DANIEL CARABALLO VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD(NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4451-15T1
    DANIEL CARABALLO,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
    Respondent.
    Submitted June 7, 2017 – Decided June 28, 2017
    Before Judges Simonelli and Carroll.
    On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole
    Board.
    Daniel Caraballo, appellant pro se.
    Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
    attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
    Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, on
    the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Daniel Caraballo appeals from the March 23, 2016
    final agency decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board)
    denying      him   parole    and    imposing    a   ninety-six     month    future
    eligibility term (FET).            We affirm.
    In     March      1985,   a    jury    convicted         appellant       of    murder,
    aggravated assault, and two weapons offenses.                         On April 18, 1985,
    appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with an aggregate
    thirty-year mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility.
    Appellant became eligible for parole on August 29, 2014.
    However, a two-member panel of the Board denied him parole and
    referred his matter to a three-member panel (panel) to establish
    a    FET.         The   panel   determined         a    ninety-six-month            FET   was
    appropriate.
    In     a    comprehensive       decision,        the    panel    noted    that:     (1)
    appellant has a prior criminal record, which includes convictions
    for possession of stolen property and intent to commit robbery;
    (2) the nature of appellant's criminal record was increasingly
    more serious, and he was presently incarcerated for a multi-crime
    conviction; (3) prior opportunities on community supervision and
    previous incarceration failed to deter his criminal conduct; (4)
    during      his    incarceration       for   the   subject          offenses,   appellant
    committed twenty-six disciplinary infractions, seven of which were
    of   the    asterisk      (serious)      variety;        (5)    insufficient         problem
    resolution,        including        appellant's        lack    of     insight   into      his
    criminal behavior, minimizing his maladaptive behavior, and his
    failure to sufficiently address his substance abuse problem; and
    2                                       A-4451-15T1
    (6) his risk assessment evaluation score of twenty nine, which
    denotes a medium risk of recidivism.
    After    considering       the      applicable       factors     in    N.J.A.C.
    10A:71-3.11(b),    the       panel       determined       appellant   remained       a
    substantial threat to public safety, essentially for the reasons
    enumerated above.        The panel further found that, pursuant to
    N.J.A.C.     10A:71-3.21(d),         a    FET    of   ninety-six      months      was
    appropriate given appellant’s lack of rehabilitative progress in
    reducing the likelihood he would engage in criminal behavior if
    released.    The panel did observe the ninety-six month FET, which
    commenced on August 29, 2014, will be reduced by any commutation,
    work, or minimum custody credits appellant earns.                          Given the
    credits    appellant    is   currently         earning,    his   projected    parole
    eligibility date is January 2019.
    Appellant filed an appeal with the full Board.                   On March 23,
    2016, the Board upheld the recommendation to deny parole and to
    impose a ninety-six-month FET.             This appeal ensued.
    On appeal, appellant presents the following arguments for our
    consideration:
    POINT ONE
    THE PAROLE BOARD DETERMINATION SHOULD BE
    OVERTURNED BECAUSE THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT
    A FINDING THAT IF RELEASED, [] APPELLANT WOULD
    COMMIT ANOTHER CRIME.
    3                                 A-4451-15T1
    POINT TWO
    THE PANEL DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
    THE BOARD CONSIDERED AS FACTORS FOR DENIAL,
    OFFENSES WHICH HAD BEEN REDUCED IN TERMS OF
    THEIR SEVERITY, AND THEREBY, ATTRIBUTED TO
    THEM MORE WEIGHT THAN NECESSARY.
    POINT THREE
    THE FET IMPOSED IS EXCESSIVE AND SHOULD BE
    REDUCED.
    We have considered these contentions in light of the record
    and applicable legal principles and conclude they are without
    sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.                R.
    2:11-3(e)(1)(D).        We   affirm   substantially     for   the   reasons
    expressed in the Board's comprehensive written decision.             We add
    only the following brief comments.
    We must accord considerable deference to the Board and its
    expertise in parole matters.          Our review of a Parole Board's
    decision is limited.         Hare v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    368 N.J. Super. 175
    , 179 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    180 N.J. 452
     (2004).
    "'Parole Board decisions are highly individualized discretionary
    appraisals,' and should only be reversed if found to be arbitrary
    or   capricious."      Id.   at   179-80   (citations   omitted)    (quoting
    Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    166 N.J. 113
    , 173 (2001)).               We
    "must determine whether the factual finding could reasonably have
    been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record."
    4                              A-4451-15T1
    
    Id. at 179
    .    In making this determination, we "may not substitute
    [our] judgment for that of the agency, and an agency's exercise
    of its statutorily-delegated responsibilities is accorded a strong
    presumption of reasonableness."     McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd.,
    
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    , 563 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted).
    Accordingly, "[t]he burden of showing that an action was arbitrary,
    unreasonable or capricious rests upon the appellant."           
    Ibid.
    An inmate serving a minimum term in excess of fourteen years
    is ordinarily assigned a twenty-seven-month FET after a denial of
    parole.   See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1).       However, in cases where
    an ordinary FET is "clearly inappropriate due to the inmate's lack
    of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of future
    criminal behavior[,]" the Board may impose a greater FET. N.J.A.C.
    10A:71-3.21(d).
    Here, we discern no basis to disturb the Board's decision.
    The Board considered the relevant factors in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11.
    Its decision is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the
    record and is entitled to our deference.          We are satisfied the
    imposition    of   a   ninety-six-month   FET   was   neither   arbitrary,
    capricious nor unreasonable.      See McGowan, 
    supra,
     
    347 N.J. Super. at 565
     (affirming the imposition of a thirty-year FET based on
    appellant's high likelihood of recidivism).
    Affirmed.
    5                              A-4451-15T1
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4451-15T1

Filed Date: 6/28/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/29/2017