SILVANO COLLADO VS. ELI M. SALZMANN (L-4337-12, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3833-14T1
    SHAWN JULY,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    ___________________________
    Submitted January 25, 2017 – Decided            April 5, 2017
    Before Judges Simonelli and Gooden Brown.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Shawn July, appellant pro se.
    Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney               General,
    attorney for respondent (Lisa A.               Puglisi,
    Assistant Attorney General, of                 counsel;
    Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy               Attorney
    General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Shawn July, an inmate previously incarcerated at the New
    Jersey State Prison (NJSP), appeals from the October 29, 2014
    final agency decision of the New Jersey Department of Corrections
    (DOC), which continued his placement in involuntary protective
    custody (IPC).1     Having considered the arguments and applicable
    law, we affirm.
    July is serving a sentence of twenty-two years, six months
    and thirteen days of imprisonment, with a seventeen-year period
    of parole ineligibility, for aggravated manslaughter, weapons and
    drug offenses.      According to the DOC, July is a member of a
    Security   Threat   Group   (STG).2   On   March    12,   2013,     while
    incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison in Rahway, July stabbed
    another inmate in the neck with a shard of glass. An investigation
    by the Special Investigations Division (SID) revealed that the
    assault was precipitated by a gang dispute.        That same day, July
    was transferred from East Jersey State Prison to NJSP in Trenton.
    1
    On December 13, 2016, the DOC transferred July to the State
    Correctional Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, pursuant to
    the Interstate Corrections Compact (the Compact), N.J.S.A. 30:7C-
    1 to -12. As codified, the Compact "empowers New Jersey to enter
    into contracts with other states 'for the confinement of inmates
    on behalf of a sending state in institutions situated within
    receiving states.'" Van Winkle v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    370 N.J. Super. 40
    , 45 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:7C-4(a)).
    Following his transfer, the State filed a motion to dismiss the
    appeal, arguing that since July was no longer in protective custody
    in New Jersey, his appeal was moot.        In an order entered on
    February 14, 2017, we denied the State's motion.
    2
    A STG is a group of inmates who pose "a threat to the safety of
    the staff, other inmates, the community or causes damage to or
    destruction of property, or interrupts the safe, secure and orderly
    operation of the correctional facility(ies)." N.J.A.C. 10A:1-2.2.
    2                               A-3833-14T1
    July was placed in prehearing IPC the following day after a
    SID investigator received information that he had acted against
    the etiquette of the STG, bringing a negative light to himself and
    others.    The investigator determined that IPC was warranted to
    ensure    July's   safety   and   the       security   of   the   institution.
    Accordingly, the DOC continued July's placement in IPC pending
    additional investigation by SID.3             Following reviews of July's
    status by the Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) on
    March 26, 2013, September 30, 2013, and May 5, 2014, July's
    placement in IPC was continued.
    On August 12, 2014, the DOC served July with a "Notice of
    Protective Custody Hearing – Involuntary" pursuant to N.J.A.C.
    10A:5-5.2(c)4 notifying him of his upcoming IPC hearing before a
    Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO).            At the hearing conducted on
    September 3, 2014, July was afforded counsel substitute and the
    3
    N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.1(c) provides that prehearing protective
    custody "shall be used when necessary in order to conduct an
    investigation. . . . [T]he Administrator or designee shall gather
    facts, information and available documentation to support or
    reject the placement and shall order such additional investigation
    as is deemed necessary for a clear understanding of the case."
    4
    N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.2(c) provides that "[a] copy of Form 146-II
    [Notice of Protective Custody Hearing – Involuntary] shall be
    given to the inmate at least 24 hours prior to the in-person
    hearing."
    3                              A-3833-14T1
    opportunity to obtain and submit five witness statements from
    fellow inmates as well as other documentary evidence.                           July
    testified that there were no threats warranting his placement in
    IPC   and    argued     that   the   length    of   time   between    his   initial
    placement and the hearing violated his due process rights.
    The DHO relied on a confidential report5 prepared by the SID
    on May 8, 2014,6 detailing its investigation.               The hearing officer
    noted that the evidence July provided failed to contradict the
    SID's findings.          Specifically, the DHO determined that July's
    witness statements were "vague" and did "not assist" his position.
    Based on the SID's confidential report, the DHO concluded that
    July's continued placement in IPC "is warranted to ensure [his]
    safety and the security of the institution." The DHO also referred
    July's      case   to   the    ICC   for   a   possible    transfer   to    another
    institution where he can remain in the general population.
    5
    We do not discuss the contents of the confidential report at
    length here in order to preserve its confidentiality.
    6
    In response to July's objection to the delay in preparing the
    report, the DHO noted that, while the evidence is clear that the
    SID did not prepare the report within the prescribed time frame,
    there was no prejudice to July because the hearing was non-
    punitive.     Under N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.2(i), "[i]nmates placed
    involuntarily in Prehearing Protective Custody shall receive a
    hearing within 20 business days after receipt of the notice, unless
    there are exceptional circumstances, unavoidable delays or
    reasonable postponements."
    4                                A-3833-14T1
    Thereafter,    July   filed    an    administrative   appeal      of   his
    placement in IPC to the administrator of the NJSP.             On October 29,
    2014, the administrator affirmed July's placement in IPC.                    The
    administrator noted that the hearing complied with N.J.A.C. 10A:5-
    5.2, governing procedures for involuntary placement in protective
    custody, and "[a] review of all documentation support[ed] [July's]
    placement into this status."         This appeal followed.
    On appeal, July argues that his placement in IPC violated his
    substantive and procedural due process rights.              He also asserts
    that there is insufficient credible evidence to support the DOC's
    decision to continue his placement in IPC.           We disagree.
    The scope of our review of a final agency decision is strictly
    limited.    In re Taylor, 
    158 N.J. 644
    , 656 (1999).            When reviewing
    an   agency's   decision,     we   consider   whether:   (1)     the   agency's
    decision violates the New Jersey Constitution or the Constitution
    of the United States; (2) "the agency's action violates express
    or   implied    legislative    policies;"     (3)   there   is    substantial
    evidence to support the findings of fact upon which the decision
    is based; and (4) "in applying the legislative policies to the
    facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that
    could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant
    factors."      Brady v. Bd. of Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210-11 (1997)
    5                                A-3833-14T1
    (quoting George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 
    137 N.J. 8
    ,
    27 (1994)).
    It is well settled that decisions of administrative agencies
    carry with them a presumption of reasonableness. Newark v. Natural
    Res. Council, 
    82 N.J. 530
    , 539, cert. denied, 
    449 U.S. 983
    , 
    101 S. Ct. 400
    , 
    66 L. Ed. 2d 245
     (1980).       Accordingly, "[a]n appellate
    court ordinarily will reverse the decision of an administrative
    agency only when the agency's decision is 'arbitrary, capricious
    or unreasonable or [] is not supported by substantial credible
    evidence in the record as a whole."         Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr.,
    
    382 N.J. Super. 18
    , 23 (App. Div. 2005) (alteration in original)
    (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980)).
    "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"            Figueroa v.
    N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    , 192 (App. Div. 2010)
    (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 
    35 N.J. 358
    , 376
    (1961)).    "The term has also been defined as 'evidence furnishing
    a reasonable basis for the agency's action.'"              
    Ibid.
       (quoting
    McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    , 562 (2002)).
    Applying these standards, we discern no reason to disturb the
    DOC's decision to continue July's placement in IPC. The New Jersey
    Legislature has declared, "incarcerated offender[s] should be
    protected     from   victimization       within   [State     correctional]
    6                              A-3833-14T1
    institution[s,]" N.J.S.A. 30:1B-3(c), and the DOC is responsible
    for implementing this legislative mandate.                   N.J.S.A. 30:1B-3.
    Where the DOC has fulfilled its statutory obligation to protect
    an incarcerated offender by placing him in IPC, as here, its action
    does not implicate due process principles applicable to certain
    other disciplinary proceedings.            See Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 486, 
    115 S. Ct. 2293
    , 2301, 
    132 L. Ed. 2d 418
    , 431 (1995)
    (holding that administrative segregation and protective custody
    do not present "atypical, significant deprivation in which a State
    might conceivably create a liberty interest.").
    Nevertheless, the DOC's regulations specify the conditions
    of protective custody, N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.6 to -5.19, as well as
    procedures    governing   placement,       N.J.A.C.     10A:5-5.2      and     -5.3.
    Inmates may be placed in protective custody on the recommendation
    of the SID or correctional staff, or by order of a corrections
    official.    N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.1(a)(1), (3) and (4).               An inmate may
    be placed in protective custody voluntarily or involuntarily,
    N.J.A.C.     10A:5-5.1(a)(5)     and       (6),   but       an   inmate       placed
    involuntarily    is   entitled   to    notice     and   a    hearing    before       a
    disciplinary hearing officer, N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.2.
    The hearing must conform to the procedures delineated in
    N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.2 and -5.3.          Pursuant to those provisions: (1)
    the inmate is informed of all information relative to his placement
    7                                     A-3833-14T1
    "with the exception of information designated confidential[,]"
    N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.2(j); (2) is afforded an opportunity to "present
    any relevant evidence supporting or contesting placement . . .
    [,]" N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.2(d)(3); and (3) is entitled "to receive the
    assistance of a counsel substitute[.]"                 N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.2(g).        An
    inmate placed in IPC may appeal the hearing officer's decision to
    the prison administrator or his designee, N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.3, and
    is entitled to an in-person hearing once a year, or more often if
    deemed necessary, N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.4(b).
    Here, July argues that the hearing officer erred by relying
    upon the uncorroborated SID report, and asserts that there is
    insufficient evidence to support his placement in IPC.                        He also
    contends     that    his    placement     was    not    in   accordance    with    the
    administrative regulations and violated his due process rights.
    We    are    satisfied      that   the    DOC     substantially        followed    the
    regulations governing IPC placements, N.J.A.C. 10A:5-5.1 to -5.24,
    and   the    hearing       officer's     final    decision     was     supported     by
    sufficient credible evidence in the record.                     Specifically, the
    SID's confidential report supports the determination that July
    would   be    at    risk   of   serious    harm    if    placed   in    the   general
    population, and protective custody was warranted to ensure his
    safety and the security of the institution.                       Further, at his
    hearing, July was advised of the reason for his placement, provided
    8                                  A-3833-14T1
    counsel substitute, and was afforded an opportunity to testify and
    present evidence contesting his placement.
    Affirmed.
    9                          A-3833-14T1