STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ROBERT M. HARMON (88-01-0039, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0944-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT M. HARMON,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted May 1, 2019 – Decided May 20, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 88-01-
0039.
Robert M. Harmon, appellant pro se.
Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Joie D. Piderit, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Robert Harmon appeals from the trial court's denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) to correct an illegal sentence without
an evidentiary hearing. He claims a violation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012). We affirm.
On February 27, 1987, when defendant was seventeen years old, he was
charged with juvenile delinquency, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-23, for acts that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute murder, robbery and possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose. After waiver to adult court, defendant was
convicted of purposeful and knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2);
first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count two); first-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); unlawful
possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); and theft as a lesser included
offense of armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C15-1.
In 1988, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of life in prison,
with thirty years of parole ineligibility. We affirmed defendant's convictions
and sentence. State v. Harmon, No. A-2532-88 (App. Div. Sept. 25, 1991) (slip
op. at 8), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 559 (1992).
In 1994, the Law Division denied defendant's first PCR petition. We
affirmed. State v. Harmon, No. A-3819-95 (App. Div. June 10, 1998) (slip op.
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at 1, 8), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 411 (1998). We also affirmed the denial of
defendant's second PCR petition. State v. Harmon, No. A-5219-99 (App. Div.
Nov. 14, 2001).
In 2006, the Law Division denied defendant's third PCR petition. In 2007,
the Law Division denied defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. In
2009, the Law Division denied defendant's second motion to correct an illegal
sentence, finding that defendant's claims were barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-5
because the same issues were addressed in 2007. According to the State,
defendant filed a third motion to correct an illegal sentence in 2010, but that
motion was not heard, because the Law Division had already ruled on the same
motion. In November 2016, the Law Division denied defendant's fourth motion
to correct an illegal sentence. On August 18, 2017, the Law Division denied
defendant's fifth motion to correct an illegal sentence because "no grounds
[were] proffered to reconsider the [2016] decision . . . ." This appeal followed
that 2017 denial.
We previously described the facts leading up to defendant's convictions
in his direct appeal. Harmon, No. A-2532-88 (slip op. at 2-3). When defendant
appeared for sentencing for murder and related charges on December 12, 1988,
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he was nineteen years old. Defense counsel acknowledged that the court had
limited sentencing options, saying:
[T]he law requires your Honor to sentence my client to
a mandatory [thirty] year term without parole. The only
discretion this court has is whether or not to sentence
him to a [thirty] year sentence with no parole for [thirty]
years or to a life sentence with no parole for [thirty]
years.
After reviewing aggravating and mitigating factors, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)
and (b), the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of life in prison with
thirty years of parole ineligibility.
Pointing to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and State v. Zuber,
227 N.J. 422 (2017), defendant argued most recently before the Law Division
that because he had been incarcerated for more than thirty years without a
"realistic and meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation," his sentence amounted to the "functional[]
equivalent of life [in prison] without parole." Defendant argued his sentence
was illegal because: (a) he "received the same sentence as an adult offender";
(b) the court did not take into account defendant's status as a juvenile or consider
the Miller factors; (c) defendant's sentence was improperly "offense based and
not offender based"; (d) "mandatory sentences unconstitutionally deprive
juveniles of any relevant characteristics of youth;" (e) "mandatory sentences for
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juveniles impermissibly undermine[] the reliability of the sentence as it relates
to moral culpability and potential for maturity and reform;" (f) "juveniles are
particularly vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures;" (g)
because defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the crime, his sentence
"serve[d] no legitimate penological justification and violate[d] the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment under both the state and federal
constitution[s];" and (h) defendant had matured and sought post-sentencing
rehabilitation.
Defendant, appearing pro se, presents the following issue 1 on appeal:
POINT I: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS
DENIAL ORDER OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE ON THE
PAPERS ALONE WITHOUT AFFORDING, AT
LEAST, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO ASSESS,
ON THE RECORD, THE ALLEGED ILLEGALITY
OF HIS SENTENCE, I.E., WHERE HE WAS NEVER
AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT TO
A SENTENCING COURT OR HAVE A
SENTENCING COURT CONSIDER THE FIVE (5)
MITIGATING FACTORS OF "YOUTH AND ITS
ATTENDANT ASSOCIATED TRAITS AND
CHARACTERISTICS" SET FORTH BY THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT IN MILLER V. ALABAMA, 567
U.S. 460 (2012), APPLIED RETROACTIVELY VIA
MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA, 136 S. Ct. 718(2016), RECOGNIZED AND APPLIED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN STATE V. ZUBER, 227
1
We corrected minor citation, spelling and grammatical errors.
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N.J. 422 (2017), THE MITIGATING FACTORS OF
"YOUTH AND ITS ATTENDANT
CHARACTERISTICS" MUST BE CONSIDERED IN
AN "INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING HEARING"
ADOPTING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
POSITION THUS THE LOWER COURT'S DENIAL,
FINDING THAT IT FOUND NO GROUNDS FOR
RELIEF WAS AN ERROR AND IS IN COMPLETE
CONFLICT WITH AND CONTRARY TO THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT AND NEW JERSEY SUPREME
COURT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED PRECEDENTS
AND THEREFORE THE LOWER COURT'S DENIAL
MUST BE REVERSED AND THE MATTER
SHOULD BE REMANDED IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE.
We review a denial of post-conviction relief without an evidentiary
hearing de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004). One ground for
post-conviction relief is an illegal sentence. R. 3:22-2(c). An illegal sentence
is one "not imposed in accordance with law." State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45
(2011) (quoting State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000)); see also State v.
Tavares, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 618 (App. Div. 1996) (noting that an illegal
sentence is one "imposed without regard to some constitutional safeguard or
procedural requirement"). A defendant may move to change an illegal sentence
at any time. R. 3:21-10(b)(5).
A person convicted of murder "shall be sentenced," unless otherwise
provided in the statute, "to a term of [thirty] years, during which the person shall
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not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall
be between [thirty] years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve
[thirty] years before being eligible for parole." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1)
(emphasis added). "A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of
murder shall be sentenced pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1)]." N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3(b)(5) (emphasis added).
In three landmark cases, the United States Supreme Court relied on
scientific data to find that age is an important factor when assessing juvenile
culpability at sentencing. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-73; Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68-69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 -72 (2005). In
Roper, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment prohibits sentencing juveniles under eighteen years old to
the death penalty. 543 U.S. at 568, 578. In Graham, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment also prohibits sentencing juveniles to life without parole for
non-homicide offenses. 560 U.S. at 74-75. Finally, in Miller, the Court
determined that a sentencing judge must consider youth-related factors "before
concluding that life without any possibility of parole was the appropriate
penalty." 567 U.S. at 479. The Court stated: "Although we do not foreclose a
sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take
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into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480. The
holding in Miller applies retroactively to sentences of life without parole,
"regardless of when a conviction became final." Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136
S. Ct. 718, 729, 732 (2016).
In Zuber, Chief Justice Rabner stated: "To the extent the parties and amici
urge this Court to impose a maximum limit on parole ineligibility for juveniles
of thirty years, we defer to the Legislature on that question." Id. at 453. We
more recently held that a juvenile's sentence of life in prison with thirty-five
years of parole ineligibility, for a murder he committed at the age of fourteen,
was not illegal. State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1, 4, 12-13 (App. Div. 2018).
On January 28, 2019, we affirmed a New Jersey State Parole Board
decision denying defendant parole and imposing a 120-month future eligibility
term. Harmon v. N.J. State Parole Bd., No. A-1977-17 (App. Div. Jan. 28, 2019)
(slip op. at 2). Defendant had "incurred a litany of serious infractions . . . in
1991 to 1996, 1999, 2001 to 2002, 2006, 2008, and 2013, during [defendant's]
twenties, thirties, and forties." Id. at 3, 10. In October 2008, defendant fought
with several corrections officers, two of whom were sent to the hospital. Id. at
3. After this incident, defendant "was sentenced to a suspended term of eighteen
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months incarceration for aggravated assault." Ibid. Of the twenty-nine
infractions defendant committed while incarcerated, ten were deemed serious.
Ibid.
Defendant did not receive a sentence of life without the realistic
possibility of parole for offenses he committed as a juvenile. His continued
incarceration is based on his adult behavior in prison.
Affirmed.
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