STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. NICOLE D. ZAMBRANO-QUILLEN (15-04-0268, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1181-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NICOLE D. ZAMBRANO-QUILLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted November 2, 2017 – Decided November 13, 2017
Before Judges Simonelli and Haas.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County,
Indictment No. 15-04-0268.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Paul B. Halligan, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Sean F. Dalton, Gloucester County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Katherine Mika,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Nicole D. Zambrano-Quillen appeals from the
November 4, 2016 Law Division order, which denied her motion to
compel entry into the Gloucester County pre-trial intervention
(PTI) program pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(f). We affirm.
At approximately 10:42 p.m. on November 15, 2014, defendant
made a left turn off State Highway 42 in Williamstown and
encroached the path of the other vehicle, causing a collision.
Both defendant and the driver of the other vehicle sustained
injuries and were transported to the hospital for treatment. A
sample of defendant's blood obtained via search warrant revealed
her blood alcohol content was 0.283 percent, three times over the
legal limit of 0.08 percent. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
A grand jury indicted defendant for fourth-degree assault by
auto while in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and bodily injury
results, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2). Defendant was also issued
summonses for driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50;
reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; failure to wear a seatbelt,
N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2; and having an open container of alcohol in her
vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:4-51b.
Defendant applied for admission to the PTI program. The
Criminal Division Manager (CDM) considered all the material
defendant submitted as well as the factors set forth in N.J.S.A.
2C:43-12, Rule 3:28, and the Guidelines, and denied the
application. The CDM noted that under Guideline 3(i), assessment
of the nature of the offense, there is a presumption against
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admission into PTI if the offense charged involved violence or
threat of violence in the absence of compelling facts and material
provided by the defendant, justifying admission. The CDM found
that defendant made the decision to operate her vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, and defendant's choice clearly
created a risk of violence and injury, as evidenced by the
collision and injuries she and the other driver sustained. The
CDM also noted defendant had a prior DWI conviction in Bucks
County, Pennsylvania, where the court sentenced her in 2005 to not
less than three days and not more than six months in the county
jail. The CDM concluded as follows:
Given the violence and injury suffered during
the present offense, coupled with defendant's
prior motor vehicle conviction for [DWI], it
is the opinion of this office that [defendant]
has not presented compelling reasons
justifying admission into the [PTI] program
nor has she established that a decision
against enrollment would be arbitrary and
unreasonable.
The prosecutor issued a written decision denying the
application. The prosecutor considered the factors set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12, Rule 3:28, and the Guidelines, and concurred
with the CDM's reasons for rejecting defendant's application for
admission into the PTI program.
Defendant appealed the prosecutor's decision to the Law
Division. The court denied the appeal, finding the prosecutor did
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not improperly or inappropriately consider the factors of the
case, and there was no patent and gross abuse of discretion.
Defendant then pled guilty to fourth-degree assault by auto
and DWI. The court sentenced defendant in accordance with the
plea agreement to a one-year non-custodial term of probation. The
court also imposed a seven-month driver's license suspension,
ordered defendant to install an ignition interlock device during
the suspension term and pay restitution, and imposed the
appropriate fines, costs, and penalties.
On appeal, defendant raises the following contention:
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR'S REJECTION OF DEFENDANT FROM
PTI, WHICH WAS BASED, SUBSTANTIALLY, ON A
MISAPPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY BAR OF
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-12 AND [RULE] 3:28,
GUIDELINE[]3(i)(3) AND A MISUNDERSTANDING OF
DEFENDANT'S BURDEN IN PROVING HER
ADMISSIBILITY, CONSTITUTED AN ARBITRARY,
PATENT AND GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
We have considered this argument in light of the record and
applicable legal principles and conclude it is without sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
However, we make the following comments.
A "[d]efendant generally has a heavy burden when seeking to
overcome a prosecutorial denial of his admission into PTI." State
v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008) (citing State v. Nwobu, 139
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N.J. 236, 246-47 (1995)). In order to overturn a prosecutor's
rejection, a defendant must "clearly and convincingly establish
that the prosecutor's decision constitutes a patent and gross
abuse of discretion." State v. Hoffman, 399 N.J. Super. 207, 213
(App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. Watkins, 390 N.J. Super. 302,
305 (App. Div. 2007), aff'd, 193 N.J. 507 (2008)); see also State
v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003); State v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215,
225 (2002).
Here, there is no evidence, let alone clear and convincing
evidence, of a patent and gross abuse of discretion. To the
contrary, the record confirms that the prosecutor considered the
relevant factors and did not rely on inappropriate factors. The
prosecutor did not rely solely on the nature of the offense, the
injury to another, the prior DWI conviction, or defendant's BAC
at the time of the accident. Rather, the prosecutor relied on a
combination of these and other factors as set forth in N.J.S.A.
2C:43-12(e).
Affirmed.
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