STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TAARIQ MILLER (10-07-0851, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4857-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TAARIQ MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted February 1, 2021 – Decided September 9, 2021
Before Judges Hoffman and Suter.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 10-07-0851.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Taariq Miller appeals from a May 3, 2019 Law Division order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm.
I.
On March 26, 2007, defendant and co-defendant Willie Yeager followed
Naquan Archie into an apartment in Trenton and demanded $1,500 in cash.
Defendant and Yeager then shot at Archie. Defendant shot at Archie once before
his gun jammed; his shot hit the ground. Yeager shot Archie five times, killing
him.
On July 29, 2010, a Mercer County grand jury indicted defendant,
alongside Yeager, on the following charges: first-degree murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) (count one); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(3) (count two); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (counts three and
eight); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4(a) (counts six and ten); and third-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count seven).
On April 7, 2014, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled
guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1).
According to the plea form, the State agreed to recommend defendant receive
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539 days of gap time as jail credit and, if he did not, defendant could withdraw
his plea. The trial court imposed a twenty-two year prison sentence, subject to
an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period required by the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and dismissed the remaining counts.
The trial court also denied defendant’s request to apply the 539 days as jail
credit, and instead applied the time as gap time. Defendant filed a pro se appeal
of his sentence; we affirmed, and held "defendant received all the jail credits to
which he was entitled." Defendant then filed for certification concerning his
sentence, which our Supreme Court denied. State v. Miller, 224 N.J. 246 (2016).
Defendant filed a PCR petition on March 16, 2018, supplemented by his
PCR counsel's letter-brief and his and multiple potential witnesses' sworn
certifications. Defendant alleged he received ineffective assistance, asserting
his trial counsel failed to interview these potential witnesses and failed to seek
withdraw of his guilty plea after the trial court denied his request to apply 539
days of gap time as jail credit. The PCR court heard oral argument on April 1,
2019, and denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing in a written
decision, finding that "every alleged deficiency raised by [defendant] in his brief
and certification fail to show any degree of prejudice or are directly contradicted
by [his] plea colloquy."
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Defendant appeals, arguing:
POINT I
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING
HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY
ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WHO, IN PART, (1) FAILED TO
WITHDRAW THE DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA
WHEN THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT
APPLY ALL OF THE JAIL CREDITS THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS PROMISED IN HIS PLEA
AGREEMENT; AND (2) DID NOT CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION OF WITNESSES, INCLUDING
INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD HAVE REFUTED
STATE INFORMANTS.
A. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BY
FAILING TO MOVE TO VACATE THE
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA WHEN THE
SENTENCING COURT DENIED THE
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO APPLY 539 DAYS
OF GAP TIME AS JAIL CREDIT.
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BY
FAILING TO CONDUCT AN APPROPRIATE
INVESTIGATION NOR DID HE CONTACT
NUMEROUS WITNESSES, INCLUDING
INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD HAVE REFUTED
STATE INFORMANTS.
C. THE PCR COURT ERRED BY NOT
GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
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II.
We "will uphold [a] PCR court's findings that are supported by sufficient
credible evidence in the record." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013). "[W]e
review under the abuse of discretion standard [a] PCR court's determination to
proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387,
401 (App. Div. 2013). When a defendant challenges such a denial, "the question
before [us] is whether defendant has alleged any facts that, when viewed in the
light most favorable to him, are sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood
of success on his PCR claim." State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311 (2014).
To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must demonstrate that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and
(2) the deficient performance actually prejudiced the outcome of the
proceedings. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland test in New Jersey).
On appeal, we apply a strong presumption that a defendant's trial counsel
"rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise
of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. To establish
a prima facie claim, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of
succeeding under the Strickland/Fritz test. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451,
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463 (1992). To demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of succeeding under the
Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant "must do more than make bald assertions[,] . . .
[and] must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard
performance." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
Here, defendant contends trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
withdraw defendant's guilty plea after the trial court denied his request to apply
539 days of gap time as jail credit. The negotiated plea agreement permitted
withdrawal if the gap time was not classified as jail credits. Defendant also
contends trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate witnesses, who
allegedly could have refuted or cast doubt on the State's informants' testimonies.
Even if trial counsel's performance was deficient, we agree with the PCR
court’s findings that defendant's petition failed to establish that he was
prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. Defendant offers no
evidence in his certification or elsewhere in the record to suggest he would have
wanted a trial if trial counsel interviewed the potential witnesses or would not
have accepted the guilty plea without the jail credit. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."). Defendant also offers no
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evidence to suggest the State might have reasonably altered its plea offer if trial
counsel interviewed the potential witnesses or withdrew defendant's guilty plea
over the jail credit issue. Specifically, the potential witnesses' certifications give
defendant no shelter from the State's other potential witnesses who identify him
at the scene of the crime, physical evidence, and his own plea colloquy.
If defendant did not accept the plea offer, he faced a trial on murder,
robbery, and weapons charges, exposing himself to a potential life sentence with
a period of parole ineligibility of no less than thirty years. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(2). Given the State's offer to significantly reduce defendant's substantial
sentencing exposure and parole ineligibility, defendant fails to establish that it
would have been rational to reject the plea offer and that he probably would
have done so. State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011).
Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance, and
therefore an evidentiary hearing was not required. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462.
For these reasons, we find the PCR court correctly denied defendant's PCR
petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
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