STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JONATHAN G. CAVALUCCI (07-08-0877, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2449-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN G. CAVALUCCI,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted April 30, 2019 – Decided May 10, 2019
Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 07-08-0877.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Anderson David Harkov, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Amanda E. Nini, Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jonathan Cavalucci appeals from a December 8, 2017 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
hearing. On appeal, defendant contends that his PCR counsel rendered
ineffective assistance. He also maintains the PCR court committed error in
denying his petition on procedural grounds, and seeks a remand for the court to
consider his petition on the merits. After reviewing the record in light of the
applicable legal principles, we vacate the denial of PCR and remand for the court
to conduct oral argument on defendant's petition.
On January 8, 2010, defendant plead guilty to one count second-degree
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). In
exchange for his guilty plea, the State recommended a five and one-half year
period of incarceration with a three-year period of parole ineligibility, consistent
with the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) (2010), and agreed to a dismissal of
the remaining three counts in the indictment, along with charges in two other
indictments.
On April 23, 2010, defendant appeared for sentencing. At sentencing,
defendant also plead guilty to an unrelated simple assault charge. With respect
to that offense, the prosecutor agreed to a six-month sentence, concurrent to the
five and one-half year sentence on the possession of a firearm for an unlawful
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purpose charge. The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea
agreements. Defendant did not file a direct appeal of his convictions.
On May 9, 2016, approximately six years after his April 23, 2010
conviction, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. In his handwritten petition,
defendant requested the appointment of counsel and alleged his plea counsel was
ineffective based on his failure to explain his PCR rights. Defendant also
maintained he was not guilty of the charges because he was acting in the defense
of others, and did not have an unlawful purpose when he discharged the gun.
Over a year later, on May 30, 2017, the court appointed PCR counsel.
On September 25, 2017, the court held a conference with the prosecutor
and PCR counsel. According to the parties, the court requested the submission
of briefs addressing the "timeliness" of the PCR petition "so that the court might
address that issue prior to any substantive issues."
PCR counsel submitted a four-page brief limited to the timeliness issue.
PCR counsel did not submit a supplemental certification of defendant, or any
other sworn statements. Instead, PCR counsel stated in his brief that he was
advised by defendant that while defendant was preparing a PCR petition for a
separate conviction "he came to understand and appreciate the five-year
timeframe . . . and filed the present matter as quickly as practicable." PCR
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counsel also stated defendant's plea counsel "ineffectively advised [defendant]
as to numerous issues surrounding the underlying matter" and that "enforcement
of the time bar in these circumstances would be tantamount to a fundamental
injustice." The brief failed to list, or discuss, however, the "numerous issues,"
or how enforcement of the five-year bar would result in a "fundamental
injustice."
The PCR court denied defendant's petition in a December 8, 2017 order,
without conducting oral argument or an evidentiary hearing. In its written
decision issued the same day, the PCR court found that the judge who accepted
defendant's plea explained to defendant his PCR rights and the time limitations
to file a petition under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1). The court concluded that
"defendant's failure to timely file his petition for post-conviction relief was not
a product of excusable neglect," and was therefore time-barred. This appeal
followed.
On appeal before us, defendant argues:
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF SHOULD BE REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TRIAL COURT TO
ORDER THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
TO APPOINT NEW PCR COUNSEL WHO WILL
FULFILL HIS OR HER OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE
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DEFENDANT WITH THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF PCR COUNSEL.
POINT II
THE TIME BAR OF [RULE] 3:22-12 SHOULD NOT
BE APPLIED TO DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE
DEFENDANT DID NOT BECOME AWARE HE HAD
NOT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO FILE HIS PCR UNTIL
HE WAS ARRESTED IN ANOTHER
JURISDICTION.
With respect to his first point, defendant relies on State v. Parker, 212 N.J.
269 (2012), and asserts that among the errors committed by PCR counsel, was
his failure to "insist that the PCR court hear oral argument on the time bar issue
in the presence of defendant." In support of his second point, defendant
contends that because the PCR court "failed to hear oral argument on the time
bar issue, and refused to allow either defendant or PCR counsel an opportunity
to present the merits" of the petition, "the PCR court did not have a record to
support its ruling that defendant failed to establish excusable neglect" for
purposes of relaxing the time bar. We conclude it was error for the PCR court
to decide defendant's PCR petition without oral argument, and without
explaining the basis for its decision to dispense with oral argument.
In Parker, the Supreme Court held there is a "significant presumption in
favor of oral argument" on a first PCR petition. Ibid. (quoting State v. Mayron,
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344 N.J. Super. 382, 387 (App. Div. 2001)). The Court added that the PCR
judge retains a "residuum of discretion" in deciding whether oral argument
should be held, but the judge must approach the issues raised with a view in
favor of hearing oral argument. Ibid. Significantly, "when the trial judge does
reach the determination that the arguments presented in the papers do not
warrant oral argument, the judge should provide a statement of reasons that is
tailored to the particular application, stating why the judge considers oral
argument unnecessary." Ibid.Here, the PCR judge did not hold oral argument, and his December 8,
2017 written decision did not address the reasons the court may have concluded
it was unnecessary. Based on the issues raised on appeal, we remand for the
trial court to permit oral argument and to reconsider denial of defendant's PCR
petition. In view of our decision, we need not address the merits of the
arguments raised in Points One and Two of defendant's brief.
The order denying PCR is vacated and the matter is remanded to the Law
Division for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
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