IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HANS KOBIN (P-000012-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any cou rt." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2652-17T1
    IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
    OF HANS KOBIN,
    Deceased.
    _______________________________
    Argued May 22, 2019 – Decided July 5, 2019
    Before Judges Alvarez and Reisner.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No.
    P-000012-17.
    William R. Connelly argued the cause for appellant
    Peter Erik Davis (Law Offices of William R. Connelly,
    LLC, attorneys; William R. Connelly of counsel and on
    the briefs).
    Russell J. Fishkind argued the cause for respondent
    Nicole A. Onni (Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr, LLP,
    attorneys; Ronald Philip Colicchio, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In this will contest, plaintiff Peter Erik Davis appeals from a January 2,
    2018 order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Nicole A. Onni,
    the executrix of the estate of Hans Kobin. On appeal, plaintiff presents the
    following point of argument:
    THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
    ERROR BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    INSTEAD OF CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY
    HEARING.
    We review the summary judgment order de novo, using the same Brill1 standard
    employed by the trial court. Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 
    219 N.J. 395
    , 405-06 (2014). After reviewing the motion record in light of that standard,
    we affirm for the reasons stated by Judge Menelaos W. Toskos in his thorough
    written opinion issued with the order.       We add only the following brief
    comments.
    Hans Kobin (decedent or grandfather) passed away in August 2016, at the
    age of ninety-five. Plaintiff is one of decedent's four grandchildren. In a 2010
    will, decedent left his entire estate to his wife. However, the will provided that
    if his wife predeceased decedent, plaintiff would inherit $10,000 and the
    remainder of the estate would go to decedent's daughter Tiina and his son Mart.2
    1
    Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540 (1995).
    2
    The wife passed away in October 2015.
    A-2652-17T1
    2
    The 2010 will did not leave anything to decedent's three other grandsons. The
    will named plaintiff as executor.
    There is evidence that several years later, a rift developed between
    plaintiff and his grandfather. In a February 16, 2016 email to his grandfather,
    plaintiff stated that, due to his mother Tiina's "uncontrollable behavior" he
    would "never invite her into my home again." Tiina died on March 15, 2016.
    In a May 5, 2016 email from plaintiff to his grandfather, plaintiff acknowledged
    that the grandfather had told plaintiff's brothers that he was "disappointed with
    the man that [plaintiff had] become." In the email, plaintiff told his grandfather
    that he found the statement "deeply offensive" and asked him to "[p]lease
    explain (in English) so that there are not misunderstandings regarding this very
    serious matter." 3
    The record also contains a letter decedent wrote to a friend on May 11,
    2016, complaining that at Tiina's funeral, plaintiff "nixed" as "not needed" a
    suggestion to have a "Scout's Friendship Circle" in her honor. In the letter,
    decedent told his friend that plaintiff's statement "really hit me as an insult." 4
    3
    Decedent spoke both Estonian and English.
    4
    In the same letter, decedent told the friend that before her death, Tiina had
    reminded him that he needed to update his will.
    A-2652-17T1
    3
    Decedent's son Mart, as well as defendant, her husband, and plaintiff's brother
    Steven, also attested to the falling-out between plaintiff and decedent.
    On March 26, 2016, after the deaths of his wife and daughter, decedent
    prepared and signed a holographic will, naming defendant as executrix.
    Defendant, then a newly-admitted attorney, was married to another of decedent's
    grandsons, Mark Fischgrund.      There is no dispute that decedent liked and
    respected defendant and was very proud that she had become an attorney. She,
    in turn, viewed him as a surrogate grandfather. It is undisputed that decedent
    wrote and signed the holographic will by himself, sitting alone in his study,
    although he had consulted with defendant before preparing it.
    The holographic will left decedent's bank accounts, stocks, and bonds to
    defendant's husband Mark.       The will left decedent's house and all other
    remaining assets to Mark and decedent's son Mart, in equal shares, and did not
    leave a bequest for plaintiff or decedent's two other grandsons. 5 Several weeks
    after decedent wrote the holographic will, he asked defendant to prepare a
    formal typed will for his signature. Decedent reviewed the typewritten will and
    handwrote a few minor corrections. After defendant made the corrections,
    5
    Steven, one of the disinherited grandsons, testified that he "didn't have a good
    relationship with [his] grandfather." The fourth grandson was a drug addict who
    stole from decedent and whom decedent had banished from his house.
    A-2652-17T1
    4
    decedent signed the will on May 14, 2016. The formal will contained the same
    essential testamentary dispositions as the holographic will.
    Judge Toskos found that defendant and decedent were in a confidential
    relationship because she acted as his attorney, and there was at least a slight
    suspicious circumstance because her husband was a beneficiary. See In re Estate
    of Stockdale, 
    196 N.J. 275
    , 303-04 (2008). Judge Toskos reasoned that, as a
    result, the burden shifted to defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that the will was not the product of undue influence. See ibid.; Haynes v. First
    Nat'l State Bank of N.J., 
    87 N.J. 163
    , 176-77 (1981). However, the judge also
    found defendant carried that burden, and plaintiff produced nothing beyond
    speculation in response. The judge found no evidence that defendant exercised
    undue influence or that decedent was susceptible of such influence. He found
    that when decedent wrote the holographic will and then signed the formal will,
    he was mentally capable and strong-willed:
    In the final months of his life, the evidence shows
    [d]ecedent paid his own bills, managed his own money,
    invested in stocks, and routinely used a computer. . . .
    He was "extremely" intelligent until his dying day, was
    "sharp" and "stubborn" and not "weak or
    feebleminded." He was opinionated and not easily
    persuadable.
    A-2652-17T1
    5
    In other words, the usual hallmarks of undue influence were notably missing
    from the case.
    Citing In re Davis' Will, 
    14 N.J. 166
    , 169 (1953), Judge Toskos concluded
    that there was no evidence to overcome defendant's proofs. The judge found
    that plaintiff "cannot prevail because [d]efendant has assembled the requisite
    clear and convincing evidence that [d]ecedent was competent and exercised free
    agency when executing the Wills. . . . With all discovery complete and trial
    imminent, [p]laintiff's evidence still amounts to just speculation, innuendo, and
    unsupported hunches about [d]efendant's improper interference."
    Our de novo review of the entire record supports Judge Toskos's findings
    of fact and conclusions of law. The evidence was so one-sided that summary
    judgment for defendant was the appropriate disposition. See Brill, 
    142 N.J. at 533
    .
    Affirmed.
    A-2652-17T1
    6