STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. W.D. (12-09-0401, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5714-14T1
JACQUELINE HEREDIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
NICOLE TORRES,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATALIA A. PICCININNI,
Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________
Argued October 27, 2016 – Decided February 15, 2017
Before Judges O'Connor and Whipple.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-
2182-13.
Oliver T. Barry argued the cause for appellant
(Barry, Corrado & Grassi, P.C., attorneys; Mr.
Barry, on the briefs).
Stephen A. Rudolph argued the cause for
respondent (Rudolph & Kayal P.A., attorneys;
Mr. Rudolph, on the brief).
Michael J. Epstein argued the cause for amicus
curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (The
Epstein Law Firm, P.A., attorneys; Mr.
Epstein, of counsel and on the brief; Michael
A. Rabasca, on the brief).
New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys
for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar
Association (Miles S. Winder, III, of counsel
and on the brief; Lauren D. Fraser, John E.
Gregory, Liana M. Nobile and Michael R.
Paglione, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this automobile negligence action, plaintiff Jacqueline
Heredia appeals from a September 2, 2015 judgment and an August
7, 2015 order denying her motion for new trial.1 Plaintiff
contends the trial judge erred when he failed to ask prospective
jurors open-ended questions, as mandated by Directive #4-07, (the
Directive) depriving her of the opportunity to conduct meaningful
jury voir dire. Additionally, plaintiff argues the trial judge
erred when he declined to charge the jury with the aggravation of
injury charge found in Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F.
It is an abuse of discretion for trial courts not to ask at
least three open-ended questions of prospective jurors during jury
1
Plaintiff originally filed a Notice of Appeal of the June 23,
2015 jury verdict of no cause of action; however, she subsequently
filed an amended Notice of Appeal to reflect she was appealing
from the September 2, 2015 final judgment denying her motion for
a new trial.
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selection, as mandated by the Directive; therefore, we vacate the
judgment, and reverse and remand for a new trial.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged she and defendant were
involved in a car accident, during which plaintiff sustained bodily
injury.2 The limitation on lawsuit option (the so-called "verbal
threshold") applies in this case. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8. Before
trial, defendant stipulated liability. In preparation for jury
selection, plaintiff submitted five open-ended questions to be
asked of prospective jurors:
1. What are your feelings regarding the
proposition that accidents resulting in
serious damage to a vehicle may result in no
bodily injuries and accidents resulting in
little damage to a vehicle may result in
serious bodily injuries?
2. Describe by way of an example an experience
in your life that illustrates your ability to
be fair and open-minded in this case.
3. Who are the two people that you least
admire and why?
4. What would you do about the homeless
situation?
5. What would you do about those without
medical insurance?
2
Nicole Torres was a passenger in plaintiff's car at the time of
the accident. Torres also filed a complaint against defendant but
ultimately settled before the trial was over.
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The trial judge declined to include any of plaintiff's
proposed open-ended questions in the list of questions. The judge
found the first question "redundant." As for the second question,
the judge stated he would be asking many open-ended and non-leading
questions when asking prospective jurors seated in the box about
their biographical background; therefore, the judge found it
inappropriate to ask the question. The judge rejected the third,
fourth, and fifth questions because the questions did not "add to
anything" or were irrelevant.
As the array entered the courtroom for jury selection, each
prospective juror received the Civil Model Jury Selection
Questions, as promulgated by the Directive, without any open-ended
questions. The judge asked each juror seated in the box multiple
biographical questions required by the Directive.3 During jury
selection, plaintiff used only two of her six peremptory
challenges. See R. 1:8-3(c). Plaintiff's counsel advised the
court on four separate occasions the jury was satisfactory.
Trial commenced on June 18, 2015. Plaintiff called Dr. Young
Lee, an anesthesiologist specializing in pain management. Dr. Lee
testified plaintiff told him she had never been in a motor vehicle
3
These questions included, among others, how they received their
news, what their favorite television shows were, if they have any
bumper stickers on their car, how they spend their time, and if
there was anything else they thought the lawyers should know.
4 A-5714-14T1
accident prior to June 3, 2011. Dr. Lee also testified plaintiff
had disk herniation and while pain management could control the
pain, the herniation was permanent. Plaintiff also called Dr.
James Panaia, a chiropractor, who testified plaintiff had a
permanent disk herniation. Lastly, plaintiff called radiologist
Dr. Ralph Dauito, who stated MRIs taken after the accident revealed
disk herniation that would never heal to function normally.
Defendant called orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Robert Ponzio. Dr.
Ponzio testified plaintiff suffered a cervical strain and sprain
injury, and opined plaintiff's injuries were permanent. Dr. Ponzio
testified plaintiff had disc bulging, but he considered her
condition to be unrelated to the accident. Because plaintiff had
no prior history of pain, Dr. Ponzio conceded on cross-examination
it was possible to have degeneration in the spine without symptoms
of pain or discomfort, and a single traumatic event could cause
previously asymptomatic conditions to become symptomatic. Dr.
Ponzio testified disc herniation is a permanent injury.
At trial, plaintiff argued the judge erroneously denied her
request to charge Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F,
aggravation/activation of preexisting asymptomatic conditions,
based upon the testimony of Dr. Ponzio. The trial judge denied
the request because neither Dr. Ponzio nor any other expert witness
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testified an underlying condition was aggravated as a result of
the accident.
The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action on the non-
economic losses but awarded plaintiff economic damages of
$18,534.41, representing the full value of plaintiff's outstanding
medical bills. Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial on July 9,
2015, arguing the trial judge should have asked the open-ended
voir dire questions she proposed, as well as charged the jury on
aggravation of preexisting injury. After hearing arguments on
August 7, 2015, the trial judge denied the motion. This appeal
followed.
I.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court improperly
disregarded the Directive by failing to ask open-ended questions
during voir dire. We agree a trial judge must ask open-ended
questions pursuant to this Directive. We are therefore constrained
to vacate the judgment, and reverse and remand for a new trial,
to be conducted in accordance with the Directive.
The Directive provides direction from our Supreme Court about
how to conduct the voir dire process. See Administrative Directive
#4-07, "Jury Selection – Model Voir Dire Questions Promulgated by
Directive #21-06 – Revised Procedures and Questions" (May 16,
2007),
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http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/2007/dir_04_07.pdf.
The purpose of the Directive is to "empanel a jury without bias,
prejudice, or unfairness." Gonzalez v. Silver, 407 N.J. Super.
576, 596 (App. Div. 2009) (citing State v. Morales, 390 N.J. Super.
470, 472 (App. Div. 2007)). Among other things, pursuant to the
Directive, the trial judge is required to ask each juror at least
three questions that require answers in narrative form. Ibid.
Specifically, the Directive directs, in pertinent part, the
following:
In addition to the printed questions, the
judge shall also inform the jurors in the box
and the array that jurors will also be
individually asked several questions that they
will be required to answer in narrative form.
. . . .
The judge will then ask [the] juror each of
the open-ended questions, to which a verbal
response shall be given and for which
appropriate follow up questions will be asked.
. . . .
Some open-ended questions must be posed
verbally to each juror to elicit a verbal
response. The purpose of this requirement is
to ensure that jurors verbalize their answers,
so the court, attorneys and litigants can
better assess the jurors' attitudes and
ascertain any possible bias or prejudice, not
evident from a yes or no response, that might
interfere with the ability of that juror to
be fair and impartial. Open-ended questions
also will provide an opportunity to assess a
juror's reasoning ability and capacity to
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remember information, demeanor,
forthrightness or hesitancy, body language,
facial expressions, etc.
. . . .
The judge must ask at least three such
questions, in addition to the biographical
question and the two omnibus qualifying
questions. This is a minimum number and
judges are encouraged to ask more where such
action would be appropriate.
The Directive is binding upon all trial courts. See Gonzalez,
supra, 407 N.J. Super. at 598.
Here, the trial judge asked what he considered open-ended
questions; he defined open-ended questions as "questions that call
for something other than an yes or no response." However, the
questions the judge referred to were either the required
biographical or omnibus questions. Such questions may offer some
insight into the perspective of prospective jurors, but they do
not satisfy the mandate to ask open-ended questions. The Directive
unequivocally states the trial judge must ask at least three open-
ended questions. While the trial judge was within his discretion
to reject plaintiff's proposed open-ended questions, it was an
abuse of discretion not to ask any other open-ended questions as
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directed by the Directive.4
We next turn to the question of whether the error warrants
reversal of the trial judgment of no cause for action and the
denial of a motion for new trial. We have previously said judges
have an affirmative obligation to adhere to administrative
directives governing the voir dire process, but counsel also has
a duty to raise objection to the jury selection process. Gonzalez,
supra, 407 N.J. Super. at 596. We have also said there must be a
"miscarriage of justice" that resulted from the failure to follow
the Directive in order to reverse a judgment. Ibid. Rule 2:10-2
provides "[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the
appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been
clearly capable of producing an unjust result . . . ." Plaintiff
here requested voir dire questions ultimately rejected by the
court, with assurances open-ended questions would be asked.
Accordingly, we apply the harmless error rule to determine
whether the trial court's failure to ask additional open-ended
questions was of "such a nature as to have been clearly capable
4
Appended to the Directive are examples of open-ended questions
that may be used. The New Jersey Judiciary Jury Selection Manual
contains additional questions. The examples are not the only
questions that may be used. The court and parties may create
their own questions. See Administrative Directive #4-07, "Jury
Selection – Model Voir Dire Questions Promulgated by Directive
#21-06 – Revised Procedures and Questions" (May 16, 2007),
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/2007/dir_04_07.pdf.
9 A-5714-14T1
of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. Based upon our review
of the record, we cannot conclude the voir dire was sufficiently
comprehensive to ensure an impartial jury was ultimately
empaneled; the omission of required open-ended questions was not
harmless.
II.
Plaintiff also argues the trial judge erred by refusing to
instruct the jury pursuant to Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F. We
disagree.
Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F states in relevant part,
If you find that [plaintiff's] preexisting
illness/injury(ies)/condition was not causing
him/her any harm or symptoms at the time of
the accident, but that the preexisting
condition combined with injuries incurred in
the accident to cause him/her damage, then
[plaintiff] is entitled to recover for the
full extent of the damage he/she sustained.
[Model Jury Charge (Civil), 8.11F "Aggravation
of the Preexisting Disability" (1997).]
For an aggravation charge to be appropriate, plaintiff must provide
evidence to support aggravation of a pre-existing injury. See
Edwards v. Walsh, 397 N.J. Super. 567, 572 (App. Div. 2007).
However, if defendant raises the issue on cross-examination, the
charge would also be appropriate. Ibid. It is therefore the
plaintiff's burden to "prepare for comparative medical evidence"
or be "at risk of failing to raise a jury-worthy factual issue
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about whether the subject accident causes the injuries." Davidson
v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 188 (2007).
The failure to instruct the jury correctly constitutes
reversible error, Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677, 688 (2000)
(citing Patton v. Ambio, 314 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 1998));
however, the trial judge here correctly charged the jury.
Plaintiff's witnesses testified plaintiff did not have a prior
condition and the injuries she incurred were caused by the
accident. Additionally, plaintiff's counsel stated prior to jury
selection plaintiff was not making a claim of aggravation of a
pre-existing condition.
During trial, plaintiff's counsel asked hypothetical
questions during cross-examination of Dr. Ponzio to which he
responded it is possible to have degeneration of the spine without
symptoms, and it is possible for a single incident to cause the
conditions to become symptomatic. Dr. Ponzio did not testify
plaintiff had a preexisting condition exacerbated by the accident.
Counsel's questions merely elicited from Dr. Ponzio that it was
"possible." Additionally, plaintiff presented no evidence of
having a preexisting condition. The trial judge therefore properly
denied plaintiff's request to charge the jury with Model Civil
Jury Charge 8.11F.
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Because we reverse on other grounds, we need not address
plaintiff's arguments about the cumulative effect of the trial
court's errors.
Judgment vacated. Reversed and remanded for a new trial
consistent with this opinion.
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