WILLIAM J. ENGELHARDT, JR., VS. DIANA ENGELHARDT (FM-15-0658-04, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1441-20
    WILLIAM J. ENGELHARDT, JR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    DIANA ENGELHARDT,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Submitted September 13, 2021 – Decided September 17, 2021
    Before Judges Sumners and Vernoia.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
    No. FM-15-0658-04.
    William J. Engelhardt, Jr., appellant pro se.
    Respondent has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff William J. Engelhardt, Jr., appeals from a December 18, 2020
    Family Part order denying his motion for reconsideration of an October 27, 2020
    Family Part order modifying his alimony obligation to his former spouse,
    defendant Diana Engelhardt. 1 Based on our review of the record, we reverse the
    court's order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, vacate in part the
    court's order modifying plaintiff's alimony obligation, and remand for further
    proceedings.
    I.
    Plaintiff moved for termination or modification of his alimony obli gation
    based on a reduction of his income following his retirement. The Family Part
    granted the motion in part, entering an order reducing plaintiff's alimony
    obligation from the $550 weekly amount set forth in the parties' 2005 judgment
    of divorce to $250 per week.2 Plaintiff appealed from the order, arguing the
    court erred by considering his retirement account, and the income earned from
    the account, in its calculation of the modified alimony obligation because he
    received the account as part of the equitable distribution of property in the
    divorce. Engelhardt v. Engelhardt, No. A-1183-18 (App. Div. Feb. 24, 2020)
    (slip op. at 10).
    1
    Defendant did not participate in this appeal.
    2
    Plaintiff's motion sought other relief not relevant to this appeal.
    A-1441-20
    2
    We found the court erred by modifying plaintiff's alimony obligation
    without precisely determining the amount of plaintiff's income from the
    retirement account and the increase in the account's value of the account that are
    attributable to the post-divorce account contributions. 3      Id. at 12-13.      We
    remanded for the court "to particularize those values, how the court derived
    same[,] and how they factored into the final alimony award." Id. at 13. We did
    not "express an opinion regarding the ultimate [alimony] award, leaving that
    determination to the court's good discretion." Ibid.
    On remand, the parties relied solely on the original motion record. In an
    October 27, 2020 written decision and order, the court found plaintiff's
    retirement account had a value of approximately $160,000 when he filed for
    divorce, and defendant received one-half the value of the account,
    approximately $80,000, in equitable distribution. The court also found plaintiff
    left those monies in the retirement account following the divorce, and that
    3
    Plaintiff also argued on appeal that the court erred by failing to consider or
    address the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3) pertinent to the
    determination of a motion for termination or modification of alimony based on
    a supporting spouse's retirement. We rejected plaintiff's argument, finding the
    Family Part "analyzed each factor of the statute, and detailed its findings of fact,
    recounting the parties' testimony, in determining the alimony award." Id. at 5
    (footnote omitted).
    A-1441-20
    3
    periodic, additional contributions were made to the account until plaintiff
    retired.
    The remand court considered the post-divorce contributions made to the
    account, as well as the dividends earned and annualized rates of return on the
    monies in the account. The court determined $158,864 of the account's balance
    is attributable to plaintiff's equitable distribution share and the income earned
    on that share following the divorce, and therefore that sum could not be properly
    considered in the calculation of plaintiff's alimony obligation. See Innes v.
    Innes, 
    117 N.J. 496
    , 505 (1990) ("When a share of a retirement benefit is treated
    as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution, the court shall not consider
    income generated thereafter by that share for purposes of determining
    alimony."); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) and (j)(3).
    The court found the account's remaining $62,280 balance is attributable
    to post-divorce contributions to the account and income earned on those
    contributions.   Thus, the court determined $62,280 was "eligible" for
    consideration in the calculation of plaintiff's alimony obligation to defendant.
    See Steneken v. Steneken, 
    367 N.J. Super. 427
    , 437-38 (App. Div. 2004)
    (explaining "a supporting spouse's pension may be considered for purposes of
    alimony to the extent that post-divorce earnings enhance its value"). The court
    A-1441-20
    4
    apportioned the $62,280 over a ten-year period, and concluded plaintiff had
    $6,228 per year, or $519 per month, in income attributable to the post -divorce
    contributions to his retirement account "available for alimony." The court stated
    it intended "to utilize the entire $519.00 towards the alimony obligation."
    The court then calculated plaintiff's alimony obligation based on the
    following findings. The court found plaintiff's gross income is co mprised of a
    $2,663 social security benefit, and defendant's gross monthly income is $1 ,577,
    which consists of a $1,127 social security benefit and $450 per month in wages.
    The court concluded "[t]his yields a difference of $1,085.00 in favor
    of . . . [p]laintiff."   Although not detailed by the court, we discern the
    "difference" to which the court referred is between what it determined to be
    plaintiff's gross monthly income of $2,663 and defendant's gross income of
    $1,577.4
    In its determination of plaintiff's alimony obligation, the court stated it
    "feels that the difference should be apportioned [sixty percent] in favor
    of . . . [p]laintiff and [forty percent] in favor of . . . [d]efendant." The court then
    concluded "the amount of alimony available for the obligation from [plaintiff's]
    income and retirement assets is a total of $953.00 per month which equates to
    4
    We note that the actual difference between $2,663 and $1,577 is $1,086.
    A-1441-20
    5
    $220.00 per week." The court added to that amount $25 per week in alimony
    based on plaintiff's "other assets, including [his] savings."5 In its October 27,
    2020 order, the court directed that plaintiff pay defendant modified alimony of
    $250 per week, and noted the modified amount resulted in a fifty-five percent
    reduction in plaintiff's alimony obligation. 6
    Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the court's order. In support of the
    motion, plaintiff did not challenge the court's calculation of the parties'
    respective incomes, its determination that he receives $519 per month in income
    attributable to post-divorce contributions to his retirement account, or its finding
    the alimony adjustment should be based on a sixty-forty split in his favor of the
    difference between the parties' incomes. Instead, plaintiff asserted the court
    made mathematical errors in its application of its findings and determinations.
    5
    The court's opinion contains a typographical error. The opinion states "that
    given the other assets including [d]efendant's savings, he can assimilate the extra
    $25.00 per week." The reference to defendant, however, is clearly intended as
    a reference to plaintiff.
    6
    As noted, the court's findings included determinations plaintiff should pay
    defendant $220 per week based on the income differential between the parties,
    and an additional $25 per week based on plaintiff's assets. Those amounts total
    $245 per week, and not the $250 per week the court ordered. The court did not
    explain the basis for the additional $5 per week incorporated into plaintiff's
    alimony obligation.
    A-1441-20
    6
    Plaintiff argued the court erred by failing to include the $519 monthly
    income from his retirement account in its calculation of his gross income.
    Plaintiff claimed that, as a result of the error, the income differential the court
    used to determine alimony was calculated inaccurately and he lost the full
    benefit of the sixty-forty split of the income differential the court found should
    be applied in his favor. More particularly, plaintiff argued the court determined
    the income differential between the parties was $1,085 based on the difference
    between plaintiff's $2,663 monthly social security income and defendant's
    $1,577 income. Plaintiff reasoned that if the court included his $519 monthly
    income from his retirement account, his gross income is $3,182 and the
    difference between his income and defendant's is actually $1,605.
    Plaintiff further contended that since the court determined the sixty-forty
    split of the income differential should be applied in his favor, he should have
    been ordered to pay only forty percent of $1,605, or $642 monthly, and $148
    weekly, in alimony based on his income. Plaintiff argued the court inaccurately
    calculated the differential without inclusion of the $519 income he receives from
    the retirement account, and that the court later added the entire $519 amount to
    his monthly alimony obligation without making any allocation of that amount in
    his favor based on the sixty-forty split.
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    7
    Plaintiff further contended the court's errors incongruously result in
    defendant's receipt of a gross monthly income, including alimony, of $2,660.33,
    with plaintiff's income—after paying alimony—reduced to only $2098.67. 7
    Plaintiff argued the court's errors "flip[] [the parties'] incomes to the point
    where . . . defendant is earning more and netting more than [plaintiff] on a
    monthly basis," thereby "discounting [his] good faith retirement while actually
    putting [him] in a worse financial position than . . . defendant."       Plaintiff
    requested that the court reconsider its October 27, 2020 order, include the $519
    in retirement income in the calculation of the parties' income differential, and
    set his modified alimony obligation at $150 per week. 8
    7
    The court's weekly alimony award of $250 totals $13,000 annually and
    $1,083.33 monthly. Plaintiff notes that after paying defendant $1,083.33 each
    month, his gross income of $3,182 is reduced to $2,098.67, and defendant's
    income, including social security ($1,127), her monthly wages ($450), and
    alimony ($1,083.33), totals $2,660.33.
    8
    A $150 weekly alimony obligation totals $7,500 per year and $625 per month.
    Acceptance of plaintiff's argument would result in a net income to him, after
    payment of alimony, of $2,557 ($3,182 – $625 = $2,557), and a gross income to
    defendant of $2,202 ($1,577 + $625 = $2,202). Plaintiff argued a $150 weekly
    payment is not only appropriate after the court's mathematical errors are
    corrected, but it is also fair and equitable because he earns much more than
    defendant, and a $150 per week alimony payment results in an allocation of
    fifty-three percent of the parties' total income to him and forty-seven percent to
    defendant.
    A-1441-20
    8
    In its December 18, 2020 order, the court denied plaintiff's motion, finding
    reconsideration inappropriate because plaintiff sought only to reargue the issues
    decided by the court following our remand. The order also denied plaintiff's
    request that his alimony obligation be reduced to $150 per week. This appeal
    followed.
    II.
    Plaintiff's notice of appeal only challenges the court's December 18, 2020
    order denying his reconsideration motion, and his arguments on appeal are
    directed to the court's denial of that motion. "We review 'only the judgment or
    orders designated in the notice of appeal,'" Kornbleuth v. Westover, 
    241 N.J. 289
    , 298-99 (2020) (quoting 1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc.,
    
    368 N.J. Super. 456
    , 459 (App. Div. 2004)), and therefore limit our analysis to
    the court's order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, id. at 299 (noting
    "the commentary to Rule 2:5-1 provides that 'if the notice [of appeal] designates
    only the order entered on a motion for reconsideration, it is only that proceeding
    and not the order that generated the reconsideration motion that may be
    reviewed'" (quoting Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 6 on R.
    2:5-1(e)(1) (2020)).
    A-1441-20
    9
    "[A] motion for reconsideration 'is not properly brought simply because a
    litigant is dissatisfied with a judge's decision, nor is it an appropriate vehicle to
    supplement an inadequate record.'" Guido v. Duane Morris LLP, 
    202 N.J. 79
    ,
    87 (2010) (citation omitted). Rather, a motion for reconsideration "is primarily
    an opportunity to seek to convince the court that either 1) it has expressed its
    decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious
    that the court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of
    probative, competent evidence." Kornbleuth, 241 N.J. at 301 (quoting Guido,
    
    202 N.J. at 87-88
    ). "[T]he aggrieved party [must] 'state[] with specificity the
    basis on which [the motion for reconsideration] is made, including a statement
    of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has
    overlooked or as to which it has erred.'" 
    Ibid.
     (fourth alteration in original)
    (quoting R. 4:49-2).
    "We will not disturb the trial court's reconsideration decision 'unless it
    represents a clear abuse of discretion.'"         
    Ibid.
     (quoting Hous. Auth. of
    Morristown v. Little, 
    135 N.J. 274
    , 283 (1994)). "An abuse of discretion 'arises
    when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed
    from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" 
    Id.
     at 302
    A-1441-20
    10
    (quoting Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 
    440 N.J. Super. 378
    , 382 (App. Div. 2015)).
    In his pro se brief, plaintiff reprises the arguments he made to the motion
    court. He claims the reconsideration motion should have been granted because
    the court made a mathematical error in its calculation of the difference between
    his income and defendant's by failing to include his $519 monthly retirement
    benefit in his gross income. He also contends the failure to include the benefit
    in his gross income resulted in a miscalculation of the income differential the
    court used to determine the modified alimony obligation.
    We agree the court was required to include plaintiff's receipt of the $519
    monthly retirement benefit in its calculation of the income differential between
    plaintiff and defendant. That benefit, as determined by the court, cons tituted
    part of plaintiff's gross income. Indeed, we remanded the matter for the express
    purpose of having the court precisely determine the amount of income from the
    retirement account so it could be properly considered in the calculation of
    plaintiff's alimony obligation and defendant's entitlement, if any, to alimony
    following plaintiff's retirement. See Engelhardt, (slip op. at 13).
    The court did not fully detail the calculations it employed to determine
    plaintiff's alimony obligation, and its initial opinion following our remand
    A-1441-20
    11
    includes statements suggesting it did not include the $519 in its calculation of
    plaintiff's monthly income and did not apply the sixty-forty split of the income
    differential to the $519. For example, the court stated it was its "intention to
    utilize the entire $519 towards the alimony obligation," and, when addressing
    the   income    differential,   the   court   referred   only   to   the   difference
    between . . . plaintiff's monthly social security income ($2,663) and defendant's
    income from social security and her wages ($1,577).
    We are not persuaded those statements establish the court failed to
    consider plaintiff's monthly retirement benefit in its calculation of his gross
    income and the income differential between the parties. Simple mathematics
    demonstrate that, as a matter of fact, the court included plaintiff's $519 monthly
    retirement benefit in the calculation of his gross income, the income differential,
    and the sixty-forty split the court applied to determine the alimony amount.
    With $519 in retirement income and $2,663 in social security benefits included,
    plaintiff's monthly gross income is $3,182. As noted, defendant's gross income
    is $1,577.     Thus, the monthly income differential between plaintiff and
    defendant is, as plaintiff contends, $1,605. Sixty percent of $1,605 is $963, and
    forty percent of $1,605 is $642.
    A-1441-20
    12
    The court found plaintiff's modified alimony obligation based on his
    income to be $953 per month, and it concluded that equated to $220 per week.
    We are convinced the court's opinion includes either a typographical error or a
    mathematical error in setting forth the monthly alimony amount, and that t he
    court intended to establish a modified alimony amount of sixty percent of the
    $1,605 differential between plaintiff's gross income, including the $519 in
    retirement income, and defendant's gross income. As noted, that amount is $963
    per month, not the $953 amount we conclude the court erroneously referred to
    in its October 27, 2020 opinion and order. The $963 amount could only be a
    product of the court's inclusion of plaintiff's $519 monthly retirement benefit in
    its calculation of plaintiff's gross income and the income differential the court
    used to determine the modified alimony. 9 We reject plaintiff's argument to the
    contrary.
    Plaintiff raises an additional issue that requires a remand to the motion
    court. Plaintiff correctly notes the court's October 27, 2020 opinion and order
    states the sixty-forty split of the income differential between the parties shall be
    9
    Based on its misstatement concerning the monthly alimony amount, it appears
    the court also erred by finding the weekly amount, based on the parties' incomes
    is, $220 per week. As noted, sixty percent of a $1,605 income differential is
    $963. A $963 monthly alimony obligation totals $11,556 annually, and $222.23
    weekly.
    A-1441-20
    13
    in his favor. In its determination of the alimony obligation, however, the court
    directed that plaintiff pay sixty percent of the income differential to defendant
    as modified alimony.      That is hardly in plaintiff's favor; it clearly favors
    defendant. As plaintiff details in his brief on appeal, if the sixty-forty split is
    applied in his favor, he will be required to pay only forty percent of the $1,605
    income differential, or $642, in monthly alimony based on his income. That
    equates to $148.15 per week.       In his motion for reconsideration, plaintiff
    requested that the court correct its misapplication of the sixty-forty split and
    enter an order modifying his alimony obligation to $150 per week. 10
    We are convinced the court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's
    reconsideration motion. The October 27, 2020 order, which plaintiff requested
    the court reconsider, contains a clear error in the determination of plaintiff's
    modified alimony obligation. The court erred either by failing to apply the sixty-
    forty split in plaintiff's favor as it stated it would, or by incorrectly stating it
    10
    In his reconsideration motion plaintiff sought, and on appeal plaintiff seeks,
    entry of an order providing a $150 weekly alimony obligation. Plaintiff's request
    is founded solely on his challenge to the court's application of the sixty -forty
    split of the income differential. He does not challenge the court's award of the
    additional $25 per week based on his assets. See Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
    v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 
    421 N.J. Super. 489
    , 496 n.5 (App. Div.
    2011) (explaining an issue not addressed in a party's merits brief is deemed
    waived).
    A-1441-20
    14
    would apply the split in plaintiff's favor, and then erroneously applying the split
    in defendant's favor.
    Because it is not possible to determine which of the two errors the court
    committed, we reverse the court's December 18, 2020 order denying plaintiff's
    reconsideration motion and remand for the court to reconsider its October 2 7,
    2020 order by resolving the conflict created by its statement the sixty-forty split
    would be applied in plaintiff's favor and its application of the split in defendant's
    favor. The court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting
    its decision, and enter an order establishing plaintiff's modified alimony
    obligation. R. 1:7-4. On remand, the court shall also correct the mathematical
    errors in its calculation of the alimony obligation. 11
    Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
    opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    11
    As noted, plaintiff did not seek reconsideration of that portion of the October
    27, 2020 order awarding defendant $25 per week in alimony based on plaintiff's
    assets. As a result, the remand court shall not reconsider that portion of the
    modified alimony it ordered on October 27, 2020.
    A-1441-20
    15