DCPP VS. Y.R. AND J.D.R., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.R. (FG-12-0063-17, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (CONSOLIDATED) ( 2019 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-2421-17T2
A-2424-17T2
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Y.R. and J.D.R.,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________________
THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF J.R.,
a Minor.
_____________________________
Submitted May 15, 2019 – Decided June 10, 2019
Before Judges Alvarez and Reisner.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
Docket No. FG-12-0063-17.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant Y.R. (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant J.D.R. (John Andrew Albright, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Joshua Paul Bohn, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel; Cory Hadley Cassar,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendants Y.R. (Mary), 1 the child's mother, and J.D.R. (Tom), the child's
father, appeal from a January 10, 2018 order terminating their parental rights to
their son, J.R. (Sam), who was approximately seventeen years old during the
time of trial. Sam was born with severe physical and cognitive disabilities,
which will prevent him from living independently. He is currently in a
specialized resource home, is maintaining his weight after a three-year dramatic
failure to thrive documented in the medical records introduced by the Division
of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) at trial, his epilepsy has
1
We employ pseudonyms when referring to the parties to protect their privacy.
A-2421-17T2
2
improved, and his cognitive skills, albeit limited, are improving. We affirm
termination, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Michael J. Nelson in
his twenty-page written decision issued the same date as the judgment. His
factual findings are fully supported by the evidence, as is his assessment of
witness credibility, and the weight he accorded expert testimony. Based on
those findings, his legal conclusion that the Division had met all four prongs of
the statutory test for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing
evidence warrants affirmance.
I.
We summarize the extensive record of pretrial proceedings and seven days
of trial testimony. The Division became involved with the family in 2004, when
their now-emancipated three older children lived at home. Those contacts
initially involved only the older children, not Sam. By 2011, however, the
Division had also become involved in Sam's care, providing services to the
family, including a referral to the Division of Developmental Disabilities and
the suggestion of a school setting better suited to Sam's needs. In December
2012, the Division obtained an order granting the agency care and supervision
for Sam, while physical custody remained with defendants.
A-2421-17T2
3
Beginning in approximately 2014, Sam's weight dropped to dangerous
levels, the fourth percentile for a child his age and height. Lab work conducted
during one of his several hospitalizations indicated that his seizure medication
was significantly below therapeutic range. The Division continued to extend
services, and ultimately closed its file when Mary agreed to be responsible for
Sam's medical care and to take him to medical appointments. Tom did not
engage with caseworkers.
Thereafter, caseworkers learned that Mary was locking Sam in his
bedroom after school until the following morning, she claimed for his own
protection. When in the summer of 2015 Sam was admitted to the hospital for
three weeks, at age fifteen, he weighed seventy pounds. The Division learned
then that Sam was actually capable of eating a far greater range of foods than
Mary claimed. School records for that time period indicate that Sam would on
occasion steal food from other students and take food out of the garbage.
When hospitalized in 2015, testing on Sam's blood levels established that
his seizure medication was again far below therapeutic levels. During his three-
week hospital stay, Sam gained twenty-eight pounds, regained his ability to
walk, and his seizures eased slightly. The hospital physician who provided care
concluded that Sam was being physically neglected and emotionally abused—
A-2421-17T2
4
not just because of his dangerous weight loss and the fact he had not been given
his medication—but also because of the family's practice of locking him in his
bedroom after school.
Caseworker notes from that summer indicate that when asked about
Mary's practice, Tom acknowledged that Mary kept Sam locked in his bedroom
but said he did not know why. He also insisted that Mary was the only person
who administered Sam's seizure medications, and that he believed she did so.
Accordingly, the Division conducted an emergency removal. 2 When served
written notice regarding the court date after the removal, Tom responded: "I
can't go to court on the 18th because of my job. Can you reschedule for the
week of the 31st?"
Sam lived in a residential setting from August 2015 to May 2016. During
that time, his condition much improved, although ultimately, he was asked to
leave the facility because of an incident during which he attacked staff. It bears
mention that during this residential placement, it was learned that Sam was
higher functioning than Mary reported. He was not blind, not deaf, could
2
A "Dodd removal" is an emergency removal without court order or consent of
a parent or guardian, New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v.
P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 26 n.11 (2011), where "continuance in . . . the care and
custody of the parent or guardian presents an imminent danger to the child's life,
safety, or health." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29(a).
A-2421-17T2
5
communicate albeit in a limited fashion, sit unassisted, and eat. Sam was placed
with a resource family in July 2016. At the time, Sam weighed 150 pounds, as
compared with 70 pounds a year earlier.
Both parents began to visit commencing in August 2016, although the
issues that had been documented earlier continued. Tom and Mary had difficulty
feeding Sam, keeping him clean, and administering his seizure medication. Tom
knew that Sam suffered from seizures, but was unaware that his son had been
diagnosed with an epilepsy disorder until several months before the
guardianship hearing began.
The Division's bonding expert opined the child's psychological parents
were the resource family. They are willing to adopt him. The Division also
presented testimony from a parental capacity expert, who concluded that
termination was the only alternative because Mary viewed herself as having
done nothing wrong, and complained that after ten years of services, the
Division had done nothing to help her.
Even Tom's expert, who did not recommend immediate reunification,
acknowledged that returning Sam to Tom's care would require supportive
services. Tom's expressed plan, were custody to be placed with him, was for
Mary to continue to care for Sam during the day. If she were unavailable, he
A-2421-17T2
6
planned to obtain assistance from a suitable agency because he intended to
continue to work.
Although there is an attachment between the parents and their child, the
Division's experts found a disconnect between Mary and Sam, more so than Sam
and his father. Mary had little tolerance or appreciation of Sam's needs. Tom
is affectionate with his child, but he has never administered his medications, and
he has little understanding of the level of care he requires.
The judge found that the Division had proven all four prongs by clear and
convincing evidence as to both parents. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). With
regard to prong one, the judge found that Sam "was subjected to medical neglect
due to the lack of adequate feeding and the lack of proper anti-seizure
medication, and emotional abuse due to the child being locked in his room and
isolated from his family." Mary had been repeatedly instructed regarding Sam's
seizure medication but failed to administer it while insisting she did so.
Obviously, Tom
failed to protect [Sam] from . . . prolonged failure to
thrive. No one intervened regarding [Sam] being
locked in his room, ensuring that he was adequately fed
and ensuring that he was adequately medicated when
his seizure activity increased. [Tom] testified on his
own behalf that he attempted to feed [Sam] pudding,
but sometimes he would not eat it and he did not know
what to do.
A-2421-17T2
7
With regard to prong two, the judge found that Tom would rely on Mary,
despite the fact Tom "confirmed his wife stopped giving [Sam] his medication."
Tom could not answer questions regarding the child's physical needs and his
medication requirements. Tom merely insisted he was not responsible for his
son's weight loss, denying any responsibility for Sam's failure to thrive even
though Tom lived in the home at the relevant time. The judge also noted that,
except for individual counseling, Tom did not follow even the recommendations
his own expert made that could have led to reunification. While Mary simply
did not "appreciate her son's medical needs[,]" Tom was simply "unreasonable"
in his failure to adequately plan for Sam's care if the child returned to his
custody.
Overall, the parents were therefore simply unable or unwilling to "correct
the circumstances that led to the removal of their son." Since delay in permanent
placement would harm the child, and Tom and Mary cannot provide him with a
safe and stable home, prong two was satisfied.
With regard to prong three, the judge reviewed the extensive services the
Division provided to the parents, the fact they received transportation assistance,
including bus and train passes, but were unable to benefit from any services.
Their failure to modify their behavior so they could provide their child with a
A-2421-17T2
8
safe and nurturing environment was not the result of any failure on the part of
the Division.
With regard to the final prong, whether termination would do more harm
than good, the judge observed all the experts acknowledged that Tom and Mary
at present lacked the capacity to parent Sam. As he said, "they are not likely to
become viable parenting options, or viable permanency options, in the
foreseeable future." Sam "is thriving in his resource home and he is happy and
secure there." Given that his parents cannot minimally feed and medicate him,
much less provide a nurturing environment, the judge opined that Sam's best
interests were to remain in the resource home where he had lived and
significantly improved for two years. Termination would not do more harm than
good.
II.
On this appeal, Tom presents the following points:
I. TERMINATION OF THE FATHER'S
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO HIS NOW ADULT
SON WAS ERROR AND POINTLESS UNDER
PRONG FOUR OF THE STATUTORY TEST,
AS DCPP DOES NOT HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO ADULT
ADOPTIONS, LEAVING NO DISCERNABLE
COMPENSATING BENEFIT.
A-2421-17T2
9
A. There is no possibility [Sam] will be
adopted because he is no longer a minor
and DCPP lacks the authority to consent to
his adoption by others, therefore, there is
no compensating benefit to the termination
of parental rights, which will do more harm
than good.
II. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT CONSIDER
ALTERNATIVES TO TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO SATISFY PRONG
THREE: THE CARE [SAM] NEEDS DID NOT
REQUIRE TERMINATION OF HIS FATHER'S
PARENTAL RIGHTS – [SAM] NEEDED DDD
SERVICES.
III. IN THE CASE OF EIGHTEEN YEAR OLD
[SAM], WHO SUFFERS FROM CEREBRAL
PALSY AND OTHER SERIOUS
CONDITIONS, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN
THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE PRONG
TWO REQUIREMENT THAT A DELAY IN
"PERMANENT" PLACEMENT WILL HARM
HIM, OR THAT SEPARATION FROM
FOSTER CARE WILL CAUSE SEVERE AND
ENDURING HARM.
A. It is beyond the scope of DCPP's statutory
mandate to establish "permanency" for a
severely disabled adult by terminating
parental rights, and [Sam] does not require
any such permanency in the form of
adoptive foster care.
B. The second prong is also unsatisfied
because DCPP did not meet its burden to
prove that separating [Sam] from his foster
A-2421-17T2
10
parent would cause severe and enduring
harm.
IV. [TOM] DID NOT INFLICT ANY HARM ON
[SAM], WHO IS NOW AN ADULT
SUFFERING FROM CEREBRAL PALSY AND
OTHER SERIOUS CONDITIONS, IN
LEAVING HIM IN HIS MOTHER'S CARE
WHILE HE WORKED FULL-TIME FOR
THIRTY YEARS TO SUPPORT THE FAMILY.
A. The trial judge's naked prong one
conclusion as to [Tom] is not tethered to
any recitation of facts, law and reasoning
and explanation.
B. The trial judge's bald conclusion [Tom]
somehow harmed [Sam] is unsupported by
the record and directly contrary to [another
judge's] conclusion he did not abuse or
neglect [Sam].
On this appeal, Mary presents the following points:
AS THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE ALL FOUR
PRONGS UNDER N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), THE
TRIAL COURT WAS WRONG WHEN IT
TERMINATED [MARY'S] PARENTAL RIGHTS TO
HER SON.
(1) As the trial court failed to consider whether
[Sam]'s dramatic change of behavior in 2015 was the
contributing cause of his weight loss, despite [Mary's]
efforts to seek treatment for her son, it erred when it
found the State satisfied its burden under prong one.
A-2421-17T2
11
(2) As the trial court failed to consider [Mary]'s
efforts to alleviate her son's medical condition, it erred
in finding the State had satisfied prong two.
(3) Because DCPP failed to provide services tailored
to a family attempting to meet the needs of an autistic
child, the trial court erred in finding the State had
satisfied prong three.
(4) As the trial court failed to seriously consider
whether gradual reunification was feasible, it erred in
finding prong four was satisfied.
III.
Our review of the Family Part judge's decision in a guardianship case is
limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014).
"[T]he trial court's factual findings should be upheld when supported by
adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." Ibid. We accord deference to
factual findings of the Family Part given its "superior ability to gauge the
credibility of the witnesses who testify before it and because it possesses special
expertise in matters related to the family." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012). We do not overturn a family court's findings
unless they are "so wide of the mark that the judge was clearly mistaken." N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). Our decision
to initiate termination of parental rights is guided by analysis of the following:
A-2421-17T2
12
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that separating the
child from his resource family parents would cause
serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm
to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide
services to help the parent correct the circumstances
which led to the child’s placement outside the home and
the court has considered alternatives to termination of
parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1)-(4).]
We will discuss each prong in turn.
A.
We consider Tom and Mary's arguments related to prong one to be so
lacking in merit as to not warrant much discussion in a written decision. See R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The Division presented ample proofs during the trial and at
pretrial hearings that they physically and emotionally neglected their child, who
suffered from life-threatening failure to thrive. Despite their protestations that
A-2421-17T2
13
circumstances beyond their control were responsible for Sam's malnutrition and
repeated prolonged and unnecessary seizures, ultimately the responsibility for
his care rested with them. They clearly did not fulfill those responsibilities.
By clear and convincing evidence, the Division proved the parents were
responsible for Sam's physically vulnerable condition, despite services, and that
neither parent understood the role he or she played in his deteriorating state, or
how to care for him in a manner that would avoid a recurrence. The Division
proved that Sam's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be
endangered by the parental relationship.
B.
With regard to prong two, nothing that we have seen in this record
indicates it is reasonably foreseeable that the parents will not inflict harm upon
Sam if he were returned to their care. Tom's plan for reunification is not
different from the circumstances which led to Sam's failure to thrive , and
emotional and physical neglect. He has never administered his epileptic child's
medication and does not know what to do when he does not eat.
Mary, on the other hand, insists she gave the child his medication, despite
blood test results to the contrary. Her description of his condition was grossly
inaccurate. It amounted to a self-serving view of Sam that justified isolating
A-2421-17T2
14
him in a locked bedroom. Thus, the Division has by clear and convincing
evidence established that neither parent was willing or able to provide Sam with
a safe home.
C.
Over the course of thirteen years, the Division provided this family with
multiple services consistent with the requirements of prong three. The child's
failure to thrive actually evolved while the Division was attempting to provide
services to the family. Short of taking custody of the child, which may have
saved his life, the Division could not have done more than it attempted to do in
this case. These arguments are so lacking in merit as to not warrant further
discussion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
D.
Finally, both parents claim that under prong four, the Division has not
proven by clear and convincing evidence that terminating their parental rights
will not do more harm than good. This child has a bond with his parents, but
they are woefully unable to recognize, much less provide for, his extreme
physical, medical, and emotional requirements. Thus, this prong was also met.
Tom's contention that there is no possibility that Sam will be adopted, and
therefore no corresponding benefit to termination of parental rights, is mistaken.
A-2421-17T2
15
The statute defines a "child" to include a person with Sam's disabilities. The
Division can in fact provide "services pursuant to the laws relating to dependent
and neglected children . . . to persons between [eighteen] and [twenty-one] years
of age who seek to avail themselves of such services and . . . who require a
course of treatment for emotionally, cognitively or physically disabled persons."
N.J.S.A. 9:17B-2(f) (emphasis added). The Division can continue to provide
services even after Sam turns eighteen years of age. See In re K.F., 313 N.J.
Super. 319, 324 (App. Div. 1998); Monmouth Cty. Div. of Soc. Servs. v. C.R.,
316 N.J. Super. 600, 607 n.5 (Ch. Div. 1998).
Furthermore, Sam can be adopted even if an adult. Our adoption statute,
N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1, "is liberally construed to give due regard to the right of all
persons affected." In re Adoption of Adult by G.V.C., 243 N.J. Super. 651, 653
(Ch. Div. 1990). The Division has the authority to continue to protect Sam.
Affirmed.
A-2421-17T2
16