CONSTANCE CENTRELLA VS. PROSPECT PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-2651-17, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4186-17T1
CONSTANCE CENTRELLA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PROSPECT PARK BOARD
OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Argued telephonically May 1, 2019 – Decided May 17, 2019
Before Judges Nugent, Reisner and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2651-17.
William P. Hannan argued the cause for appellant
(Oxfeld Cohen, PC, attorneys; William P. Hannan, of
counsel and on the briefs).
Albert C. Buglione argued the cause for respondent
(Buglione, Hutton & DeYoe, LLC, attorneys; Jeffrey R.
Merlino, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Constance Centrella appeals from two April 9, 2018 orders
denying her summary judgment motion and granting summary judgment in favor
of defendant Prospect Park Board of Education (Board). The appeal presents
solely legal issues, as to which our review is de novo. Kean Fed'n of Teachers
v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 583 (2018). We affirm both orders.
The record of this appeal can be summarized as follows. Plaintiff
challenged the Board's June 27, 2017 resolution (resolution) eliminating her
position of speech language specialist and terminating her from tenured
employment for budgetary reasons. There is no dispute that the Board gave
plaintiff appropriate notice of the proposed personnel action (the Rice notice).1
In response, plaintiff notified the Board that she wanted the matter discussed at
the public portion of the meeting rather than privately in executive session. See
N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) (permitting a public body to exclude the public from its
discussion of a personnel matter, unless a potentially adversely-affected
employee requests a public discussion).
1
Plaintiff abandoned her claim challenging the Rice notice. See Rice v. Union
Cty. Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 155 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 1977).
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2
The proposed termination of plaintiff's position was listed on the Board's
publicly available agenda in the following language, which explained the
reasons for the recommended action:
WHEREAS, N.J.S.A. 18A:28-9 provides that a
board of education has the right to reduce the number
of positions . . . for reasons of economy or because of
reduction in the number of pupils or of change in the
administrative or supervisory organization of the
district or for other good cause upon compliance with
the provisions of this article; and WHEREAS, for
reasons of economy, change in the number of special
education pupils requiring speech language services
and change in administrative or supervisory
organization of the District and for other good cause,
the Superintendent recommends that the position of
Speech Language Pathologist be abolished with an
effective date of August 31, 2017; and NOW BE IT
RESOLVED that the Board of Education, upon the
recommendation of the Superintendent, approves the
abolishment of the positon of Speech Language
Pathologist effective August 31, 2017, for reasons of
economy, change [i]n the number of special education
pupils requiring speech language services and change
in administrative or supervisory organization of the
District and for other good cause.
Without discussion, the Board voted to approve the resolution, along with
fourteen additional resolutions concerning other employees. According to the
Board Secretary's unrebutted certification, the fifteen resolutions were moved
and seconded as a bloc. Then, "a call for discussion amongst Board members
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was made and the Board members had no comments." The Board then voted to
approve the resolutions. The Board did not permit plaintiff to comment on the
resolution prior to the vote, although she was permitted to speak later during the
public comment portion of the meeting.
As in the trial court, plaintiff contends on appeal that the Board violated
the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21, because it did
not discuss the resolution before voting on it. Plaintiff also contends the Board
should have permitted her to comment on the proposed action before the Board
voted on it. Like the trial court, we find no merit in either argument.
In Kean Federation of Teachers, the Supreme Court stated that OPMA,
N.J.S.A.10:4-12(b)(8), gives an employee who may be adversely affected by
Board action the right to demand that any discussion of that proposed action be
conducted in the public portion of the meeting rather than in executive session.
233 N.J. at 584-85. However, the Court did not hold that OPMA requires a
Board to engage in discussion of the proposed action during the meeting. Id. at
586. In fact, the following language clearly signals a different conclusion:
[P]ublic bodies routinely approve recommendations in
public meetings without discussion and must rely on
advice from professional staff to make decisions. . . .
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Forcing public bodies to issue Rice notices and
robustly discuss all personnel matters, as the Appellate
Division intimated, would intrude on a public body's
prerogative as to how to conduct its meetings. . . . .
The OPMA does not contain a requirement about
the robustness of the discussion that must take place on
a topic. Here, members of the public were able to
witness the Board's public vote on faculty
reappointments and thus have a base of information on
which they can express views to the Legislature and
others responsible for appointments to the Board
regarding the adequacy, or inadequacy, of the
discussion of Board business. But the robustness of a
debate on a particular item discussed in public session
is not a topic addressed in the OPMA. It is beyond the
existing requirements of the OPMA. If a discussion of
a certain length or quality is to be mandated, the OPMA
requires amendment by the Legislature, not by the
courts.
[Kean Fed. of Teachers, 233 N.J. at 587-88 (citations
omitted).]
We conclude that Kean is dispositive here, and plaintiff's attempts to
distinguish the case are unpersuasive. Contrary to plaintiff's argument,
N.J.S.A.10:4-12(b)(8) does not mandate that a public entity engage in any
particular level of discussion at a public meeting. Rather, this section of OPMA
gives a public employee the right to require the public entity to conduct its
discussion, if any, in public rather than in executive session. In this case, after
the resolutions were moved and seconded, there was a formal "call for
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discussion," but the Board members had no comments on any of the resolutions.
Contrary to plaintiff's argument, neither OPMA nor Kean required the Board
members to engage in a discussion.
Plaintiff's reliance on Rice and Jamison v. Morris School District Board
of Education, 198 N.J. Super. 411 (App. Div. 1985), is likewise misplaced.
Neither of those cases addresses the level of discussion in which a Board must
engage at a public meeting. Plaintiff also speculates that the resolution
concerning her employment must have arisen from some improper private
discussion the Board held before the meeting. But the resolution itself recites
that the Superintendent of Schools recommended abolishing plaintiff's position
for economic reasons. 2 Lastly, plaintiff cites no legal authority to support her
claim that she was entitled to speak at the meeting before the Board voted on
the resolution, and the argument does not warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
2
Plaintiff did not challenge the substance of the Board's decision to eliminate
her position. That is, her lawsuit did not claim that the Board lacked good faith
budgetary reasons for its decision.
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