ANDRE COARD VS. OAKS INTEGRATED CARE, INC. (L-1329-16, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1201-17T2
ANDRE COARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OAKS INTEGRATED CARE, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.
______________________________
Submitted April 8, 2019 – Decided May 3, 2019
Before Judges Messano and Fasciale.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-1329-16.
Cohen Fineman, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Samuel
B. Fineman, of counsel and on the brief).
Capehart & Scatchard, PA, attorneys for respondent
(Joseph F. Betley and Sanmathi Dev, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Andre Coard appeals the Law Division's September 29, 2017
order granting defendant Oaks Integrated Care, Inc. summary judgment and
dismissing plaintiff's claims with prejudice. Plaintiff, a former employee of
defendant, alleges that he was terminated without cause and because of his race,
in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A.
10:5-1 to -49.
I.
Plaintiff, who is African-American, began working for defendant in 2014
as a residential assistant at defendant's group home, which provides services to
autistic and developmentally challenged youth. Plaintiff's immediate supervisor
reported directly to Colleen Mosco, the program supervisor. Plaintiff premised
the allegation that he was terminated in 2016 because of his race on comments
Mosco allegedly made questioning plaintiff's ability to afford certain "luxuries,"
such as designer jeans, sneakers, rental cars, and vacations. Plaintiff claimed
these comments evidenced Mosco's racial stereotyping and led him to believe
that Mosco had a negative opinion of African-American men. In his deposition,
however, plaintiff said he "d[id] not have facts" demonstrating Mosco
discriminated against him based on his race.
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In December 2015, Mosco received an anonymous text message from
another employee alleging plaintiff was "smoking marijuana outside of the
group[]home" and left work to meet with strangers in the driveway of the group
home. Mosco suspended plaintiff pending an investigation. Lola Heath, an
employee in defendant's Human Resources Department, mailed plaintiff an
unemployment benefits claim form and advised plaintiff over the telephone that
he was eligible to collect unemployment benefits while suspended. However,
the claim form indicated plaintiff's "[s]eparation" was "permanent." Plaintiff
asserted defendant did this purposely, evidencing its intention to permanently
terminate his employment. Plaintiff believed he was "fired" when he received
the unemployment form.
Plaintiff voluntarily submitted to a drug test, which was negative. In his
deposition, plaintiff acknowledged that he never called defendant after he
received the unemployment form, or after he received the negative drug test
results.
Mosco conducted and concluded an internal investigation within two
weeks. She determined the allegations against plaintiff were unsubstantiated
and that plaintiff was eligible to return to work. Mosco tried calling him to
schedule his return on more than one occasion, but plaintiff testified in his
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deposition that he did not return the calls. Heath also called plaintiff and left a
voicemail, but he did not return her phone call. Instead, plaintiff sent a text
message to Mosco with his attorney's contact information. On February 10,
2016, Heath sent a letter to plaintiff via certified mail terminating his
employment due to his violation of defendant's attendance and conflict
resolution policy.
Defendant moved for summary judgment. In a concise and thorough
written statement of reasons, the motion judge determined that plaintiff's
"subjective feelings of race-based discrimination" failed to demonstrate a prima
facie violation of the LAD. The judge also decided that assuming arguendo
plaintiff did demonstrate a prima facie case, defendant provided "two legitimate
non-discriminatory reasons for [p]laintiff's dismissal," and plaintiff failed to
provide any evidence to rebut those reasons. She entered the order under review.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the judge erred by (1) finding that plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the LAD; (2)
finding that defendant provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
plaintiff's termination; and (3) relying on unpublished decisions for the
proposition that subjective feelings of race-based bias do not establish a
discriminatory inference.
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II.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard used by the trial court, which
mandates that summary judgment be granted "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment or order as a matter of law."
[Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (quoting R.
4:46-2(c)).]
We also determine "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to
permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406
(2014) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995)). We owe no deference to the trial court's legal analysis or interpretation
of a statute. Palisades at Fort Lee Condo. Ass'n v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230
N.J. 427, 442 (2017) (citing Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 512 (2009)).
The LAD makes it illegal for an employer to discharge or discriminate
against an employee on the basis of race. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12. "If direct evidence
of discrimination is unavailable, a plaintiff may prove [his or] her claim by
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circumstantial evidence." Grande v. St. Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 17
(2017). "To address the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, New Jersey
has adopted the procedural burden-shifting methodology" articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005). That
burden-shifting paradigm requires:
(1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient
evidence to constitute a prima facie case of
discrimination; (2) the defendant then must show a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision;
and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity
to show that defendant's stated reason was merely a
pretext or discriminatory in its application.
[Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320,
331 (2010) (quoting Dixon v. Rutgers, The State Univ.
of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 442 (1988)).]
In an alleged discriminatory discharge case, "a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) he was in the protected group; (2) he was performing his job at a level that
met his employer's legitimate expectations; (3) he nevertheless was fired; and
(4) the employer sought someone to perform the same work after he left." Zive,
182 N.J. at 450 (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 597 (1988)).
As to the fourth element, in Williams v. Pemberton Township Public Schools, —
also a race-based LAD case — we noted the federal courts' struggle in
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determining the proper formulation of the fourth element and the varying results
across the courts. 323 N.J. Super. 490, 501 (App. Div. 1999). We concluded
that "[t]he appropriate fourth element of a plaintiff's prima facie case requires a
showing that the challenged employment decision (i.e., failure to hire, failure to
promote, wrongful discharge) took place under circumstances that give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination." Id. at 502 (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
Here, as the motion judge noted, the first three elements of plaintiff's
prima facie case are undisputed. However, we agree that plaintiff failed to
adduce any evidence that circumstantially raises an inference of unlawful
discrimination. Plaintiff argues that he demonstrated a prima facie case of
discrimination because he believed Mosco's comments about his lifestyle
equated to "a heinous racial stereotype," which in turn led to his suspension and
termination. However, "[t]o defeat a motion for summary judgment, the
opponent must '"come forward with evidence" that creates a genuine issue of
material fact.'" Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014)
(quoting Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J. v. State, 425 N.J. Super. 1, 32
(App. Div. 2012)). "Bare conclusory assertions, without factual support in the
record, 'will not defeat a meritorious application for summary judgment.'"
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Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield, 425 N.J. Super. at 32 (quoting Brae Asset Fund,
LP v. Newman, 327 N.J. Super. 129, 134 (App. Div. 1999)); accord Puder v.
Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005) ("[C]onclusory and self-serving assertions
by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome the [summary judgment]
motion.").
At his deposition, plaintiff stated that Mosco did not reference his race
when she allegedly made these comments. Importantly, plaintiff also stated that
he did not have "any facts" to support his allegations that Mosco had racial
animus against him or African-American males in general. In Oakley v.
Wianecki, an LAD case alleging sexual harassment in the workplace, we said
"unsubstantiated inferences and feelings" are insufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment. 345 N.J. Super. 194, 201 (App. Div. 2001).
In Williams, we addressed a racial discrimination claim made by the
plaintiff, a guidance counselor, against the defendant, the employer/school's
principal. 323 N.J. Super. at 492-93. The plaintiff and the defendant did not
have an amicable relationship, and after a meeting between the two, the
defendant gave the plaintiff a list of areas that needed improvement. Id. at 493-
94. The defendant told the plaintiff that she needed to "become more teachable."
Id. at 494. We stated,
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[t]hroughout her argument, [the] plaintiff refers to [the
defendant]'s use of the word "teachable" and
characterizes it as "overtly racial." We do not agree.
[The defendant] employed that word to describe a
perceived characteristic of [the] plaintiff's personality.
Although more appropriate words may have been
available (irrespective of the racial or ethnic
background of the person to whom [the defendant] was
speaking), the word "teachable" does not connote racial
animus. To accept [the] plaintiff's characterization is
to find a racial overtone in every conversation between
a supervisor and an employee of different ethnic or
racial backgrounds. It would also permit an individual
listener's subjective perception and reaction determine
the objective question of the speaker's liability. The
law should not find divisions where none exist.
[Id. at 503 (emphasis added).]
Here, the undisputed record belies any inference of racial animus, much
less termination based on invidious discrimination. Plaintiff admits that after
his negative drug test and the completion of Mosco's internal investigation,
Mosco contacted plaintiff to return to work. Plaintiff admits he never responded
and simply never returned to work.
As a result, even were we to assume plaintiff met his burden of
demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination under the LAD, the judge
properly determined that defendant provided legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for plaintiff's termination and plaintiff failed to rebut those reasons.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, plaintiff was required to come
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forward with proof that defendant's reasons for termination were pretextual. "To
prove pretext, . . . a plaintiff must do more than simply show that the employer's
reason was false; [the plaintiff] must also demonstrate that the employer was
motivated by discriminatory intent." Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1,
14 (2002) (citing Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 561 (1990))
(An "employee can be fired for false cause or no cause at all. That firing may
be unfair but it is not illegal."). "[T]he burden of proving that the employer
intentionally discriminated remains at all times with the employee." Grande,
230 N.J. at 19 (citing Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 110 N.J. 363,
383 (1988)).
In this regard, plaintiff points to the unemployment claim form and notes
that defendant's representatives first claimed it was erroneously completed only
shortly before being deposed in this litigation. Any significance to this,
however, is belied by plaintiff's own admission that he refused to answer
defendant's calls for his return to work. Given this admission, no rational
factfinder could conclude the unemployment benefit form raises a genuine
material factual dispute that plaintiff's termination was a pretext for
discrimination.
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The balance of plaintiff's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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