RONALD LONG VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5196-14T3
RONALD LONG,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE
BOARD,
Respondent.
_______________________________
Submitted February 28, 2017 – Decided September 8, 2017
Before Judges Espinosa and Suter.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole
Board.
Ronald Long, appellant pro se.
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Ronald Long (appellant) appeals the May 27, 2015 final
administrative decision of the New Jersey Parole Board (Board),
denying his parole and setting a 96-month future parole eligibility
term (FET). We affirm the Board's decision.
We recount only such facts as are necessary for our decision.
In 1985, appellant was convicted on all counts of a thirteen-count
indictment, including felony murder and a number of other crimes.
He is serving a life sentence with a minimum term of thirty years
and nine months on the felony murder conviction and, on the non-
murder convictions, an aggregate sentence of 61.5 years with parole
ineligibility of 30.75 years, to be served concurrently. These
convictions were affirmed on appeal, State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439
(1990) (Long I) and his petitions for post-conviction relief were
denied.1
Appellant became eligible for parole in May 2014. A hearing
officer referred the case to a two-member panel of the Board in
February 2014. After a hearing before the two-member panel,
appellant's request for parole was denied on March 17, 2014. The
1
See State v. Long, No. A-3860-92 (App. Div. Jan. 3, 1995),
certif. denied, 139 N.J. 441 (1995) (Long II); State v. Long, No.
A-6072-98 (App. Div. June 8, 2001), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 86
(2001) (Long III); State v. Long, No. A-0066-02 (App. Div. July
17, 2003), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 250 (2003) (Long IV); State
v. Long, No. A-4219-03 (App. Div. Jan. 27, 2005), certif. denied,
183 N.J. 215 (2005) (Long V); State v. Long, No. A-1413-07 (App.
Div. Aug. 14, 2009), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 548 (2009) (Long
VI); State v. Long, No. A-0913-11 (App. Div. Sept. 26, 2013),
certif. denied, 217 N.J. 304 (2014) (Long VII); and State v. Long,
No. A-4859-12 (App. Div. Oct. 15, 2014) (Long VIII).
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two-member panel determined that "a substantial likelihood exists
that [appellant] would commit a new crime if released on parole
at this time." That panel also referred the case to a three-
member panel to establish a FET.
Appellant sent a letter of mitigation to the Board Chairman
in March 2014. He maintained he had no criminal record because,
although he was charged with four offenses in Pennsylvania prior
to the December 1982 charges in New Jersey for which he was
convicted, he did not plead guilty to the Pennsylvania charges
until after. His only disciplinary infraction occurred in 1993.
Criminal charges against him arising from two fights while in
prison occurred a number of years ago. He attained minimum custody
status. He alleged the nature of his criminal record was not
increasingly more serious, and that no prior opportunities for
probation had failed. He referred the panel to a Channel 9 "I
Team" report, asking that it be reviewed. He maintained his
innocence of the convictions, citing to an unreported decision to
support his contention that only expert psychological analysis
could link probable recidivism with a failure to admit guilt.
Appellant appealed to the Board by letter in May 2014. There
he challenged the jurisdiction of the Board because there was no
pre-sentence investigation or pre-sentence report (PSR). He
alleged his constitutional rights were violated by a decision of
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less than the full Board. He reviewed N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b) in
support of his application for parole, noting issues he raised in
the letter of mitigation and maintaining that favorable
information was overlooked. He urged the Board to review
"purported confidential information."
In July 2014, a three-member panel of the Board concluded the
standard FET for murder was not appropriate for appellant, see
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1) & (c), imposing instead a FET of 96
months. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d) (allowing a three-member panel
to "establish a future parole eligibility date which differs from
[the regulation] if . . . [it would be] clearly inappropriate due
to the inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the
likelihood of future criminal behavior"). A Decision Narrative in
September 2014 supported the panel's decision.
Appellant appealed to the Board, again raising the alleged
absence of a PSR. He asserted the panel members did not comply
with their professional code of conduct and should have considered
mitigating factors, including his minimum custody status, lack of
a prior criminal record, and the fact that he was infraction-free
while incarcerated.
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The two- and three-member panels issued amended decisions
in May 2015. 2 In its amended decision, the two-member panel
continued to deny parole, determining that a "substantial
likelihood exist[ed] that [appellant] would commit a new crime if
released on parole at this time" and referred the case to a three-
member panel to set an appropriate FET. It added as mitigating
factors that appellant had no prior or minimal criminal record,
had achieved minimum custody status and that his last institutional
infraction was in 1993. It amended the reasons for denial to
remove that his prior criminal record was extensive, that a prior
opportunity on parole failed to deter criminal behavior and that
a prior incarceration did not deter criminal behavior. However,
the panel continued to deny parole, noting appellant's prior
criminal record, the increasingly serious nature of that record,
that he was incarcerated for multi-crime convictions, showed lack
of insight into his criminal behavior, minimized his conduct,
failed to take responsibility for the serious nature of the crimes,
and committed a crime while incarcerated, taking into
consideration the panel interview, pre-parole report and
documentation in the case file.
2
The two-member panel issued an earlier amendment in April 2014.
We discuss those changes with the May 2015 amendments.
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The three-member panel established a 96-month FET and issued
an amended Notice of Decision. The panel noted appellant committed
multiple offenses in Pennsylvania before the December 1982 murder,
which "dramatically escalated" his criminality. He was
incarcerated in New Jersey for eight separate offenses. He
committed an assault while incarcerated. He continued to minimize
his involvement in prior criminal acts and blamed his actions on
youth and the involvement of others. By not admitting guilt, he
"miss[ed] opportunities to explore [his] motivations." He
characterized himself as "less dangerous" than his "record would
otherwise reflect."
Based on a "comprehensive review of the entire record,"
appellant "continue[d] to remain a substantial threat to public
safety." It considered his letters of mitigation, concluding that
those issues were "already a matter of record" that he had the
opportunity to mention these at his hearing, but that "the
information [he] presented [did] not outweigh the factors
supporting the establishment of a[n] [FET] in excess of the
administrative guidelines." The panel concluded that appellant's
"need to distance [himself] from responsibility for [his] actions
render[ed him] unable to gain full insight into the root causes
of [his] decisions." He "mitigate[d] every admission by
attributing [his] culpable actions to others." For acts where he
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actually admitted guilt, he maintained that his involvement was
minor in nature. He had engaged in "damage control" that showed
his lack of "insight into these crimes." He could not identify
the causes of his criminal behavior. His answers at the hearing
did "little to suggest [he had] fundamentally changed and [was]
no longer . . . a substantial threat." The panel determined the
96-month FET was necessary, concluding that "after thirty (30)
years incarceration, [he had] not shown the requisite amount of
rehabilitative progress in reducing the likelihood of future
criminal activity."
In its final agency decision of May 27, 2015, the Board
affirmed the decisions of the two- and three-member panels, finding
that "the aggregate of information [had been considered] pursuant
to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11" and that there was support in the record
and documentation in accord with N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.18(f). It
affirmed the two-member panel determination that the standard FET
was "clearly inappropriate due to [his] lack of satisfactory
progress in reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior."
The Board affirmed the determination of the three-member panel to
establish a 96-month FET as set forth in the Notice of Decision.
The Board took into consideration the May 20, 2015 amended
Notice of Decision by the three-member panel. The Board found the
panel had "sufficient material [about] . . . his commitment
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offenses, criminal history and personal background at the time of
[his] hearing" and that appellant's argument about the lack of a
PSR "had no bearing" on the panel's determination. The Board
found that the panel relied on the sentencing fact sheet that
included "details regarding [his] original and final charges,
dates of arrest, convictions and offense, the State's version of
the offense, 'special factors' and prior record, as well as the
court decisions in [appellant's] case and the 'Reasons for the
Sentence' issued in [appellant's] case."
The Board cited to our opinion in Long VI where we rejected
appellant's PCR petition. We stated there that the "absence of a
PSR was well within the knowledge of defendant from the initial
resentencing and during all periods when the various sentences
were imposed." Long VI, supra, slip op. at 20. We concluded the
PCR issue was time-barred and declined to address it on the merits.
The Board found that appellant's entire criminal and
institutional disciplinary record was reviewed. When he was
charged in New Jersey, he already had committed "multiple offenses"
in Pennsylvania and was awaiting adjudication of those, one of
which featured violence and "foreshadow[ed]" his criminal offenses
in New Jersey.
The Board found that the panel correctly reconsidered and
removed as a factor "prior opportunity on parole has failed to
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deter criminal behavior" as a basis for denying parole. The Board
found mitigating factors were properly considered, which included
appellant's risk assessment, no prior criminal record, favorable
institutional adjustment, and the achievement of minimum custodial
status.
The Board agreed with the panel that appellant's record should
not be considered infraction-free because there was one
infraction, but that the panel also appropriately considered that
he had favorable institutional adjustment. The Board rejected
appellant's contention that the panel failed to consider gang-free
status or minimum custody status because those factors were taken
into consideration. The Board rejected appellant's contention
that it should not consider an assault he committed thirty years
earlier while incarcerated, finding that it was appropriate to
consider it.
The Board rejected appellant's contention that it denied
parole because he continued to maintain his innocence. The
decision was based on sufficient credible evidence that appellant
lacked problem resolution, lacked insight into his criminal
behavior and minimized his conduct. The Board found no
constitutional violations because appellant was afforded a parole
hearing that considered all records and information. It found a
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substantial likelihood he would commit a new crime and denied
parole.
Further, the Board rejected appellant's contention there was
a violation of Board policy or procedure or a violation by the
panel members of the professional code of conduct or that anyone
had a personal interest or demonstrated bias or prejudice.
Appellant appeals the May 27, 2015 Board decision, raising
these issues:
POINT I. APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR PAROLE
HEARING WITHOUT A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, AS IS
MANDATED BY STATE LAW, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE GOVERNING PAROLE HEARINGS.
POINT II. THE DECISION TO DENY PAROLE AND
IMPOSE AN EIGHT-YEAR FUTURE ELIGIBILITY TERM
BASED ON 'DENIAL OF CRIME' AND THE
'SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE' AT APPELLANT'S
TRIAL, WHERE APPELLANT HAS ALWAYS MAINTAINED
HIS INNOCENCE, ARE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND
SHOULD BE REVERSED.
POINT III. THE PAROLE BOARD ERRED BY RELYING
ON MISLEADING AND EXAGGERATED REASONS, AND
EVEN FALSE FACTS, TO DENY PAROLE AND IMPOSED
AN EIGHT-YEAR FUTURE ELIGIBILITY TERM,
WHEREFORE THOSE DECISIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED.
POINT IV. BOARD PANEL MEMBERS FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE BOARD'S PROFESSIONAL CODE OF
CONDUCT AND RENDERED DECISIONS BASED UPON
FALSE REASONS, WHEREFORE THE DECISIONS TO DENY
PAROLE AND IMPOSE AN 8-YEAR FUTURE ELIGIBILITY
TERM MUST BE REVERSED.
The scope of our review is very limited. "[T]he Parole Board
is the 'agency charged with the responsibility of deciding whether
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an inmate satisfies the criteria for parole release under the
Parole Act of 1979.'" Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 224 N.J.
213, 222 (citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.
Ct. 85, 196 L. Ed. 2d 37 (2016). "The decision of a parole board
involves 'discretionary assessment[s] of a multiplicity of
imponderables . . . .'" Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166
N.J. 113, 201 (2001) ("Trantino V") (first alteration in original)
(quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677 (1979)).
"[T]he Board 'has broad but not unlimited discretionary powers' .
. . . " Id. at 173 (citations omitted). The Board's decision
regarding parole will not be disturbed unless "arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial
credible evidence in the record as a whole." In re Stallworth,
208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted); see also Acoli, supra, 224 N.J. at 222-23.
Appellant is serving a life sentence for the murder he
committed in 1982. Under the statute in effect at the time, "[t]he
Parole Board's ultimate determination of parole fitness must be
based on whether there is a likelihood that [appellant] will again
engage in criminal activity." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd.,
154 N.J. 19, 39 (1998) ("Trantino IV"); see also Williams v. N.J.
11 A-5196-14T3
State Parole Bd., 336 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
165 N.J. 523 (2000).
Our review of the record and of appellant's contentions on
appeal reveals nothing in the Board's decision that was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. The Board's decision affirmed the
two- and three-panel member decisions made after their
reconsideration of issues raised by appellant. Those decisions
removed three reasons for denial of parole, and added an additional
mitigating factor. Appellant's arguments on appeal about those
four issues have no relevance because they were not the basis of
the Board's decision.
Appellant expressed that he did not think the Board "took the
matter serious," because parole was denied and a 96-month FET
imposed. However, the Board expressly took into consideration
appellant's psychological report and the factors set forth in
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b). The Board considered appellant's prison
history, participation in prison programs, counseling, his work
as a paralegal and in other areas within the prison, and his
minimum custody status. It took into consideration reasons for
denying his request for parole including his criminal record in
Pennsylvania, a record that increased in seriousness, multi-crime
convictions, a lack of insight into his criminal behavior, the
denial of these crimes, and that he committed a crime while
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incarcerated. At the hearing in March 2014, appellant minimized
his conduct, blaming others or circumstances for his offenses,
which showed no insight into his behavior.
Appellant was not denied a fair parole hearing because of the
absence of a PSR.3 Appellant did not present new information for
the Board's consideration. He cited nothing that should have been
considered, but was not. He was time-barred in 2009 from raising
the PSR issue in the appeal of his sentence and its assertion here
is no more timely. He cited no facts to support his contention
of bias or prejudice. Instead, the record shows the absence of
bias because both the two- and three-member panels reconsidered
based on the letters appellant submitted and amended their
decisions. He had ample opportunity at the hearings to explain
why he should be entitled to parole.
We disagree with appellant's contention that the Board cannot
consider his denial of responsibility for his convictions. The
Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. Long, supra, 119 N.J. at
504. The issues he raised post-conviction all were rejected. We
are satisfied based on the record that the Board's decision was
not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
3
We affirmed appellant's sentence in 2009 rejecting as out of
time his challenge based on the absence of a presentence report.
13 A-5196-14T3
Affirmed.
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