MOHAMMED HOSSAIN VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITYÂ AFFAIRS(NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, SANDY RECOVERY DIVISION) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3497-15T2
    MOHAMMED HOSSAIN,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
    COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, SANDY
    RECOVERY DIVISION,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    _______________________________
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
    COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, SANDY
    RECOVERY DIVISION,
    Petitioner-Respondent,
    v.
    MOHAMMED HOSSAIN,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    _______________________________________
    Submitted August 8, 2017 – Decided August 15, 2017
    Before Judges Sabatino and O'Connor.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Community Affairs, Sandy Recovery Division,
    Docket Nos. RRE0022673 and RSP0022615.
    Chad M. Sherwood, attorney for appellant.
    Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
    attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton
    Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
    counsel; Valentina M. DiPippo, Deputy Attorney
    general, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This appeal arises from a March 14, 2016 consolidated final
    agency decision of the Department of Community Affairs ("DCA") to
    recoup   previously-allocated   grant   funds   from   a   residential
    property owner and deny him access to additional funds from the
    Sandy Recovery Division. In particular, we mainly consider whether
    DCA, which adopted an initial decision of an Administrative Law
    Judge ("the ALJ"), had a sufficient basis in the record to deny
    the owner access to Superstorm Sandy relief funds because he failed
    to meet the $8,000 threshold in storm-related damages needed to
    qualify for the grants.
    For the reasons that follow, we vacate DCA's decision and
    remand for additional proceedings and factual findings.          Among
    other things, on remand DCA shall seek a FEMA inspection that was
    not performed, and also shall calculate and take into account
    permit fees and construction costs that, when added to appellant's
    other expenses, potentially could lead to a repair estimate of
    over $8,000.
    2                             A-3497-15T2
    We   derive   the    following       background    from    the    record.
    Superstorm Sandy devastated large portions of coastal New Jersey
    on October 29, 2012.        Following the storm, the United States
    Department of Housing and Urban Development allocated Community
    Block Grant Disaster Recovery funds to aid in the relief effort
    for   property   owners    who    sustained     damage    from    the    storm.
    Allocations,     Common    Application,       Waivers,     and    Alternative
    Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block
    Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane
    Sandy, 78 Fed. Reg. 14329, 14335 (March 5, 2013).            DCA administers
    the program in New Jersey.
    In   administering    the   federal     funding,     DCA   created     the
    Superstorm Sandy Housing Intake Program, which is divided into
    several types of grants.          In this appeal, appellant Mohammed
    Hossain challenges denials of his claims under two Sandy-related
    programs: the Homeowner Resettlement Program ("HRP"), and the
    Renovation,    Reconstruction,     Elevation     and     Mitigation     Program
    ("RREMP").
    HRP offers grants for "any non-constructive purpose that
    assists the homeowner to remain in the county in which they lived
    at the time of the storm."          Department of Community Affairs,
    Disaster Recovery Division, Resettlement Program Policy: Version
    3                                A-3497-15T2
    3 4 (July 29, 2013).        To receive an HRP grant of up to $10,000,
    an applicant must demonstrate he:
    1. Resided       in    one   of    the    nine    distressed
    counties;
    2. Lived in the property as a                        primary
    residence at the time of the storm;
    3. Registered with FEMA by May 1, 2013; and
    4. Sustained Sandy-related damages with a
    fully verified loss ("FVL") of at least $8,000
    or experienced one foot of water on the first
    floor of the property.
    [Id. at 5.]
    Additionally,        DCA    administers        aid    through    RREMP,     which
    assists impacted Sandy homeowners to "complete the necessary work
    to make their homes livable and compliant with flood plain,
    environmental,      and     other       State       and     local    requirements."
    Department     of   Community       Affairs,        Sandy     Recovery    Division,
    Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, Elevation and Mitigation (RREM)
    Program:     Policies     and    Procedures       16      (October   2014).         The
    qualifications for this program are nearly identical to HRP, with
    the added requirement that a recipient have an adjusted household
    gross annual income of less than $250,000.                  
    Id. at 18.
    Appellant owned, and continues to own, a building at 3001
    Fairmount Avenue in Atlantic City.              The property consists of three
    units: a first-floor commercial space used as a convenience store,
    4                                    A-3497-15T2
    a second-floor residence that appellant lives in with his wife and
    children, and a third-floor apartment that he rents out.
    DCA does not contest that appellant lived in the second-floor
    residence during Sandy.       DCA stipulated that appellant would meet
    nearly   all   other     qualifications    of   both   grant   programs,    but
    disputes that he sustained a FVL on the second floor of at least
    the minimum eligibility threshold of $8,000.
    Appellant applied to the DCA for both a HRP and RREM grant
    through separate online applications in June 2013.             He noted that
    the property was damaged during Sandy, and he had registered with
    FEMA.
    On July 28, 2013, DCA issued appellant a $10,000 grant
    agreement and promissory note for the 3001 Fairmount property
    under the HRP grant.         Under the terms of the grant, appellant
    attested that he met the HRP requirements, and agreed to continue
    to reside in the property for three years in order to be forgiven
    the $10,000.        The funds were accordingly disbursed to appellant.
    After a delay of nearly two years not explained in the record,
    DCA   acted    on    appellant's   RREM   application.      Laura   Shea,    an
    assistant commissioner for DCA, issued appellant a denial letter
    for this RREM application on April 27, 2015.             Shea wrote that, in
    reviewing his application, DCA determined he did not sustain the
    $8,000 minimum amount of FVL.
    5                               A-3497-15T2
    Additionally,        Shea     wrote       appellant        was     not    "legally
    authorized to receive" the HRP grant money he had been given nearly
    two years earlier, because he failed to meet the $8,000 threshold
    for   that   grant,   as    well.       Consequently,            Shea    demanded     that
    appellant reimburse DCA the $10,000 HRD grant if he had already
    spent the disbursement.
    Appellant   challenged         both       the   RREM   denial       and   the    HRP
    reimbursement     demand.          He   submitted          numerous      invoices     and
    construction quotes to the agency to demonstrate his eligibility.
    DCA transmitted the case to the Office of Administrative Law, and
    an ALJ conducted a hearing on December 10, 2015.                       A representative
    appeared for DCA, and appellant was self-represented. No witnesses
    other than appellant testified.
    At the hearing, DCA argued that appellant had improperly
    certified he had met the $8,000 threshold, and therefore the agency
    could request a refund.           In support of its position, DCA submitted
    construction estimates that do reflect that more than $8,000 worth
    of damages occurred at the property.                  However, the record is not
    clear as to how much damage was associated with the residential
    second floor – the only part of the property eligible for the
    grants.      Although   appellant       lives         on   the    second    floor,    the
    electrical panel for the entire property, for example, is on the
    6                                    A-3497-15T2
    first floor.     These and other facts about the premises made a
    floor-by-floor analysis of the costs challenging.
    The property had two heating boilers that were replaced.   The
    costs of these boilers and what parts of each boiler serviced
    which floor or floors were vital issues at the hearing.
    Customarily, DCA relies on FEMA inspectors to determine the
    FVL.    However, in the present case FEMA mistakenly inspected a
    different building appellant owned as a landlord, 44 South Trenton
    Avenue, instead of his subject residence at 3001 Fairmount Avenue.
    Because appellant failed to correct FEMA's error, as DCA argued
    he was obligated to do, DCA never received a valid FVL estimate
    from FEMA for 3001 Fairmount Avenue.
    As the hearing transcript reflects, appellant testified that
    a FEMA inspector mistakenly came to his Trenton Avenue property.
    ALJ: Did you have a meeting with an inspector
    and tell him you lived at Trenton Avenue?
    APPELLANT: No. The inspector came and – he
    came in Trenton Avenue. . . . He said ["]this
    is your house?["] I said yes. So he did the
    inspection and then . . . he left.
    . . . .
    ALJ: [W]hy did he come to Trenton Avenue and
    not Fairmount Avenue?
    APPELLANT: I don't – I don't know.
    7                          A-3497-15T2
    Given the evidence that appellant has lived at his Fairmount
    residence since 2005 and voted in that precinct, the ALJ noted
    that it made him "uncomfortable" that a FEMA inspector would show
    up     instead   at   appellant's   Trenton    Avenue   rental   property.
    Appellant testified that his children attended a school near the
    Fairmount property.      The ALJ commented that "it makes it hard for
    me to be a fact-finder without having both sides of the story" and
    that a representative from FEMA should have been at the hearing.
    In explaining why DCA approved appellant's grant initially,
    the agency's representative told the ALJ that the Trenton Avenue
    property had sustained at least one foot of water, so the $8,000
    threshold would not be applicable.            Further, she remarked that
    FEMA    and   applicants   often    made   errors   inspecting   incorrect
    properties if a property had a different mailing address from its
    physical location.       The ALJ also noted that the errors in this
    matter may have been the result of a language barrier.
    Lacking the typical FEMA estimate in this case, DCA conducted
    its own damage assessment.           DCA summarized the documents it
    considered: a November 2012 insurance adjuster's report, which
    singled-out no damages for the second floor but reflected a total
    furnace bill at $4,917; a report from Bangla Trade, Inc. and the
    City of Atlantic City from April 2013 certifying $44,164 worth of
    damage, without specifying what part of the property was damaged;
    8                            A-3497-15T2
    and a $3,050 chimney sweep and masonry invoice for the entire
    Fairmount property.    Additionally, appellant presented a quote for
    $107,390.65 in repairs for the entire property by NK Construction,
    which was conducted on October 5, 2015, several years after Sandy.
    With respect specifically to the replacement of boilers, DCA
    reviewed an installation estimate from a contractor, Broadley's
    of Marmora, of $6,889 for a 175,000 BTU boiler "for home" on
    November 10, 2012.     This estimate noted that a "permit is extra"
    and that appellant also "must have [a] chimney inspection."      This
    quote also estimated a 100,000 BTU unit for what is delineated as
    "home-apartment" at a cost of $6,071, excluding permitting and
    chimney inspection expenses.    Additionally, Broadley's provided a
    $7,843 estimate on January 28, 2013 for a 100,000 BTU unit boiler
    "for apartment."      Again, this quote did not include a chimney
    inspection or permit expenses.
    With respect to the residential boiler quote, the ALJ noted
    at the hearing:
    If this is true and this was paid, [appellant]
    could    probably    get    to    the    $8,000
    threshold . . . with incidentals that . . .
    are related to this, you know. . . . The permit
    fee, if there's an inspection fee       . . . .
    Because it says [on the quote] "permit is
    extra. Build at cost. Must          . . . have
    chimney inspected."
    9                          A-3497-15T2
    Tellingly, the ALJ perceived a fundamental problem with DCA's
    position:
    [Appellant] has extensive damages.    I mean,
    he has at least $50,000 worth of damage [to
    the total property], close to it. And, you
    know, he's – he's a smidge below the $8,000,
    if you look at just based upon heating.
    . . . .
    I'm not a contractor, you're not a contractor,
    so . . . that's why we need that inspector to
    go out there, to say how much is this, was it
    attributable   to   --   or   allocatable   to
    commercial, residential.    And if he went to
    the wrong address, maybe [appellant] is
    entitled to have an inspector go back out
    again.
    At the close of the hearing, the ALJ directed DCA to request
    more information from FEMA and to ascertain whether appellant was
    entitled    to   an    additional   FEMA   inspection   at   the   Fairmount
    property.    The record is unclear if DCA carried out this request.
    The ALJ also asked appellant to provide him with receipts of
    what appellant paid for the repairs.             Specifically, he asked
    appellant to break out storm-related repairs isolated to the second
    floor.     The ALJ recognized that appellant was "very close on the
    estimates, but [was] not close on the . . . bank or the adjuster's
    calculations.         Now, they may have lowballed it, they may have
    depreciated it[.]"
    10                              A-3497-15T2
    After the hearing, appellant presented to the ALJ an invoice
    dated March 22, 2013 from Broadley's, which reflected that it
    performed $13,285 worth of repairs to appellant's second-floor
    heating and hot water units on March 18, 2013.   The invoice listed
    the installation of a 175,000 BTU boiler for the second floor.      In
    addition to the boiler installation, the invoice noted "additional
    gas piping/water piping repairs."    The invoice detailed $3,620 for
    parts, and an installation price of $9,665.
    After the record closed, the ALJ issued a seven-page initial
    decision on January 28, 2016.   The ALJ framed the core issue as
    whether the boiler used for the second floor sustained $8,000 in
    damages.
    The ALJ first cited the adjuster's assessment for the entire
    furnace repair of $4,917.   He contrasted that estimate with the
    $6,071 and $7,843 higher estimates appellant presented for the
    second and third-floor boiler repairs total.         Last, the ALJ
    referenced the $13,285 invoice that appellant had submitted post-
    hearing.   The ALJ stated it was "unclear if this invoice is for
    the second and third floor units or just petitioner's second floor
    residential unit, because it is so much higher than all of the
    previous estimates."   He described the $4,917 and $7,843 quotes
    as "making the $13,286 post-hearing paid invoice appear very high."
    11                           A-3497-15T2
    Additionally,   the     ALJ   again   underscored   that   FEMA    never
    inspected the Fairmount property, remarking that the "tribunal
    could have benefitted from the FEMA inspection."           Even so, the ALJ
    found it significant that an "independent adjuster" who is a "third
    party outsider[] and [is] considered reliable" provided the $4,917
    quote.   Comparing that figure to the $6,071 to $7,843 estimates
    presented   by   appellant    pre-hearing,     the   ALJ    concluded     the
    adjuster's figure was reasonable, and therefore appellant fell
    below the $8,000 FVL threshold.
    The DCA Commissioner adopted the ALJ's decision as final on
    March 14, 2016.    Now represented by counsel, appellant seeks to
    overturn that determination.
    Appellant contends that this court should rely on the proofs
    to reach its own conclusions, which he argues demonstrate his
    eligibility for either grant.        Additionally, he argues that the
    ALJ failed to consider chimney repair costs and the post-hearing
    invoice, and instead relied on an estimate for a different boiler
    unit to reach his conclusion.        DCA counters that the ALJ relied
    on credible proofs in the record, and did not reach his decision
    arbitrarily or capriciously to deny appellant's grant eligibility.
    We are cognizant that appellate courts generally must afford
    agency determinations' deference for orders based on the credible
    12                              A-3497-15T2
    evidence.    Our role as an appellate court is restricted to four
    inquiries:
    (1) whether the agency's decision offends the
    State or Federal Constitution; (2) whether the
    agency's action violates express or implied
    legislative policies; (3) whether the record
    contains substantial evidence to support the
    findings on which the agency based its action;
    and (4) whether in applying the legislative
    policies to the facts, the agency clearly
    erred in reaching a conclusion that could not
    reasonably have been made on a showing of the
    relevant factors.
    [George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.,
    
    137 N.J. 8
    , 27 (1994) (citations omitted).]
    "An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision
    will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is
    arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair
    support in the record."   In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 27-28 (2007)
    (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 
    39 N.J. 556
    , 562 (1963));
    see also Aqua Beach Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 
    186 N.J. 5
    , 16 (2006).   "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's
    action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the
    [party] challenging the administrative action."    In re Arenas, 
    385 N.J. Super. 440
    , 443-44 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    188 N.J. 219
    (2006) (citing McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    , 563 (App. Div. 2002); Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs., 
    210 N.J. Super. 276
    , 285 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 
    107 N.J. 355
    (1987)).
    13                          A-3497-15T2
    Despite that general policy of deference, we conclude that
    the agency's decision in this particular case lacks adequate
    support in the present record and, absent further development and
    clarification of the record, is arbitrary and capricious.
    Throughout the hearing and his written decision, the ALJ
    voiced concerns with DCA's proofs. He never found appellant lacked
    credibility, and noted that any problem with his application may
    be attributed to "a language barrier."       Further, DCA does not
    challenge appellant's residency, but instead blames appellant for
    FEMA's mistake in inspecting the wrong property.    Indeed, the ALJ
    wrote his preference would be for FEMA to inspect the property
    itself to give a truly unbiased opinion, and he mused that, in
    fairness   to   appellant's   application,   FEMA   should   do   so.
    Unfortunately, that did not occur.
    The ALJ hypothesized during the hearing that the adjuster
    might have "low-balled" appellant in its $4,917 estimate. However,
    in his written decision, the ALJ placed substantial weight upon
    the adjuster's figure in determining that the $13,000 estimate was
    "very high."    At the hearing's close, the ALJ orally noted that
    permit costs and other fees could very well vault the $6,071 and
    $7,843 estimates over the $8,000 threshold, but later declared in
    his written decision that he could not accept the $13,285 actual
    invoiced cost as valid.
    14                           A-3497-15T2
    Having considered this rather convoluted record as a whole,
    we are satisfied that the ALJ and the agency unreasonably concluded
    that   appellant's   damages   were   definitely   under   $8,000.    For
    instance, taking the adjuster's furnace estimate of $4,917, and
    adding the chimney estimate1 of $3,050, coupled with permitting
    costs and the chimney inspection2, the $8,000 threshold is easily
    cleared.     The same can be said if the higher boiler estimates of
    $6,071 or $7,843 were added to the chimney inspections and permit
    costs.
    The ALJ did not explain sufficiently why the $13,285 invoice
    for repairs performed, which was generated before litigation, was
    unacceptable.    Even if it is deemed unacceptable, the ALJ did not
    explain why permitting and chimney fees were not included in his
    final calculations.     As the ALJ himself noted, certain documents
    in the record indicated appellant was "a smidge below" the $8,000
    threshold.     Hence, the permitting and chimney costs manifestly
    could have placed him over the required amount.
    1
    Neither the ALJ opinion nor DCA's brief on appeal challenge the
    chimney replacement estimate, nor do they factor that estimate
    into their calculation.    Ultimately, the chimney costs may not
    factor into the second floor's FVL calculation in full or in part,
    but they must be addressed on remand.
    2
    Similarly, the ALJ opinion and DCA brief neglect to factor in
    these added costs the contractor spotlighted as figures not
    included in the initial estimates.
    15                             A-3497-15T2
    DCA cites this court's opinion In re Adoption of Amendments
    to   Northeast,   Upper   Raritan,    Sussex   County   Water   Quality
    Management Plans, 
    435 N.J. Super. 571
    , 582 (App. Div. 2014) to
    advocate deference to the administrative determinations. However,
    there the Appellate Division affirmed an agency decision that
    differed from an ALJ decision because the agency placed greater
    emphasis on an expert's report than the ALJ, but that decision was
    still based in the record.     
    Id. at 585.
        Here, the ALJ did give
    greater weight to the $4,917 adjuster's estimate over the $13,286
    invoice, but we note he also neglected to analyze the impact of
    the $3,500 chimney quote or the permitting and chimney inspection
    costs.
    Construction costs in actuality often exceed estimates, due
    to a variety of reasons.     Here, without making further inquiry
    into the reasons behind the price disparity between the estimates
    and the $13,280 invoiced sum, the ALJ improperly dismissed out of
    hand the very evidence he requested appellant present him post-
    hearing.
    These facts of the case, coupled with the nearly two years
    that transpired between DCA issuing appellant a grant and demanding
    a refund, leads us to conclude that the agency's decision should
    be reconsidered on remand.
    16                             A-3497-15T2
    On remand, DCA must seek a FEMA inspection of appellant's
    property.    Additionally,   the    remand   proceeding    should     allow
    appellant   to   present   clearer      evidence   about    the      actual
    construction work done, and the fact-finder should make associated
    credibility determinations on the record.
    Vacated and remanded.   We do not retain jurisdiction.
    17                               A-3497-15T2