SABRINA LOSADA VS. PRINCETON UNIVERSITYÂ (L-0057-14, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3606-15T4
SABRINA LOSADA and
HENRY LOSADA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
PRINCETON TIGERS AQUATIC
CLUB,
Defendant.
_____________________________________
Submitted June 6, 2017 – Decided August 24, 2017
Before Judges Reisner and Rothstadt.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket
No. L-0057-14.
Gluck & Allen, LLC, attorneys for appellants
(Robert W. Allen and Daniel G. Leone, on the
briefs).
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC,
attorneys for respondent (Michael A. Spero
and Jill R. Cohen, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Sabrina Losada and her husband Henry Losada appeal
from the Law Division's dismissal of their complaint on summary
judgment entered in favor of defendant, Princeton University
(Princeton). Plaintiffs filed suit against Princeton and
defendant Princeton Tigers Aquatic Club (PTAC) for damages arising
from personal injuries Sabrina1 sustained from a fall that occurred
on Princeton's property as she left a PTAC swim meet in which her
child participated. PTAC is unaffiliated with Princeton other
than renting a facility from it to hold the swim meet. After
plaintiffs settled with PTAC, Princeton filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing it was immune from liability pursuant to the
Charitable Immunity Act (CIA), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. The
motion judge agreed and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the judge erred by not
recognizing that Princeton's renting its facility to PTAC was not
part of its pursuit "of educational objectives it was organized
to advance" and therefore was not entitled to charitable immunity.
We disagree and affirm.
The facts considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
see Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., 213 N.J. 573, 577
(2013) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523
1
We refer to plaintiffs by their first names to avoid confusion.
2 A-3606-15T4
(1995)), are summarized as follows. On January 14, 2012,
plaintiffs attended their fourteen-year-old daughter's swim meet,
held at Princeton's DeNunzio pool and hosted by PTAC, a youth swim
team that is not affiliated with Princeton. Upon exiting the
building, Sabrina stepped into a depression located directly next
to a walkway, fell, and sustained injuries.
Princeton is an educational institution offering
undergraduate and graduate degrees and is exempt from taxation
under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).
Additionally, Princeton qualifies as a public charity under IRC §
170(c). Princeton's charter states its "purposes . . . are the
conduct of a university not for profit, including colleges and
schools affiliated therewith, in various branches within or
without [New Jersey]."
PTAC is a private swim team that also provides swimming
lessons to children between the ages of six and eighteen. PTAC
rented the DeNunzio pool from Princeton for swim meets and
practices.
The motion judge determined that summary judgment should be
awarded to Princeton, as he found that Sabrina was a beneficiary
of Princeton's educational goals within the meaning of the CIA
because "Princeton was engaged in the performance of the charitable
objective it was organized to advance" and plaintiffs were "a
3 A-3606-15T4
direct recipient of those good works." The judge added: "[Sabrina]
is a [beneficiary;] she was a spectator at a swim meet for her
daughter hosted by PTAC at the university's building[,] and she
clearly was a [beneficiary] of Princeton."
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that Princeton, an educational
institution typically afforded immunity under the CIA, "was not
engaged in the performance of the educational objectives it was
organized to advance" on the day that Sabrina was injured. They
contend Princeton's stated purpose is the education of
undergraduates and graduates, not the minor children who
participated in PTAC's activities. Plaintiffs conclude, "youth
sports offered by an outside organization . . . was clearly not
an educational objective [that] Princeton . . . was organized to
advance." Moreover, they argue that because PTAC was not a
charitable organization, Princeton was not entitled to immunity.
We review the motion judge's grant of summary judgment de
novo and apply the same standard as the trial court. Cypress
Point Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., 226 N.J. 403,
414 (2016). Summary judgment must be granted if there is no
genuine issue of material fact challenged and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. 4:46-2. No special
deference is afforded to the legal determinations of the trial
court when no issue of fact exists. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp.
4 A-3606-15T4
v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199
(2016) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). Whether an entity is entitled to
immunity under the CIA is a legal question subject to our de novo
review. Roberts v. Timber Birch-Broadmoore Athletic Ass'n, 371
N.J. Super. 189, 197 (App. Div. 2004).
We conclude from our de novo review of the record that the
motion judge correctly awarded summary judgment in favor of
Princeton because it was entitled to the immunity from liability
provided for by the CIA. The CIA is deemed remedial and is to be
"'liberally construed' in favor of the protected entities." P.V.
ex rel T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 167 (2008) (quoting
N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10). The CIA provides immunity to any "nonprofit
corporation . . . organized exclusively for religious, charitable
or educational purposes" where the injured person
is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the
works of such nonprofit corporation . . . ;
provided, however, that such immunity from
liability shall not extend to any person who
shall suffer damage from the negligence of
such corporation . . . or of its agents or
servants where such person is one unconcerned
in and unrelated to and outside of the
benefactions of such corporation, society or
association.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a)]
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The scope of the CIA's immunity extends to the buildings and other
facilities used by the charitable organization to fulfill its
qualifying purpose. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-9.
"[A]n entity qualifies for charitable immunity when it '(1)
was formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized exclusively
for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was
promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury
to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works'"
O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 489 (2002) (quoting Hamel v.
State, 321 N.J. Super. 67, 72 (App. Div. 1999)). "Entities that
can prove they are organized exclusively for educational or
religious purposes automatically satisfy the second prong of the
charitable immunity standard"; that is, "no further financial
analysis is required to satisfy the second prong of the [CIA]."
Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333,
346 (2003).
"The established test for determining whether a party is a
beneficiary of the works of a charity has two prongs." Id. at
350. "The first is that the institution pleading the immunity,
at the time in question, 'was engaged in the performance of the
charitable objectives it was organized to advance.'" Ibid.
(quoting Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J. Super. 532,
536 (App. Div.), cerif. denied, 38 N.J. 305 (1962)). "The second
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is that the injured party must have been a direct recipient of
those good works." Ibid. (citing DeVries v. Habitat for Humanity,
290 N.J. Super. 479, 487-88 (App. Div. 1996), aff’d o.b., 147 N.J.
619 (1997)).
In determining whether the institution was engaged in the
performance of the charitable objectives it was organized to
advance, a non-profit organization exclusively dedicated to
religious or educational purposes is afforded "substantial
latitude in determining the appropriate avenues for achieving
their objectives." Bloom v. Seton Hall Univ., 307 N.J. Super.
487, 491 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 405 (1998). The
term "education," is defined broadly in the CIA "and [is] not
limited to purely scholastic activities." Estate of Komninos v.
Bancroft Neurohealth, Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 309, 320 (App. Div.
2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Orzech v. Fairleigh
Dickinson Univ., 411 N.J. Super. 198, 205 (App. Div. 2009)); see,
e.g., Roberts, supra, 371 N.J. Super. at 194 ("[The defendant]'s
purpose of teaching and promoting good citizenship and
sportsmanship and assembling teams and groups for participation
in sports qualifies it as a non-profit organization within the
scope of the [CIA]."); Morales v. N.J. Acad. of Aquatic Scis., 302
N.J. Super. 50, 54 (App. Div. 1997) (citation omitted) ("[A] non-
profit corporation may be organized for 'exclusively educational
7 A-3606-15T4
purposes' even though it provides an educational experience which
is 'recreational' in nature.").
The CIA may afford immunity to "a non-profit entity's rentals
to members of the general public for social and recreational
activities." Lax v. Princeton Univ., 343 N.J. Super. 568, 573
(App. Div. 2001) (citing Bieker v. Cmty. House of Moorestown, 169
N.J. 167, 177 (App. Div. 2001)). In Lax, we extended immunity
under the CIA to a claim for damages caused by injuries sustained
by a retiree who fell on Princeton's property while attending an
unaffiliated chamber symphony's performance in an auditorium it
rented from Princeton. We held that immunity applied when use of
a nonprofit organization's facility is not dominated by rentals
to for-profit entities and found that the use of Princeton's
facilities by members of the general public serves important social
and recreational needs of the community. Id. at 573 (citing
Bieker, supra, 169 N.J. at 177).
We discern no difference between the injured retiree's claim
in Lax and that of Sabrina in this case. We therefore similarly
hold that Princeton "is entitled to immunity from [plaintiff's]
claim [here that] aris[es] out of the rental of an [indoor swimming
pool] to another . . . entity that uses the facility for similar
educational purposes." Ibid. We conclude that, like the plaintiff
in Lax, Sabrina was a beneficiary of Princeton's educational
8 A-3606-15T4
purposes as contemplated by the CIA's "use of the words 'to
whatever degree' modifying the word 'beneficiary' in the statute."
Ryan, supra, 175 N.J. at 353 (quoting Gray v. St. Cecilia's School,
217 N.J. Super. 492, 495 (App. Div. 1987)). "Those who are not
beneficiaries must be [shown to be] 'unconcerned in and unrelated
to' the benefactions of such an organization." Ibid. (quoting
Gray, supra, 217 N.J. Super. at 495). Spectators at sporting
events are "[c]learly" beneficiaries for purposes of the CIA.
Pomeroy v. Little League Baseball, 142 N.J. Super. 471, 475 (App.
Div. 1976); see also Bieker, supra, 169 N.J. at 171. As a spectator
and mother of a participant in an educational endeavor taking
place on Princeton's premises, Sabrina was a beneficiary because
she clearly benefited to some degree by attending the swim meet
in which her child participated, regardless of whether PTAC
operated as a for profit or nonprofit entity.
Affirmed.
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