AZIZ M. THABO VS. Z TRANSPORTATION(L-3296-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2530-16T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v. November 21, 2017
SUSAN HYLAND, APPELLATE DIVISION
Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________
Argued October 2, 2017 – Decided November 21, 2017
Before Judges Messano, O'Connor and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Camden County,
Indictment No. 16-06-1879.
Linda A. Shashoua, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for appellant (Mary Eva
Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney; Ms. Shashoua, of counsel and on
the brief).
Tamar Y. Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Ms. Lerer, of counsel and on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VERNOIA, J.A.D.
The State appeals from a judgment of conviction sentencing
defendant Susan Hyland to special Drug Court probation, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-14. Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to
consider the State's appeal, we dismiss the appeal.
In March 2016, an automobile driven by defendant struck
sixteen-year-old Q.T. as he walked across a roadway. Q.T.
suffered spinal injuries that later caused his death.
Defendant, who did not have a valid driver's license, did not
stop or call the police. She took no action to get assistance
for Q.T. Instead, she fled the scene and went to a friend's
house, where they discussed burning her badly damaged automobile
and reporting that it was stolen.
Defendant's niece, who was in the car when Q.T. was struck,
called the police, reported the incident and identified
defendant as the driver. The police determined defendant's
location, found the automobile and arrested her.
Defendant was charged in an indictment with second-degree
knowingly leaving the scene of a fatal motor vehicle accident,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, third-degree causing death while driving
with a suspended or revoked license, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22(a), and
third-degree endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-
1.2(a).
The Camden County Prosecutor's Office recommended against
defendant's admission into Drug Court. The State determined
defendant was legally ineligible for a special probation Drug
2 A-2530-16T2
Court sentence because it could not find that defendant "would
not be a danger to the community if placed" in Drug Court. See
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(9). The State claimed "it is impossible to
find that . . . defendant is the type of non-violent offender
for which [D]rug [C]ourt was intended." Defendant appealed the
State's determination.
The court ordered that defendant undergo a substance abuse
evaluation, which revealed defendant suffered from five
substance abuse disorders. The evaluator recommended that
defendant undergo intensive treatment and concluded defendant
was clinically eligible for admission into Drug Court.
Over the State's objection, the court determined defendant
was legally eligible for special probation.1 The court observed
that defendant was not charged with causing Q.T.'s death, but
instead for her actions after Q.T. was struck. The court found
that although defendant was not charged with driving while
intoxicated, there was a connection between defendant's
1
Special probation is one of two tracks for admission to Drug
Court. State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div.
2013), aff'd o.b., 223 N.J. 290 (2015). Special probation is
available to "prison-bound offenders, who would not [otherwise]
be eligible for regular probation." Ibid. An offender may also
be admitted to Drug Court under a separate track for those
eligible for regular probation. Ibid. Here, defendant's
admittance to Drug Court was through the court's imposition of a
sentence of special probation. See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (defining
standards for a special probation Drug Court sentence).
3 A-2530-16T2
substance abuse and the commission of the offenses. The court
considered defendant's prior record, noting her last criminal
conviction was sixteen years earlier in 2000 for criminal
trespass, and her "slew of arrests and convictions" for motor
vehicle and disorderly persons offenses. The court found that
defendant's prior record and "terrible choices" after Q.T. was
accidentally struck did not establish that she would be a danger
to the community if she was admitted to Drug Court. The court
entered an order finding defendant was legally eligible for a
special probation Drug Court sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.
Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges in the indictment
without the benefit of a negotiated plea agreement. The State
reserved its right to object to defendant's admission into Drug
Court at sentencing.
At sentencing, the court merged defendant's conviction for
third-degree endangering an injured victim with her conviction
for second-degree knowingly leaving the scene of a fatal motor
vehicle accident. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent
five-year special probation Drug Court terms on her convictions.
The court denied the State's motion for a stay of sentence
pending the State's appeal of defendant's Drug Court sentence.
Three weeks later, the court granted defendant's motion for
post-conviction bail pending appeal and released defendant on
4 A-2530-16T2
her own recognizance with the condition that she remain in an
inpatient substance abuse treatment facility until further court
order. We granted the State's request for a stay of execution
of defendant's sentence pending the State's appeal.
On appeal, the State makes the following argument:
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LAW DIVISION'S
SPECIAL PROBATION SENTENCING OF DEFENDANT AS
A TRACK ONE DRUG COURT OFFENDER AS, AFTER
KILLING THE VICTIM, DEFENDANT'S
PARTICIPATION IN DRUG COURT PRESENTS A RISK
TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND OFFENDS THE PRINCIPLES
OF THE DRUG COURT PROGRAM.
The State argues that a proper assessment of defendant's
danger to the community is required under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
14(a)(9), and the court's error in its assessment of the danger
requires reversal of defendant's Drug Court sentence. Defendant
argues we cannot address the merits of the State's contention
because we do not have jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal
of the court's sentence.
Rule 2:3-1(b) governs the right of the State to appeal in a
criminal proceeding. In pertinent part, it permits the State to
"appeal or where appropriate, seek leave to appeal" from:
(1) a judgment of the trial court dismissing
an indictment, accusation or complaint,
where not precluded by the constitution of
the United States or of New Jersey; (2) an
order of the trial court entered before
trial in accordance with [Rule] 3:5 (search
5 A-2530-16T2
warrants); (3) a judgment of acquittal
entered in accordance with [Rule 3:18-2]
(judgment n.o.v.) following a jury verdict
of guilty; (4) a judgment in a post-
conviction proceeding collaterally attacking
a conviction or sentence; (5) an
interlocutory order entered before, during
or after trial, or, (6) as otherwise
provided by law.
[R. 2:3-1(b).]
"Sentencing appeals by the State implicate the prohibitions
against multiple punishments incorporated in the double jeopardy
provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions." State v.
Johnson, 376 N.J. Super. 163, 171 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
183 N.J. 592 (2005). Rule 2:3-(b)(6) permits the State to
appeal as "provided by law." Thus, the State has authority to
appeal a sentence where there is "explicit statutory authority"
granting the State the right to appeal. State v. Veney, 327
N.J. Super. 458, 460 (App. Div. 2000); accord State v. Cannon,
128 N.J. 546, 573 n.13 (1992); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 343
(1984).
Rule 2:3-1(b)(6) also authorizes the State's appeal of an
illegal sentence. State v. Lefkowitz, 335 N.J. Super. 352, 356
(App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 637 (2001). The
State "ha[s] the authority, if not the duty, to appeal" an
illegal sentence. State v. Leslie, 269 N.J. Super. 78, 86 (App.
Div. 1993), certif. denied, 136 N.J. 29 (1994); see also State
6 A-2530-16T2
v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597, 605 (2011) (finding "the State can
appeal from imposition of an illegal sentence"). That is
because a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time
"even if it means increasing the term of a custodial sentence
that [a] defendant has begun to serve." State v. Eigenmann, 280
N.J. Super. 331, 337 (App. Div. 1995), aff'd o.b., 138 N.J. 89(1994).
Here, the State claims authority to appeal on both bases.
The State asserts it may appeal because defendant's Drug Court
sentence is illegal. It also asserts N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)
expressly authorizes its appeal of defendant's non-custodial
Drug Court sentence. We address and reject the State's
arguments in turn.
A.
The State argues defendant's sentence is illegal because
the court did not correctly assess and determine defendant's
danger to the community if she were sentenced to Drug Court as
required by N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(9). The State reasons that
because the court failed to correctly assess defendant's danger
to the community in accordance with the statute, the court erred
in finding defendant was eligible for Drug Court under N.J.S.A.
2C:35-14 and, as a result, the Drug Court sentence was illegal.
7 A-2530-16T2
Our "Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 2C:104-9
[] does not define the term 'illegal sentence,'" but "does
specify the sentence or penalty for each offense and the
authorized dispositions. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2." State v. Murray,
162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000). Our Supreme Court has defined "an
illegal sentence [as] one that 'exceeds the maximum penalty
provided in the Code for a particular offense' or a sentence
'not imposed in accordance with law.'" State v. Acevedo, 205
N.J. 40, 45 (2011) (quoting Murray, supra, 162 N.J. at 247). A
sentence "not imposed in accordance with law" includes a
"disposition [not] authorized by the Code." Murray, supra, 162
N.J. at 247. However, "mere excessiveness of sentence otherwise
within authorized limits, as distinct from illegality by reason
of being beyond or not in accordance with legal authorization,"
does not render a sentence illegal. Acevedo, supra, 205 N.J. at
46 (quoting State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 592 (App. Div.
1988), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 78 (1989)).
Defendant's Drug Court probationary sentence does not
exceed the ten-year maximum custodial term permitted by the Code
for the second-degree offense for which she was convicted. See
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2). Therefore, the sentence is not illegal
because it does not exceed the punishment authorized under the
Code. Acevedo, supra, 205 N.J. at 45; see also State v. Ancrum,
8 A-2530-16T2
449 N.J. Super. 526, 534 (App. Div.) (stating the Drug Court
sentencing statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, provides "one of many
dispositions" of offenders under our Criminal Code), certif.
denied, __ N.J. __ (2017); Bishop, supra, 429 N.J. Super. at 539
(finding that a Drug Court sentence "is another authorized
disposition under the Code[]"), aff'd o.b., 223 N.J. 290 (2015).
Moreover, the sentence was imposed in accordance with the
law because N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 expressly authorizes imposition of
the Drug Court sentence here. See Murray, supra, 162 N.J. at
247 (noting a sentence that is not a "disposition authorized by
the Code" is illegal). Defendant's sentence did not violate any
mandatory sentencing conditions. See ibid. (observing that a
sentence is illegal if it violates mandatory sentencing
requirements); see also State v. Baker, 270 N.J. Super. 55, 70
(App. Div.) (finding failure to impose mandatory period of
parole ineligibility rendered sentence illegal), certif. denied,
136 N.J. 297 (1994).
We reject the State's contention that alleged errors in the
court's assessment of defendant's alleged danger to the
community under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(9) rendered the sentence
illegal. A court's assessment of statutory factors in imposing
a sentence relates to the excessiveness of the sentence, "rather
than [its] legality." Acevedo, supra, 205 N.J. at 46 (quoting
9 A-2530-16T2
Flores, supra, 228 N.J. Super. at 596). Thus, any alleged
errors in the court's assessment of the statutory factors under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a) did not render defendant's sentence illegal
because a Drug Court sentence is an authorized disposition under
the Code. See, e.g., Acevedo, supra, 205 N.J. at 47 (holding
the sentencing court's failure to state reasons for imposition
of consecutive sentences did not render sentences illegal);
Flores, supra, 228 N.J. Super. at 595-96 (finding the court's
alleged improper consideration of aggravating and mitigating
factors and consecutive sentencing guidelines did not result in
illegal sentence).
Defendant's sentence is not illegal. We therefore reject
the State's argument that it has authority to appeal on that
basis. See Ciancaglini, supra, 204 N.J. at 605 (explaining the
State may appeal an illegal sentence).
B.
We next address the State's claim that N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(f)(2) expressly authorizes its appeal of defendant's non-
custodial probationary sentence. See Veney, supra, 327 N.J.
Super. at 460 (finding State has no right to appeal a sentence
unless expressly authorized by statute). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)
provides that "if the court imposes a non-custodial or
probationary sentence upon conviction for a crime of the first
10 A-2530-16T2
or second degree, such sentence shall not become final for 10
days in order to permit the appeal of such sentence by the
prosecution." See Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 360 (finding N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(f)(2) authorizes the State's appeal of non-custodial
sentences on first or second-degree convictions).
In interpreting N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), our "overriding
goal must be to determine the Legislature's intent." Cast Art
Indus., LLC v. KPMG LLP, 209 N.J. 208, 221 (2012) (citation
omitted). "[A] statute's 'words and phrases shall be read and
construed within their context' and 'given their generally
accepted meaning.'" Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408,
421 (2009) (citing N.J.S.A. 1:1-1). "To that end, 'statutes
must be read in their entirety; each part or section should be
construed in connection with every other part or section to
provide a harmonious whole.'" Ibid. (quoting Bedford v. Riello,
195 N.J. 210, 224 (2008)).
Applying these principles, we first consider N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(f)(2) within the context of the other provisions of
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) creates a presumption
that first and second-degree offenders will be sentenced to
incarceration. The statute mandates that a court "deal with" a
defendant convicted of a first or second-degree offense by
imposing "a sentence of imprisonment." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). The
11 A-2530-16T2
presumption of imprisonment, however, may be overcome. Under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), a first or second-degree offender may be
given a non-custodial or probationary sentence, if "having
regard to the character and condition of the defendant, [the
court] is of the opinion that . . . imprisonment would be a
serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct
by others." Ibid.The presumption of incarceration for first and second-
degree offenders under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) "is rarely overcome."
Bishop, supra, 429 N.J. at 539. The circumstances permitting a
finding that there is a "serious injustice" overcoming the
presumption of imprisonment "are extremely narrow" and "should
be applied only under circumstances that are 'truly
extraordinary and unanticipated.'" State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J.
394, 406 (1989) (quoting Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 358). Where a
sentencing court does not impose the presumed sentence of
incarceration for a first or second-degree offense, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(f)(2) authorizes the State to appeal the non-custodial
or probationary sentence imposed.
The State argues defendant was convicted of second-degree
leaving the scene of a fatal accident, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, and
was therefore subject to the presumption of incarceration under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). The State reasons that because the court
12 A-2530-16T2
imposed the non-custodial sentence of special probation Drug
Court sentence for the second-degree offense, its appeal is
expressly authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). We disagree.
The State's reliance on N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) is
misplaced. Although N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) authorizes the State
to appeal a non-custodial or probationary sentence for a first
or second-degree offender, we find it does not authorize an
appeal by the State where a court imposes a special probation
Drug Court sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.
When N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) was enacted in 1978, L. 1978,
c. 95, the only means by which first or second-degree offenders
could be sentenced to a non-custodial or probationary sentence
was if the court made the findings necessary under N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(d) to overcome the presumption of incarceration. Thus,
by granting the State the right to appeal a non-custodial or
probationary sentence for a first and second-degree offender,
the Legislature could have only intended to authorize the State
to appeal a court's determination under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) that
"imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the
need to deter such conduct by others."
Here, the court's imposition of defendant's Drug Court
sentence did not require a determination under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(d). Defendant's sentence was imposed under a separate
13 A-2530-16T2
statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14,2 which was not enacted until nine
years after N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). Imposition of a non-
custodial Drug Court sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 requires
an analysis under a wholly different statutory standard than
under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). Because N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) was
enacted to permit only an appeal of a court's sentencing
determination under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d),3 we find it inapplicable
to an appeal from a determination to impose a non-custodial Drug
Court sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.
In its adoption of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, the Legislature
established an exception to the presumption of incarceration for
first and second-degree offenders that is independent of any
determination required under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). Although a
probationary sentence "is almost never appropriate under the
Code's sentencing provisions" for first and second-degree
offenders, a special probation Drug Court sentence "is another
2
L. 1987, c. 106.
3
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) also authorizes the State to appeal a
court's decision to sentence first and second-degree offenders
"to a term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower than that
of the crime for which [the defendant] was convicted." That
portion of the statute has no application here. The court did
not impose the special probation Drug Court sentence based on a
finding defendant should be sentenced to a term appropriate to a
crime one degree lower than the second-degree offense for which
she was convicted. The sentence was imposed based on the
court's determination that defendant was eligible for special
probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.
14 A-2530-16T2
authorized disposition under the Code." Bishop, supra, 429 N.J.
Super. at 540-41. "[T]he Legislature created special probation
as a disposition aimed specifically at prison-bound offenders,
who would not be eligible for regular probation." Id. at 540.
For a defendant otherwise eligible for a special probation
Drug Court sentence, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 renders inapplicable the
presumption of incarceration that would otherwise apply to a
defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)
provides that "[a]ny person who is ineligible for probation due
to a conviction for a crime which is subject to a presumption of
incarceration or a mandatory minimum period of parole
ineligibility may be sentenced to a term of special probation
. . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).
The statute further provides that "[n]otwithstanding the
presumption of incarceration pursuant to" N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d),
an otherwise qualified defendant may be admitted to Drug Court
provided the court makes findings of nine specified factors.
Ibid. The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 therefore
establishes a separate and independent standard for the
imposition of a probationary Drug Court sentence for defendants
who would otherwise be subject to the presumption of
incarceration under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). Bishop, supra, 429
N.J. Super. at 539-40.
15 A-2530-16T2
In its imposition of defendant's Drug Court sentence, the
court did not apply the presumption of incarceration under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), nor could it. The court never made
findings under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) permitting defendant to
overcome the presumption of incarceration, and the court was not
required to do so. To the contrary, defendant was sentenced
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, which provides an exception to
the presumption of incarceration under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d).
Unlike N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), which permits the State to
appeal a court's determination overcoming the presumption of
incarceration under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 does
not include any authorization for the State to appeal a
defendant's Drug Court sentence. In our view, the absence of
such statutory authorization requires the conclusion that the
State lacks the requisite authority to appeal. See Veney,
supra, 327 N.J. Super. at 460-61.
The State argues N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) authorizes it to
appeal any non-custodial or probationary sentence for a first or
second-degree offender. Acceptance of the State's reasoning
would permit the State to appeal every special probation Drug
Court sentence because a special probation Drug Court sentence
under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 may be imposed only on defendants who
are "ineligible for probation due to . . . conviction[s] for
16 A-2530-16T2
. . . crimes . . . subject to the presumption of incarceration."4
The legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, however,
undermines the State's position.
A 1999 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 expressly authorized
the State to appeal the imposition of a special probation Drug
Court sentence under certain circumstances. L. 1999, c. 376.
The amendment provided that a defendant convicted of "any crime
for which there exist[ed] a presumption of imprisonment pursuant
to [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d)] or any other statute" was ineligible
for special probation if the State objected to the sentence.
Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(c) (1999). The statute,
however, provided that a court could sentence a person who
committed an offense for which there was a presumption of
imprisonment to special probation, if the court found the
State's objection constituted a "gross and patent abuse of
prosecutorial discretion." Ibid.; State v. Clarke, 203 N.J.
166, 175 (2010). Where the court sentenced a defendant to
special probation Drug Court over the State's objection, the
amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 expressly authorized the State's
right to appeal. Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(c) (1999).
4
Special probation may also be imposed for individuals whose
convictions otherwise require imposition of a "mandatory minimum
period of parole ineligibility." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).
17 A-2530-16T2
The 1999 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 undermines the
State's position that N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) permits the State
to appeal a special probation Drug Court sentence. If N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(f)(2) already authorized the State to appeal special
probation Drug Court sentences for defendants otherwise subject
to the presumption of incarceration under the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(d), it was wholly unnecessary to amend N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 to
authorize a State's appeal of special probation sentences for
convictions otherwise subject to the presumption of
imprisonment.
We presume the Legislature was familiar with the parameters
of its grant of authority to the State to appeal sentences under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). See State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 381
(2012) (noting it may be presumed the Legislature is "thoroughly
conversant with its own legislation" (citation omitted)).
Indeed, the 1999 amendment makes express reference to the
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) presumption of incarceration. We also
cannot read the 1999 amendment in a manner rendering meaningless
its grant of authority to the State to appeal special probation
sentences for defendants otherwise subject to the presumption of
incarceration. See State v. Malik, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 278
(App. Div. 2003) ("[I]t is not proper statutory construction to
reach a result which would render a provision completely
18 A-2530-16T2
meaningless."), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 (2003). The 1999
amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 was not meaningless. The
amendment included a grant of authority for the State to appeal
special probation Drug Court sentences that did not, and does
not, exist under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). See In re Expungement
Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54 (2015) ("[A] change of language in
a statute ordinarily implies a purposeful alteration in [the]
substance of the law[.]" (citation omitted)).
Nevertheless, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 does not authorize the
State's appeal of special probation Drug Court sentences. In
2012, the Legislature repealed N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(c), and removed
from the statute any grant of authority to the State to appeal a
Drug Court sentence.5 L. 2012, c. 23. Following the 2012
amendment, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 no longer authorizes under any
circumstances the State to appeal a special probation Drug Court
sentence.
We interpret the repeal of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(c) as an
unequivocal expression of the Legislature's intent to deprive
the State of statutory authority to appeal special probation
Drug Court sentences. In the absence of any express statutory
5
The 2012 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 also "directly altered
eligibility requirements and procedures for consideration" of
defendants otherwise subject to a presumption of incarceration
or a minimum period of parole ineligibility. State v. Maurer,
438 N.J. Super. 402, 414 (App. Div. 2014).
19 A-2530-16T2
authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 allowing the State's appeal,
see Veney, supra, 327 N.J. Super. at 460-61, or a showing
defendant's sentence is illegal, see Ciancaglini, supra, 204
N.J. at 605, we are convinced we have no jurisdiction to
consider the State's challenge to defendant's special probation
Drug Court sentence.
Dismissed.
20 A-2530-16T2