ESSEX COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICERS PBA LOCAL 183 VS. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (STATE HEALTH BENEFITS COMMISSION) ( 2019 )


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  •                                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
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    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1228-17T2
    ESSEX COUNTY SHERIFF'S
    OFFICERS PBA LOCAL 183
    and ESSEX COUNTY SUPERIOR
    OFFICERS FOR LODGE 106,
    Petitioners-Appellants,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE
    TREASURY, DIVISION OF
    PENSIONS AND BENEFITS,
    STATE HEALTH BENEFITS
    COMMISSION,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    _______________________________
    ESSEX COUNTY SUPERIOR
    OFFICERS PBA LOCAL 183A,
    ESSEX COUNTY SUPERIOR
    OFFICERS FOR LODGE
    138, and ESSEX COUNTY PBA
    LOCAL 382,
    Intervenors-Appellants.
    _______________________________
    Argued May 6, 2019 – Decided June 14, 2019
    Before Judges Sabatino, Haas and Sumners.
    On appeal from the State Health Benefits Commission,
    Department of the Treasury, Declaratory Ruling 2017-
    001.
    Valerie Palma DeLuisi, Cathlene Y. Banker, and
    Joseph P. Slawinski argued the cause for appellants
    (Law Office of Nicholas J. Palma, attorneys for
    appellant PBA Local 183 and intervenor PBA Local
    183A; C. Elston & Associates, LLC, attorneys for
    appellant FOP Lodge 106 and intervenor FOP Lodge
    138; and Law Offices of Steven A. Varano, PC,
    attorneys for intervenor PBA Local 382; Valerie Palma
    DeLuisi, Cathlene Y. Banker, Joseph P. Slawinski, and
    Albert J. Seibert, of counsel and on the joint briefs).
    Angelo J. Genova argued the cause for respondent
    County of Essex (Genova Burns LLC, attorneys;
    Angelo J. Genova, of counsel and on the briefs; Joseph
    M. Hannon and Diane M. Camacho, on the brief).
    Christopher R. Meyer, Deputy Attorney General,
    argued the cause for respondent State Health Benefits
    Commission (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General,
    attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Danielle P. Schimmel, Deputy
    Attorney General and Christopher R. Meyer, on the
    briefs).
    PER CURIAM
    This administrative appeal involves a narrow jurisdictional issue. The
    issue comes to this court after the State Health Benefits Commission ("the SHB
    A-1228-17T2
    2
    Commission") issued a declaratory ruling arising from a dispute between the
    labor union appellants and Essex County regarding health insurance benefits.
    The unions maintain that the County unilaterally reduced the levels of
    their members' bargained-for contractual health benefits without engaging in
    prior good faith negotiations. In particular, the unions claim their members were
    transitioned by the County from the coverage under their previous plan to the
    State Health Benefits Program ("SHBP") under duress. The unions accordingly
    have filed a separate unfair practice charge against the County, a claim which is
    pending before the Public Employment Relations Committee ("PERC").
    With the unfair practice proceeding before PERC pending, the unions filed
    a request for declaratory ruling from the SHB Commission on four issues related
    to the SHBP. According to the unions, the ruling was requested for the purposes
    of facilitating labor negotiations and the fashioning of an adequate remedy
    before PERC, assuming the County's unfair practice were proven. The SHB
    Commission subsequently issued the declaratory ruling, answering all four of
    the questions posed by the unions.
    The unions now contest the SHB Commission's statutory authority and
    jurisdiction to issue its declaratory ruling concerning what is known as
    A-1228-17T2
    3
    "Question 3" of the issues they had presented. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm the SHB Commission's declaratory ruling.
    I.
    This appeal was brought by Essex County Sheriff’s Officers PBA Local
    183 and Essex County Superior Officers FOP Lodge 106, and joined by
    intervenors, Essex County Superior Officers Association (Sheriff) FOP Lodge
    138, New Jersey State PBA Local 382, and Essex County Sheriff’s Superior
    Officers Association PBA Local 183A (collectively, "the Unions"). Together,
    the Unions represent all the sheriff's officers and corrections officers employed
    by Essex County.
    On September 27, 2016, Essex County adopted a resolution approving its
    participation for its employees in the SHBP, effective January 1, 2017.
    According to the resolution, "if Essex County moves into the SHBP in 2017, the
    savings will be over $9.7 million dollars versus the last and best 2017 offer of
    Aetna [Insurance Company], our current provider."
    In response to this change of health benefits, the Unions brought unfair
    labor practice proceedings against the County before PERC. The Unions assert
    in the PERC case that the County did not engage in good faith negotiations in
    A-1228-17T2
    4
    advance of the change in health care benefits, and were transitioned into the
    SHBP under duress. 1
    On January 23, 2017, the Unions sought declaratory rulings from the SHB
    Commission on an expedited basis, seeking to have such rulings assist in
    resolving the labor disputes pending in PERC. 2 Specifically, the Unions
    requested the SHB Commission's declaratory ruling on these four specific
    questions:
    (1) Whether Essex County is required to enroll all
    employees and retirees who meet the eligibility
    requirements of the SHBP;
    (2) Whether Essex County, as an SHBP participating
    employer in the SHBP can supplement the medical
    plans it offers to employees and retirees with the non-
    SHBP plans;
    (3) Whether Essex County, as an SHBP-participating
    employer, can reimburse employees for incremental
    costs arising from changes in negotiated levels of
    health benefits; and
    1
    According to the Unions' brief, the unfair practice charges are being held in
    abeyance by PERC pending this appeal.
    2
    The Unions' brief details the torturous procedural history of the matters
    pending before PERC. However, that complicated procedural history of the
    PERC matters – which involves several emergent applications to both this court
    and the Supreme Court – is not relevant to the narrow jurisdictional issue now
    before us. The events in the PERC matter only provide context as to why the
    Unions sought a declaratory ruling from the SHB Commission in the first place.
    A-1228-17T2
    5
    (4) If the relief requested is not permissible under the
    SHBP Act, which provisions of the Act will the [SHB]
    Commission waive to facilitate a remedy to the change
    in the negotiated level of benefits?
    The Unions' request for declaratory rulings was not heard at the SHB
    Commission's March or May 2017 regularly scheduled meetings. Consequently,
    the Unions appealed the SHB Commission's inaction to this court. On July 5,
    2017, a panel of this court granted the SHB Commission's cross-motion to
    remand the case, and ordered the SHB Commission to issue a ruling on the four
    questions at its "July or September 2017 meeting."
    In accordance with this court's remand, on September 13, 2017, the
    Unions and the County presented arguments before the SHB Commission
    concerning the four listed questions.3
    On September 28, 2017, the SHB Commission met in public session to
    vote on the four presented issues.           The day before the vote, six labor
    representatives of the twelve-member State Health Benefits Plan Design
    Committee ("Plan Design Committee") sent a letter to the SHB Commission,
    asserting the Plan Design Committee was the appropriate state entity with
    3
    A transcript of the September 13, 2017 session is not included in the appellate
    record and the parties do no rely on it.
    A-1228-17T2
    6
    jurisdiction over Question 3. That letter was read into the record at the SHB
    Commission's public meeting. The letter states:
    Dear Chairwoman Culliton: We the undersigned union
    representatives of the Plan Design Committee of the
    State Health Benefits Program request that you hold off
    on the declaratory ruling on your agenda for September
    28th until such time as the [Plan Design Committee]
    has met and fully considered the implications on plan
    design raised by question 3. The SHB Commission no
    longer has any authority to make plan design decisions.
    Respectfully, Patrick Nolan, Robert Little, Kevin
    Lyons, Hetty Rosenstein, Abdur Yasin and Michael
    Sandur.
    Although the Unions' counsel was not present at the September 28 public
    meeting, Kevin Lyons, a union-designated member of the Plan Design
    Committee, appeared before the SHB Commission. Amplifying the September
    27 letter he co-signed, Lyons maintained that the SHB Commission did not have
    the authority to rule on Question 3.       Lyons argued that the Plan Design
    Committee has the sole authority to design state health benefit plans, and that
    because Question 3 involves copay and reimbursements under the plan, the Plan
    Design Committee is the correct venue to determine that issue. Lyons also
    A-1228-17T2
    7
    clarified that the Plan Design Committee was only asserting jurisdiction over
    Question 3, and not Questions 1, 2, and 4. 4
    After hearing from Lyons, and seeking legal advice in executive session,
    the SHB Commission issued a detailed written declaratory ruling on September
    28, 2017. The relevant part of the ruling as to Question 3 states:
    RULING REQUEST #3:
    Pursuant to the [SHBP], is it permissible for the
    County, as a participant in the SHBP, to reimburse its
    employees for incremental costs arising from changes
    in negotiated levels of health benefits?
    No, a local employer may not reimburse any out-of-
    pocket costs that are part of the design of an SHBP plan.
    With the enactment of Chapter 78 and the Legislature's
    creation of the [Plan Design Committee], that body was
    vested with "the sole discretion to set the amounts for
    maximums, co-pays, deductibles, and other such
    participant costs for all plans in the program." N.J.S.A.
    52:14-17.27(b).
    ....
    As previously stated, reimbursing incremental costs
    alters the participant's out of pocket costs in the SHBP,
    and these costs are established plan by plan by the [Plan
    Design Committee]. The [Plan Design Committee] has
    exercised its jurisdiction and established co-payments,
    which are a plan component, for each plan offered.
    Thus[,] the [SHB] Commission has no authority to
    4
    On appeal, the Unions likewise only challenge the SHB Commission's
    jurisdiction over Question 3.
    A-1228-17T2
    8
    modify these plan components and cannot permit a
    participating employer to do so either. The [Plan
    Design Committee] has the sole authority to modify
    these plan components and the [SHB] Commission is
    bound by the plan components created by the [Plan
    Design Committee].
    [(Emphasis added).]
    The Unions thereafter filed a motion with this court seeking an order to
    refer jurisdiction over Question 3 to the Plan Design Committee. Another panel
    of this court denied that motion.
    Additionally, in August 2018, this court denied the Unions' application to
    compel joinder of the Plan Design Committee as a party to this appeal. Notably,
    the Plan Design Committee itself has not sought to intervene.
    The Unions appeal the SHB Commission's exercise of jurisdiction over
    Question 3. They also disagree with the substance of the SHB Commission's
    answer to that Question. The County and the SHB Commission oppose the
    appeal, and argue the Commission properly exercised its jurisdiction.
    II.
    This court's review of administrative agency decisions is generally
    limited. In re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011). "We will ordinarily defer
    to the decision of a State administrative agency unless the appellant establishes
    that the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it
    A-1228-17T2
    9
    was unsupported by sufficient credible, competent evidence in the record."
    Green v. State Health Benefits Comm'n, 
    373 N.J. Super. 408
    , 414 (App. Div.
    2004).
    It is also well established that "[c]ourts afford an agency great deference
    in reviewing its interpretation of statutes within its scope of authority." N.J.
    Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs v. Schundler, 
    211 N.J. 535
    , 549 (2012) (citations omitted).
    For example, "'[d]eference to an agency decision is particularly appropriate
    where interpretation of the [a]gency's own regulation is in issue.'" R.S. v. Div.
    of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 
    434 N.J. Super. 250
    , 261 (App. Div. 2014)
    (quoting I.L. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 
    389 N.J. Super. 354
    , 364 (App. Div.
    2006)).
    Nonetheless, "when an agency's decision is based on the 'agency's
    interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue,' we are
    not bound by the agency's interpretation. Statutory interpretation involves the
    examination of legal issues and is, therefore, a question of law subject to de
    novo review." Saccone v. Bd. of Trs. of Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 
    219 N.J. 369
    , 380 (2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs. of Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.,
    
    206 N.J. 14
    , 27 (2011)).
    A-1228-17T2
    10
    With these review standards in mind, we proceed to the substance of this
    jurisdictional appeal. We begin with an overview of the pertinent statutory and
    regulatory scheme.
    A.
    The State Health Benefits Program Act
    Through the authority granted by the State Health Benefits Program Act
    ("SHBP Act"), the SHBP offers medical, prescription drug, and dental coverage
    to qualified State and local employees, retirees, and eligible dependents.
    N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.25 to -17.46a. The SHBP is not itself an insurance carrier,
    but rather a program that offers health benefit coverage through contracts
    negotiated between the SHB Commission and insurance carriers.         N.J.S.A.
    52:14-17.28. Once a local government employer has elected to participate in
    the SHBP, it is "a participating employer under the program, subject to and in
    accordance with the rules and regulations of the [SHB] [C]omission related
    thereto." N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.37(a).
    B.
    Chapter 78 and Creation of the Plan Design Committee
    "In 2011, the Legislature enacted Chapter 78, making numerous
    significant changes to public employee pension and health care benefits."
    A-1228-17T2
    11
    Rosenstein v. State, 
    438 N.J. Super. 491
    , 494 (App. Div. 2014). See also L.
    2011, c. 78, § 45(b) (codified at N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.27). Perhaps the most
    significant change to the SHBP was Chapter 78's creation of the Plan Design
    Committee, which the Legislature vested with "the exclusive authority to design
    state health benefits plans – a power previously possessed by the [SHB
    Commission]." Ibid.
    The Plan Design Committee consists of twelve members: six members
    appointed by the Governor and six members from various state labor unions.5
    N.J.S.A 52:14-17.27(b). The SHB Commission, meanwhile, consists of five
    members: "the State Treasurer; the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance; the
    Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission; a State employees' representative
    chosen by the Public Employee Committee of the AFL-CIO; and . . . a local
    employees' representative chosen by the Public Employee Committee of the
    AFL-CIO." N.J.S.A 52:14-17.27(a). As this court has previously observed:
    5
    Specifically, the six union members are: "three members . . . appointed by the
    Public Employee Committee of the AFL-CIO; one member . . . appointed by the
    head of the union . . . that represents the greatest number of police officers in
    this State; one member appointed by the head of the union . . . that represents
    the greatest number of firefighters in this State; and one member . . . appointed
    by the head of the State Troopers Fraternal Association." N.J.S.A 52:14-
    17.27(b).
    A-1228-17T2
    12
    [O]ne clear legislative intent revealed by [the creation
    of the Plan Design Committee] . . . was the leveling of
    the balance of power between labor and the public
    employer by giving six votes to each side, rather than
    the three-to-two edge previously possessed by the
    administration when the [SHB Commission] had the
    authority to create, modify and terminate components
    of the state health plan.
    [Rosenstein, 438 N.J. Super. at 501 n.4.]
    The Plan Design Committee establishes the components of the SHBP's
    overall plan designs, while the SHB Commission authorizes the plan's contracts
    with various insurance carriers. See N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28; see also Beaver v.
    Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 
    433 N.J. Super. 430
    , 433 (App. Div. 2013)
    ("Although the State contracts with health insurers to administer various benefit
    plans for program participants, the [SHB Commission] alone has the authority
    and responsibility to make payments on claims and to limit or exclude
    benefits.").
    Accordingly, the SHBP Act provides:
    The [Plan Design Committee] shall have the
    responsibility for and authority over the various plans
    and components of those plans, including for medical
    benefits, prescription benefits, dental, vision, and any
    other health care benefits, offered and administered by
    the program. The [Plan Design Committee] shall have
    the authority to create, modify, or terminate any plan or
    component, at its sole discretion. Any reference in law
    to the [SHB Commission] in the context of the creation,
    A-1228-17T2
    13
    modification, or termination of a plan or plan
    component shall be deemed to apply to the [Plan Design
    Committee].
    [N.J.S.A 52:14-17.27(b) (emphasis added).]
    See also Rosenstein, 438 N.J. Super. at 500 ("[T]he adoption of Chapter 78
    transferred authority over the plan design of the state health benefits program to
    the newly-created [Plan Design Committee]"); Teamsters Local 97 v. State, 
    434 N.J. Super. 393
    , 416 (App. Div. 2014) ("With the enactment of Chapter 78, the
    Legislature has vested the [Plan] Design Committee with the sole discretion to
    create, modify, or terminate any plan or component, as well as to set amounts
    for maximums, co-pays, deductibles, and other participant costs for all plans
    offered.").
    C.
    SHBP Contract Procurement and Coverage Terms
    N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.29 mandates the types of coverage the SHB
    Commission must provide for when procuring contracts with insurers, and also
    contains several subsections discussing the administration of contract
    coverages. For example, N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.29(A)(1)-(2) details the required
    coverage for "basic benefits" (e.g., hospital benefits, surgical benefits, inpatient
    A-1228-17T2
    14
    benefits) and "major medical expense benefits," which provides benefit
    coverage for "reasonable and necessary eligible medical expenses."
    Subsection (D) of this portion of the statute, an administrative provision,
    provides in pertinent part:
    Benefits under the contract or contracts purchased as
    authorized by this act may be subject to such
    limitations, exclusions, or waiting periods as the [SHB
    Commission] finds to be necessary or desirable to avoid
    inequity, unnecessary utilization, duplication of
    services or benefits otherwise available . . . . No
    benefits shall be provided beyond those stipulated in
    the contracts held by the [SHB Commission].
    [N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.29(D) (emphasis added).]
    Subsection (J), the last portion of N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.29, was included in
    the Chapter 78 amendments enacted in 2011. Subsection (J) instructs:
    [T]he . . . Plan Design Committee shall provide to
    employees the option to select one of at least three
    levels of coverage each for family, individual,
    individual and spouse, and individual and dependent, or
    equivalent categories, for each plan offered by the
    program differentiated by out of pocket costs to
    employees including co-payments and deductibles.
    Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
    contrary, the [Plan Design Committee] shall have the
    sole discretion to set the amounts for maximums, co-
    pays, deductibles, and other such participant costs for
    all plans in the program.
    [N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.29(J) (emphasis added).]
    A-1228-17T2
    15
    See also Teamsters Local 97, 434 N.J. Super. at 417 ("In view of the
    Legislature's vesting in the [Plan] Design Committee the sole discretion to make
    changes in the . . . healthcare plans, such changes are no longer effectuated
    through collective negotiations between the State and its employees.").
    D.
    Administration of the SHBP
    The provision creating the SHB Commission and the Plan Design
    Committee, N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.27, states in pertinent part: "The [SHB]
    [C]ommission, in consultation with the [Plan Design Committee], shall establish
    rules and regulations as may be deemed reasonable and necessary for the
    administration of [the SHBP Act]."
    Pursuant to that delegated authority, the SHB Commission promulgated
    N.J.A.C. 17:9-1.3, a regulation which governs hearings before the SHB
    Commission. That regulation provides, in pertinent part, that "any member of
    the SHBP who disagrees with a decision of the carrier and has exhausted all
    appeals with the plan . . . may request that the matter be considered by the [SHB]
    Commission." N.J.A.C. 17:9-1.3(a).
    The Division of Pensions and Benefits ("the Division"), in turn,
    administers the SHBP. N.J.A.C. 17:1-1.1(d). The SHB Commission is one of
    A-1228-17T2
    16
    thirteen "boards and commissions" that provides "oversight and direction to the
    [Division's] benefits programs." N.J.A.C. 17:1-1.1(f)(8).
    The Attorney General serves as the legal advisor to both the SHB
    Commission and the Plan Design Committee. N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.27(a).
    With this backdrop in mind, we turn to the substance of the appeal.
    III.
    A.
    As a threshold matter, the County argues that the Unions are judicially
    estopped from contesting the authority of the SHB Commission to issue a ruling
    on Question 3 because the Unions specifically requested the SHB Commission
    to issue the declaratory ruling. The Attorney General does not join in this
    argument.
    Although it is understandable from a practical perspective why the County
    would raise this argument, judicial estoppel is considered "an 'extraordinary
    remedy,' which should be invoked only 'when a party's inconsistent behavior
    will otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice.'" Ali v. Rutgers, 
    166 N.J. 280
    ,
    288 (2000) (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 
    81 F.3d 355
    , 365 (3d Cir. 1996)).
    A-1228-17T2
    17
    The essence of the Unions' argument – that the SHB Commission does not
    have jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling on Question 3 – is essentially an
    issue of subject matter jurisdiction, a fundamental concern which can be raised
    at any time. See, e.g., Macysyn v. Hensler, 
    329 N.J. Super. 476
    , 481 (App. Div.
    2000); see also Murray v. Comcast Corp., 
    457 N.J. Super. 464
    , 470 (App. Div.
    2019) ("Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties' failure to
    object, nor conferred upon the court by the parties' agreement"); Lall v. Shivani,
    
    448 N.J. Super. 38
    , 48 (App. Div. 2016) ("Challenges to subject matter
    jurisdiction may be raised at any time.").
    Consequently, although we are puzzled as to why the Unions presented
    Question 3 to the SHB Commission in the first place, they are not barred by
    principles of judicial estoppel from raising on appeal a jurisdictional challenge
    to the SHB Commission's authority to answer Question 3.
    B.
    Having dispensed with the estoppel argument, we turn to the crux of this
    appeal: Whether the SHB Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over the
    issue raised by Question 3.
    The Unions contend that the Plan Design Committee has the sole
    jurisdiction over this issue, and therefore the declaratory ruling by the SHB
    A-1228-17T2
    18
    Commission was ultra vires.      To support this position, the Unions cite to
    N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.29(J), which provides: "the [Plan Design Committee] shall
    have the sole discretion to set the amounts for maximums, co-pays, deductibles,
    and other such participant costs for all plans in the program." (Emphasis added).
    Therefore, because Question 3 essentially asks whether plan participants (i.e.,
    union members) can be reimbursed for increased costs, and because the Unions
    interpret reimbursements and "participant costs" as "one and the same," the
    Unions maintain that the Plan Design Committee alone has the authority to
    adjudicate Question 3.
    It is undisputed that the Plan Design Committee has the sole authority to
    design and modify components of statewide health plans. See, e.g., Rosenstein,
    438 N.J. Super. at 500; see also N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.27(b). Indeed, the SHB
    Commission recognized this principle in its declaratory ruling, stating: "The
    [Plan Design Committee] has the sole authority to modify these plan
    components and the [SHB] Commission is bound by the plan components
    created by the [Plan Design Committee]." The Plan Design Committee also has
    the authority to modify a plan, plan component, or to terminate a plan. It does
    not, however, have any authority over labor relations.
    A-1228-17T2
    19
    The Plan Design Committee is not an adjudicatory body. The Unions do
    not point to any regulatory or statutory authority under which the Plan Design
    Committee would have the jurisdiction to issue an adjudicatory decision on
    Question 3. Even if Question 3 were brought before the Plan Design Committee,
    and it decided that the County could reimburse participants dollar-for-dollar for
    increased costs, it is unclear how the Committee could enforce that decision. In
    fact, the Plan Design Committee notably is not mentioned at all in the SHBP
    regulations.
    By contrast, the SHBP regulations vest certain adjudicatory authority to
    the SHB Commission, albeit mainly for the adjudication of benefits and
    coverage disputes between participants and insurance carriers. That mechanism
    enables disputes to be brought before the SHB Commission, which in turn can
    refer contested factual disputes to the Office of Administrative Law. See, e.g.,
    N.J.A.C. 17:9-1.3(d). 6 In that same vein, the regulations of the Division
    6
    In issuing the declaratory ruling in the present case, the SHB Commission
    cited N.J.S.A. 52:14B-8 as its authority to issue such a ruling. That provision
    generally covering New Jersey administrative agencies states:
    [A]n agency upon the request of any interested person
    may in its discretion make a declaratory ruling with
    respect to the applicability to any person, property or
    state of facts of any statute or rule enforced or
    administered by that agency. A declaratory ruling shall
    A-1228-17T2
    20
    recognize the SHB Commission as one of the "boards and commissions"
    providing oversight and direction to the benefit programs administered by the
    Division. N.J.A.C. 17:1-1.1(f)(8).
    In addition to these regulatory provisions, the terms of the SHBP Act
    reflect that the SHB Commission has the authority to enforce and administer the
    bounds of the existing plan. Two statutory provisions are particularly instructive
    on this point.
    The first statutory provision is N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.27, which details the
    structure and overlap between the SHB Commission and the Plan Design
    Committee.       As we have already noted, N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.27 provides, in
    pertinent part: "The [SHB] Commission, in consultation with the [Plan Design
    Committee], shall establish rules and regulations as may be deemed reasonable
    bind the agency and all parties to the proceedings on
    the state of facts alleged. Full opportunity for hearing
    shall be afforded to the interested parties. Such ruling
    shall be deemed a final decision or action subject to
    review in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.
    Nothing herein shall affect the right or practice of every
    agency in its sole discretion to render advisory
    opinions.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    A-1228-17T2
    21
    and necessary for the administration of [the SHBP Act]." (Emphasis added).
    This provision shows that the SHB Commission does in fact have the authority
    – after consulting with the Plan Design Committee – to create rules and
    regulations that would aid in the administration of the SHBP Act.
    Another instructive statutory provision is N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.29(D), which
    as we have noted, is in the section establishing the SHB Commission's authority
    to purchase contracts for health coverage, and to make adjustments to avoid
    inequity. This provision indicates that the SHB Commission has the authority
    to consider equitable factors in administering the contracts.
    The Attorney General asserts that the SHB Commission's declaratory
    ruling on Question 3 with respect to these specific Essex County unions avoids
    inequity in administering the statewide program, because "[a]ltering the
    participants costs[,] alters the entire plan created by the [Plan Design
    Committee] and the [SHB] Commission and impacts the costs for everyone.
    Neither the [SHB] Commission nor participating employer[s] [are] authorized
    to modify the plan."
    We agree with that interpretation of the statutory and regulatory scheme.
    The Unions have not identified any language in the statutes or regulations that
    A-1228-17T2
    22
    empowers the Plan Design Committee to revise plan components for a county
    participant in the SHBP on an employer-specific or union-specific basis.
    The Attorney General, who, as previously mentioned, serves as the legal
    advisor to both the SHB Commission and the Plan Design Committee (although
    not a party to this appeal), asserts the Plan Design Committee can set participant
    costs, but that body cannot "retroactively change an existing design on an ad hoc
    basis." As the Attorney General puts it: "the [Plan Design Committee] designed
    the plan. The SHB Commission enforced the bounds of the plan in issuing its
    ruling."
    In a supplemental brief filed at our request following oral argument, the
    Attorney General amplified this interpretation of the statutory scheme. As that
    supplemental brief explains:
    Employees of an employer other than the State
    are not automatically included in the State Health
    Benefits Program. A local employer [7] must elect to
    participate in the SHBP for its employees to be eligible.
    N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.37(a). Once a local employer elects
    to participate, the plans available to the local employer
    are the same as those available to the State, because "all
    provisions of [the SHBP Act] will . . . be construed as
    to participating employers . . . the same as for the
    State." N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.36 (a); see also N.J. Sch.
    7
    An employer is defined to include, among other things, "a county" such as
    Essex County, but does not include individual bargaining units, such as the
    Unions. N.J.S.A. 52:17.35(a).
    A-1228-17T2
    23
    Bds. Ass'n v. State Health Benefits Comm'n, 
    183 N.J. Super. 215
    , 220 (App. Div. 1982) ("The legislative
    intention was to maintain uniformity in benefits
    afforded state and local employees."). The local
    employer may then determine which plans to make
    available to its employees: "the availability of plans
    within the program may be limited for employees . . .
    pursuant to a binding collective negotiations
    agreement." N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.37(b).
    In short, when a local employer elects to
    participate in the SHBP, it elects to participate in the
    program itself, not any one plan. The [Plan Design
    Committee] creates plans for the program, which plans
    become available to all local employers to offer to its
    employees. If it so chooses, a participating local
    employer may select a subset of plans, but it must select
    from the plans available in the program. Thus, the
    [Plan Design Committee] has no authority to create a
    plan that applies only to Essex County employees or the
    individual bargaining units of the Union.
    [(Emphasis added)].
    Although we are not obliged to adopt the Attorney General's
    interpretation 8 of the SHBP Act, we accord the Attorney General a degree of
    deference because the Attorney General is the legal advisor to the Division as a
    whole and its sub-agencies. See N.J.S.A. 52:17A-4(e); see also Quarto v.
    Adams, 
    395 N.J. Super. 502
    , 513 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the
    8
    The County has submitted a supplemental letter joining in the Attorney
    General's legal position.
    A-1228-17T2
    24
    Attorney General's interpretation of a statute or law is entitled "to a degree of
    deference" because of its "special role as the sole legal adviser to most agencies
    of State Government"); Clark v. Degnan, 
    163 N.J. Super. 344
    , 371 (Law Div.
    1978) (finding the Attorney General's statutory interpretation, as the legal
    advisor to most state agencies, is considered "strongly persuasive" but ultimately
    not binding on courts).
    We reject the Unions' contention that the Attorney General, as the legal
    advisor to both the SHB Commission and the Plan Design Committee, has an
    untenable conflict of interest in asserting a single legal position on behalf of the
    State contrary to the wishes of six of the twelve Plan Design Committee
    members. The "wide scope of function" of the Attorney General justifies the
    Attorney General in having the discretion to overrule the preferences of client
    agencies in interpreting the law and litigating cases. See Gormely v. Lan, 
    88 N.J. 26
    , 43-44 (1981).
    In their own post-argument submission, the Unions assert the Attorney
    General's interpretation of the statute is too narrow and not reflective of actual
    practice.   The Unions inform us that the Plan Design Committee recently
    exercised authority in altering plans available to members of a union of State
    workers. Although we appreciate the Unions calling the development to our
    A-1228-17T2
    25
    attention, it does not analytically refute the soundness of the Attorney General's
    statutory analysis in this case. In addition, the situation identified by the Unions
    involved a union of State workers, not local or county employees participating
    in the SHBP.
    In sum, we agree with the Attorney General that the Plan Design
    Committee has no statutory authority to alter the statewide plan components at
    the county level, on a county-specific or union-specific basis. Such alterations
    would affect utilization of health benefits and, in turn, upset the economic
    balance of the overall statewide plan. The SHB Commission properly exercised
    jurisdiction over Question 3 and provided a legally sound answer.
    C.
    Lastly, the Unions argue that the SHB Commission's ruling on Question
    3 unfairly deprives them of a possible "make-whole" remedy in the PERC
    proceedings.    The Unions allege the SHB Commission's conclusion that
    reimbursement funds are impermissible undermines PERC's ability to provide
    an award of monetary damages. We disagree.
    The declaratory ruling addressed this concern by expressly stating that,
    "[t]he Commission is confident that in cases where violations of the New Jerse y
    Employer-Employee Relation Act are found, the PERC can fashion an
    A-1228-17T2
    26
    appropriate remedy that does not infringe on the SHBP plan design or offend
    the public policies underlying the State Health Benefits program." (Emphasis
    added).
    As the County notes, there has been no harm yet established by the union
    members whose grievance is pending before PERC. The County argues the
    Unions are improperly seeking from this court an advisory opinion on remedial
    options before PERC. We agree.
    The SHB Commission did not rule that PERC cannot issue an appropriate
    remedy if an unfair labor practice is found by PERC. It expressed confidence
    PERC can fashion a fair remedy that would not infringe on the overall SHBP
    plan design.
    In essence, the Unions are seeking from this court an advisory opinion
    about whether any fair remedies – other than dollar-for-dollar reimbursements
    to individual employees – could be issued in the future by PERC in this matter.
    We respectfully decline to do so.
    The questions of remedy must be decided in the first instance by PERC.
    See De Vesa v. Dorsey, 
    134 N.J. 420
    , 428 (1993) (noting that our courts
    "refrain[] from rendering advisory opinions or exercising [their] jurisdiction in
    the abstract."). See also G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway, 
    199 N.J. 135
    , 136 (2009)
    A-1228-17T2
    27
    (instructing that courts should not "answer abstract questions or give advisory
    opinions."). If any party is aggrieved by PERC's ultimate decision, including as
    to the terms of any remedy, it may appropriately seek appellate review of that
    ruling in a separate appeal.
    IV.
    Affirmed, without prejudice to findings and any appropriate remedies that
    PERC may choose to issue in the pending unfair labor practice case.
    A-1228-17T2
    28