MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY VS. COUNTY OF PASSAIC(L-2866-14, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) , 451 N.J. Super. 523 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3318-15T3
MONTCLAIR STATE
UNIVERSITY,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Appellant, August 23, 2017
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
COUNTY OF PASSAIC and
CITY OF CLIFTON,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________________
Argued May 31, 2017 – Decided August 23, 2017
Before Judges Koblitz, Rothstadt and
Sumners.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket
No. L-2866-14.
Antonio J. Casas argued the cause for
appellant (Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf,
LLP, attorneys; Samuel G. Destito, of
counsel and on the briefs; Mr. Casas and
Sandy L. Galacio, Jr., on the briefs).
Michael H. Glovin argued the cause for
respondent County of Passaic (William J.
Pascrell, III, Passaic County Counsel,
attorney; Mr. Glovin, of counsel and on the
brief).
Marvin J. Brauth argued the cause for
respondent City of Clifton (Wilentz, Goldman
& Spitzer, PA, attorneys; Mr. Brauth, of
counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROTHSTADT, J.A.D.
In Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142 (1972), the Supreme Court
addressed the limits of a local government's authority to
regulate development of a state university's property that was
confined to its campus. In this dispute, we are asked to
determine whether those limits apply to a state university's
construction of a roadway that intersects with a county road.
For the reason expressed herein, we hold that the limits imposed
by Rutgers apply equally to the development proposal in this
case, reverse the trial judge's dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint and remand the matter for a trial.
Plaintiff Montclair State University (MSU) appeals from the
Law Division's March 7, 2016 order dismissing its complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief that sought an order
permitting it to proceed with the development of a roadway from
its campus to Valley Road in Clifton. Prior to filing the
complaint, MSU spent approximately six years consulting with
defendants County of Passaic and City of Clifton, both of which
interposed various objections and concerns about the project.
Through various meetings between construction professionals, MSU
was able to satisfy most of defendants' concerns about the
roadway.
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In 2014, MSU submitted an application to the county for a
permit to install traffic controls at the proposed intersection
of the roadway and Valley Road. In its cover letter, MSU stated
that it was exempt under Rutgers from seeking any approvals from
Clifton's land use boards. When the county failed to respond,
MSU filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief, seeking a determination that the county's refusal to
issue the permit was contrary to law and directing that it be
issued so MSU could construct the proposed roadway.
At a hearing held on the return date of an order to show
cause, the trial judge addressed the limits of the county's
authority to withhold approval. He stated that the county did
not have jurisdiction over the speed limit on the roadway as it
is on state land. He also noted that while defendants could be
legitimately concerned with a "palpably unsafe" intersection,
they could not block the proposal simply because it would
generate more traffic. Despite those observations, the judge
denied the relief plaintiff sought, reasoning MSU had not
complied with its obligations under Rutgers only because it
needed an updated traffic study. The judge, however,
specifically contemplated that he would be "review[ing the] up-
to-date expert reports" and making the ultimate determination
whether the project should proceed. On November 6, 2014, he
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entered an order requiring the parties to submit updated traffic
studies and requiring "the parties [to] consult, which shall
include, without limitation, appearances before the Planning
Boards of the City of Clifton and the County of Passaic." The
court retained jurisdiction in the event the parties could not
reach a resolution.
In accordance with the judge's order, the parties obtained
updated traffic studies that concluded traffic conditions had
not changed from the last completed traffic study in 2004.
MSU's expert concluded that its proposed "design does not create
[a] safety risk." Defendants' expert concluded that the roadway
did not meet certain American Association of State Highway and
Transportation (AASHTO) and New Jersey Department of
Transportation (NJDOT) criteria. On April 1, 2015, the parties
and their respective experts met again to resolve the matter.
Defendants made numerous recommendations to the proposed design,
which MSU reviewed with its experts. Following the meeting, MSU
proposed additional revisions to its plans, which the county
found "acceptable." The county also asked MSU's engineers to
consider redesigning the road for higher speeds, but MSU
rejected this recommendation explaining that it "would have the
unintended consequence of encouraging higher operating speeds
and could result in an unsafe condition." In response, the
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county disagreed, its counsel stating that a thirty-five mile-
per-hour design would support anticipated traffic volume and
explaining that "it is totally unreasonable to expect drivers to
adhere to a 15 or 20 mph speed limit along a newly constructed
roadway." MSU submitted a revised plan that reflected changes
that satisfied some of the county's concerns. The county,
however, refused to issue a permit because it believed the
roadway design continued to fail to meet applicable AASHTO/NJDOT
standards and because Clifton's approval was required for a
proposed traffic signal as it would impact municipal roadways.
Believing it had reached an impasse with defendants, MSU
wrote to the court and requested the matter be relisted for a
decision. Clifton objected, arguing that MSU had not returned
to its planning board. While awaiting a response from the
judge, MSU's and the county's engineers corresponded about the
roadway's design, the proposed traffic signal and speed limits.
Clifton did not participate in the exchanges between MSU and the
county.
The trial judge heard the matter again on February 25,
2016. MSU argued that it had revised its plans to resolve the
county's and Clifton's concerns regarding safety, that the only
area on which they could not agree was the design of the roadway
that was located entirely on MSU's property, and MSU had sole
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jurisdiction over the roadway. It also argued there was expert
testimony that confirmed the roadway design was safe, and had
met all of the requirements under Rutgers. The county
acknowledged that MSU had accommodated nearly all of the county
planning board's comments, but it still took issue with the
stopping distance from the bottom of the hill leading into the
intersection.
After considering the parties' arguments and without taking
any testimony, the judge dismissed MSU's complaint, finding that
he had an insufficient record to rely upon because MSU had not
appeared before the county's or Clifton's planning boards as he
previously ordered. The judge instructed MSU that its choices
were to appeal his determination or "set something up so there
can be a record [which could] be basically an encapsulation of
the old prior . . . hearings and the plans and how much of an
accommodation has already been made by the university."
On appeal, MSU relies on the holding in Rutgers and argues
that the trial judge abused his discretion by dismissing its
complaint without determining whether MSU met its obligation
under Rutgers "to act reasonably and consult with the county and
city" and by adding a requirement that MSU return to Clifton's
planning board for approval for any reason, including, for the
development of a record. Defendants respond by arguing Rutgers
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is "distinguishable" from this case because its exemption from
the authority of local zoning boards does not apply to
"legitimate safety concern[s]" about MSU's proposal.
We conclude from our review of the record and the
applicable legal principles that the trial judge correctly
recognized that Rutgers controlled MSU's application, but he
mistakenly exercised his discretion by dismissing MSU's
complaint and requiring the matter be heard by the municipal and
county planning boards for development of a record.
Like Rutgers University, MSU is a state university,1
N.J.S.A. 18A:64-45, and is therefore permitted to exercise
certain "governmentally autonomous powers." Rutgers, supra, 60
N.J. at 158; see also N.J.S.A. 18A:64-7 (granting state colleges
broad control over their property). In Rutgers, the Supreme
Court upheld the exclusion of Rutgers University's proposed land
development from local regulation. Rutgers, supra, 60 N.J. at
144, 159. According to the Court, "the Legislature did not
intend the growth and development of Rutgers University to be
subject to restriction or control by local land use
1
MSU was originally a state college and later transitioned
into a state university. Most recently, the Legislature enacted
the Montclair State University Act, which placed it on par with
Rutgers University as a research university. Montclair State
University Act, L. 2017, c. 178 (supplementing and amending
Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes).
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regulations." Twp. of Franklin v. Den Hollander, 172 N.J. 147,
150 (2002).
A state university's "immunity [from regulation] is not
completely unbridled" and must not "be exercised in an
unreasonable fashion so as to arbitrarily override all important
legitimate local interests." Rutgers, supra, 60 N.J. at 153
(citing Washington Twp. v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578,
584-86 (1958)). Like other state agencies immune from local
regulation under similar circumstances, a state university must
"weigh conscientiously local interests, to examine carefully
whether the proposed . . . facility is compatible with the
surrounding land uses and to consult the local ordinances and
authorities in making its . . . decision." Twp. of Franklin,
supra, 172 N.J. at 150 (quoting Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay,
77 N.J. 439, 455-56 (1978) (addressing "Commissioner of
Transportation['s] authority concerning the placement of
aeronautical facilities" within a community)). The university
has an "implied duty" to consider local interests that obviously
include legitimate "safety concerns." Id. at 151 (quoting
Holgate Prop. Assocs. v. Twp. of Howell, 145 N.J. 590, 601, 603
(1996)).
To satisfy its obligation, a state university "ought to
consult with the local authorities and sympathetically listen
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and give every consideration to local objections, problems and
suggestions in order to minimize the conflict as much as
possible." Twp. of Fairfield v. State, Dep't of Transp., 440
N.J. Super. 310, 319 (App. Div.) (quoting Garden State Farms,
Inc., supra, 77 N.J. at 455), certif. denied, 222 N.J. 310
(2015). It must act reasonably in its consideration of local
concerns. See Kearny v. Clark, 213 N.J. Super. 152, 160-61
(App. Div. 1986). A difference of opinion as to the best method
to address a local traffic safety concern alone, however, does
not support a finding that the state university acted
unreasonably. See Cedar Grove v. Sheridan, 209 N.J. Super. 267,
280 (App. Div.) (addressing Department of Transportation's
placement of a traffic signal at a location opposed by local
residents through petitions and letters), certif. denied, 104
N.J. 464 (1986); see also City of Newark v. N.J. Turnpike Auth.,
7 N.J. 377, 381-82, appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 874, 72 S. Ct.
168, 96 L. Ed. 657 (1951).
In order to satisfy its obligation to reasonably consider
local safety concerns, a state university is not obligated to
appear before local land use boards. "The fact that [its]
officials did not appear before the Local Planning Board does
not establish that [it] acted unreasonably [as long as there is
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evidence that the university] listened to local objections and
considered them." Kearny, supra, 213 N.J. Super. at 160.
Because of the limits imposed on a state university's
decision making process, the immunity from regulation, which
Rutgers applied to dormitories and other on-site campus
construction, applies as well to a state university's proposed
construction of an on-site road that will intersect a local or
county road. In either case, it is clear that the state
university must reasonably take local safety concerns into
consideration when formulating and executing its plans.
The determination of whether a state university has
complied with its obligation to consult and consider local
concerns is a judicial function not conditioned upon
consideration by a local zoning board. A municipal planning
board "lacks standing and jurisdiction over the development
project [because g]enerally, local zoning and planning
regulations cannot affect the State's authority to carry out
public functions for the benefit of all the people of the State,
especially on the State's own land." Jersey City v. State Dep't
of Envtl. Prot., 227 N.J. Super. 5, 14 (App. Div.) (citing
Rutgers, supra, 60 N.J. at 152-53) (finding appellate review
appropriate where issue was whether agency met its obligation
when appeal arose from final agency decision), certif. denied,
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111 N.J. 640 (1988). Unlike judicial review of a land use
board's final decision that requires a trial on the record
developed before a local board, see R. 4:69; see also Willoughby
v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266, 273-74
(App. Div. 1997), disputes as to whether a state university
satisfied its obligation to consider local concerns is a matter
to be determined based upon a record developed at a trial, see
N.J.S.A. 2A:16-58, to the extent any facts are in dispute or are
not clear. Cf. Jersey City, supra, 227 N.J. Super. at 14
(finding "[t]he facts surrounding the controversy [were]
clear").
Applying these guiding principles here, we are constrained
to remand this matter to the trial judge for reinstatement of
plaintiff's complaint and a trial, if necessary, for the judge
to determine whether MSU satisfied its obligation under Rutgers.
We observe that the record contains substantial evidence of the
parties' efforts to identify and address local concerns over
many years, which the trial judge may solely rely upon in his
discretion in determining whether MSU satisfied its duty to
consider those concerns. If an evidentiary hearing is required,
it is to be held before the judge.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with our opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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