WELLS FARGO BANK, NA VS. DONALD D. COLLUCCI, JR.(F-16527-13, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1948-15T3
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    DONALD D. COLLUCCI, JR.,
    Defendant,
    and
    VERONICA COLLUCCI,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________
    Submitted June 8, 2017 – Decided July 11, 2017
    Before Judges O'Connor and Whipple.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Union County, Docket No.
    F-16527-13.
    Franzblau Dratch, attorneys for appellant
    (Julian Wilsey and S.M. Chris Franzblau, of
    counsel and on the briefs; Noah Franzblau, on
    the briefs).
    Reed Smith L.L.P., attorneys for respondent
    (Henry F. Reichner, of counsel and on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Veronica Collucci appeals from Chancery Division
    orders entered January 9, and August 3, 2015.               We affirm.
    On or about November 5, 2009, defendant Donald Collucci, Jr.,
    executed a promissory note in favor of plaintiff, Wells Fargo
    Bank, N.A., in the amount of $561,952; his wife, Veronica, did not
    sign the note.1      The note was secured by a mortgage, also dated
    November 5, 2009, on the marital home.           Both defendants signed the
    mortgage.
    In 2010, defendants separated and a final judgment of divorce
    was entered in 2013.          Following the divorce, Veronica continued
    to reside in the marital home.              Unbeknownst to Veronica, Donald
    stopped paying the required monthly payments on the note, beginning
    in   January   2011.     The    note   subsequently    went      into   default.
    Plaintiff sent Donald a Notice of Intent to Foreclose (NOI) on
    March 6, 2011, to the marital residence.             Plaintiff did not send
    the NOI to Veronica, personally, or copy her on the NOIs sent to
    Donald.      On   May   16,   2013,    plaintiff    filed    a   complaint    for
    foreclosure.      Veronica filed an answer on August 15, 2013.
    Plaintiff moved for summary judgement on October 16, 2014.
    Veronica opposed the motion and cross-moved, pursuant to Rule
    1
    We refer to defendants by their first names in order to avoid
    any confusion.
    2                                A-1948-15T3
    4:46-2, to dismiss the complaint arguing she had not been served
    with any notice of foreclosure, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56
    of the Fair Foreclosure Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-52 to -68.
    The Chancery Division judge granted plaintiff's motion for
    summary   judgement   on    January   9,   2015,   finding    plaintiff   had
    satisfied the requirements of the Fair Foreclosure Act by only
    sending notice to Donald as Veronica had not signed the note and
    was not required to receive notice of intent to foreclose.                The
    Chancery Division judge issued a final judgement of foreclosure
    on August 3, 2015.     This appeal followed.
    On appeal, Veronica argues the Chancery Division judge erred
    in determining plaintiff satisfied the notice requirements of the
    Fair    Foreclosure   Act   by   serving   only    Donald,   warranting   the
    reversal of the final judgement of foreclosure.              We disagree and
    affirm.
    Here, the Chancery Part judge focused on whether Veronica,
    as a non-debtor mortgagor, was required to receive a NOI and,
    after   considering the language of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56, rejected her
    argument.
    The facts are not contested.        We consider whether a lender
    has an obligation under N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56 to send a NOI to a
    mortgagor who is not a signatory to the note.                Since that is a
    question of statutory interpretation, we consider the matter de
    3                              A-1948-15T3
    novo.     In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 
    193 N.J. 86
    , 94
    (2007).
    "The Legislature adopted the Fair Foreclosure Act to give
    homeowners 'every opportunity to pay their home mortgages, and
    thus    keep    their   homes'   and   to   benefit   lenders   by   allowing
    'residential mortgage debtors [to] cure their defaults and return
    defaulted residential mortgage loans to performing status.'"              Bank
    of N.Y. v. Laks, 
    422 N.J. Super. 201
    , 206 (App. Div. 2011)
    (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:50-54), rev'd on
    other grounds, U.S. Bank Nat'l. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 
    209 N.J. 449
    (2012). The Fair Foreclosure Act requires the lender, upon default
    on the mortgage, to send notice of its intention to foreclose at
    least thirty days prior to the lender accelerating the mortgage
    obligation or commencing any foreclosure action.           N.J.S.A. 2A:50-
    56(a).    The lender's statutory obligation to provide notice of its
    intention to foreclose is "independent of any other duty to give
    notice."       Laks, supra, 
    422 N.J. Super. at 206
     (quoting N.J.S.A.
    2A:50-56(e)).
    N.J.S.A. 2A:50-55 defines "residential mortgage debtor" or
    "debtor" as "any person shown on the record of the residential
    mortgage lender as being obligated to pay the obligation secured
    by the residential mortgage."          As noted above, only Donald signed
    the promissory note, not Veronica.          Veronica was a mortgagor, but
    4                             A-1948-15T3
    not a debtor and the record does not expose any obligation on her
    part to pay the note.        Therefore, plaintiff did not have a
    statutory obligation to send her a NOI.         We previously rejected
    the same premise urged by Veronica in Laks, supra, 
    422 N.J. Super. at
      205   n.4.   We   see   no   reason   to   revisit   our   previous
    determination.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: A-1948-15T3

Filed Date: 7/11/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/11/2017