IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF C.E.G. SVP-452-07 (ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5228-14T1
ANNA CASCIOLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH BONAFIGLIA,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted January 31, 2017 — Decided February 27, 2017
Before Judges Koblitz and Rothstadt.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic
County, Docket No. FD-01-596-13.
Scott J. Capriglione, attorney for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Anna Casciole appeals from a June 25, 2015 order,
entered after a plenary hearing, modifying custody and parenting
time and designating defendant Joseph Bonafiglia primary parent
of residence (PPR) for their daughter, then four years old. After
reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on
appeal, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
Noah Bronkesh's thorough and well-reasoned written opinion.
Prior to the June 25 order, in May 2014, the parties, who
were never married, entered into a consent order agreeing they
would share joint physical and legal custody and New Jersey would
continue to be the "home state" of their child, although plaintiff
resided in Pennsylvania. The consent order remained in place
until plaintiff initiated the current proceedings. At the time
of the hearing, the parents lived about two hours apart. With the
parties' daughter about to turn five in September 2015, making her
eligible to attend kindergarten, plaintiff filed a petition that
venue be changed to Pennsylvania and that plaintiff be appointed
PPR. Defendant filed a cross-motion opposing the venue change and
seeking to become the PPR.
Judge Bronkesh held a three-day hearing, after which he made
credibility assessments, and detailed fact-findings. He carefully
reviewed the statutory custody factors contained in N.J.S.A. 9:2-
4 as they applied to those facts. He found, as both parties
claimed, that the child becoming school age "constitute[d] a
substantial change of circumstance given the distance between the
parties' residences." The judge continued joint custody, finding
both parents to be fit. Although acknowledging that plaintiff
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exercised more parenting time when the child was younger and
perhaps was more in tune with the child's needs due to their
mother-daughter bond, the judge designated defendant as the PPR
due to the greater stability of defendant's home environment and
his ability to provide superior educational opportunities for the
child. See N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 (7), (8) and (9).
"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding
function is limited." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
I.Y.A., 400 N.J. Super. 77, 89 (App. Div. 2008). The findings
"are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence." Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.
394, 411-12 (1998)). "[B]ecause of the family courts' special
jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts
should accord deference to family court factfinding." N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010)
(quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 413).
Judge Bronkesh's decision was supported by adequate,
substantial, credible evidence. He did not abuse his discretion
in making this difficult decision regarding the primary residence
of a young child. Plaintiff's argument that we should reverse
because no change of circumstances was established, as well as her
arguments concerning evidentiary issues, are without sufficient
merit to require discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
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3(e)(1)(E). We note only that our review of a trial judge's
evidentiary rulings requires that substantial deference be granted
to the judge's exercise of discretion. DeVito v. Sheeran, 165
N.J. 167, 198 (2000).
Affirmed.
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