J.L. VS. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF Â FAMILY DEVELOPMENT (DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4932-15T2
J.L.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
DIVISION OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT,
Respondent.
______________________________
Argued September 13, 2017 – Decided October 3, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Suter.
On appeal from Department of Human Services,
Division of Family Development, Passaic County
Board of Social Services Agency Docket No.
C395404.
Stanley G. Sheats argued the cause for
appellant (Northeast New Jersey Legal
Services, Inc., attorneys; Mr. Sheats, on the
briefs).
Victoria R. Ply, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General; Melissa H.
Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Ms. Ply, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
J.L. appeals from the June 27, 2016 Department of Human
Services, Division of Family Development's (DFD) denial of his
request for housing Emergency Assistance (EA) after a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). J.L. subsisted on $322
monthly from Work First New Jersey/Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families and $326 monthly from the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program while living with his mother for more than two
years. He paid $150 monthly rent to her for the last nine months.
J.L.'s mother wrote a letter stating J.L. and his son had to leave
her residence on June 1, 2016. The ALJ found J.L. to be incredible,
and found he was not homeless because his mother had not yet
followed through on evicting him and his three-year-old son from
her Section 8 housing although her June 1 deadline had passed.1
DFD further found that J.L. had demonstrated no evidence of a job
search and had therefore brought his imminent homelessness upon
himself.
At appellate oral argument, J.L.'s counsel candidly admitted
that we could offer J.L. no practical relief. See N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. A.P., 408 N.J. Super. 252, 261 (App. Div.
2009) ("An issue is 'moot' when the decision sought in a matter,
1
A court order awarded visitation to J.L. on alternate weekends
and one evening during the week. J.L., however, maintained that
his son lived with him and he was receiving benefits for both
himself and his son. See N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.3; N.J.A.C. 10:90-
2.7(a)(1).
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when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing
controversy"). J.L. no longer claimed to be eligible for EA and
the six-month period of ineligibility due to having caused one's
own homelessness without good cause, N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(3), had
run its course. This appeal raises no issue of significant public
importance that is capable of repetition, yet evades review. See
State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017) (deciding an issue
because it was a matter of public importance likely to recur under
the same temporal circumstances). We thus dismiss the appeal as
moot.
We note, in the hope of avoiding repetition, that the hearing
afforded J.L. was disconcerting in several respects. J.L. was
prevented from completing his testimony about how he spent the
money he received by the ALJ, who said:
I've been more than patient. I've tried to
help you. We're at — we're at the end of this
hearing. There's not much more I need to hear,
[counsel]. He's going to tell me he's bought
Pampers. He's going to tell me he bought milk.
He's going to tell me he bought food which he
can do with the food stamps. He paid $150 to
his mother. We can find that fact as well. We
all agreed on it.
She also went off the record in the middle of the hearing. After
turning the recording device on again, the ALJ noted that she "had
several words with Mr. L. who has shown complete disrespect for
the [c]ourt. I want the [DFD] to take note of that and I will
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make note of it in a full written decision that will accompany —
I'm not going to do it on a form anymore. I'm going back to my
office and write a full written decision." She said to J.L., "I
do find that you caused your own problem, because you didn't do
much for 29 months and you did it with a three year old." The ALJ
did not place on the record nor in her subsequent written opinion
exactly what J.L. had said or done that she found so disrespectful.
She did state in her opinion:
It should be noted that Petitioner was
completely uncontrollable during the hearing
and had a terrible attitude. He was
insubordinate on many occasions and I almost
had to end the hearing to have him removed due
to his total disregard for appropriate
demeanor in a courtroom. To that end, I FIND
he was a completely incredible witness and
really had nothing much to say about what he
did to prevent his own homelessness anyway.
J.L. was entitled to a full and fair hearing. Moiseyev v.
New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 239 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (1989). If the
ALJ determined that something significant occurred off the record,
it was incumbent upon her to relate what had happened in sufficient
detail to facilitate review by the agency and, if necessary, by
us. See Baghdikian v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Ramsey,
247 N.J. Super. 45, 51 (App. Div. 1991) (stating that "[d]isclosure
on the record is also essential for proper appellate review, if
necessary"). Without such a record, our only recourse is to remand
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for another hearing. Under these circumstances no useful purpose
would be served by such a remand.
Dismissed.
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