RICHARD KLEIN VS. FRANKLIN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY VS. CHRIS DEBROCK(L-3099-14, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0125-16T1
    RICHARD KLEIN and VICKI
    KLEIN,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    FRANKLIN MUTUAL
    INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant/Third-Party
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    CHRIS DEBROCK and LAURA
    DEBROCK,
    Third-Party Defendants.
    _______________________________
    Submitted September 27, 2017 – Decided October 23, 2017
    Before Judges Nugent and Currier.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket
    No. L-3099-14.
    Gallant, Parlow, Lang & Bergstralh, PC,
    attorneys for appellants (David S. Bergstralh,
    on the brief).
    Sweet   Pasquarelli,   PC,    attorneys                 for
    respondent   (Anthony  P.   Pasquarelli,                 of
    counsel; Kenneth C. Ho, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiffs Richard and Vicki Klein appeal from the July 26,
    2016 order granting defendant Franklin Mutual Insurance Company's
    (FMI)   motion    for   summary       judgment.      After   a   review   of    the
    contentions in light of the record and applicable legal principles,
    we affirm.
    In the winter of 2014, plaintiffs noticed that their in-
    ground pool cover appeared lower than usual and they filed a claim
    for damage to the pool under their homeowners insurance policy
    issued by FMI.     After the snow and ice melted off the pool cover,
    plaintiffs stated that they observed a branch in the pool and
    noticed   tears   in    the    pool    cover   and   the   vinyl   pool   lining.
    Plaintiffs also reported that the pool walls were bowing inward.
    At   depositions,        plaintiffs     surmised   that     the   damage   was
    caused when a rotted tree branch fell from a neighbor's property
    into the pool.     Neither plaintiff had observed this event.
    In support of their claim, plaintiffs retained a public
    adjuster, Thomas Brett Jr., who opined in a one-paragraph letter
    that wind had caused a tree branch to fall, which had punctured
    the pool cover and vinyl lining.             He stated:
    2                                A-0125-16T1
    This puncturing lead to the draining of the
    pool, which negated the counteracting lateral
    water pressure and thus the lateral earth
    pressure buckled the main wall of the pool.
    Therefore even though lateral earth pressure
    eventually buckled the pool wall it was the
    sudden and accidental event of the wind
    displacing a tree branch that started the
    chain of events and therefore the damage to
    the pool should be a covered claim.
    To investigate the claim, FMI retained an engineer, Craig
    Moskowitz, MBA, MS, PE, who inspected the pool and observed several
    bowed walls and corroded metal connection bars.                  He also noted
    that the pool stairs were not level.                Moskowitz opined that the
    bowed    wall    was   "caused   by   weakening      support   connections       and
    differential movement of the ground/soil adjacent to such wall.
    The bowing of such wall most likely occurred over a period of the
    past 5-10 years based on my observations of the in-ground pool in
    its entirety."
    FMI denied plaintiffs' claim, asserting that the alleged
    damage    fell    within   the   "wear       and   tear"   exclusion   of     their
    homeowners policy. Plaintiffs thereafter instituted suit alleging
    that FMI improperly denied their insurance claim.
    Upon motion of FMI, the trial judge barred the expert report
    of Brett, finding it to be an impermissible net opinion. 1                      Both
    parties subsequently moved for summary judgment.                  In a written
    1
    Plaintiffs do not appeal from this order.
    3                                  A-0125-16T1
    decision of July 26, 2016, Judge Stuart A. Minkowitz noted that
    it was the insurer's burden to demonstrate that the claim fell
    within an exclusion in the policy to disclaim coverage.         The judge
    found Moskowitz's report satisfied FMI's burden as the engineer
    had provided "plausible evidence that the damage to the pool was
    caused by wear and tear over a five to ten-year period."            Judge
    Minkowitz stated that the expert evidence satisfied the wear and
    tear exclusion in the policy.
    Additionally, the judge further noted that plaintiffs had
    failed to present any evidence to dispute Moskowitz's expert
    opinion.     Their proposal that a tree branch had fallen into the
    water, tearing the liner and causing an imbalance resulting in a
    compromise to the integrity of the pool walls, was speculative.
    The judge found expert testimony was required to assist a jury in
    understanding    this   matter,   and   without   an   expert   opinion,
    plaintiffs could not prove the proximate cause of the pool damage.
    The judge granted summary judgment in favor of FMI.
    Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial judge erred in
    determining that they were required to prove causation for the
    claimed damages, and in accepting the defense expert's opinion,
    as it is the jury's province alone to assess the credibility of
    witnesses.
    4                              A-0125-16T1
    We conduct a de novo review, applying the same standard as
    the trial court.       Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire
    Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 
    224 N.J. 189
    , 199 (2016). Summary judgment
    must   be    granted    "if    the   pleadings,        depositions,    answers      to
    interrogatories        and    admissions    on    file,     together    with      the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to
    a judgment or order as a matter of law."                R. 4:46-2(c); see Brill
    v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 528-29 (1995).
    Rather, to defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must
    bring forth "evidence that creates a 'genuine issue as to any
    material fact challenged.'" Brill, 
    supra,
     
    142 N.J. at 529
     (quoting
    R. 4:46-2).
    After     reviewing     the   record,       we    conclude     that     Judge
    Minkowitz's factual findings are fully supported by the record
    and,    in     light   of    those   facts,      his    legal   conclusions       are
    unassailable.      We, therefore, affirm substantially for the reasons
    expressed in his well-reasoned opinion, and add the following
    brief comments.
    It is well established that insurance policy exclusions are
    narrowly construed and "the burden is on the insurer to bring the
    case within the exclusion."          Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 
    151 N.J. 80
    , 95 (1997); see S.T. Hudson Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pa. Nat'l Mut.
    5                                    A-0125-16T1
    Cas. Co., 
    388 N.J. Super. 592
    , 603-04 (App. Div. 2006), certif.
    denied, 
    189 N.J. 647
     (2007).
    Here, FMI presented expert evidence that the claimed damage
    to the pool occurred over the course of five to ten years.
    Defendant's unrebutted expert opinion regarding the damage to the
    pool satisfied the "wear and tear" exclusion of the policy.
    Plaintiffs    did    not   contradict       this   evidence,   other   than    by
    presenting an unsupported theory of how the damage might have
    occurred.    There was no issue of fact before the trial judge.               The
    grant of summary judgment to FMI is supported by the evidence in
    the record.
    We     find    the    remainder    of    plaintiffs'      arguments    lack
    sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.                   R.
    2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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