STEVEN PRIOLO, ETC. v. SHORROCK GARDEN CARE CENTER (L-2263-20, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3032-20
    STEVEN PRIOLO, as
    administrator ad prosequendum
    of the Estate of DOROTHY
    PRIOLO and STEVEN PRIOLO,
    individually,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    SHORROCK GARDEN CARE
    CENTER,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    Submitted September 12, 2022 - Decided September 20, 2022
    Before Judges Currier and Bishop-Thompson.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2263-20.
    Richard A. Amdur, Jr., attorney for appellant.
    Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, attorneys for
    respondent (Malinda A. Miller, of counsel and on the
    brief; Alex W. Raybould and S. Christopher Martino,
    on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Dorothy Priolo was a resident at defendant's assisted living facility when
    she contracted COVID-19, leading to her death on April 17, 2020.1 Plaintiff
    alleges defendant was negligent "in failing to implement and execute
    appropriate protocols and standards for managing and minimizing the existing
    threat and risks posed by the COVID-19 virus." Plaintiff further contends
    defendant did not follow State mandated guidelines regarding the management
    and containment of the virus, did not properly implement testing protocols,
    visitation policies, and employee testing, and failed to establish the enforcement
    and procurement of personal protection equipment and employee contact
    procedures.
    After defendant filed an answer asserting statutory defenses and
    requesting plaintiff provide an affidavit of merit (AOM), plaintiff served an
    AOM on April 6, 2021 authored by Bruce H. Podrat, MBA/MHA. According
    to his curriculum vitae, Podrat is a healthcare administrative consultant who
    specializes in assisting healthcare systems, including assisted living facilities,
    to "achieve strategic business objectives." He certified he was "experienced
    1
    The death certificate listed the cause of death as cardiac arrest, hypoxic
    respiratory failure, and COVID-19 infection.
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    2
    with assisted living and nursing home administrative standard of care issues
    based on [his] training, education and experience with nursing home[s], assisted
    living facilities and lifecare facilities."
    Defendant objected to plaintiff's AOM, asserting Podrat was not a licensed
    medical professional, a licensed nursing home administrator or a certified
    assisted living administrator. Therefore, Podrat was not qualified to offer an
    opinion regarding the standard of care owed to decedent from an assisted living
    facility. During an April 22, 2021 Ferreira2 conference, the court advised
    plaintiff the AOM did not meet the statutory requirements under N.J.S.A.
    2A:53A-27.        The    court   permitted        plaintiff   to   submit   supplemental
    documentation.
    Thereafter, the court conducted a hearing in an attempt to resolve the
    issues regarding plaintiff's AOM.        Failing to reach a resolution, the court
    directed defendant to file the appropriate motion.
    Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the
    AOM statute, failure to state a cause of action under the New Jersey COVID-19
    Immunity Act, P.L. 2020, c.18, and failure to state a claim under the Public
    Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
    2
    Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 
    178 N.J. 144
     (2003).
    A-3032-20
    3
    On June 24, 2021, the trial court issued an order and written opinion
    granting the motion to dismiss.3 The court found plaintiff was required to serve
    an AOM because defendant was a licensed person under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26(j)
    as a health care facility defined under N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2. The court relied on the
    definition of a "health care facility" which includes, but is not limited to, "a
    rehabilitation center, extended care facility, skilled nursing home, . . . residential
    health care facility, [and] dementia care home."              N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2(a).
    Therefore, plaintiff required an AOM from a licensed person having the
    requisite expertise in the administration of an assisted care facility to opine on
    the applicable standard of care.
    We review de novo a trial court's determination of a motion to dismiss
    under Rule 4:6-2(e). Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo,
    Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 
    237 N.J. 91
    , 108 (2019) (citing Stop & Shop
    Supermarket Co., LLC v. Cnty. of Bergen, 
    450 N.J. Super. 286
    , 290 (App. Div.
    2017)). "[N]o deference [is owed] to the trial court's legal conclusions." 
    Ibid.
    (citing Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 
    423 N.J. Super. 103
    ,
    114 (App. Div. 2011)).
    3
    The court dismissed the complaint due to plaintiff's failure to serve the
    required AOM. The court did not address the additional grounds asserted for
    dismissal.
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    4
    Our review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability,
    validity (including constitutionality) or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules
    is also de novo. See Meehan v. Antonellis, 
    226 N.J. 216
    , 230 (2016).
    On appeal, plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in finding defendant is a
    health care facility as defined under N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2, thus requiring plaintiff
    to serve a compliant AOM.
    In any action for damages for negligence by a licensed person in their
    profession or occupation, plaintiff must provide defendant, within sixty days of
    defendant's answer, 4 an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person stating that
    "there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised
    or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the
    complaint, fell outside acceptable professional . . . practices." N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-
    27.
    The definition of a "licensed person" under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 includes
    "a health care facility as defined in . . . ([the Health Care Facilities Planning Act
    (HCFPA), N.J.S.A.] 26:2H-2)." Under N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2, a health care facility
    is
    4
    The court may grant one additional period, not to exceed sixty days, to file the
    affidavit of merit for "good cause." N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.
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    5
    the facility or institution, whether public or private, that
    is engaged principally in providing services for health
    maintenance organizations, diagnosis, or treatment of
    human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or physical
    condition, including, but not limited to, a general
    hospital, special hospital, mental hospital, public health
    center,     diagnostic      center,   treatment     center,
    rehabilitation center, extended care facility, skilled
    nursing home, nursing home, intermediate care facility,
    tuberculosis hospital, chronic disease hospital,
    maternity hospital, outpatient clinic, dispensary, home
    health care agency, residential health care facility,
    [and] dementia care home. . . .
    [emphasis added.]
    The purpose of the affidavit of merit statute "is laudatory—to weed out
    frivolous claims against licensed professionals early in the litigation process."
    Meehan, 226 N.J. at 228 (citing Ferreira, 
    178 N.J. at 146
    ).
    In interpreting a statute, courts must discern and effectuate the
    Legislature's intent. 
    Id. at 232
    . The best indicator of that intent is the statutory
    language itself. DiProspero v. Penn, 
    183 N.J. 477
    , 492 (2005). Therefore, we
    begin with the words of the statute and ascribe to them their ordinary meaning.
    Mason v. City of Hoboken, 
    196 N.J. 51
    , 68 (2008).
    A reading of the statute reveals the Legislature did not explicitly include
    "assisted living facility" in its definition of health care facility under N.J.S.A.
    26:2H-2. However, since the statute is part of a larger framework, we read it i n
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    6
    connection with the other parts to give meaning to the legislative scheme.
    Wilson ex. rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 
    209 N.J. 558
    , 572 (2012) (citing
    Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 
    108 N.J. 123
    , 129 (1987)).
    N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2 plainly defines a "health care facility" as "the facility or
    institution . . . engaged principally in providing services for health maintenance
    organizations, diagnosis, or treatment of human disease, pain, injury, deformity,
    or physical condition, including, but not limited to, a general hospital . . .
    extended care facility, skilled nursing home, nursing home, . . . residential health
    care facility, [and] dementia care home . . . ." (emphasis added). The HCFPA
    also defines an "[a]ssisted living facility" as an "assisted living residence or
    comprehensive personal care home pursuant to . . . ([N.J.S.A.] 26:2H-1 . . . .)"
    N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.56. And "[a]ssisted living" is defined as "a coordinated array
    of supported personal and health services, available [twenty-four] hours per day,
    which promote resident self-direction and participation in decisions that
    emphasize independence, individuality, privacy, dignity, and homelike
    surroundings to residents who have been assessed to need these services,
    including residents who require formal long-term care." N.J.S.A. 26:2H-7.15
    (emphasis added).
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    7
    It cannot be disputed that defendant provides health services and is similar
    in nature to a "a general hospital . . . extended care facility, skilled nursing home,
    nursing home, . . . residential health care facility, [and] dementia care home."
    N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2. As all these entities are included in the definition of a health
    care facility, we can infer the Legislature intended an assisted living facility to
    also fall within the statute and be considered a health care facility subject to the
    requirements of the AOM statute.
    Moreover, we note defendant is licensed by the New Jersey State
    Department of Health and regulated under N.J.A.C. 8:36-1 to -21. To achieve
    the license, an assisted living facility must be capable of providing "assistance
    with personal care, nursing, pharmacy, dining, activities, recreational, and social
    work services to meet the individual needs of each resident." N.J.A.C. 8:36-
    5.1(b). The facility must also be capable of providing the supervision of self-
    administered medication and administration of medications by trained and
    supervised personnel. N.J.A.C. 8:36-5.1(c) to (d). And an assisted living facility
    must always have at least one registered professional nurse available to its
    residents.   N.J.A.C 8:36-8.2.      In providing personal and health services,
    including nursing and pharmacy services, defendant is a health care facility as
    defined under N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2.
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    In addition, the list of facilities included in N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2 is not meant
    to be exclusive as noted by the Legislature's addition of the phrase "including,
    but not limited to." In fact, the Legislature explicitly excluded certain entities
    from the definition of health care facility, such as institutions that provide
    healing solely by prayer. See N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2(a). An assisted living facility
    was not an excluded entity.
    Because we have found defendant is a health care facility to which the
    AOM statute is applicable, plaintiff was required to serve an appropriate AOM
    to support its complaint.     The person executing the AOM must meet the
    requirements under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 and, in addition to holding a
    professional license, also have particular expertise in the general area o r
    specialty involved in the action. Podrat cannot meet those requirements. He is
    not licensed as a physician or nurse or a nursing home administrator. Nor is
    Podrat a certified assisted living administrator. Therefore, Podrat does not have
    the qualifications to opine on the standard of care required of an assisted care
    facility during the first months of the COVID-19 epidemic.
    Without the requisite AOM, plaintiff cannot support its cause of action.
    The trial court properly dismissed the complaint.
    Affirmed.
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