BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF PISCATAWAY, MIDDLESEX COUNTY VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION) ( 2019 )


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    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5427-16T2
    BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
    TOWNSHIP OF PISCATAWAY,
    MIDDLESEX COUNTY,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
    EDUCATION, OFFICE OF SCHOOL
    FINANCE,
    Respondent-Respondent,
    and
    HATIKVAH INTERNATIONAL
    ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, INC.,
    and COLLEGE ACHIEVE CENTRAL
    CHARTER SCHOOL,
    Intervenors-Respondents.
    __________________________________
    Argued May 30, 2019 – Decided June 7, 2019
    Before Judges Haas, Sumners and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Education.
    David B. Rubin argued the cause for appellant.
    Thomas O. Johnston argued the cause for respondents
    Hatikvah International Academy Charter School, Inc.
    and College Achieve Central Charter School (Johnston
    Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Thomas O. Johnston, of
    counsel and on the brief; Rula Alzadon Moor, on the
    brief).
    Geoffrey N. Stark, Deputy Attorney General, argued
    the cause for respondents Commission of Education
    and the State Board of Education (Gurbir S. Grewal,
    Attorney General, attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Geoffrey N.
    Stark, on the brief).
    Turp, Coates, Driggers & White, PC, attorneys for
    amicus curiae East Windsor Regional School District
    (David H. Coates, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway, Middlesex
    County (Piscataway) appeals from the July 27, 2017 declaratory ruling of the
    Commissioner of Education (Commissioner), determining that pursuant to the
    Charter School Program Act of 1995, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-1 to -18 (the Charter
    School Act or CSPA), Piscataway was obligated to provide funding for its
    students enrolled in charter schools located in other school districts. Piscataway
    A-5427-16T2
    2
    argues1 that the regulations implementing the funding requirements of the
    Charter School Act, N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2, and -15.3, are ultra vires to the
    extent that they impose financial obligations on school districts not in the district
    where the charter school is located ("district of residence") or in a contiguous
    district to the charter school ("region of residence"). 2 We affirm.
    I.
    The Piscataway Township Public School District is located in Middlesex
    County. Although there are no charter schools located in Piscataway, a number
    of its resident students attend charter schools located in other school districts,
    including attendance at intervenors Hatikvah International Academy Charter
    School (Hatikvah) in East Brunswick Township, Middlesex County, and College
    Achieve Central Charter School (College Achieve) in Union County.
    1
    Amicus, East Windsor Regional School District (East Windsor), supports
    Piscataway's arguments.
    2
    This issue has also been raised in Highland Park Board of Education v.
    Harrington (Highland Park II), No. A-3455-16, and in North Brunswick
    Township Board of Education v. Harrington (North Brunswick), No. A-3415-
    16, which together with In the Matter of the Approval of the Charter Amendment
    of Central Jersey College Prep. (Central Jersey), No. A-3074-16, have been
    calendared back-to-back, and heard together with this appeal. Because of this
    overlap, the reader is encouraged to review all four of our opinions in these
    cases, which are being released simultaneously.
    A-5427-16T2
    3
    In December 2015, counsel for Piscataway wrote to then-Commissioner
    David Hespe, seeking a determination that the term "school district of
    residence," as used in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) (the funding provision of the
    CSPA), was limited to the charter school's "district of residence," or at most, its
    "region of residence."3 Under that interpretation, Piscataway would not be
    required to bear the costs for its students to attend any charter schools because
    none of the charter schools attended by its students include Piscataway in its
    approved "district of residence."
    On January 20, 2016, the New Jersey Department of Education
    (Department or DOE) responded that the Commissioner could not grant the
    requested relief absent a formal petition for a declaratory ruling, and moreover,
    that any determination as to whether to entertain such a petition was "within the
    sole discretion of the Commissioner." Piscataway filed an appeal challenging
    3
    The term "district of residence" is defined as "the school district in which a
    charter school facility is physically located; if a charter school is approved with
    a region of residence comprised of contiguous school districts, that region is the
    charter school's district of residence." N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2. The term "region of
    residence" is defined as "contiguous school districts in which a charter school
    operates and is the charter school's district of residence." N.J.A.C. 6A:11 -1.2.
    See In re Charter Sch. Appeal of Greater Brunswick Charter Sch., 
    332 N.J. Super. 409
    , 424 (App. Div. 1999) ("the regulations allowing regional charter
    schools are a legitimate means of effectuating the Act's purpose of encouraging
    the establishment of charter schools.")
    A-5427-16T2
    4
    the regulations as applied, but subsequently withdrew it based on the
    Department's representation that it would entertain its petition for a declaratory
    ruling.
    On June 24, 2016, Piscataway filed a verified petition seeking a
    declaratory ruling from the Commissioner regarding its funding obligations
    under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) and the implementing regulations. The Attorney
    General filed an answer on behalf of the Department.
    In July 2016, the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative
    Law (OAL) for disposition as a contested case. The OAL granted Hatikvah's
    and College Achieve's motions to intervene.
    In December 2016, Piscataway filed a motion for summary decision
    seeking a determination from the Commissioner that under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-
    12(b), "financial responsibility for charter school attendance is limited to school
    districts formally designated as the 'district of residence,' or within a 'region of
    residence,' in a charter school's approved charter." Piscataway sought relief
    from any obligation to fund out-of-district placements and sought restoration of
    State aid previously directed to the charter schools. In a certification submitted
    in support of the motion, Piscataway's Board Secretary and Business
    Administrator stated that for the 2016-2017 school year, its projected payment
    A-5427-16T2
    5
    to out-of-district charter schools totaled $247,030.
    The Department cross-moved for summary decision, seeking a
    determination that "the language and history of the [CSPA], and its
    implementing regulations, clearly demonstrate that resident districts are
    responsible for paying for their students to attend charter schools regardless of
    the charter school's location." Hatikvah and College Achieve also filed briefs
    in opposition to Piscataway's motion for summary decision.
    On June 14, 2017, the ALJ issued an initial decision denying Piscataway's
    motion and granting the Department's motion for summary decision. Bd. of
    Educ. of Twp. of Piscataway v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., EDU 10995-16, initial
    decision (June 14, 2017).     In her comprehensive written decision, the ALJ
    reviewed the statutory text, legislative history, and implementing regulations,
    and determined that Piscataway was "obligated to provide funding in accordance
    with N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) for each of its residents who enrolled in a charter
    school no matter where the charter school is located."
    The ALJ found that the meaning of the term "district of residence" as used
    in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) was "clearly ambiguous."          For example, if the
    regulatory definition of "district of residence," N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2, was
    "inserted into N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b), that provision would read '[the school
    A-5427-16T2
    6
    district in which a charter school facility is physically located] shall pay directly
    to the charter school for each student enrolled in the charter school who resides
    in the district.'" "Under such a reading, as urged by Piscataway, a school district
    would be obligated to pay for its residents to attend [the] charter school only if
    the school district is included in the charter school's district of residence or
    region of residence."
    However, the ALJ found that the implementing regulations, as challenged
    here, "imbue the term 'district of residence' as found in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b)
    with meaning beyond the literal regulatory definition" because the challenged
    regulations require both a "district of residence" and a "non-resident district" to
    make payments to charter schools.            N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2, -15.3.        The
    Department argued that this interpretation made sense because the term "district
    of residence" in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b), referred to the student's district of
    residence and thus had a different meaning from the regulatory definition of
    "district of residence."
    The ALJ found that despite the confusion caused by the regulatory
    definition of "district of residence," a review of the Act as a whole and the
    legislative history revealed that the regulations properly implemented the
    funding requirements of the CSPA. The legislative history of the Charter School
    A-5427-16T2
    7
    Act "supports the conclusion that a school district must pay for its residents to
    attend charter schools regardless of the location." Notably, in its fiscal estimate
    for S. 1796 (1995), which, combined with A. 592 (1995), became CSPA, the
    Office of Legislative Services (OLS) stated that:
    In regard to the funding of charter schools, the bill
    provides that the school district of residence would pay
    directly to the charter school for each student enrolled
    who resides in the district an amount equal to the local
    levy budget per pupil in the district for the specific
    grade level. . . . The cost for out of district pupils would
    be paid by the district of residence of the pupil. . . .
    The Office of Legislative Services (OLS) estimates
    that there will be little or no additional costs to the State
    or local school districts as a result of this bill. The
    charter school would receive the local levy budget per
    pupil (State aid plus local tax levy) for each pupil
    attending the charter school, plus any categorical aid or
    federal funds attributable to that pupil. If out of district
    pupils were admitted, the district of residence would
    pay the costs for that pupil. . . .
    [Legislative Fiscal Estimate to S. 1796 1 (Sept. 14,
    1995) (emphasis added).]
    The ALJ stated that the fiscal estimate, which was apparently not available
    to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee prior to its Statement , was
    "not the perfect extrinsic aid for discerning legislative intent with respect to
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b)." S. Budget & Approps. Comm. Statement to A. 592
    & S. 1796 2 (Dec. 11, 1995). Nonetheless, the fiscal estimate was useful in
    A-5427-16T2
    8
    determining legislative intent because there was no indication that the sponsor
    of the bill "objected to the OLS's statements regarding a district-of-residence's
    funding obligations for all of its residents who are enrolled in charter schools ."
    The ALJ also found that "as originally enacted," the third sentence of
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) (subsequently amended), provided, "[t]he per pupil
    amount paid to the charter school shall not exceed the [program] budget per
    pupil for the specific grade level in the district in which the charter school is
    located." (quoting L. 1995, c. 426). The ALJ reasoned that "[t]his suggests that
    the Legislature could have written '[t]he school district in which the charter
    school is located' instead of '[t]he school district of residence' in the first
    sentence of N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) if that is what the Legislature truly meant
    by 'district of residence.'"
    The ALJ concluded that the interpretation that all school districts must
    fund their students' attendance at charter schools irrespective of location was
    consistent with the "overall purpose of the CSPA, which declares that '[a] charter
    school shall be open to all students on a space available basis.'" (quoting
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-7). Although preference for enrollment in a charter school is
    given to "students who reside in the school district in which the charte r school
    is located," N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8(a), if space is available, charter schools may
    A-5427-16T2
    9
    enroll non-resident students. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8(d). The ALJ reasoned that
    "[i]f a school district did not have to pay for all of its residents to attend charter
    schools, then charter schools would not truly be 'open to all students.' Instead,
    non-resident students presumably would only be able to attend charter schools
    if they could afford it themselves."
    The ALJ further explained that:
    This might threaten the financial viability of a charter
    school that is unable to fill its rolls with students who
    reside in the district in which the charter school is
    located. While charter schools may "[s]olicit and
    accept any gifts or grants for school purposes," N.J.S.A.
    18A:36A-6(g), there is no guarantee that a charter
    school that could not attract sufficient numbers of
    resident students could make up the shortfall with gifts
    and grants. And, while the CSPA prohibits a charter
    school from charging tuition to a resident student,
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8(a), but does not specifically
    prohibit a charter school from charging tuition to a non-
    resident student, it is highly unlikely that a charter
    school could fill a sufficient number of available spaces
    with non-resident students whose parents could afford
    to pay tuition.
    By implementing N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) to
    require both "districts of residence" and "non-resident
    districts" to pay for their children to attend charter
    schools, the State Board of Education met its
    responsibility under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-18 to effectuate
    the purpose of the CSPA, which is meant to establish a
    charter-school program as an alternative to traditional
    public schools for "all students on a space available
    basis." As the State Board of Education has explained,
    A-5427-16T2
    10
    [t]he premise of the [CSPA] is that all
    students in New Jersey are entitled to free
    education provided by the school district in
    which they reside in accordance with
    N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1. This entitlement can be
    accomplished whether they choose to
    attend a public school of the district or a
    charter school as an independent public
    school.
    [29 N.J.R. 3492(a) (Aug. 4, 1997).]
    Which district or region a charter school chooses for its
    residence is immaterial for determining a school
    district's funding obligation under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-
    12(b); what triggers a school district's funding
    obligation is the mere fact that one of its residents is
    enrolled in a charter school, irrespective of location.
    Thus, the Department persuasively argues that the term
    "district of residence" as used in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-
    12(b) is reasonably interpreted as the student's district
    of residence and not the charter school's district of
    residence.
    Lastly, the ALJ found that "the fact that a school district's transportation -
    funding obligations are different for resident and non-resident students under
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-13 and N.J.A.C. 6A:27-3.1 to -3.7, does not alter the way in
    which N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) should be read." The ALJ reasoned:
    The CSPA provides that "[t]he students who reside in
    the school district in which the charter school is located
    shall be provided transportation to the charter school on
    the same terms and conditions as transportation is
    provided to students attending the schools of the
    district," but that "[n]on-resident students shall receive
    A-5427-16T2
    11
    transportation services pursuant to regulations
    established by the State board." N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-13.
    Under those regulations, "[t]he expenditure for the
    transportation of charter . . . school students who reside
    outside of the school district or region of residence in
    which the charter . . . school is located is limited to the
    annual nonpublic school maximum statutorily
    established expenditure per student in accordance with
    N.J.S.A. 18A:39-1," and "[i]f the cost of transportation
    exceeds the maximum allowable expenditure, the
    student's parents or legal guardians may pay the amount
    in excess of the annual maximum or they shall be
    entitled to the maximum allowable expenditure as aid
    in lieu of transportation." N.J.A.C. 6A:27-3.1(e), -3.4.
    Thus, non-resident students of charter schools receive
    less favorable transportation treatment than resident
    students of charter schools, but this arrangement should
    be viewed as a reasonable tradeoff for a free education
    at a charter school of one's choice and not as having any
    bearing on a logical interpretation of a school district's
    tuition obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b).
    [(Footnote omitted).]
    Thus, the ALJ held that Piscataway was "obligated to provide funding in
    accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) for each of its residents who is
    enrolled in a charter school no matter where the charter school is located ." The
    ALJ stated:
    Ultimately, the Legislature directed the State Board of
    Education to implement the provisions of the CSPA.
    Through its adoption of N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2 and
    -15.3, the State Board of Education has implemented
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) by requiring both "districts of
    A-5427-16T2
    12
    residence" and "non-resident districts" to pay for their
    children to attend charter schools. Here, Piscataway
    has asked for a declaratory ruling regarding the scope
    of its funding obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-
    12(b). The State Board of Education has made clear
    that Piscataway must, in accordance with N.J.S.A.
    18A:36A-12(b), pay a charter school for each
    Piscataway resident who is enrolled in the charter
    school no matter where the charter school is located. If
    Piscataway wishes to challenge the validity of any of
    the State Board of Education's regulations, the proper
    venue for such a challenge would be the Appellate
    Division in accordance with R. 2:2-3(2).
    In her final decision, then-Commissioner Kimberley Harrington adopted
    the initial decision of the ALJ, and stated:
    Upon      consideration    and    review,     the
    Commissioner is in accord with the ALJ's
    determination that, pursuant to the Act and the
    provisions set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.1-15.4, the
    petitioner is obligated to provide funding for its
    students enrolled in charter schools located in other
    school districts.[]     Furthermore, while petitioner
    [Piscataway] has framed its contentions as an issue with
    the Department's interpretation of the Act—which
    interpretation the Commissioner finds was proper—
    petitioner is, nevertheless, questioning the validity of
    the regulations. It is clear from the submissions that
    petitioner's true contention is with the department's
    regulations, which set forth the specific requirements
    from which petitioner is seeking relief. Therefore,
    petitioner's disagreement with the regulations, and its
    challenges to the requirement imposed upon it, is
    properly addressed before the Appellate Division in
    accordance with R. 2:2-3(2).
    A-5427-16T2
    13
    [(Footnote omitted).]
    This appeal followed.
    II.
    As noted at the outset, Piscataway contends that "the Department['s] . . .
    charter school regulations are ultra vires to the extent they impose financial
    obligations on school districts not included in a charter school's 'district of
    residence' or 'region of residence.'" We disagree. 4
    The scope of judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner is
    limited. In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp.,
    
    216 N.J. 370
    , 385 (2013). Further, "[j]udicial review of agency regulations
    begins with a presumption that the regulations are both 'valid and reasonable.'"
    4
    Initially, Intervenors Hatikvah and College Achieve argue that the appeal is
    time-barred because Piscataway had been making payments to charter schools
    located outside of its district for years, and waited until 2015 to challenge the
    regulations. However, we reject this argument because the Commissioner
    agreed to entertain the petition for declaratory ruling on the merits below, and
    Piscataway filed an appeal within forty-five days of that final decision. R. 2:4-
    1(b). Moreover, in administrative appeals, "[u]nlike quasi-judicial actions, there
    is . . . no time limit on . . . direct challenges to the substantive validity of an
    agency rule or regulation." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt.
    3.1 on R. 2:4-1(b) (2019). See In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1,
    
    372 N.J. Super. 61
    , 87 (App. Div. 2004) ("forty-five-day time limit on appeals
    from final decisions of administrative agencies does not generally apply to
    challenges to the validity of agency regulations, especially where the challenges
    raise constitutional questions or involve important questions implicating the
    public interest.")
    A-5427-16T2
    14
    N.J. Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs v. Schundler, 
    211 N.J. 535
    , 548 (2012) (quoting N.J.
    Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NJSPCA) v. N.J. Dep't of
    Agric.,
    196 N.J. 366
    , 385 (2008)). "[T]he party challenging a regulation has the
    burden of proving that the agency's action was 'arbitrary, capricious or
    unreasonable.'" 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-
    80 (1980)).     A challenger can meet that burden "by demonstrating an
    inconsistency between the regulation and the statute it implements, a violation
    of policy expressed or implied by the Legislature, an extension of the statute
    beyond what the Legislature intended, or a conflict between the enabling act and
    other statutory law that cannot be harmonized.” N.J. Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs v.
    Cerf, 
    428 N.J. Super. 588
    , 596 (App. Div. 2012).
    Although an appellate court is not bound by an agency's determination on
    a question of law, Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC, 
    220 N.J. 289
    , 301 (2015),
    "[c]ourts afford an agency 'great deference' in reviewing its 'interpretation of
    statutes within its scope of authority and its adoption of rules implementing' the
    laws for which it is responsible." Schundler, 211 N.J. at 549 (quoting NJSPCA,
    
    196 N.J. at 385
    ). Nevertheless, "courts must invalidate a regulation that is
    'inconsistent with the statute it purports to interpret. . . .'" 
    Ibid.
     (quoting
    NJSPCA, 
    196 N.J. at 385
    ).
    A-5427-16T2
    15
    "[T]he goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the
    Legislature's intent." Cashin v. Bello, 
    223 N.J. 328
    , 335 (2015). "[T]he best
    indicator of that intent is the statutory language." DiProspero v. Penn, 
    183 N.J. 477
    , 492 (2005).       "Accordingly, '[t]he starting point of all statutory
    interpretation must be the language used in the enactment.'" Spade v. Select
    Comfort Corp., 
    232 N.J. 504
    , 515 (2018) (quoting N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
    Permanency v. Y.N., 
    220 N.J. 165
    , 178 (2014)).
    Courts "construe the words of a statute 'in context with related provisions
    so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.'" Spade, 232 N.J. at 515
    (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 
    229 N.J. 541
    , 570
    (2017)).   "If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then
    our interpretative process is over." Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 
    226 N.J. 370
    , 386 (2016). Courts "turn to extrinsic tools to discern legislative intent
    . . . only when the statute is ambiguous, the plain language leads to a result
    inconsistent with any legitimate public policy objective, or it is at odds with a
    general statutory scheme." Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 
    214 N.J. 419
    , 429
    (2013).
    Charter schools are public schools that operate under a charter granted by
    the Commissioner, operate independently of a local board of education, and are
    A-5427-16T2
    16
    managed by a board of trustees. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-3(a). Funding for charter
    schools comes from the local school district, and state and federal aid, but is not
    equivalent to the per pupil funding that a traditional public school receives.
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b).
    At issue here, the CSPA funding provision provides that:
    The school district of residence shall pay directly to the
    charter school for each student enrolled in the charter
    school who resides in the district an amount equal to
    90% of the sum of the budget year equalization aid per
    pupil, the prebudget year general fund tax levy per
    pupil inflated by the CPI rate most recent to the
    calculation, and the employer payroll tax per pupil that
    is transferred to the school district pursuant to
    subsection d. of section 1 of P.L.2018, c.68. In
    addition, the school district of residence shall pay
    directly to the charter school the security categorical
    aid attributable to the student and a percentage of the
    district’s special education categorical aid equal to the
    percentage of the district’s special education students
    enrolled in the charter school and, if applicable, 100%
    of preschool education aid. The district of residence
    shall also pay directly to the charter school any federal
    funds attributable to the student.
    [N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) (emphasis added).]
    The term "school district of residence" is not defined in either the CSPA
    or the implementing regulations. The term "district of residence" is, however,
    defined in the regulations as "the school district in which a charter school facility
    is physically located; if a charter school is approved with a region of residence
    A-5427-16T2
    17
    comprised of contiguous school districts, that region is the charter school's
    district of residence." N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2; N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.1. A "resident
    student" means "a student who resides in the area served by the district board of
    education that is the same as the district of residence of the charter school."
    N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2; N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.1.
    However, a non-resident school district is defined as both "a school
    district outside the district of residence of the charter school," N.J.A.C. 6A:11 -
    1.2, and as "a school district outside the school district of residence of the charter
    school." N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.1 (emphasis added). A "'non-resident student'
    means a student from a non-resident district attending a charter school."
    N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2; N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.1.
    In 2009, in accordance with the CSPA, the State Board of Education
    promulgated the regulations at issue here, N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2 and -15.3. 41
    N.J.R. 642(a) (Jan. 20, 2009). The regulations were designed "to assure the
    financial accountability of local public school districts through enhanced State
    monitoring, oversight and authority, and to ensure that each district board of
    education adopts an annual budget that provides adequate resources to meet the
    State Constitution's mandate for a thorough and efficient system of free public
    schools for all children." 41 N.J.R. 642(a) (Jan. 20, 2009).
    A-5427-16T2
    18
    No commentator objected to the regulations. 41 N.J.R. 642(a) (Jan. 20,
    2009); 49 N.J.R. 1038(a) (May 1, 2017). Nor did any commentators object on
    that basis to N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.1 to -6.4, the regulations governing the
    application for and operation of a charter school. 29 N.J.R. 3492(a) (Aug. 4,
    1997); 32 N.J.R. 3560(a) (Oct. 2, 2000); 49 N.J.R. 1038(a) (May 1, 2017). In
    fact, in response to a comment to an amendment to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-22.4
    ("Financial Requirements"), the Department explained that "[c]harter school
    funding follows the child and, therefore, is only remitted once the school is
    operational." 49 N.J.R. 2521(a), 2522 (Aug. 7, 2017).
    The funding regulations, N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.1 to -15.4, require both a
    "district of residence" and a "non-resident district" to pay for its students to
    attend a charter school. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2 details the per pupil payments
    to charter schools:
    (a) The resident and non-resident school districts shall
    use projected charter school aid as established by the
    Commissioner in a report to be distributed no later than
    February 15 of the prebudget year for budget purposes
    and to initiate school district payments to the charter
    school for the subsequent year. The report establishes
    for each resident and non-resident school district a per
    pupil amount for the local and State shares and
    categorical aids per student. Once the per pupil amount
    is established, it is not adjusted. Projected charter
    school aid is based on projected enrollments at the
    charter school. The number of students enrolled in the
    A-5427-16T2
    19
    charter school is adjusted based on average daily
    enrollment for aid purposes throughout the school year
    in accordance with the prescribed adjustments listed in
    N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.3.
    (b) The per pupil amount comprises local share as
    defined in (b)1 below and State share as defined in (b)2
    below.
    1. The local share per pupil is the part of the per pupil
    amount that includes the general fund tax levy of the
    school district of residence's or nonresident district(s)'
    budget(s).
    2. The State share per pupil is the part of the per pupil
    amount that includes the equalization aid portion of the
    school district of residence's or nonresident district(s)'
    budget(s) or amounts, if any, contained in the annual
    appropriations act in-lieu-of or to supplement
    equalization aid for the corresponding fiscal year. . . .
    [(Emphasis added).]
    Also at issue, N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.3(g) provides that both the district of
    residence and non-resident school districts are, under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b),
    obligated to pay charter schools as follows:
    (g) A district board of education shall process
    payment(s) and payment adjustments to a charter
    school during the school year as follows:
    1. The district of residence and non-resident school
    district(s) shall initiate payments to the charter school
    based on projected enrollment, as set forth in this
    section.
    A-5427-16T2
    20
    2. The school district of residence and non-resident
    school district(s) shall pay directly to a charter school
    the local share per pupil at the charter school rate,
    pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12.b, in 12 equal
    installments starting July 15 and thereafter on the 15th
    of each month.
    3. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12.b, the school
    district of residence and non-resident school district(s)
    shall pay directly to the charter school the following aid
    in 20 equal installments on the 9th and 23rd of every
    month starting with September 9 and ending with June
    23, or as established by the Legislature:
    i. The State share per pupil at the charter
    school rate; and
    ii. Categorical aid attributable to the
    student.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    Although the challenged regulations expressly impose an obligation to
    fund charter schools on both the resident and non-resident school districts, the
    regulations also seem to distinguish between a "school district of residence" and
    a "non-resident district" N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2, -15.3.
    Nonetheless, a review of the term both in the context of the CSPA as a
    whole and in light of the legislative history of the Act, supports the
    Commissioner's interpretation. In this regard, the fact that the Legislature,
    which as recently as last year amended N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b), L. 2018, c. 68,
    A-5427-16T2
    21
    did not act in response to the agency's adoption of N.J.A.C. 6A:23A -15.1 to -
    15.4, eleven years earlier, should be "'granted great weight as evidence of its
    conformity with the legislative intent.'" Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-
    Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., Monmouth Cty., 
    199 N.J. 14
    , 24-25 (2009)
    (quoting Malone v. Fender, 
    80 N.J. 129
    , 137 (1979)).
    Moreover, as discussed in Highland Park II, after the Commissioner's
    decision in this case, the Appellate Division, in an unpublished decision,
    Highland Park Board of Education v. Hespe (Highland Park I), No. A-3890-14
    (App. Div. Jan. 24, 2018) (slip op. at 19), certif. denied, 
    233 N.J. 485
     (2018), 5
    addressed this precise issue. In that case, this court rejected Highland Park's
    argument that only the charter school's "district of residence" was obligated to
    pay for its students to attend the school. 
    Ibid.
     The court found that the plain
    language of N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) "expressly provides that the 'school district
    of residence' must pay the charter school for 'each student' enrolled in the
    school." Id. at 16. Thus, we held that "as used in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b), the
    term 'school district of residence' refers to the district where the student reside s,
    5
    The appellant in Highland Park I appealed from the Commissioner's final
    decision approving Hatikvah's second application to amend its charter.
    Although Highland Park I is unpublished, it involved some of the same parties,
    and the identical issue raised here, and thus, although not precedential, it is
    instructive.
    A-5427-16T2
    22
    not the district where the charter school is located." Ibid.
    This court found that the CSPA "expressly envisions that students may
    enroll in a charter school, even though they reside in a district other than the
    district where the charter school is located." Id. at 16-17. There is nothing in
    the CSPA "that would allow these students to attend a charter school without a
    financial contribution from the school districts in which they reside." Id. at 17.
    Thus, under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b), the obligation of a school district to fund
    its student's attendance at a charter school is not limited to the charter school's
    "district of residence." Ibid.
    We also found that the implementing regulations were "consistent with
    this interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b)." Ibid. Specifically, the court
    cited to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.3(g)(2), (3), one of the challenged regulations in
    this case, noting that "[i]ndeed, the regulations expressly provide that both a
    charter school's 'district of residence' and the 'non-resident school districts' must
    pay for their students to attend a charter school." Ibid.
    Lastly, the court found that "extrinsic evidence," notably the OLS fiscal
    estimate as relied on by the ALJ here, "also supports this interpretation of
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b)." Ibid. Thus, we concluded that "as used in N.J.S.A.
    18A:36A-12(b), the term 'school district of residence' refers to the district where
    A-5427-16T2
    23
    the student resides, not the district where the charter school is located." Id. at
    16.
    On appeal, Piscataway argues that the decision in Highland Park I was
    "erroneous and should not be followed." It contends that the more plausible
    inference is that the Legislature intended to impose financial responsibility only
    on the district where the charter school is located, or at most the region of
    residence, because non-resident districts are not entitled to receive notice or
    input as to the approval or amendment process. Under that interpretation,
    Piscataway would be relieved of any financial responsibility for educating its
    students enrolled in charter schools because no charter schools are located in its
    district, or in a contiguous district.
    However, the Legislature found that "the establishment of a charter school
    program is in the best interests of the students of this State and it is therefore the
    public policy of the State to encourage and facilitate the development of charter
    schools."   N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-2.          Under that broad policy, the Legislature
    mandated that "[a] charter school shall be open to all students on a space
    available basis. . . ." N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-7. Significantly, although preference
    is given to students who reside in the school district in which the charter school
    is located, if available space permits, a charter school may enroll non-resident
    A-5427-16T2
    24
    students. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8(a),(d).
    As this court found in Highland Park I, slip op. at 17, there is nothing in
    the Act that would allow non-resident students to attend a charter school without
    a financial contribution from the school district in which they reside. In fact, in
    order to enroll in a charter school, either in or out of district, the student must
    first register "in the school district in which he or she resides," N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-
    15.3(a), and thus funding would pass through the Board of Education in that
    district before being allocated to the charter school. See In re Grant of Charter
    Sch. Application of Englewood on the Palisades Charter Sch., 
    320 N.J. Super. 174
    , 224 (App. Div. 1999) (discussing funding provision of CSPA), aff'd as
    modified, 
    164 N.J. 316
     (2000).
    To that end, the interpretation of the term "school district of residence"
    used in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) to refer to the district where the student resides,
    and not the district where the charter school is located, is entirely consistent with
    the Act and the policy expressed by the Legislature. As the ALJ found, "[i]f a
    school district did not have to pay for all of its residents to attend charter schools,
    then charter schools would not truly be 'open to all students.'" Students residing
    in districts without a charter school, like Piscataway, would be foreclosed from
    attending a charter school unless they could afford to pay to attend the public
    A-5427-16T2
    25
    charter school—a result inconsistent with the Legislature's intent in drafting the
    Charter School Act.      See Englewood, 
    164 N.J. 322
     (charter schools were
    authorized as an alternate format for providing public education to New Jersey
    children).
    In fact, as originally enacted, the Legislature differentiated in N.J.S.A.
    18A:36A-12 (subsequently amended), between a school district of residence and
    a school district where the charter school was located, to protect a wealthy
    district from sending excess revenue to charter schools located in less wealthy
    districts, as follows:
    The school district of residence shall pay directly to the
    charter school for each student enrolled in the charter
    school who resides in the district a presumptive amount
    equal to 90% of the local levy budget per pupil for the
    specific grade level in the district. At the discretion of
    the commissioner and at the time the charter is granted,
    the commissioner may require the school district of
    residence to pay directly to the charter school for each
    student enrolled in the charter school an amount equal
    to less than 90% percent, or an amount which shall not
    exceed 100% of the local levy budget per pupil for the
    specific grade level in the district of residence. The per
    pupil amount paid to the charter school shall not exceed
    the local levy budget per pupil for the specific grade
    level in the district in which the charter school is
    located. The district of residence shall also pay directly
    to the charter school any categorical aid attributable to
    the student, provided the student is receiving
    appropriate categorical services, and any federal funds
    attributable to the student.
    A-5427-16T2
    26
    [L. 1995, c. 426 (emphasis added).]
    Although the underlined provision regarding per pupil expenditures was
    subsequently amended, L. 2007, c. 260, § 56, reading the statute as a whole as
    originally enacted supports both the Commissioner's and the Highland I court's
    interpretation that the Legislature meant the term "school district of residence,"
    to refer to the student's residence. There would have been no need for such a
    provision if districts were only responsible for funding students attending
    charter schools in their districts.
    Moreover, the current funding provision, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b), was
    amended by the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-
    43 to -63, to apply the "weighted school funding formula" to charter schools.
    Our Supreme Court described that formula, which is used to calculate the
    amount of state aid to be provided to each school district, as "the State's most
    recent, lengthy and painstaking effort to craft a redesigned school funding
    formula that satisfies the constitutional standard." Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
    XX), 
    199 N.J. 140
    , 147 (2009).        Under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b), the school
    district of residence shall pay directly to the charter school certain funds,
    including equalization aid, security categorical aid, received by the district
    under the SFRA formula. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.1. Those funds, which are
    A-5427-16T2
    27
    "attributable to the student," are paid to the school district where the student
    resides and not to the district where the charter school is located. N.J.S.A.
    18A:7F-43 to -63.
    Thus, it would make no sense to interpret "school district of residence" to
    mean the "district of residence." N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b). Given that both
    resident and non-resident students can attend a charter school, the term "school
    district or residence" logically means the district where the student resides. A
    school is located in a district, it does not reside in a district.
    This interpretation is also consistent with another section of the CSPA,
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-11(b), which provides that a charter school shall comply with
    the laws concerning the "provision of services to students with disabilities;
    except that the fiscal responsibility for any student currently enrolled in or
    determined to require a private day or residential school shall remain with the
    district of residence."      As used in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-11(b), "district of
    residence" must refer to the student's home district, because a non-resident
    district would not be obligated to fund a student residing outside its borders. In
    fact, the Legislature did not use the term "district of residence" elsewhere in the
    Act when referring to the district where the charter school is located.         See
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8(a); N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-13. Further, in a separate Act, the
    A-5427-16T2
    28
    Legislature directed the Commissioner, for school funding purposes for children
    in State facilities, N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12(b), to determine the child's "district of
    residence" based on the district where the parent or resource family resided.
    N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12.
    Additionally, as this court found in Highland Park I, the interpretation is
    supported by the legislative history of the CSPA. In its fiscal estimate the OLS
    confirmed its understanding that the district in which the student resided would
    pay an out-of-district charter school. Legislative Fiscal Estimate to S. 1796 (L.
    1995, c. 426). Although, as the ALJ pointed out, the fiscal estimate is not "the
    perfect extrinsic aid" because the bill was subsequently amended, and the
    estimate was not available at the time of the Sponsor's Statement to S. 1796 5
    (L.1995, c. 426), it nonetheless demonstrates the Legislature's understanding
    that the student's district would fund the charter school. See In re Pub. Serv.
    Elec. & Gas Co.'s Rate Unbundling, 
    167 N.J. 377
    , 388 n.2 (2001) (Legislative
    Fiscal Estimate was a "slender reed on which to overturn the BPU's Final
    Order"); Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Morris v. State, 
    311 N.J. Super. 637
    , 645 (Law Div. 1997) (Legislative Fiscal Estimate is very useful in
    ascertaining legislative intent if relied on by Legislature in enacting bill), aff'd,
    
    311 N.J. Super. 587
     (App. Div. 1998), aff'd, 
    159 N.J. 565
     (1999).
    A-5427-16T2
    29
    Nonetheless, Piscataway argues here, as in Highland Park II, that under
    that interpretation non-resident school districts will be deprived of due process
    because non-resident districts are not entitled to receive formal notice of a
    charter school's application to amend its charter, or input into the amendment
    process. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1, -2.6(a)(b). Piscataway argues that "surely," the
    Legislature did not contemplate a system where every school district had to
    constantly monitor charter school activity throughout the state, and was
    obligated to fund those schools without consideration of the charter school's
    impact.
    The notice provisions do not, however, relieve non-resident districts from
    bearing financial responsibility for their students' attendance at charter schools.
    Because preference for enrollment in a charter school is given to students who
    reside in the school district in which the charter school is located, N.J.S.A.
    18A:36A-8(a), it is likely that the majority of students will reside in that district,
    and thus it makes sense that the district of residence should receive formal notice
    and an opportunity for input.
    Moreover, it was undisputed that Piscataway, and the appellants in the
    other back-to-back appeals, were aware of the applications to amend filed by
    Hatikvah and Central Jersey College Prep (CJCP), and had an opportunity to
    A-5427-16T2
    30
    submit comments on the amendment requests. In fact, in Highland II, the
    Commissioner received, and considered, comments from several school
    districts, individuals, an educational service commission, and even several
    legislators. Nor is there any indication in this record that the process of tracking
    applications to amend a charter would be particularly onerous for a non-resident
    district.
    Nonetheless, Piscataway contends that its interpretation finds support in
    the Court's decision in Englewood, 
    164 N.J. at 316
    . However, this argument
    also lacks merit. In Englewood, three boards of education brought an action
    challenging the New Jersey Board of Education's grants of charters to schools
    in their respective districts. 
    Id. at 318-19
    .    In discussing a prior version of
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12,6 the Court wrote that "the Act provides that the district
    of residence of the charter school shall forward to the school a per-pupil amount
    set by the Commissioner, but presumptively set by the Legislature at 90% of the
    local levy budget per pupil for that student's grade level in the district." 
    Id. at 322
    . However, in that passing comment, the Court was merely referring to the
    6
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12 then provided that "[t]he school district of residence
    shall pay directly to the charter school for each student enrolled in the charter
    school who resides in the district a presumptive amount equal to 90% of the
    local levy budget per pupil for the specific grade level in the district." L. 1995,
    c. 426.
    A-5427-16T2
    31
    funding provision, and did not address the question of whether the term "school
    district of residence" referred to the student's or the school's location.
    Finally, the amicus unpersuasively argues that Piscataway's interpretation
    is logical because there is no provision in the CSPA prohibiting the charge of
    tuition to students from other districts and thus non-resident students must pay
    tuition to attend an out-of-district charter school.       N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8(a)
    provides that "[a] charter school shall not charge tuition to students who reside
    in the district." Although there is no similar provision prohibiting a charter
    school from charging a non-resident student tuition, there are also no provisions
    specifically authorizing such payment, or defining the method of determining
    tuition rates. See N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-22.1 to -22.15 (Financial Operations of
    Charter Schools).
    For example, with regard to traditional public schools, N.J.S.A.18A:38 -
    3(a) provides that "[a]ny person not resident in a school district, if eligible
    except for residence, may be admitted to the schools of the district with the
    consent of the board of education upon such terms, and with or without payment
    of tuition, as the board may prescribe." See N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17-1 to -17.2
    (method of determining tuition rates for regular public schools); N.J.A.C.
    6A:23A-18.1 to -18.23 (tuition for private schools for students with disabilities).
    A-5427-16T2
    32
    In contrast, for charter schools, the Department specifically provided for
    payment of state and federal aid to the charter school by both the resident and
    non-resident districts. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2 to -15.3. As set forth above, the
    Legislature did not act in response to that interpretation, and non-resident school
    districts have apparently been funding their students' attendance at charter
    schools since they were first established in 1997. Further, the Commissioner's
    interpretation is consistent with the legislative policy to encourage the
    development of charter schools, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-2, and the OLS statement
    that out-of-district districts would pay for the cost of their students to attend the
    charter school. Legislative Fiscal Estimate to S. 1796 1 (Sept. 14, 1995).
    In sum, we conclude that the Commissioner correctly determined that the
    Department properly implemented the funding requirements of N.J.S.A.
    18A:36A-12(b) by obligating both a "district of residence" and a "non-resident
    district" to fund their students' attendance at charter schools.          Therefore,
    N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2 and -15.3 are not ultra vires, and Piscataway is obligated
    to provide funding for its students enrolled in charter schools located outside its
    school district.
    Affirmed.
    A-5427-16T2
    33