CHARLOTTE P. EILERTSEN VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (DEPARTMENT OF LABOR) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1130-17T1
    CHARLOTTE P. EILERTSEN,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF REVIEW,
    DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
    and ROBERT L. LEUNG,
    Respondents.
    ____________________________
    Argued January 30, 2019 – Decided May 13, 2019
    Before Judges Accurso and Moynihan.
    On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
    Labor, Docket No. 119,582.
    Kevin J. Mahoney argued the cause for appellant
    Charlotte Eilersten (Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP,
    attorneys; Charlotte Eilertsen, on the pro se briefs).
    Rimma Razhba, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause for respondent Board of Review (Gurbir S.
    Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa Dutton
    Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
    Rimma Razhba, on the brief).
    Respondent Robert L. Leung has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Charlotte Eilertsen appeals from the Board of Review's decision affirming
    the Appeal Tribunal's denial of unemployment benefits and its finding that
    appellant voluntarily left her job without good cause attributable to her work.
    See N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). In her self-authored merits brief, appellant argues:
    POINT I
    THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS MATTER
    FOR CONSIDERATION IN LIGHT OF THE NEW
    MANDATES OF MEDICAL GOOD CAUSE FROM
    ARDAN V. BOARD OF REVIEW AND ON
    IMMINENT DISCHARGE IN COTTMAN V. BOARD
    OF REVIEW
    POINT II
    THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REVERSED SINCE
    THE AGENCY DID NOT OFFER THE CLAIMANT
    A FAIR DETERMINATION OF HER CASE, AND
    MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT, AND
    FAILED TO SATISFY CONSTITUTIONAL DUE
    PROCESS PROTECTIONS APPROPRIATE TO THE
    CASE AND THE REMEDIAL PROTECTIONS OF
    THE STATUTE.
    Our review of administrative agency decisions is normally limited. Brady
    v. Bd. of Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210 (1997). "If the Board's factual findings are
    supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.' "
    A-1130-17T1
    2
    
    Ibid.
     (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 
    91 N.J. 453
    , 459 (1982)). "However, the
    exercise of such deference is premised on our confidence that there has been a
    careful consideration of the facts in issue and appropriate findings addressing
    the critical issues in dispute." Bailey v. Bd. of Review, 
    339 N.J. Super. 29
    , 33
    (App. Div. 2001).
    Neither the Tribunal nor the Board, however, made sufficient findings of
    fact in this matter. N.J.A.C. 1:12-18.1(b)(2) requires appeal tribunals to set forth
    in the second section of their decisions "Findings of Fact" which must include
    "among all the pertinent facts the date the claim was filed." (emphasis added).
    Here, the Appeal Tribunal, after reciting a brief procedural history, 1 set forth its
    limited findings pertaining to appellant's complaint that her employer, a dentist,
    installed a camera in her work area which was the "final straw" that prompted
    her to leave employment as a front-end office coordinator in the dental office:
    "The claimant was employed as a Front End Coordinator for the above-named
    employer from 9/12/1988 until 3/9/2017 when she left work because the
    employer had installed a camera in the area where the claimant worked." In its
    decision, the Appeal Tribunal concluded:
    1
    That history should have been included in the first section of the decision.
    N.J.A.C. 1:12-18.1(b)(1).
    A-1130-17T1
    3
    The claimant's leaving of the work because the
    employer installed a camera in her work area is not
    considered a cause sufficient enough to justify one
    leaving the ranks of the employed to join the ranks of
    the unemployed. The claimant left work voluntarily
    without good cause attributable to such work.
    Those findings did not include all "pertinent facts." As appellant's counsel
    explained in her summation to the Tribunal, the employer's installation of "the
    camera, although it was the final hostile act, was not the sole reason why
    [appellant] left [her employment] as her testimony has indicated."           That
    testimony included allegations that the dentist harassed and verbally abused her;
    "[p]retty much every day there was some kind of verbal abuse being said to me."
    Although appellant acknowledged her employer never used profanity, she
    testified that the dentist:
    was constantly degrading me, telling me I was making
    too many mistakes. He didn't like anything I was doing
    any longer. His practice was getting slow and he [felt]
    that . . . I was sabotaging it.
    ....
    was just constantly degrading my work ethic. He was
    complaining about how fast I was working, the words
    that I was using, how I was interrupting with patients;
    A-1130-17T1
    4
    to the point that the patients told me that they felt it was
    unfair how I was treated.[2]
    ....
    would always shake his head and mumble at things that
    I did. . . . He felt I wasn't working to my potential and
    stated that. . . . He . . . couldn't stand watching me on
    the computer. He kept asking me when I was going to
    get it. He . . . asked me . . . did I think I could get a job.
    ....
    stated that things had to be different. That he could no
    longer take what was going on in the practice, he
    needed a change.
    ....
    said to me . . . that he felt that I couldn't have a very
    good marriage if I could never shut up and listen, which
    I never do to him.
    2
    The Appeal Tribunal allowed, over the employer's objection, written
    statements (exhibits D through H) from people who claimed to be patients,
    which were proffered to buttress appellant's harassment and abuse contentions.
    The Tribunal noted that it was disputed whether some of the people were patients
    with first-hand knowledge of their assertions and whether some people were
    biased. The Tribunal said the documents would "be afforded the weight that the
    (Inaudible) deems appropriate." Neither the Tribunal nor the Board further
    addressed those documents.
    A-1130-17T1
    5
    The Tribunal addressed only appellant's complaint about the employer's
    installation of the camera. Appellant's testimony on that issue made clear that
    she viewed the camera as part of a continuing practice by the dentist:
    I just felt it was pointed at me, and I wanted to know
    what the reason was for that, why he was not trusting
    me after all these years of working for him, 3 and after
    being told that he didn't like the way . . . I worked; I
    was . . . no longer doing the job. . . . And, honestly, I
    felt that if that camera had been left there he would've
    seen the job that I was doing. But, by him doing that
    . . . I couldn't do it. I've been a victim of his verbal
    abuse and harassment, I feel for so long . . . his
    degradation . . . his bullying type of behavior, it was
    taking its toll on me mentally and physically.
    Some of these facts were disputed. Of course, it was within the province
    of the Tribunal and the Board to accept or reject these facts. We still hold to the
    tenet that we may not vacate an agency's determination because of doubts as to
    its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result. Brady, 
    152 N.J. at 210
    ; De Vitis v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 
    202 N.J. Super. 484
    , 491 (App.
    Div. 1985). But appellant's claims had to be addressed and the Board must make
    those determinations. Judge Carchman's observations in Bailey are apt in this
    case:
    3
    It was undisputed that appellant worked for her employer for twenty-eight and
    one-half years.
    A-1130-17T1
    6
    The Supreme Court addressed the issue of
    administrative fact-finding in In re Arbitration between
    New     Jersey    Bell    Telephone      Company      v.
    Communications Workers of America, 
    5 N.J. 354
    (1950), when it commented:
    It has been said that it is a fundamental of
    fair play that an administrative judgment
    express a reasoned conclusion. A
    conclusion requires evidence to support it
    and findings of appropriate definiteness to
    express it.
    [Id. at 375 (citation omitted).]
    See also Lister v. J.B. Eurell Co., 
    234 N.J. Super. 64
    ,
    73 (App. Div. 1989) (requiring a "reasoned explanation
    based on specific findings of basic facts"). This was
    neither a complex nor extended hearing, but
    nevertheless required a careful analysis and the
    requisite findings to insure a just result. Fact-finding is
    just that. It is not a recitation of statutory citations but
    a clear and concise demonstration that the litigants have
    been heard and their arguments considered. Justice
    requires no less.
    [Bailey, 
    339 N.J. Super. at 33
    .]
    In Bailey, 
    339 N.J. Super. at 33
    , we could not overlook the Tribunal's and the
    Board's failure to "address, discuss, or make separate findings" on the issues.
    Likewise, here, we are constrained to remand this case to the Board to address
    those deficiencies.
    A-1130-17T1
    7
    Although the Tribunal and Board did not address appellant's arguments
    that she left work for medical good cause, relying on Ardan v. Board of Review,4
    and because her discharge was imminent, relying on Cottman v. Board of
    Review,5 we do not require the Board to consider those discrete issues because
    we do not perceive sufficient support in the record for those claims. But the
    failure of both the Appeal Tribunal and the Board to discuss the proofs appellant
    presented that her employer harassed and verbally abused her over an extended
    period, culminating in the installation of the camera in her workspace, cannot
    be overlooked. Addressing only that last act in isolation denied appellant a fair
    hearing on her claim. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the Board to
    address appellant's claim. On remand, we direct the Board to consider the
    totality of the dentist's comments it finds to be credible and supported in making
    that determination.
    Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
    do not retain jurisdiction.
    4
    
    231 N.J. 589
     (2018).
    5
    
    454 N.J. Super. 166
     (App. Div. 2018).
    A-1130-17T1
    8