trial court's order on a motion for reconsideration
will not be set aside unless shown to be a mistaken exercise of
discretion. Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App.
Div. 2016) (citing Fusco v. Bd. of Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002)), certif. denied,
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___ N.J. (2017). Reconsideration should only be granted in
those cases in which the court had based its decision "upon a
palpably incorrect or irrational basis," or did not "consider, or
failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent
evidence." Ibid. (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super.
392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).
We conclude that Judge Goodzeit's decision to deny
defendant's motion for reconsideration and enforce the JOD is
supported by the record and consistent with applicable legal
principles. We find no merit in defendant's arguments to warrant
further discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the judge in her
thoughtful written decision. Additionally, we note that
defendant's brief is largely incoherent and substantially bereft
of any controlling legal authority. See 700 Highway 33 LLC v.
Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2011) (noting the
requirement that parties make "an adequate legal argument" in
support of their claims). Moreover, to the extent defendant
attempts to raise new issues that were not the subject of the JOD
or the parties' post-judgment motions, we decline to address them
for the first time on appeal. See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins.
Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).
Affirmed.
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