DCPP VS. N.J. AND J.B., IN THE MATTER OF S.B., A.B., AND C.B. (FN-12-0159-17, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3698-17T4
    NEW JERSEY DIVISION
    OF CHILD PROTECTION
    AND PERMANENCY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    N.J.,
    Defendant-Appellant/
    Cross-Respondent,
    and
    J.B.,
    Defendant.
    _______________________________
    IN THE MATTER OF S.B., A.B.,
    and C.B., Minors,
    Respondents/Cross-Appellants.
    _______________________________
    Submitted September 10, 2019 – Decided September 25, 2019
    Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
    Docket No. FN-12-0159-17.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant/cross-respondent (Phuong Ving Dao,
    Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
    attorney for respondents/cross-appellants (Nancy P.
    Fratz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Michael A. Thompson,
    Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant N.J.1 appeals from the June 16, 2017 Family Part order finding
    that she was grossly negligent when she drove while intoxicated, with her then
    twelve-year-old daughter A.B. (Amanda) and her then four-year-old son C.B.
    (Carl) in the car. In addition, the Law Guardian for the children cross-appeals
    from the same order, alleging the Division of Child Protection and Permanency
    (the Division) misled the trial court to believe defendant failed to provide
    requested medical records. In addition, the Law Guardian asserts defendant's
    1
    We use initials to protect the privacy of the parties and their children. For
    ease of reference, we refer to N.J. as defendant and to J.B. as defendant's
    husband; in addition, we use pseudonyms to refer to the parties' children.
    A-3698-17T4
    2
    attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to present the medical records
    at trial. We affirm.
    I
    We discern the following facts from the record. On October 5, 2016 at
    4:33 p.m., the Division received a referral from the Bridgewater Police
    Department (BPD) reporting that defendant had been pulled over on October 4,
    2016, with her two minor children in her car, and charged with driving while
    intoxicated (DWI).
    Upon receiving the referral, the Division immediately investigated and
    attempted to interview defendant, initially making at least two attempts at
    contacting defendant that same day, without success. The Division's screening
    summary indicates that when caseworkers arrived at defendant's home at 9:20
    p.m., "[a]n adult male answered the door and indicated that [defendant] was not
    home and would not be home until tomorrow. He would not identify himself or
    advise workers of the whereabouts of [defendant] or her children."            The
    caseworkers returned to the home eighty-five minutes later, at 10:45 p.m., in a
    further attempt to contact defendant; at that time, "there was no answer."
    Seventy-five minutes later, at midnight, defendant arrived at a hospital
    A-3698-17T4
    3
    emergency room (ER) by ambulance "after family witnessed a tonic clonic
    seizure."2
    On June 7, 2017, the trial court conducted a factfinding hearing. The
    Division presented two witnesses: a Division caseworker and Officer Joseph
    Daley.     The Division moved three exhibits into evidence: the Division's
    screening summary, its investigation report, and a BPD incident report.
    Defendant testified in her own defense and also presented her adult son and
    husband as additional witnesses. Defendant offered no other evidence.
    Officer Daley, a BPD patrol officer with more than fourteen years'
    experience, described the traffic stop that resulted in the DWI charge against
    defendant. On the evening of October 4, 2016, 3 Officer Daley observed a
    vehicle swerving within the eastbound lane on U.S. Highway 22, which he
    described as "drifting . . . touching one line to the other line." He stopped the
    vehicle and requested the driver's license, registration, and insurance card,
    which defendant provided. At that point, he detected "an odor of an alcoholic
    2
    Defendant's hospital record further indicates that defendant's husband reported
    that after his wife had gone to bed, he "came to see her, [and] she was stiffened,
    shaking all extremities, and foaming at the mouth . . . . [Patient] cannot
    remember the episode."
    3
    The BPD incident report indicates the stop occurred at 11:53 p.m.
    A-3698-17T4
    4
    beverage coming from [defendant's] breath," and asked her "if everything was
    okay." She replied that "she was fine," explaining "she got turned around . . .
    looking to get on [Route] 287."
    While speaking with defendant, Officer Daley continued to smell the odor
    of alcohol. Before asking defendant to exit her vehicle, he asked her to recite
    the alphabet from "C" to "M," and she was unable to do so. He then repeated
    the instructions and defendant still could not successfully complete the test; at
    that point, he asked her to step out of the vehicle.
    Officer Daley then attempted to administer two field sobriety tests: the
    horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and the walk and turn test. He explained
    that the HGN test looks for "involuntary jerking movements of the eye, which
    is an indicator of possible intoxication." He stated he held his pen "out in front
    of [defendant] 10 to 15 inches away," and instructed "her to keep her head still"
    as he moved a "pen back and forth and then just follow the movement of the pen
    with her eyes"; however, he could not adminster the test because defendant
    repeatedly failed "to follow the instructions for the test." Defendant also failed
    to complete the walk and turn test successfully. Initially, Officer Daley stopped
    the test when defendant started walking out towards the highway. After guiding
    A-3698-17T4
    5
    defendant back to the front of the vehicle, he again attempted to administer the
    test but defendant became belligerent and was subsequently arrested for DWI.
    Officer Daley continued to smell alcohol emanating from defendant while
    transporting her to the police station, where defendant refused to submit to an
    Alcotest. Officer Daley then charged defendant with DWI, refusal to submit to
    a breath test, failure to maintain lane, and driving while suspended.
    Officer Daley testified that defendant did not tell him, at any time, that
    she had been injured earlier that day, or at any time prior, nor did she advise him
    that she had been assaulted and might be suffering from a concussion. He also
    did not observe any bruising, swelling, or injuries to defendant's face or head,
    either at the scene or at the police station.
    The caseworker testified next, recounting the Division's investigation and
    findings regarding the October 5, 2016 referral. She detailed the Division's
    multiple attempts to meet with defendant and her family at their home the same
    day as the referral. The caseworker finally made contact with the family on
    October 7, 2016. She first interviewed Amanda, who stated her mother was
    pulled over for swerving, and that the police officer made her mother recite the
    alphabet and leave the car. Amanda did not believe her mother's car was
    A-3698-17T4
    6
    swerving; however, she did state her mother was unable to complete the
    alphabet. She did not observe anything after her mother got out of the car.
    The caseworker next spoke with defendant, reaching her on her cell phone.
    Defendant advised that "she was currently hospitalized" because of "a seizure,"
    and said "they were still running tests to see what was wrong with her." The
    caseworker said defendant did not state that she had suffered a concussion or
    had been assaulted, or that her seizure was the result of an injury. Defendant
    told her the DWI charge was "unfounded . . . . she was not intoxicated and . . .
    she would be fighting the charges."
    When the caseworker finally met defendant on October 17, 2016, she
    continued to deny the allegations of intoxication and, for the first time, told the
    caseworker that a concussion caused her to fail the field sobriety tests. The
    caseworker asked defendant if she told the arresting officer she had been
    assaulted or that she had a concussion, and defendant said she had not.
    Defendant told the caseworker she received the concussion when a Somerset
    fireman assaulted her and that she did not report the incident nor did she go to
    the hospital to treat her injuries. The caseworker asked defendant for her
    hospital discharge paperwork but she could not locate it. Defendant said she
    would fax it as soon as she found it.
    A-3698-17T4
    7
    The caseworker testified the Division determined that the allegations of
    abuse and neglect against defendant were "[e]stablished" due to the observations
    made by the BPD, leading to her arrest and DWI charge, with her children in the
    vehicle. On cross-examination, the caseworker acknowledged the Division
    eventually received defendant's medical records several months later and the
    hospital records indicated that defendant reported she had been assaulted.
    Defendant testified that she was with Amanda and Carl all day on October
    4, 2016. She indicated that she took her children to a doctor's appointment and
    then spent the majority of the day at her uncle's home in Plainfield. Defendant
    said she was assaulted by her uncle prior to leaving his home, which she left
    between 11 p.m. and midnight. She claimed she did not know the extent of her
    injuries and was simply trying to get home when she was stopped by the police.
    Defendant admitted she was unable to complete any of the field sobriety tests,
    but claimed that she advised the officer that she had numerous medical issues
    and disabilities that would prevent her from standing "surefooted." Defendant
    also claimed she advised the officer that she was hurt, that she had visible bruises
    on her face, and that she "had no shoes on."
    On cross-examination, defendant testified that she was punched in the
    head "maybe twenty" times by her uncle, that she was rendered unconscious for
    A-3698-17T4
    8
    a few seconds, but that she did not think her injuries were severe enough to
    warrant going to the hospital that night. Defendant could not recall how soon
    after the alleged incident she contacted her adult son J.B. (Jason) to come pick
    her up; in addition, she initially could not state how and when she knew she had
    visible injuries to her face. Defendant later testified that she saw the injuries a
    few days later in the hospital.
    Defendant testified that she did not yell out during the course of the
    alleged assault because "I'm not a punk." Defendant further stated the officer
    was lying in his report and his testimony and that she was not driving while
    intoxicated but rather was "driving while injured." Finally, defendant admitted
    that, in spite of the significant trauma she sustained when her uncle assaulted
    her, she did not go to the hospital until the night of October 5, 2016, more than
    twenty-four hours after the assault.
    Jason then testified, recounting that his mother called him around 11:30
    p.m. on October 4, 2016, to tell him that she was "assaulted by my uncle" and
    "that she was lost so I was coming to get her." Jason stated that he was going
    to pick up his mother "somewhere on highway 287[,] like in Bridgewater."
    Jason said he received a second call from his mother approximately fifteen
    minutes later, advising that she was pulled over by the police and that he would
    A-3698-17T4
    9
    have to come get Amanda and Carl. Jason claimed to have seen "bruises on [his
    mother's] cheekbones and a knot on her forehead – all from first sight" and that
    he "smelled no alcohol" on her breath. Jason did not take his mother to the
    hospital after picking her up from the police station nor did she ask to go to the
    hospital.
    Defendant's husband testified last, recounting that he received a call from
    his wife on the night of October 4, 2016, that Jason answered first. He said his
    wife told him she was assaulted by her uncle. He stated he told his wife to stay
    in the parking lot and that they would come get her, but she said she did not feel
    safe there.
    Defendant's husband apparently accompanied Jason to the police station
    to pick up his wife, Amanda, and Carl, although he remained in the car. He
    "observed them walking out together. [Defendant] wasn't stumbling." He also
    did not smell alcohol on her breath nor did he hear her "slurring her speech."
    He did state that he observed bruises "[o]n her forehead, on her cheek . . . and I
    witnessed lumps and stuff on the back of her head, and on the side of her head."
    Despite these injuries, he said they "didn't go to the hospital . . . my wife is really
    not a hospital person. . . . Then she eventually [ended] up having a seizure" and
    went to the hospital by ambulance.
    A-3698-17T4
    10
    Following the factfinding hearing, the trial court issued a written decision
    finding that the Division had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
    defendant acted grossly negligent by driving Amanda and Carl while intoxicated
    on October 4, 2016. The court found Officer Daley "to be very credible," and
    found "his testimony to be wholly consistent with his report." The court also
    found the caseworker "to be credible," describing her testimony as "forthright,"
    and her answers to questions as "clear and concise," with no "attempt to
    embellish."
    The court noted there were multiple inconsistencies in defendant's
    statements to the Division, the BPD incident report, and her sworn testimony,
    and found "her to be incredible."      Specifically, the court found defendant
    "evasive and hostile during the course of cross-examination," noting that she
    "was unable to recall details about the day in question on cross-examination but
    had been able to answer the same questions . . . during direct examination."
    The court found numerous "details in her testimony that had not
    previously been disclosed to the Division . . . and were in fact inconsistent with
    her earlier reports," such as "being arrested without shoes on" and having "a
    large green, blue, and purple bruise on her face at the time of [her] arrest."
    Additionally, the court noted that "[defendant] offered no documentary evidence
    A-3698-17T4
    11
    to corroborate her version of events" and simply accused others of lying where
    there were details she could not explain.
    The court also did not find Jason's testimony to be credible, independent
    of its credibility findings of defendant, noting that portions of Jason's testimony
    were self-contradictory while other portions sounded "rehearsed." Specifically,
    the court noted that both Jason and defendant's husband used "nearly identical
    phrasing that they were 'appalled' to learn of the alleged assault [of defendant]."
    The court also found that parts of Jason's testimony were "self-contradictory."
    The court also did not find the testimony of defendant's husband credible
    and similarly noted that portions sounded "rehearsed." The court found that
    those portions that did not sound rehearsed directly contradicted the testimony
    offered by Jason. The court also found that defendant's husband similarly
    "attempted to embellish his story, particularly when stating what physical
    manifestations of the assault were present" and "attempted to exaggerate his
    efforts to soothe [defendant] and their discussion about taking her to the
    hospital, a conversation [Jason] had no recollection of hearing." The court
    determined the family "attempted to ensure that they gave consistent testimony,
    but ultimately were unable to do so."
    A-3698-17T4
    12
    The court found that on October 4, 2016, defendant was driving on US
    Highway 22 with her children, Amanda and Carl, in her vehicle. After Officer
    Daley observed defendant's vehicle drift between the "right fog line and the
    dashed lines dividing the highway," he executed a traffic stop.         He asked
    defendant some preliminary questions and smelled alcohol on her breath. He
    did not observe any facial injuries on defendant and at no time did defendant
    indicate she had been assaulted. The officer asked defendant to exit the vehicle
    for field sobriety tests and found her unable to complete them successfully, when
    defendant either could not, or would not, follow instructions regarding the tests.
    As a result of Officer Daley’s observations, defendant was arrested and charged
    with DWI and other offenses.
    The court found that, "[b]ased on the competent and credible evidence,
    and the reasonable and common sense inferences that can be drawn from same
    . . . [defendant] was driving while intoxicated with [Amanda] and [Carl] in her
    car on October 4, 2016." The court further found that defendant "did not merely
    allow an intoxicated person to drive her children, but rather was the intoxicated
    person herself." The court concluded that the Division had established, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, that "[defendant] drove with her children while
    A-3698-17T4
    13
    in an intoxicated state" and that the "well settled law is clear that this conduct is
    grossly negligent." These appeals followed.
    On appeal, defendant argues the record lacks sufficient evidence to
    support the trial court's finding of neglect, and that her conduct, in retreating
    with her children from the scene of an assault, was not grossly negligent,
    wanton, or reckless. On the cross-appeal, the Law Guardian alleges the deputy
    attorney general (DAG) representing the Division violated the rules of
    professional conduct, causing the judge to misinterpret the evidence to believe
    defendant did not disclose her medical records to the Division.           The Law
    Guardian further alleges defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel,
    arguing her defense counsel failed to enter defendant's available medical records
    at trial to support her testimony that she suffered a concussion, prior to the police
    stopping her.
    II
    Title 9 controls the adjudication of abuse or neglect cases. N.J. Div. of
    Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 
    201 N.J. 328
    , 343 (2010) (citing N.J.S.A.
    9:6-8.21 to -8.73). In an abuse or neglect proceeding, the Division bears the
    burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence adduced at a factfinding
    hearing, that a person has committed abuse or neglect. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b).
    A-3698-17T4
    14
    The standards governing our review are well known.             "We accord
    deference to factfindings of the family court because it has the superior ability
    to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before it and because it
    possesses special expertise in matters related to the family." N.J. Div. of Youth
    and Family Servs. v. F.M., 
    211 N.J. 420
    , 448 (2012) (citing Cesare v. Cesare,
    
    154 N.J. 394
    , 413 (1998)). "We recognize that the cold record, which we review,
    can never adequately convey the actual happenings in a courtroom." 
    Ibid. (citing N.J. Div.
    of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 
    196 N.J. 88
    , 104 (2008)). "When
    the credibility of witnesses is an important factor, the trial court's conclusions
    must be given great weight and must be accepted by the appellate court unless
    clearly lacking in reasonable support." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
    F.M., 
    375 N.J. Super. 235
    , 259 (2005) (citing In re Guardianship of DMH, 
    161 N.J. 365
    , 382 (1999)). "We will not overturn a family court's factfindings unless
    they are so 'wide of the mark' that our intervention is necessary to correct an
    injustice." 
    F.M., 211 N.J. at 448
    (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
    G.L. 
    191 N.J. 596
    , 605 (2007)).
    Based on our review of the record, we find no basis to disturb the trial
    court's decision. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Bruce
    A-3698-17T4
    15
    J. Kaplan's thorough and well-reasoned written opinion. We add a few additional
    comments.
    After defendant and the Law Guardian appealed, the Law Guardian was
    granted leave to supplement the record with defendant's hospital records. In a
    brief filed in support of this motion, the Law Guardian asserted that defendant
    "was diagnosed with a TBI [traumatic brain injury] and mild concussion." The
    Law Guardian's appellate brief repeats this same assertion; however, a careful
    review of the hospital record does not support this contention.      The initial
    assessment of defendant's condition states "new-onset seizure of unclear
    etiology." One day later, before discharge, the updated "impression" describes
    defendant's injury as a "questionable mild TBI" and states "there is a question
    . . . whether a concussion was sustained." We agree with the Division that
    defendant's "medical records are devoid of any formal diagnosis of concussion
    or concussive-like symptoms; rather, they merely contain defendant's self-report
    of what she alleged happened on October 4, 2006." 4
    4
    Even if defendant's hospital records had contained a definitive diagnosis, the
    admissibility of any such medical opinion would depend on "the complexity of
    the analysis involved in arriving at the opinion and the consequent need for the
    other party to have an opportunity to cross-examine the expert." N.J. Div. of
    Youth & Family Servs. v. B.M., 
    413 N.J. Super. 118
    , 130 (App. Div. 2010).
    A-3698-17T4
    16
    Rather than containing a definitive diagnosis that supports defendant's
    version of events, the hospital record contains entries that strongly support the
    trial court's adverse credibility findings concerning the testimony of defendant
    and her husband. The hospital record of the initial physical examination of
    defendant that addressed her head, eyes, ears, nose and throat, described these
    areas as "normocephalic, atraumatic." Another physical examination, less than
    five hours later, noted defendant complained of "tenderness to touch" in the area
    of her "left forehead, occipital, [and] temporal areas." Significantly, the record
    does not document any bruises, swelling, or other evidence of the beating
    defendant alleges she sustained. To the contrary, the record describes
    defendant's skin as "normal." Following our review of the hospital record, we
    conclude the Law Guardian's contention that defendant received ineffective
    assistance of counsel lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
    opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    We also reject the Law Guardian's argument that while the Division
    "received [defendant's] medical records months prior to the fact-finding trial[,]
    the judge was never made aware of this fact by either the DAG . . . or defense
    counsel."   As previously noted, the caseworker acknowledged, on cross-
    examination, that the Division did eventually receive defendant's medical
    A-3698-17T4
    17
    records and that the hospital records did indicate that defendant reported she had
    been assaulted. The record therefore fails to support the contention that the
    DAG violated rules of professional conduct regarding defendant's medical
    records.
    Any arguments not addressed lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion
    in a written opinion. 
    Ibid. In summary, we
    conclude the record contains
    sufficient credible evidence supporting the trial judge's determination of neglect
    under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).
    Affirmed.
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    18