DCPP VS. A.C. AND M.E., IN THE MATTER OF J.C. AND V.E. (FN-15-0044-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2018 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2081-16T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.C.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
M.E.,
Defendant.
______________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF J.C. and V.E., minors.
______________________________________
Submitted March 19, 2018 - Decided September 11, 2018
Before Judges Messano, Accurso and Vernoia.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County,
Docket No. FN-15-0044-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Victor E. Ramos, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Cynthia McGeachen, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minors (Linda Vele Alexander,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this protective services matter, defendant A.C. appeals from a now
final June 8, 2016 order, entered after a summary hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A.
30:4C-12 (Section 12), reflecting her family's continued need of services and
extending the Division of Child Protection and Permanency's care and custody
of her two minor children. The order became final in December 2016 when
the Division dismissed the Title 30 protective services case when it filed a
guardianship complaint against defendant.1
Defendant claims the trial court never acquired jurisdiction to permit the
Division to direct services and retain care and custody of the children because
1
See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.A., 357 N.J. Super. 155, 164-65
(App. Div. 2003) (distinguishing an interlocutory order finding abuse or
neglect from a final and appealable dispositional order).
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her stipulation to the need for both was the result of ineffective assistance of
her counsel. She further claims she was subsequently denied notice of the
June 2016 summary hearing, and that the trial court's finding at the hearing
that her family continued to be in need of services and extending the Division's
care and custody of the children was not supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence in the record.
We conclude the Division's filing of the guardianship action effectively
mooted this appeal, see N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.P., 408 N.J.
Super. 252, 261-64 (App. Div. 2009), and that defendant must bring her
challenge to the Family Part's jurisdiction in the guardianship action, or risk its
loss through operation of laches, see N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 445-46 (2012).
Defendant's two young children, a girl almost three and another girl just
three months at the time of these events, were the subject of an emergency
removal in August 2015 after another domestic violence incident between
defendant and her partner M.E., the father of the infant. Defendant had
recently obtained a temporary restraining order against M.E. after she alleged
he pushed her, punched her and chased her around their apartment with a
knife, which he plunged into the door of the bedroom in which she had taken
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refuge with the children. Defendant admitted to the Division's intake workers
that she used the baby as a shield on that occasion, as she had on others,
because M.E., whom she claimed was abusing steroids and Suboxone, would
not hit her when she was holding his daughter.
After defendant dismissed the temporary restraining order, the Division
arranged for her temporary housing at a local motel, and defendant agreed to a
safety plan forbidding M.E. to have any contact with the children. Defendant
also agreed to undergo a psychological evaluation, meet with the Division's
domestic violence liaison and contact Providence House for domestic violence
services. The Division received another referral days later that defendant was
"constantly screaming and cursing" at her toddler, and that the child had fallen
into the motel pool when defendant left her in the care of other residents.
Defendant denied yelling at the toddler but admitted she fell into the pool after
defendant asked other residents to watch the toddler when defendant went to
feed the baby. Defendant signed another safety plan agreeing to never leave
the child alone near the pool, and the Division provided her an emergency 911
cell phone to use in the event M.E. ever appeared at her residence.
The Division removed the children several days later, after defendant
was arrested for simple assault of M.E. following an argument at the motel that
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turned physical. M.E. claimed defendant picked him up to go to a bar in
Seaside Heights. He claimed defendant flirted with other men at the bar,
prompting an argument between the two of them, after which he left for the
motel where defendant's great aunt was caring for the children. When
defendant returned to the motel, they continued to argue and M.E. claimed
defendant struck him on the head. Police, who noted defendant appeared
under the influence of alcohol, arrested her after seeing proof of injury.
Defendant's story was different. She denied picking up M.E. Instead,
she claimed he just showed up at the bar, where he was eventually escorted out
by bouncers. She also denied she told M.E. where she lived, speculating that
one of his friends must have seen her car at the motel. She told the Division
workers she returned to the motel only after her great aunt appeared at the bar
and told her M.E. was at the motel with the children, which defendant knew
was a violation of the safety plan. She claimed she struck M.E. in self-defense
only after he pushed her and she felt threatened.
After the emergency removal, the Division filed a complaint detailing
those events and defendant's history with the Division, including her prior
substantiation for neglect of another child. That finding stemmed from
defendant and a partner being under the influence of drugs in a car with
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defendant's son in 2010, resulting in defendant's arrest for possession.
Defendant's rights to her son were terminated in 2012, and he was adopted by
defendant's mother. Defendant acknowledges she formerly had a ten-bag-a-
day heroin habit. She has been on methadone maintenance for several years,
including throughout these proceedings.
The Division also noted in the complaint that the month before
defendant obtained her temporary restraining order against M.E., the Ocean
County Board of Social Services made a referral to the Division regarding
defendant's ability to care for her newborn. The referral was prompted by staff
having observed defendant "nodding off" while visiting the office with the
baby. The Board expressed concern that defendant might be overmedicated.
An investigation revealed defendant, in addition to methadone, had also
been prescribed Klonopin and Zoloft. At the Division's request, both
defendant and M.E. attended substance abuse evaluations. M.E. was referred
for an extended assessment. Although the Division's count of defendant's
Klonopin did not match the amount she should have had in her possession, she
tested negative for non-prescribed substances and the Division closed the case
against her. The Division did not refer defendant for treatment as she was
already in treatment.
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In its complaint, the Division sought an order for care and custody of the
children under Title 9 and Title 30. At the initial hearing on August 25, 2015,
three days after the removal, defendant, through her counsel, consented to
jurisdiction and did not oppose the Division's application, but reserved the
right to do so on the return date. The court found the Division "had reasonable
cause to remove the children from the household based on allegations of both
substance abuse and violence in the household." On the return date, the court
continued custody, care and supervision with the Division and the children
were continued in placement with defendant's sister. The transcript from that
hearing is not in the record.
When the matter returned for a Title 30 summary hearing on December
21, 2015, counsel for the Division advised that defendant and M.E. "have
signed off on the Title 30 summary order." That order, which defendant and
her counsel signed consenting to both its form and entry, provides, among
other things, that the court finds "[b]y consent, based on the testimony set forth
on the record and having reviewed the defendant's voluntary admission(s),
that" defendant "knowingly, willingly and voluntarily" agreed to give up her
"right to a summary hearing" and that "[h]er family is in need of services due
to domestic violence concerns." (Emphasis in original.)
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Counsel for defendant argued the Division should continue its care and
supervision of the children but return custody to defendant, or that the children
be placed with defendant's mother, the adoptive parent of defendant's older
child, and defendant allowed liberal, supervised visitation in order to assist her
mother with all three children. Counsel argued the Title 30 order was based on
domestic violence issues, "[t]hat's why there's a continued need for services."
Acknowledging that defendant "does have a drug history," counsel contended
the court report and the various attachments note that
she is in [Jersey Shore Addiction Services], and she's
doing very well in that program. She is complying
with the court services, and we are simply asking that
she be allowed to have her children back; that it be
supervised by her mother.
Defendant's counsel acknowledged the psychologist who evaluated
defendant opined in an attachment to the court report that placing the children
with defendant's mother "does not seem the best arrangement." Counsel
argued, however, that the expert's opinion was based on an incomplete
understanding of defendant's mother's position. Counsel contended "[t]he
maternal grandmother is ready, willing and able to care for them. She just
needs a little help, and that would be from my client." Counsel relied on that
portion of the psychologist's opinion recommending defendant "engage in
counseling to address the P.T.S.D. and continue to wean off the methadone and
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to avoid further concerns over sedation and fatigue, and then re-explore the
maternal grandmother's home as an option," as supportive of defendant's
request to "change to the care and supervision and just allow the maternal
grandmother to supervise [defendant's] contact."
Having heard argument and after reviewing the court report and its
attachments, the court denied defendant's request to return custody to her or
her mother as not in the children's best interests at that time, and continued
placement with defendant's sister. The judge, however, ordered the expedited
psychological evaluation of defendant's mother, which the Division requested
in order to assess her for placement, and which was supported by the Law
Guardian, in order to determine quickly whether such a placement would be
appropriate for the children, and if so, that it be effected as soon as possible.
The judge ordered that defendant continue in substance abuse treatment and
that she be referred for services as recommended by the evaluating
psychologist, including individual counseling. The judge further ordered that
defendant continue receiving domestic violence services at Providence House.
Following a compliance hearing in March 2016 that maintained the
status quo, the court conducted another Title 30 summary hearing on June 8,
2016. Although defendant maintains she was not provided notice that a
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summary hearing would occur on that date, and the Division concedes the
order entered after the March compliance hearing checked the box noting the
next hearing would be a compliance review, not a summary hearing,
defendant's counsel did not object to proceeding on June 8. Indeed, all counsel
appeared prepared to participate in a summary hearing on that date and there is
no indication otherwise in the transcript.
Specifically, after counsel made their appearances on the record, the
judge stated she had "the matter scheduled for a Title 30 summary hearing
today." The deputy attorney general announced the Division was seeking "to
continue jurisdiction based upon a need for services as to the mother,
[defendant]," and the judge asked defendant's counsel whether defendant was
"going to consent that the Division needs to continue to be involved i n this
case, or do we have to have a summary hearing." When defense counsel
replied that "[w]e'd need a summary hearing in this matter," the judge directed
the Division to "call your witness," and the permanency worker was sworn in.
The worker testified the Division was involved with defendant's family
because the children were in placement "as a result of domestic violence issues
and some substance abuse concerns" as to both parents. The worker made
clear the case was not one for abuse and neglect, and services were being
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offered to correct the conditions that led to the children's placement. She
testified the Division was providing therapeutic and supervised visitation,
substance abuse evaluations and individual counseling.
The worker testified defendant had successfully completed domestic
violence counseling and was compliant with individual counseling. She
testified she was "not aware" of whether defendant and M.E. continued in a
relationship, although she believed they no longer lived together.
The court admitted the worker's report without objection, which noted
defendant was administratively discharged from Jersey Shore Addiction
Services in April 2016 following five positive urine screens over four weeks in
March. Defendant refused a random screen on April 19. The worker testified
defendant's screens on May 31 and June 3 were negative, as was a random
screen on May 27. The worker's report also noted that M.E. was granted a
temporary restraining order against defendant on May 5. The report noted
"[t]he circumstances surrounding this restraining order are unclear" and further
noted the temporary order was dismissed when M.E. failed to appear for a
hearing on a final order.
Following the hearing, the judge found the Division established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the children required the continued care
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and supervision of the Division, that defendant remained unable to adequately
care for the children based on substance abuse and domestic violence between
defendant and M.E., and that the family continued to be in need of services. In
an amplified statement of reasons pursuant to R. 2:5-1(b), the court provided a
lengthy history of the matter and explained the worker testified it was in the
children's best interests to continue the matter to allow defendant to complete
recommended services and the court report "indicated there were safety and
risk factor of substance abuse and domestic violence, which continued to be
issues."
The court conducted a permanency hearing on August 2, 2016, at which
it approved the Division's plan for termination of parental rights followed by
adoption. The judge noted defendant was arrested for possession of marijuana
on June 23, 2016, coinciding with a hair follicle test, which defendant
contested, evidencing use of marijuana. The judge also noted defendant had
not completed substance abuse treatment and "recently left a visit with her
children, and then had a physical altercation with [M.E.] in the parking lot of
the Division office." Following the filing of a complaint for guardianship, the
court dismissed the Title 30 proceeding in a dispositional order on December
12, 2016. This appeal of the June 8, 2016 summary hearing order followed.
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Defendant raises the following issues for our consideration:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION UNDER
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 THAT THE FAMILY
CONTINUED TO BE IN NEED OF SERVICES
REQUIRING THE CONTINUATION OF THE
CHILDREN IN THE CUSTODY, CARE, AND
SUPERVISION OF DCPP WAS NOT SUPPORTED
BY ADEQUTE SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. (RAISED BELOW).
POINT II
A.C. WAS DENIED HER DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO TIMELY AND ADEQUATE NOTICE OF
DCPP'S BASIS FOR THE JUNE 8, 2016 SUMMARY
HEARING. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ESTABLISH
PROPER JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER TO
ALLOW DCPP TO RETAIN CARE CUSTODY AND
SUPERIVISION OF THE CHILDREN OR TO
DIRECT SERVICES GIVEN THE INADEQUACY
OF THE ADMISSION OBTAINED AT THE
DECEMBER 21, 2015 SUMMARY HEARING THAT
RESULTED FROM THE INADEQUATE
REPRESENTATION OF A.C.'S TRIAL COUNSEL
THAT DAY. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
A. DCPP's Defective Stipulation and The Trial
Court's Inadequate Jurisdiction.
B. A.C.'s Trial Counsel's Ineffective
Assistance.
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The Division argues this appeal is moot because the only practical effect
of the summary order extending the Division's care, supervision and custody of
defendant's daughters and reflecting her family's continued need of services "is
that her children were not in her custody while the [protective services
proceeding] was pending." The Division asserts that as current and future
custody determinations will be made in the pending guardianship action,
defendant "faces no ongoing consequences from the [o]rder on appeal."
"Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion
that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately
threatened with harm." Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311
(App. Div. 2010). "An issue is 'moot' when the decision sought in a matter,
when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy."
Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div.
2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If, however, "a party
'still suffers from the adverse consequences to her caused by [a] proceeding,'
an appeal from an order in that proceeding is not moot." A.P., 408 N.J. Super.
at 262 (quoting Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 398 N.J. Super. 21, 51
(App. Div. 2008), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 198 N.J. 382, 387
(2009)).
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Judged by those standards, we agree with the Division the matter is
moot. The Division instituted this action seeking the temporary care, custody,
and supervision of defendant's two daughters pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12
and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S.,
214 N.J. 8, 31 (2013) (noting "the Division usually pleads Title 9 and Title 30
claims concurrently in order to facilitate the efficient processing of assistance
to the family"). It never alleged defendant abused or neglected either child.
The Title 30 protective services case was dismissed, following the filing
of a guardianship complaint, without any finding other than the best interests
of the children required the Division to assume temporarily their care,
supervision and custody pursuant to Section 12. See I.S., 214 N.J. at 33
(explaining that Section 12 "provides the means for the Division to effectuate
services to children in need when a parent does not consent to the Division's
supervision, care, or custody"). The disposition order entered in this
protective services case based on a finding under Section 12 thus has none of
the adverse consequences of a final order of disposition based on a finding of
abuse or neglect. See A.P., 408 N.J. Super. at 262-63 (explaining the adverse
consequences to a parent of a final order of disposition entered under N.J.S.A.
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9:6-8.50 through N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.58, including inclusion of the parent's name in
the Central Registry).
We acknowledge the trial court's finding under Section 12 could form
the basis of jurisdiction in a guardianship case, as it establishes one of the five
statutory grounds for instituting an action to terminate parental rights under
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.2 See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(c) (permitting the filing of a
petition to terminate parental rights when "it appears that the best interests of
any child under the care or custody of the division require that he be placed
under guardianship"). Although that might suggest a continuing adverse
consequence to defendant, she remains free to contest the Division's continued
care and custody of the children, and thus the guardianship court's jurisdiction,
in the guardianship case. Cf. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 207
N.J. 88, 120-21 (2011) (explaining the limited preclusive effect of Title 9
determinations in any subsequent and related guardianship proceeding). As
Justice LaVecchia explained in I.S., a protective services order entered
pursuant to Section 12 is only intended to be temporary and requires periodic
review by the court. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12; see also I.S., 214 N.J. at 37; N.J. Div.
2
The guardianship complaint is not included in the record, and we are
unaware of the asserted basis of jurisdiction in that matter.
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of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.C., 423 N.J. Super. 259, 267-68 (App. Div.
2011).
Indeed, as our Supreme Court has warned that a parent failing to contest
the Division's authority " to exercise 'care or custody,' . . . at or about the time
of the filing of the guardianship petition" risks losing the opportunity to do so
by operation of laches, F.M., 211 N.J. at 445-46, an appeal of a summary order
under Section 12, even if successful, may well be a Pyrrhic victory. The
Court's directive in F.M. is clear: "[i]f there is to be a challenge to [DCPP's]
very right to proceed with a termination-of-parental-rights hearing, it must
come before the hearing." Id. at 445. As Justice Albin explained, even were
there merit to a claim that the Division lacked proper "care or custody" of a
child at the time it filed its guardianship complaint, "it would be questionable
public policy to upend a properly conducted guardianship hearing at which the
family court has fairly found that termination of parental rights is in the best
interests of the children." Id. at 446.
Any decision of ours in defendant's favor on the care and custody
question would likely be similarly ineffective "to upend a properly conducted
guardianship hearing" culminating in the termination of defendant's parental
rights to her daughters for those same reasons of public policy. Thus it is
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imperative that defendant, and indeed any parent wishing to challenge the care
and custody the Division obtained of his or her child in a protective services
proceeding ending with the filing of a guardianship complaint, pursue that
challenge in the only case where success will matter — the subsequent
guardianship. Accordingly, that the trial court's summary order in this
protective services case could form the basis of jurisdiction in the guardianship
proceeding is not a sufficiently adverse consequence to make defendant's
appeal of that order justiciable. See A.P., 408 N.J. Super. at 262.
In sum, this case is moot because any decision we would make could
have no practical effect on the temporary care and custody orders entered
under Section 12 in the Title 30 protective services case, and any adverse
consequence defendant might suffer from those orders in any subsequent
guardianship proceeding can, and indeed must, be addressed in that
proceeding. Having reviewed the record, we are convinced that none of the
other issues defendant raises is of such substantial public importance and so
unlikely to recur in a live controversy as to compel our consideration of the
appeal on the merits. See De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428-29 (1993).
Appeal dismissed as moot.
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