H.I. VS. S.I. N/K/A S.S. (FM-02-0339-11, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1161-20
    H.I.,1
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    S.I. n/k/a S.S.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Submitted September 13, 2021 – Decided September 20, 2021
    Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
    Docket No. FM-02-0339-11.
    Weinberg & Cooper, LLC, attorneys for appellant
    (Melissa E. Cohen and Gale B. Weinberg, on the
    briefs).
    Atkins, Tafuri, Minassian, D'Amato & Beane, PA,
    attorneys for respondent (Robert J. Tafuri and Christian
    L. Beane, on the brief).
    1
    We use initials in this opinion to refer to the child and his parents and the
    sealed Family Part records to protect the child's privacy interests. R. 1:38-3(d).
    PER CURIAM
    In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant S.I., now known as
    S.S. ("the mother"), seeks reversal of Judge Magali M. Francois' November 18,
    2020 order denying her motion which sought, in essence, to accelerate the
    process of her potential reunification with the parties' son, X.I. ("the son").
    At the time of the motion practice, the son was twelve years old and living
    with his father, plaintiff H.I.; his stepmother; and his younger brother, who is
    the child of the father's second marriage. The parties divorced in December
    2010. The mother has a long history of alcoholism, undergoing treatment, and
    relapsing, although she asserts that she has been sober for nearly three years and
    has been working in the field of education after reportedly earning a master's
    degree.
    The son has suffered emotional trauma due to the consequences of his
    mother's alcoholism and his parents' divorce. As a young child, he apparently
    witnessed his mother get arrested after being drunk and passed out at a New
    York City bus stop. More recently, the son alleged that during one of the
    mother's supervised visits with him, she was abusive to him and frightened him,
    at one point allegedly locking him in a closet. This allegation, which the mother
    disputes, was investigated by a child welfare agency in New York City, where
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    2
    the mother resides, at the referral of the son's then-therapist, but apparently the
    agency did not find evidence that the allegations were true. This incident did not
    result in a change in the mother's custody rights.
    The father became the primary caretaker at the time of the divorce, with
    liberal supervised parenting time initially awarded to the mother, who resided
    intermittently in addiction-treatment facilities.    In addition, a Guardian Ad
    Litem ("GAL") for the son was appointed in 2016 and her successor GAL
    continues to be involved in this matter. A parenting coordinator was also
    appointed to deal with the parties' persisting conflicts.
    Since September 2016, the son has been receiving therapy from Dr.
    Larissa Labay, a psychologist. In addition, he has been periodically evaluated
    by a court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Allison Strasser Winston.
    In February 2020, the parties entered into a consent order to establish a
    plan for the son and mother to begin reunification therapy together, the goal of
    which is to reacquaint the two and work towards developing a renewed
    relationship. The consent order contemplated that the son may not be ready to
    begin such therapy, and accordingly provided for the son to be evaluated by his
    therapists to assess his emotional readiness. Thereafter, Dr. Strasser Winston
    and Dr. Labay both submitted expert reports several months later in October
    A-1161-20
    3
    2020, independently recommending against taking any steps at that time toward
    reunification therapy.
    Both experts believe that the son is not ready to begin reunifying with his
    mother and that he continues to be traumatized by her previous behavior. The
    son has expressed that he does not wish to see his mother, who has apparently
    not seen him since 2017.       In particular, Dr. Labay made the following
    observations and recommendations:
    Over time, it became clear that [the son] was thriving
    in his father's home. Behavioral issues had subsided,
    he was excelling socially and academically, and he
    reported strong and positive relationships with his
    father, stepmother, and half-brother. [The son] began
    to express that he no longer wanted to attend therapy,
    because he did not want to revisit negative aspects of
    his history on a weekly basis. It was my belief as his
    therapist that sessions were more disruptive than
    productive, and that they interfered with [the son's]
    ability to move forward freely and enjoy his current
    circumstances. Trauma-based CBT therapy is the
    approach most often used when children have had
    experiences of abuse or neglect in their past. However,
    it is believed that children need to be encouraged to
    process their traumatic experiences gradually and only
    in a way that they can handle both cognitively and
    emotionally. If this type of therapy is forced upon
    children before they are willing and equipped to
    participate, therapy can do more harm than good and
    can potentially retraumatize them.
    [(Emphasis added).]
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    4
    Dr. Labay concluded:
    Given the belief that [the son] does not exhibit this level
    of readiness, paired with his significant psychological
    improvement, [the son's] therapy was shifted to an "as
    needed" basis, which is where it currently stands. His
    father and stepmother are aware that they can access
    therapy if any concerns arise, and [the son] knows to
    request sessions if he would like to meet.
    I have expressed in earlier communications my belief
    that [the son] should be re-evaluated every 3 months to
    determine his level of readiness for reunification. If
    [the son] verbalizes a desire to resume contact with his
    mother, he and [the mother] should work with a
    reunification therapist who can develop a gradual,
    stepwise, plan for in-person parenting time.
    Reunification attempts must be carefully monitored and
    any negative outcomes must be considered when
    deciding whether or not to proceed. All visits should
    involve professional supervisors who can effectively
    facilitate stable and safe visitation if in-person visits are
    to resume.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    On appeal, the mother argues the experts' opinions are skewed and do not
    adequately consider her current sobriety and the affirmative steps she has taken
    to become a stable parent. The mother further argues the experts and the judge
    improperly relied on the expressed preferences of a twelve-year-old boy.
    After hearing oral argument from counsel, Judge Francois denied the
    mother's application. She adopted Dr. Labay's recommendation that the son be
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    5
    re-evaluated every three months to assess his readiness to begin reunification
    therapy.
    In her oral ruling, the judge noted, among other things, the importance of
    not causing harm to the child, observing that "the child is not ready to do
    anymore than what is already happening. . . ." The judge did reject, however,
    the father's request that the court restrain the mother from bringing any further
    motions concerning the appointment of new experts and requesting new
    psychological evaluations of the son.
    We review on appeal the Family Part judge's determinations in this matter
    through a prism of substantial deference. In general, the decisions of Family
    Part judges are not set aside unless the appellant demonstrates that those
    decisions are legally unsound or lack support in the record with substantial
    credible evidence. Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 411-12 (1998); Pascale v.
    Pascale, 
    113 N.J. 20
    , 33 (1988). We must be cognizant of the judge's "feel for
    the case," especially given the expertise of the Family Part in dealing with family
    disputes on a daily basis. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. at 412
     (quoting Pascale, 
    113 N.J. at 33
    ).
    Although parents have a presumptive constitutional right to have a
    relationship with their children, those rights at times must yield to the be st
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    interests of those children. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 
    161 N.J. 337
    , 347-48
    (1999). The court has a parens patriae responsibility to consider the welfare of
    the child in resolving disputes over custody and the terms and conditions of
    parenting time. Borra v. Borra, 
    333 N.J. Super. 607
    , 611-12 (Ch. Div. 2000).
    In the present case, we discern no basis to second-guess the Family Part's
    determination that it was not in the son's best interests to force him to commence
    reunification therapy at that time. The judge reasonably relied upon the expert
    opinions of both Dr. Labay and Dr. Strasser Winston in declining the mother's
    application to require the therapeutic process to begin immediately. See City of
    Long Branch v. Liu, 
    203 N.J. 464
    , 491 (2010) (underscoring the fact finder's
    role in assessing the import of expert opinions).
    The court also reasonably considered the concerns voiced by the GAL
    about preventing the infliction of further harm upon the child. The GAL re-
    interviewed the son around the time of the motion practice and reported that the
    son "presented as frantic at the thought of seeing his mother again" and was
    "very agitated emotionally at [the GAL's] suggestion and questions" on the
    topic. The trial court did not, as the mother asserts, abdicate its decision-making
    role, but instead thoughtfully analyzed the child's best interests on the record
    supplied.
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    The mother argues that the trial court, the GAL, and the experts unduly
    deferred to the son's expressed desires. In this regard, she relies on a passage in
    a 1951 Supreme Court opinion, Callen v. Gill, 
    7 N.J. 312
    , 320 (1951), which
    observed that "[a] 12-year-old child has not attained that ripened discretion
    which enables him to determine conclusively what his own welfare demands
    . . . ." The mother overstates the significance of that rather old observation.
    Case law has since clarified that a child's preferences, while not dispositive, are
    important factors in the court's decisions. See, e.g., Wilke v. Culp, 
    196 N.J. Super. 487
    , 498 (App. Div. 1984); Lavene v. Lavene, 
    148 N.J. Super. 267
    , 272
    (App. Div. 1977).
    We have not regarded a child's age of twelve as categorially too immature
    to qualify as relevant to the court's analysis. Indeed, Rule 5:8-6 authorizes
    Family Part judges to interview children within the court's discretion, without
    specifying age limitations.      Historically, such interviews were deemed
    appropriate for children who were at least seven years old. Robert A. Fall &
    Curtis J. Romanowski, Current N.J. Child Custody, Protection & Support
    Family Law §23:3-6 (c)(2021).
    Here, the twelve-year old son's expressed anxiety and fear about resuming
    contact with his mother was a relevant and important factor to be considered by
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    8
    the experts and the judge. There was no need for a plenary hearing. In this
    regard, we note the GAL's cautionary observation that subjecting the son to
    additional interviews for litigation purposes could further traumatize him.
    That all said, we appreciate the positive steps the mother has made
    towards sobriety and stability, and her understandable desire to resume in-
    person contact with her son. Nothing in the November 18, 2020 order, which
    was entered about ten months ago, prevents the Family Part from reexamining
    the status quo. Indeed, if the recommended three-month cycle was observed, by
    now there should have been three updates provided to the GAL. We neither
    discourage nor encourage future motion practice, nor discourage the trial court
    and the experts from reconsidering the three-month pattern as circumstances
    unfold.
    Affirmed.
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