AMERICAN EXPRESS CENTURION BANK VS. SALVATORE MASTROPOLE(L-0440-14, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0699-15T4
    AMERICAN EXPRESS
    CENTURION BANK,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    SALVATORE MASTROPOLE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ___________________________________________
    Argued April 25, 2017 – Decided           July 5, 2017
    Before Judges Suter and Grall.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket
    No. L-0440-14.
    Richard H. Kotkin argued the cause for
    appellant.
    Respondent American Express Centurion Bank
    has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff American Express Centurion Bank filed a complaint
    alleging defendant Salvatore Mastropole breached a credit card
    agreement to pay the minimum amount due as indicated on his
    monthly statements (count one), seeking payment due on the
    account (count two), and alleging unjust enrichment based on
    defendant's receipt of the benefits charged on the card without
    tendering payment (count three).     The parties settled the case
    and filed an amended stipulation of settlement with the court on
    May 6, 2014.    On July 10, 2015, defendant moved to vacate the
    settlement agreement, and he now appeals from a July 25, 2015
    order, denying his motion to vacate.    Plaintiff did not file a
    timely answering brief, and on its own motion, this court
    suppressed the brief.    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Defendant was not represented by counsel at the time of the
    settlement.    He was, however, represented by counsel on the
    motion to vacate, and he is represented by the same attorney on
    appeal.   In support of his motion to vacate the settlement,
    defendant submitted a certification asserting that he "agreed to
    settle" the initial litigation with the understanding that he
    "would make certain monthly payments, towards the outstanding
    balance" and "would get back [his] credit privileges and . . .
    could continue to charge on the Account."    Although his credit
    was not restored, he continued to make monthly payments.     By
    plaintiff's account, he made ten monthly payments under their
    agreement before stopping payments and consulting an attorney,
    who, according to defendant, told him the agreement did not
    reflect his understanding.
    2                          A-0699-15T4
    There is no question that the four page, seven paragraph
    stipulation of settlement defendant signed does not reflect
    those terms.   Instead, it includes the following:
    Except for the terms and conditions contained
    herein    Defendant[s]     acknowledges     and
    represents that he possess no claims, demands,
    defenses, counterclaims, or causes of action
    whatsoever against [plaintiff], its officers,
    directors,   employees,   agents,    attorneys,
    heirs and assigns pertaining to [his account
    number], which are not being resolved pursuant
    to the Agreement. Defendant[s] forever waives
    and relinquishes any and all such claims,
    whether   known   or  unknown,    and   further
    covenants and agrees that he shall not
    institute any suit, proceedings or action at
    law, equity arbitration, or otherwise against
    [plaintiff], or in any way aid in the
    institution or prosecution of any claim,
    demand, or cause of action against American
    Express arising directly or indirectly out of
    or in connection with [his account number].
    Defendant does not point to a single passage in the
    document he signed to settle plaintiff's suit that he could have
    read as a promise to restore his credit.   Nevertheless, he
    signed it.
    "Public policy favors the settlement of disputes."
    Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 
    215 N.J. 242
    , 253 (2013).   "An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a
    contract which, like all contracts, may be freely entered into
    and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other
    compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does
    3                          A-0699-15T4
    other contracts."     Pascarella v. Bruck, 
    190 N.J. Super. 118
    , 124
    (App. Div.) (quoting Honeywell v. Bubb, 
    130 N.J. Super. 130
    , 136
    (App. Div. 1974), certif. denied, 
    94 N.J. 600
     (1983)); accord
    Zuccarelli v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 
    326 N.J. Super. 372
    ,
    380 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied and appeal dismissed, 
    163 N.J. 394
     (2000).    "Before vacating a settlement agreement, our
    courts require clear and convincing proof that the agreement
    should be vacated."    Nolan v. Lee Ho, 
    120 N.J. 465
    , 472 (1990)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).    "A party is bound to the
    contract it made at the time, even if it turns out to be a poor
    deal."   New Jersey Mfrs. v. O'Connell, 
    300 N.J. Super. 1
    , 7
    (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    151 N.J. 75
     (1997).
    Given defendant's signing of the agreement unambiguously
    omitting any promise concerning restoration of credit, and his
    tender of ten monthly payments in conformity with the
    stipulation, defendant's unsupported assertion that plaintiff
    fraudulently omitted a promise material to his agreement is
    simply not enough to warrant an order vacating the settlement.
    Judge Brogan properly denied the motion.
    Affirmed.
    4                         A-0699-15T4