MICHAEL ZEGARSKI VS. KELLEEN ZEGARSKI (FM-20-0444-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2306-17T2
MICHAEL ZEGARSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent,
v.
KELLEEN ZEGARSKI,
Defendant-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted December 12, 2018 – Decided May 21, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz, Ostrer and Currier.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket
No. FM-20-0444-14.
Richard Obuch, attorney for appellant/cross-
respondent.
Budd Larner, PC, attorneys for respondent/cross-
appellant (David R. Tawil and Karolina A. Dehnhard,
on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
This post-judgment matrimonial dispute pertains to the allocation of
college expenses of the parties' third child, and to related attorney's fees. In
response to the defendant-mother's motion, the Family Part ordered the plaintiff-
father to contribute $10,000 toward his son's freshman-year college expenses,
with a five-percent annual inflation adjustment for subsequent years. The court
denied defendant's motion for fees.
Plaintiff thinks the amount is too high; defendant thinks it is too l ow.
Plaintiff appeals, contending the award lacks sufficient support in the record,
and that a plenary hearing was required. Defendant cross-appeals, arguing the
parties' property settlement agreement (PSA) required plaintiff to contribute half
their son's annual expenses at the out-of-state private university he attends, after
accounting for financial aid. Defendant also contends the court should have
imposed a deadline for payment. She also appeals from the denial of her fee
motion.
Having reviewed the parties' arguments in light of the record and
applicable principles of law, we conclude the parties' PSA is too indefinite to
constitute an enforceable agreement regarding college expenses. We are
constrained to remand the matter for reconsideration in light of the factors set
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forth in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982) and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).
The court shall revisit the issue of fees in light of its college expense allocation.
I.
The parties have four children. The eldest two were already attending a
public New Jersey university when the parties divorced after a marriage of over
twenty years. Their college expenses are not directly in issue, although plaintiff
agreed in the PSA to sole responsibility for over $100,000 in debt related to their
education. The future college expenses of the parties' fourth and youngest child
are not before us.
Four years after the divorce, the parties' third child, whose educational
expenses are at issue, began applying to colleges. He was interested in an
engineering career. He ultimately received offers of admission to a private out-
of-state university and Rutgers. He preferred the out-of-state school. However,
plaintiff told him he could not afford to pay half the cost of attendance. Plaintiff
adhered to his position when he accompanied his son and defendant on a
university tour for accepted students. Despite his father's resistance, the young
man matriculated at the out-of-state school for the 2017-2018 school year.
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In June 2017, defendant filed her request to compel plaintiff to pay half
the post-financial-aid expenses.1 She invoked the PSA, which requires equal
allocation of college expenses that are "reasonable and agreed upon." The
relevant provision states:
All reasonable and agreed upon college and secondary
education costs shall be divided between the parties
after any and all financial aid is received by said
children, the cost of which shall be paid with the
Husband paying 50% of the cost and Wife paying 50%
of the cost of same. . . . Any and all reasonable and
agreed upon extra-curricular activities shall be paid
equally between the parties.
The PSA defines "education costs" as including, but not limited to "tuition,
room, board, miscellaneous school fees, books, reasonable transportation to and
from the school and any reasonable related costs and expenses."
The PSA also required the parties to consult with each other about the
child's college plans, and to exchange tax information during the child's junior
year of high school. The consultation provision states: "The parties shall consult
with each other and with the children with a view toward providing each child
with the best education possible in view of their particular circumstances, each
1
The month before, plaintiff filed a motion to reduce child support and for other
relief, but did not address college expenses. Defendant raised the issue in an
extensive cross-motion. The parties successfully mediated all the post-judgment
issues, except college expenses and related fees.
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child's educational abilities and desires, and the parties' then existing financial
ability."
Defendant argued that the out-of-state school offered the best preparation
for the engineering career the child envisioned. Since she and the child had
consulted with plaintiff about the child's desire to attend the school, defendant
maintained that plaintiff was obliged to pay half the expenses. She also
contended she was entitled to attorney's fees, pursuant to a PSA provision that
shifted fees incurred to enforce the agreement.
Plaintiff responded that he was not obliged to pay half the costs because
he never agreed to them. His attorney argued that plaintiff was not bound to
contribute anything toward the child's college expenses, although he suggested
his client might be willing to share $1000 to $2000 a semester if the child
attended Rutgers as a commuter.
The trial court agreed that plaintiff was not obliged to pay half the out-of-
state university's costs since he had not agreed to them. However, the court held
that to exempt plaintiff from all responsibility to share college costs would be
"terribly inequitable." The court surmised that plaintiff's responsibility should
be based on the costs of attending Rutgers, and it referred the matter to mediation
again, which was unsuccessful.
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When the matter returned to the court, the judge decided that plaintiff
should pay half the cost of attendance at a public university in New Jersey, after
accounting for financial aid. However, the parties did not create a record of
what that cost would be. The court concluded that the likely amount for a
commuting student would be $20,000 a year, and it ordered plaintiff to pay
$10,000 for freshman year, with a five-percent inflation adjustment for
subsequent years. The court rejected defendant's claim for attorney's fees, after
reviewing the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c).
II.
The Family Part exercises "substantial discretion" in determining parents'
contribution to college expenses. Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super.
574, 588 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 308
(App. Div. 2008)). However, we owe no deference to a decision that is
"manifestly unreasonable, [or] arbitrary," J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013)
(citation omitted), or that "ignores applicable standards," Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super.
at 309. As we apply contract principles to the interpretation of a PSA, Pacifico
v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265-66 (2007), we review the trial court's
interpretation of the PSA de novo, see Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
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309 N.J. Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 1998) (stating that contract interpretation
is a matter of law subject to de novo review).
As did the trial court, we conclude that the PSA did not compel plaintiff
to bear half the out-of-state university's expenses because he did not agree to
them. In the interests of "'stability of arrangements' in matrimonial matters" and
amicable resolution of disputes, we will enforce the parties' intentions as
expressed in a PSA's plain language, although the court retains discretion to
modify terms based on changed circumstances, or to avoid "unconscionability,
fraud, or overreaching." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44, 47 (2016) (citations
omitted). The PSA expressly confines the parties' obligation to pay half of
college expenses that are both "reasonable and agreed upon." We must strive to
give each word meaning. Washington Constr. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217
(1951). Thus, the parties' agreement is essential, as is the objective
reasonableness of the amount.
Defendant does not contend that plaintiff breached the agreement to
consult. Rather, she contends that the consultation implied agreement. We are
not convinced. The PSA expressly left the issue of college costs for further
negotiation. While the court is empowered to enforce an obligation to negotiate
in good faith, it cannot enforce "an agreement to agree" that reflects the parties'
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intention "to postpone agreement on a term essential to their ultimate contractual
objective." 1 Corbin on Contracts § 2.9[3](A)(ii) (Timothy Murray ed., rev. ed.
2018). An enforceable contract requires "obligations . . . specifically described
in order to enable a court . . . to ascertain what it was the promisor undertook to
do." Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank,
163 N.J. Super. 463, 474 (App. Div. 1978).
Since the PSA did not allocate college expenses absent the parties'
agreement, the trial court was obliged to determine each parent's respective
obligation according to the Newburgh and statutory factors. See Avelino-
Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. at 591 n.8 (distinguishing between a PSA providing
for equal division of college costs, where the trial court must enforce the
agreement, and a PSA that is silent on "the specific division of college costs,"
where courts must determine "a fair allocation of expenses" under the Newburgh
and statutory factors); see also Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. at 307, 310 (holding the
trial court must consider factors where the judgment of divorce allocated the
cost of college "in accordance with appropriate legal standards").
The non-exhaustive list of Newburgh factors include:
(1) whether the parent, if still living with the child,
would have contributed toward the costs of the
requested higher education; (2) the effect of the
background, values and goals of the parent on the
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reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher
education; (3) the amount of the contribution sought by
the child for the cost of higher education; (4) the ability
of the parent to pay that cost; (5) the relationship of the
requested contribution to the kind of school or course
of study sought by the child; (6) the financial resources
of both parents; (7) the commitment to and aptitude of
the child for the requested education; (8) the financial
resources of the child, including assets owned
individually or held in custodianship or trust; (9) the
ability of the child to earn income during the school
year or on vacation; (10) the availability of financial aid
in the form of college grants and loans; (11) the child's
relationship to the paying parent, including mutual
affection and shared goals as well as responsiveness to
parental advice and guidance; and (12) the relationship
of the education requested to any prior training and to
the overall long-range goals of the child.
[Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 545; N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a); see
also Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. at 309 (stating the
Newburgh factors are "non-exhaustive").]
The court must consider each factor. See Raynor v. Raynor, 319 N.J. Super.
591, 616-17 (1999) (reversing a trial court's decision as to college contribution
that gave only "cursory attention to" a certain Newburgh factor). While "the
parents' ability to pay is clearly the most significant" of the Newburgh factors,
a court should not consider it "to the exclusion of all others." Id. at 617 (citation
omitted).2
2
Regarding capacity to pay, defendant highlights that plaintiff's income has
increased since the divorce. Plaintiff responds that his child-support and
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Though the amount a parent would likely have paid for college, were the
family still intact, has significance, a court should recognize that "any effort to
gauge how parents would have reacted to educational expenses if they had
remained married is fraught with uncertainty." Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 544
(2006). The changes that often accompany divorce, including "heightened
economic concerns and animosity, . . . may influence a parent's viewpoint as to
how he or she would have acted if the family had remained together." Id. at 545.
A court should, therefore, be wary of ascribing too much weight to its conclusion
about a parent's hypothetical contribution had the divorce not occurred. See id.
at 544-45.
The trial court did not undertake a Newburgh and statutory analysis in
allocating the parties' shares of their son's college expenses. The trial court
apparently predicated its allocation on the assumption that had the parties
alimony obligations, as well as the debt he assumed for the older children's
education, render him unable to afford a significant contribution to his third
child's college expenses. He also contends that defendant could increase her
ability to pay by working full-time. We express no opinion on the ultimate
determination of each party's ability to pay. However, we note that a parent's
ability to pay is not limited to his or her current income. Rising college costs
compel many parents to save for college well before a child reaches college age
or, when saving is impossible or inadequate, to borrow funds for repayment
later. Therefore, what a parent can reasonably bear depends on his or her current
and projected earnings, age, assets and other financial obligations, among other
factors.
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remained married, the child would likely have followed his two brothers by
attending a New Jersey public university. However, the trial court failed to
address specifically several other Newburgh factors, including the "most
significant" – the parties' respective financial resources. Nor did it consider "the
effect of the background, values and goals of [plaintiff] on the reasonableness
of the expectation of the child for higher education"; the child's own financial
resources or ability to earn income while at college; the availability of financial
aid at other schools; the child's "relationship to [plaintiff], including mutual
affection and shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental advice and
guidance"; or how "the education requested" related to the child's own goals,
aptitude, and prior training.
The court may not cap a parent's contribution at the cost of an in-state
public college where the balance of Newburgh factors favor the child's private
school of choice. Finger v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438, 444-45 (App. Div. 2000).
Furthermore, the court's premise that attendance at an in-state public
engineering program would cost $20,000 a year lacked any evidential support
in the record.
We recognize that the trial court addressed the complex issue before it
with sensitivity and that decisions about college expenses usually defy
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numerical precision. In attempting to reach a fair and just result, the trial court
must account for all relevant factors and base its consideration of each factor on
evidence in the record. On remand, the court's analysis may necessitate the
submission of additional evidence, such as evidence pertaining to the child's
own financial resources or earning capacity; the opportunity for financial aid at
Rutgers or another state school; the child's relationship with plaintiff; and how
the education at the out-of-state private university compares to that of an in-state
public university. Whether a plenary hearing is required is left to the trial court's
determination. Finally, the issue of counsel fees will abide the trial court's
decision on the merits, particularly inasmuch as the court must consider "the
results obtained." R. 5:3-5(c).
Remanded for reconsideration. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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