NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, ETC. VS. CINTAS FIRE PROTECTION, INC. (L-6413-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1802-17T4
    NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE
    COMPANY OF HARTFORD,
    a/s/o REFORMED CHURCH
    MINISTRIES TO THE AGING,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CINTAS FIRE PROTECTION,
    INC.,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    _______________________________
    Argued April 29, 2019 – Decided May 21, 2019
    Before Judges Sabatino, Mitterhoff and Susswein.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-6413-16.
    W. Dana Venneman argued the cause for appellant
    (Law Office of Steven J. Tegrar, attorneys; William E.
    Paulus, on the briefs).
    Dennis M. Marconi argued the cause for respondent
    (Barnaba & Marconi, LLP, attorneys; Dennis M.
    Marconi, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford ("National Fire"),
    appeals the trial court's order of summary judgment dismissing its subrogation
    claim against defendant Cintas Fire Protection, Inc. ("Cintas"). Cintas installed
    fire sprinklers in a nursing facility operated by National Fire's insured, Reformed
    Church Ministry to the Aging ("RCMA"). After the sprinklers were installed, a
    pipe burst and caused roughly $1.5 million in property damages to nursing
    facility. RCMA submitted a claim to National Fire, which paid the claim in full.
    National Fire then obtained an assignment of RCMA's rights and brought this
    subrogation again against Cintas to recoup the indemnity payments.
    The trial court granted summary judgment to Cintas based on a waiver-
    of-subrogation clause in the contract for services between RCMA and Cintas.
    In so holding, the trial court determined that pursuant to the contract terms, Ohio
    law governed the dispute. The trial court also found that a limitation-of-liability
    provision in the contract, which limited recovery against Cintas to $1,00 0, was
    enforceable. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Lisa M.
    Vignuolo's oral opinion, adding only the following comments. 1
    1
    Although the judge's oral ruling was clear, the accompanying order is
    ambiguous as to the court's ruling on the limitation-of-liability clause. The
    A-1802-17T4
    2
    RCMA operates a nursing facility in Old Bridge, New Jersey. On October
    22, 2012, RCMA entered into a "Fire Protection Proposal" (the "contract") with
    Cintas for the installation of thirty-three dry sidewall sprinkler heads in all of
    the balconies in the nursing facility for $28,760. Russel Nagy, the "GM [of]
    Facilities," executed the contract on behalf of RCMA.
    On the front side of the one-page written agreement, a section entitled
    "Acceptance of Proposal" provides:
    The specification and payment terms of this proposal
    are satisfactory and hereby accepted. Signing and
    accepting this proposal constitutes acknowledgement
    for the receipt and acceptance of the Cintas Corporation
    Terms and Conditions of Sale – Fire Equipment and
    Services, included in this proposal. I am authorized to
    approve this proposal and its payment as an agent of the
    "Customer" whose information is contained in this
    proposal. You are authorized to begin work as
    provided.
    judge stamped "DENIED" over the portion of Cintas' proposed order awarding
    National Fire $1,000 under the terms of the contract. Stemming from this
    ambiguity, Cintas filed a cross-appeal as to this issue, but withdrew the cross
    appeal once it had received the transcript of Judge Vignuolo's oral decision.
    Similarly, National Fire states in its brief that the trial court "den[ied] the part
    of the motion that sought to limit RCMA'S damages to $1,000 under the
    liquidated damages clause."
    In her oral opinion, Judge Vignuolo clearly ruled that the limitation-of-
    liability clause was enforceable. This oral ruling is controlling. See Taylor v.
    Int'l Maytex Tank Terminal Corp., 
    355 N.J. Super. 482
    , 498 (App. Div. 2002)
    ("Where there is a conflict between a judge's written or oral opinion and a
    subsequent written order, the former controls.").
    A-1802-17T4
    3
    The signature line is below these statements. Below the signature line, the
    contract provides, "The acceptance of this proposal is subject to the Terms and
    Conditions Attached."
    Accordingly, the back of the contract provides, 2 in small print, the terms
    and conditions of sale. Three particular provisions contained in these terms and
    conditions are at issue in the instant appeal.
    First, the contract contained a choice-of-law clause, providing in pertinent
    part: "14. Governing Law; Disputes. The rights and obligations of the parties
    contained herein shall be governed by the laws of the State of Ohio, excluding
    any choice of law which may direct the application of the laws of another
    jurisdiction." (Emphasis in original).
    Second, the contract required RCMA to maintain an insurance policy on
    the property and to indemnify Cintas for all losses arising from claims required
    to be covered by the insurance policy:
    9. Cintas not an insurer. Indemnification of Cintas
    by Purchaser. Purchaser agrees that neither Cintas nor
    its subcontractors or assignees, including, without
    limitation, those providing monitoring services,
    2
    The trial court noted, quite accurately, that the clauses were "in small type on
    the back of the contract itself." In its brief, Cintas states that the terms and
    conditions were "on the next page of the [c]ontract."
    A-1802-17T4
    4
    (collectively, "Subcontractors") are insurers and no
    insurance coverage is provided by this Agreement.
    PURCHASER ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES
    THAT CINTAS AND ITS SUBCONTRACTORS DO
    NOT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY NOR SHALL
    THEY HAVE ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS
    MADE AGAINST THEM CLAIMING THAT THEY
    ARE AN INSURER OF PURCHASER'S SYSTEMS,
    THE FAILURE OF SUCH SYSTEMS TO OPERATE
    EFFECTIVELY, OR ANY OTHER TYPE OF
    INSURANCE COVERAGE AS AN INSURER.
    Purchaser acknowledges that during the term of the
    Agreement, it will maintain a policy of insurance,
    covering public liability, bodily injury, sickness or
    death, and losses for property damage, fire, water
    damages, and loss of property in amounts that are
    sufficient to cover all claims of Purchaser for any losses
    sustained.
    PURCHASER AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND
    HOLD CINTAS AND ITS SUBCONTRACTORS
    HARMLESS FROM AND AGAINST ALL COSTS,
    EXPENSES            (INCLUDING           ATTORNEYS'
    REASONABLE FEES) AND LIABILITY ARISING
    FROM CLAIMS REQUIRED TO BE COVERED BY
    INSURANCE PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION,
    INCLUDING ANY CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES
    ATTRIBUTABLE TO BODILY INJURY, SICKNESS
    OR DEATH OR THE DESTRUCTION OF ANY
    REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY. Cintas shall not
    be responsible for any claims of Purchaser against the
    Subcontractors nor for any portion of any loss or
    damage that is required to be insured, is insured or
    insurable and shall be indemnified by Purchaser against
    all such claims including the claims of any third parties.
    [(Emphasis and capitalization in original).]
    A-1802-17T4
    5
    Third, the contract contained a limitation-of-liability clause:
    10. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF CINTAS,
    LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. THE LIABILITY OF
    CINTAS AND ITS SUBCONTRACTORS FOR ANY
    CLAIMS WHICH PURCHASER, ITS AGENTS,
    OFFICERS,        DIRECTORS,          EMPLOYEES        OR
    INVITEES MAY HAVE AGAINST CINTAS
    PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT, IN THE
    EVENT IT IS DETERMINED THAT CINTAS HAS
    ANY LIABILITY, SHALL BE LIMITED TO $1,000
    AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. If Purchaser wishes to
    increase the limitation of liability, Purchaser may, as of
    right, enter into a supplemental agreement with Cintas,
    and obtain a higher limit by paying an additional
    amount consistent with the increase in liability.
    Seller's service fees are based on the value of the
    services provided and the limited liability provided
    under this contract, and not on the value of Purchaser's
    premises or contents, or the likelihood of potential
    extent or severity of the injury (Including death) to
    Purchaser or others. Seller cannot predict the potential
    amount, extent, or severity of any damages or injuries
    that Purchaser or others may incur which could be due
    to the failure of the system or services to work as
    intended. As such (I) Purchaser hereby agrees that the
    limits on the liability of Cintas and Subcontractors, and
    the waivers and indemnities set forth in this contract are
    a fair allocation of risks and liabilities between Cintas,
    Purchaser, Subcontractors and any other affected third
    parties; (II) except as provided in this agreement,
    Purchaser waives all rights and remedies against Cintas
    and Subcontractors including rights of subrogation that
    Purchaser, any insurer, or third party may have due to
    any losses or injuries subscriber or others incur.
    A-1802-17T4
    6
    Purchaser agrees that were Cintas and its
    Subcontractors to have liability greater than that stated
    above, it would not provide the services. Neither party
    shall be liable to the other or any other person for any
    incidental, punitive, loss of business profits,
    speculative or consequential damages.
    [(Emphasis and capitalization in original).]
    As alleged in National Fire's complaint, on October 19, 2013, a leakage
    occurred in the "A" wing balcony of the nursing facility from the sprinkler
    system that had been recently installed by Cintas pursuant to the contract.
    Thomas Hart, the Old Bridge Fire Marshall, responded to the facility on October
    19 and determined "that the orange fire sprinkler pipe which was being installed
    for balcony sprinkler heads . . . was separated at the elbow[,] and it was obvious
    that the connection was not glued together which resulted in the separation and
    caused the water to flow." Similarly, an engineering consultant retained by
    RCMA opined that the socket joint failure caused the leakage of water and
    resulting damage, and that "[t]he socket joint failure was caused either by:
    improper socket joint assembly, improper curing of construed socket joint, or a
    combination thereof."
    RCMA suffered property damage and losses in excess of $1.5 million, and
    National Fire made indemnity payments to RCMA in accordance with the
    insurance policy in an amount in excess of $1.5 million. Accordingly, in the
    A-1802-17T4
    7
    underlying subrogation action, National Fire sought to recover damages in
    excess of $1.5 million.
    On November 6, 2017, the trial court, applying Ohio law, rendered an oral
    decision granting Cintas' motion for summary judgment based on the contract's
    waiver-of-subrogation clause. In that regard, the judge noted that the contract
    was not a consumer contract and was entered into between two business entities.
    The judge rejected National Fire's contentions that the contract was
    unconscionable, reasoning that: (1) Cintas did not have a duty to explain the
    waiver-of-subrogation clause to RCMA; (2) there was no factual evidence in the
    record indicating that RCMA was unable to understand the terms of the contract;
    (3) Ohio law permits contractual terms to be on the back of a document; and (4)
    there was no factual evidence in the record indicating that RCMA attempted to
    negotiate different or additional terms. In sum, the judge found that RCMA
    waived its right to subrogate its claim by the express language of the contract,
    and that such a waiver was enforceable under Ohio law.
    Although noting that the ruling on the waiver of subrogation "resolve[d]
    all outstanding issues relative to the enforcement of the contract with respect to
    National Fire attempting to asserts rights as a subrogee," the trial judge also
    determined that the limitation-of-liability clause was enforceable under Ohio
    A-1802-17T4
    8
    law. The judge reasoned that under Ohio law, such a clause is enforceable unless
    it is "commercially unreasonable." The judge found no factual evidence in the
    record supporting that the limitation-of-liability clause was commercially
    unreasonable.
    This appeal ensued. On appeal, National Fire contends that the trial court
    erred in determining that Ohio law applies. National Fire also argues that the
    waiver-of-subrogation and limitation-of-liability clauses in the contract are
    unconscionable and unenforceable. Finally, National Fire contends that the trial
    court erred in granting summary judgment prior to the close of discovery.
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
    standard as the trial court. Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 
    204 N.J. 320
    ,
    330 (2010). Summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions,
    answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
    any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and
    that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.
    4:46-2(c). The court considers whether "the competent evidential materials
    presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are
    sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in
    A-1802-17T4
    9
    favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540 (1995).
    "The trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that
    flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."
    Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995).
    "The analytical framework for deciding how to resolve a choice-of-law issue is
    a matter of law." McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 
    227 N.J. 569
    , 583
    (2017). Accordingly, we review the trial court's choice-of-law determination de
    novo. 
    Id. at 583-84
    .
    Choice of law
    We first address National Fire's contention that the trial court erred in its
    determination that Ohio law governs the dispute. Citing to Ginsberg v. Quest
    Diagnostic, Inc., 
    441 N.J. Super. 198
     (App. Div. 2015), National Fire argues
    that Ohio has no substantial relationship to the transaction, and that New Jersey
    has a more substantial relationship to the transaction. National Fire's citation to
    Ginsberg, however, is inapposite, as that case addressed the choice-of-law
    standards governing tort cases. Id. at 209-11.
    The New Jersey Supreme Court set forth the standards for evaluating
    contractual choice-of-law provisions in Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer
    A-1802-17T4
    10
    Curriculum Corp., 
    130 N.J. 324
    , 341-42 (1992). In Instructional Sys., the Court
    held that "[o]rdinarily, when parties to a contract have agreed to be governed by
    the laws of a particular state, New Jersey courts will uphold the contractual
    choice if it does not violate New Jersey's public policy." 
    Id. at 341
    . In so
    holding, the Court endorsed the standards set forth in the Restatement (Second)
    of Conflict of Laws ("Restatement"), which provides that the law of the state
    chosen by the parties in the contract will apply, unless either:
    (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to
    the parties or the transaction and there is no other
    reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
    (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be
    contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
    materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
    determination of the particular issue and which * * *
    would be the state of the applicable law in the absence
    of an effective choice of law by the parties.
    [Id. at 342 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
    of Laws, § 187 (Am. Law Inst. 1969).]
    In this case, National Fire is not entitled to relief under either exception.
    With respect to the exception in subsection (a), Ohio has a substantial
    relationship to the transaction because Cintas is headquartered in Ohio. See N.
    Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., a Div. of Keller Sys., 
    158 N.J. 561
    , 569 (1999) ("The substantial relationship standard under the Restatement
    A-1802-17T4
    11
    has been met in the present case because TLC is headquartered in Illinois.").
    With respect to the exception in subsection (b), as detailed below, there do not
    appear to be any substantial differences in Ohio and New Jersey law on the
    enforceability of waiver-of-subrogation or limitation-of-liability contract
    clauses.
    Specifically, "Ohio courts have repeatedly held that waiver-of-
    subrogation provisions are valid and enforceable."          Westfield Ins. Grp. v.
    Affinia Dev., L.L.C., 
    982 N.E.2d 132
    , 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012). For example,
    in Westfield, the insurer of a property damaged by a fire filed a subrogation
    action against a contractor who was renovating the property, alleging that
    contractor negligently caused the fire. Id. at 133-35. The Fifth District Court
    of Appeals held that the insurer's claim was barred by a waiver-of-subrogation
    clause in the contract between the property owner and the contractor. Id. at 144-
    46.   The court reasoned, "Waiver of subrogation is useful in construction
    contracts because it avoids disrupting the project and eliminates the need for
    lawsuits because it offers certainty as to the liability of the parties." Id. at 145.
    Similarly, in Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sonitrol, Inc. of Cleveland,
    
    672 N.E.2d 687
    , 692-93 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996), the Eight District Court of
    Appeals upheld a waiver-of-subrogation clause in a contract for the installation
    A-1802-17T4
    12
    and monitoring of a security system for a school building. In so holding, the
    court noted, "Other jurisdictions construing similar contract provisions have
    upheld contract provisions where the parties agreed to waive claims of personal
    liability in the event of a loss or peril, with the understanding that the loss would
    be covered by insurance." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Len Immke Buick v. Architectural
    Alliance (1992), 
    611 N.E.2d 399
    , 402 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)).
    As have Ohio courts, New Jersey courts have upheld waiver-of-
    subrogation provisions. See, e.g., ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Med. Plumbing,
    Inc., ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2019) (slip. op. at 10-12) (upholding
    waiver-of-subrogation clause in construction contract even as to "Non-work
    related" damages); Skulskie v. Ceponis, 
    404 N.J. Super. 510
    , 512-14 (App. Div.
    2009) (upholding waiver-of-subrogation clause in a condominium unit owner's
    insurance policy); School Alliance Insurance Fund v. Fama Construction Co.,
    
    353 N.J. Super. 131
    , 140-41 (Law Div. 2001) (upholding mutual waiver of
    subrogation in contract between school district and construction firm), aff'd o.b.,
    
    353 N.J. Super. 1
     (App. Div. 2002).
    Most notably, in Synnex Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 
    394 N.J. Super. 577
    , 580 (App. Div. 2007), we upheld "an exculpatory clause in a contract for
    the sale of a burglar alarm system, which require[d] the buyer to rely solely on
    A-1802-17T4
    13
    its own insurance for any loss from theft." In that case, the exculpatory clause
    provided that the customer agreed to look exclusively to the customer's insurer
    to recover for injuries and damages and waived all rights of recovery arising by
    way of subrogation. 
    Id. at 582
    . We held that the insurer's subrogation action
    was barred by the exculpatory clause and the waiver of subrogation, finding that
    the clause was not contrary to public policy. See 
    id. at 587-594
    . We noted,
    "Our courts have also recognized the appropriateness of exculpatory clauses
    designed to allocate responsibility for maintenance of insurance coverage and to
    avoid subrogation actions by insurance companies that attempt to shift
    responsibility for a covered loss to another party." 
    Id. at 589
    .
    Based on the lack of any significant divergence between the laws of Ohio
    and New Jersey with respect to waiver-of-subrogation clauses, National Fire has
    failed to show a fundamental policy in New Jersey that would suffice to override
    the parties' selection of Ohio law as governing the parties' rights under the
    contract. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's application of Ohio law to this
    matter.
    Unconscionability
    National Fire next argues that the trial court erred in enforcing the waiver-
    of-subrogation clause because the contract was a contract of adhesion that was
    A-1802-17T4
    14
    both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Although we conclude that
    the waiver-of-subrogation provision in the contract may have rendered it a
    contract of adhesion, we nonetheless affirm the trial court's ruling that the
    contract is not unconscionable under Ohio law. 3
    The Ohio Supreme Court has described a contract of adhesion as "a
    standardized form contract prepared by one party, and offered to the weaker
    party, usually a consumer, who has no realistic choice as to the contract terms."
    Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 
    884 N.E.2d 12
    , 24 (Ohio 2008) (citing
    Black’s Law Dictionary 342 (8th ed. 2004)); see, e.g., DeVito v. Autos Direct
    Online, Inc., 
    37 N.E.3d 194
    , 203 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) ("The loser-pays
    provision is tucked into a take-it-or-leave-it, preprinted, boilerplate arbitration
    agreement sent in an email to the vehicle purchaser among a stack of documents.
    As such, it is adhesive. There was little meaningful, face-to-face opportunity
    for understanding, negotiating, or altering the terms.").
    3
    In its brief, Cintas notes that "National [Fire] appears to concede that the
    provisions are enforceable under Ohio law; it never argues that the Ohio [l]aw
    was incorrectly applied and instead, appears to premise all of its arguments on
    New Jersey [l]aw." Because National Fire did not brief the application of Ohio
    law, we deem National Fire to have waived the argument that the trial court
    incorrectly applied Ohio law. See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 
    417 N.J. Super. 648
    ,
    657 (App. Div. 2011) ("An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived.").
    A-1802-17T4
    15
    Although there does not appear to be an appreciable difference in
    bargaining power between these two businesses, the additional terms and
    conditions were contained in small print on the back of a document which would
    commonly be characterized as a pre-printed, standard invoice. Even without
    specific evidence that RCMA unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate different
    terms, the fact that the additional terms were presented in such a manner allows
    for a reasonable inference that the terms were essentially on a "take-it-or-leave-
    it" basis.
    "However, even a contract of adhesion is not in all instances
    unconscionable per se." Taylor, 884 N.E.2d at 24. "[I]t is incumbent upon the
    complaining party to put forth evidence demonstrating that the clause is
    adhesive and, moreover, that as a result of the adhesive nature, the clause is
    unconscionable." Schaefer v. Jim Brown, Inc., 
    33 N.E.3d 96
    , 100 (Ohio Ct.
    App. 2015) (quotation omitted).         "A party challenging [a contract as
    unconscionable] must prove a quantum of both procedural and substantive
    unconscionability." Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 
    908 N.E.2d 408
    , 414 (Ohio
    2009).
    "Procedural unconscionability considers the circumstances surrounding
    the contracting parties' bargaining, such as the parties' age, education,
    A-1802-17T4
    16
    intelligence, business acumen and experience, . . . who drafted the contract, . .
    . whether alterations in the printed terms were possible, [and] whether there were
    alternative sources of supply for the goods in question." Taylor, 884 N.E.2d at
    22 (alterations in original) (quotations and citations omitted).        A party’s
    "inability to understand the language of the agreement" may also support a
    finding of procedural unconscionability. Ibid. (quoting Restatement (Second)
    of Contracts, § 208, cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1981)).
    In this regard, National Fire's strongest argument is that the additional
    terms were printed in small print on the back of the contract document.
    Although the copy of the contract in the appellate appendix is barely legible, it
    appears that the reproduction of it has contributed to the illegibility. That being
    said, National Fire does not submit a certification from Nagy that he was unable
    to read the terms due to the small size of the text, nor does National Fire contend
    in its brief that the terms were actually illegible, instead referring to them as
    "microscopic."
    Ohio courts have found that small print does not render contracts
    unconscionable, as long as the print is actually legible and other factors do not
    render the contract unconscionable. See Brondes Ford, Inc. v. Habitec, 
    38 N.E.3d 1056
    , 1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (rejecting an argument that a
    A-1802-17T4
    17
    limitation-of-liability clause was unconscionable because it was contained in
    small print on the back of the contract document); Vincent v. Neyer, 
    745 N.E.2d 1127
    , 1132-33 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting an argument that an arbitration
    clause was unconscionable because it was printed on the back of the contract in
    small print, reasoning that consumers failed to read the entire contract and did
    not present evidence that the clause was non-negotiable); P & O Containers, Ltd.
    v. Jamelco, Inc., 
    641 N.E.2d 794
    , 799 (1994) ("While the print is small, it is not
    illegible and the language is understandable. A party's duty to read terms of a
    contract before entering into it depends on the facts of the specific case. Both
    parties are commercially sophisticated. This was not a consumer transaction.").
    As in P & O Containers, there is insufficient procedural unconscionability
    to render the contract unenforceable. Although the contract was adhesive in
    nature, the agreement was between two business entities. There is no evidence
    in the record supporting that the parties had an appreciable difference in
    bargaining power, or that RCMA was unable to obtain services from another fire
    protection company. Even though the terms were in small print, it does not
    appear that the terms were actually illegible and would have prevented a meeting
    of the minds.
    A-1802-17T4
    18
    Likewise, as did the trial judge, we reject National Fire's contention that
    the contract was substantively unconscionable. "An assessment of whether a
    contract is substantively unconscionable involves consideration of the terms of
    the agreement and whether they are commercially reasonable." Hayes, 908
    N.E.2d at 414. "Factors courts have considered in evaluating whether a contract
    is substantively unconscionable include the fairness of the terms, the charge for
    the service rendered, the standard in the industry, and the ability to accurately
    predict the extent of future liability." Ibid. The inquiry is fact-specific and
    "var[ies] with the content of the agreement at issue." Ibid.
    As discussed above, "Ohio courts have repeatedly held that waiver-of-
    subrogation provisions are valid and enforceable." Westfield, 982 N.E.2d at
    139. Such waivers allow the parties to accurately predict that any losses will be
    covered exclusively by insurance. Ohio courts have not determined that such
    waivers are contrary to public policy or commercially unreasonable.
    Contrary to National Fire's assertion, no different result would have
    adhered from the application of New Jersey law. Under New Jersey law, "the
    essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is presented on a take-it-or-
    leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without opportunity for
    the 'adhering' party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars." Rudbart
    A-1802-17T4
    19
    v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 
    127 N.J. 344
    , 353 (1992) (citation
    omitted).
    Even assuming the contract was adhesive, however, as under Ohio law,
    "[t]he determination that a contract is one of adhesion, however, 'is the
    beginning, not the end, of the inquiry' into whether a contract, or any specific
    term therein, should be deemed unenforceable based on policy considerations."
    Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 
    189 N.J. 1
    , 15 (2006)
    (quoting Rudbart, 
    127 N.J. at 354
    ). The New Jersey Supreme Court set forth
    the following factors to consider in determining whether a contract of adhesion
    in unconscionable:
    [I]n determining whether to enforce the terms of a
    contract of adhesion, courts have looked not only to the
    take-it-or-leave-it nature or the standardized form of
    the document but also to [(1)] the subject matter of the
    contract, [(2)] the parties' relative bargaining positions,
    [(3)] the degree of economic compulsion motivating the
    'adhering' party, and [(4)] the public interests affected
    by the contract.
    [Id. at 15-16 (alterations in original) (quoting Rudbart,
    
    127 N.J. at 356
    ).]
    We conclude that the contract was not unconscionable when considering
    these four factors. New Jersey courts have enforced waiver-of-subrogation
    clauses and have determined that they are not contrary to public policy. Again,
    A-1802-17T4
    20
    National Fire has not presented any specific evidence supporting a disparity in
    bargaining power or a degree of economic compulsion.
    Additionally, the fact that the contested terms were in small print on the
    back of the contract is not an independent ground to render the terms
    unenforceable under New Jersey law. To be sure, in the context of evaluating
    whether arbitration clauses were "conspicuous," New Jersey courts have
    invalidated clauses based in part on the small size of the text. See Kernahan v.
    Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 
    236 N.J. 301
    , 322-23 (2019) ("Even when
    located, the small size of the print makes the provision burdensome to read and
    appears to violate the font size requirements of the [Plain Language Act].");
    Rockel v. Cherry Hill Dodge, 
    368 N.J. Super. 577
    , 586 (App. Div. 2004)
    (invalidating arbitration clause that was "onerous to read in light of the small
    size of the print" and was "difficult to locate" because there was no
    distinguishable reference to clause on the first page of the document.). But these
    cases dealt with consumer contracts and the specific requirement that an
    arbitration clause "must state its purpose clearly and unambiguously." Atalese
    v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 
    219 N.J. 430
    , 435 (2014). In this case, by
    contrast, the contract was between two business entities, and the front of the
    A-1802-17T4
    21
    contract document clearly indicated that acceptance was subject to the attached
    terms and conditions.
    In sum, both Ohio and New Jersey law permit waiver-of-subrogation
    clauses, and there does not appear to be any substantial divergence between the
    jurisdictions on this issue. Indeed, National Fire has not identified a case from
    either jurisdiction in which a court invalidated a similar waiver-of-subrogation
    clause. Because National Fire has not presented a persuasive argument that the
    contract was unconscionable under either Ohio or New Jersey law, the trial court
    correctly granted summary judgment based on RCMA's waiver of subrogation.
    Limitation-of-liability clause
    Characterizing the limitation-of-liability clause as a liquidated damages
    clause,4 National Fire argues that the clause is unreasonable and unenforceable
    under New Jersey law. National Fire maintains "the amount fixed in the subject
    4
    The clause at issue here is best characterized as a limitation-of-liability clause.
    See Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc., 
    892 F. Supp. 962
    , 969 (N.D. Ohio 1995)
    ("Liquidated damages clauses, properly employed, attempt to fix in advance
    'reasonable compensation for actual damages.' However, limitation of liability
    clauses by definition restrict the amount of compensation available, regardless
    of the actual damages ultimately suffered."). The limitation-of-liability clause
    in Cintas' contract does not attempt to fix reasonable compensation for actual
    damages, but rather restricts the amount of compensation available irrespective
    of actual damages. Accordingly, National Fire's reliance on Wasserman, Inc. v.
    Township of Middletown, 
    137 N.J. 238
     (1994), for the standards to evaluate the
    enforceability of a liquidated damages provision, is misplaced.
    A-1802-17T4
    22
    contract ($1,000.00) is not a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the
    harm caused by the breach of [Cintas]." We disagree and conclude that the
    limitation-of-liability clause is not unconscionable under either Ohio or New
    Jersey law.
    Under Ohio law, "[a] party seeking to avoid a limitations clause on
    grounds of unconscionability must show that the clause is commercially
    unreasonable and that he had no meaningful choice but to accept its inclusion in
    the contract." Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc., 
    892 F. Supp. 962
    , 970 (N.D. Ohio
    1995).    Similarly, under New Jersey law, a limitation-of-liability is
    unenforceable where it is unconscionable or violates public polic y.         See
    Marcinczyk v. N.J. Police Training Comm'n., 
    203 N.J. 586
    , 593-94 (2010);
    Lucier v. Williams, 
    366 N.J. Super. 485
    , 491-92 (App. Div. 2004).
    Similar limitation-of-liability clauses have been enforced by both Ohio
    and New Jersey courts. See, e.g., Nahra, 
    892 F. Supp. at 970-72
     (upholding
    limitation-on-liability clause in a contract for security alarm services to the
    lesser of $10,000 or the annual service fee and noting that "it was commercially
    reasonable for [the security company] to seek as a basis of the bargain a fixed
    limit on its potential liability."); Brondes Ford, 38 N.E.3d at 1082 (upholding
    $250 limit of liability in a contract for fire alarm services); Synnex, 394 N.J.
    A-1802-17T4
    23
    Super. at 591-94 (upholding limitation-of-liability clause in a business contract
    for a burglar alarm system that limited damages to the greater of 10% of annual
    service charge or $1,000); Tessler & Son, Inc. v. Sonitrol Sec. Sys. of N. New
    Jersey, Inc., 
    203 N.J. Super. 477
    , 481-86 (App. Div. 1985) (upholding a $250
    limitation-of-liability provision in an alarm services contract).
    Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's holding that the limitation-of-
    liability clause is not unconscionable, that it is commercially reasonable, and
    that it is therefore enforceable.
    Discovery incomplete
    Finally, we reject National Fire's argument that disputed issues of material
    fact precluded the entry of summary judgment. In that regard, a party opposing
    a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that discovery is incomplete,
    must "demonstrate with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further
    discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action." Badiali v.
    New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 
    220 N.J. 544
    , 555 (2015) (quoting Wellington v.
    Estate of Wellington, 
    359 N.J. Super. 484
    , 496 (App. Div. 2003)). The party
    must identify the specific discovery that is still needed. See Trinity Church v.
    Lawson-Bell, 
    394 N.J. Super. 159
    , 166 (App. Div. 2007) ("A party opposing
    summary judgment on the ground that more discovery is needed must specify
    A-1802-17T4
    24
    what further discovery is required, rather than simply asserting a generic
    contention that discovery is incomplete."). "[D]iscovery need not be undertaken
    or completed if it will patently not change the outcome." Minoia v. Kushner,
    
    365 N.J. Super. 304
    , 307 (App. Div. 2004).
    National Fire notes that the trial court relied in part on the fact that there
    was no certification from a representative from RCMA supporting that RCMA
    did not understand the contractual terms. National Fire requests that "at a
    minimum, . . . this [c]ourt remand the matter for further discovery on the issue
    of the state of mind of the individuals preparing, drafting and executing the
    subject contract."
    However, discovery would not be needed to obtain this evidence, as it
    would be within the control of National Fire's subrogor, RCMA. We also note
    that National Fire did not tender a certification from Nagy or another fact
    witness in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Regardless, the state
    of mind of the individuals drafting and executing the contract is largely
    irrelevant to the issue of whether the challenged terms are unconscionable. In
    this case, involving two sophisticated business entities, we that any failure by
    Nagy to read the contract prior to signing it would be insufficient to overcome
    summary judgment.
    A-1802-17T4
    25
    To the extent we have not specifically addressed any arguments raised by
    the parties, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
    written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    A-1802-17T4
    26