S.H. VS. W.H. (FM-02-0441-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0404-17T1
    S.H.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    W.H.,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    Submitted January 8, 2019 – Decided May 20, 2019
    Before Judges Accurso and Moynihan.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
    Docket No. FM-02-0441-15.
    S.H., appellant pro se.
    Fusco & Macaluso Partners, LLC, attorneys for
    respondent (Amie E. DiCola, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff S.H. and defendant W.H. had one son – born June 13, 2014 –
    prior to their March 2016 divorce. Plaintiff appeals from two Family Part
    orders, entered March 22 and August 18, 2017 denying her sequential motions
    for post-judgment relief.
    In her self-authored merits brief plaintiff argues:
    POINT I
    THE JUDGE [ERRED] IN NOT CONSIDERING
    MANY ITEMS OF RELIEF IN THE PLAINTIFF'S
    NOTICE   OF    MOTION,   WHICH    WERE
    INACCURATELY STATED BY THE JUDGE AS
    NOT INCLUDED IN THE NOTICE OF MOTION.
    POINT II
    [THE] JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING HER
    MOTIONS FOR ADJUSTMENT OF PARENTING
    TIME, DID NOT CONSIDER THE CHANGED
    CIRCUMSTANCES PROPERLY, AND DID SO
    WITHOUT AFFORDING HER AN EVIDENTIARY
    HEARING.
    POINT III
    THE JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING THE
    PLAINTIFF'S  REQUESTS   FOR   CURRENT
    MODIFICATION IN CHILD SUPPORT, STATING
    SHE DID NOT [DEMONSTRATE] "CHANGED
    CIRCUMSTANCES," NOR WAS THE JUDGE'S
    RULING ACCOMPANIED BY FINDINGS OF FACT
    AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS OR DID THE JUDGE
    REQUEST A DISCOVERY HEARING OR REQUIRE
    THE DEFENDANT TO DISCLOSE UPDATED
    FINANCIAL INFORMATION.
    A-0404-17T1
    2
    POINT IV
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND
    THAT      THE     [DEFENDANT]       HAD
    MISREPRESENTED HIS INCOME AT THE TIME
    OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MARITAL
    SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE IN
    DENYING THE [PLAINTIFF'S] REQUEST FOR A
    RETROACTIVE INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT
    BASED UPON THAT MISREPRESENTATION.
    POINT V
    [THE] JUDGE [ERRED] IN NOT CONSIDERING
    PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS OF CONTINUED
    ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FAILED TO
    HOLD THE DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT OF THE
    PARTIES CONSENT ORDER AND INCORRECTLY
    HAD NO OTHER REASONABLE BASIS FOR THIS
    EVIDENCE TO NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED IN
    EVALUATION THE PLAINTIFF'S CHANGE IN
    PARENTING TIME.
    POINT VI
    [THE] TRIAL COURT [ERRED] IN DENYING THE
    PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A CHANGE OF
    VENUE.
    POINT VII
    THE [TRIAL COURT JUDGE] SHOULD [HAVE]
    RECUSED HIMSELF BECAUSE THE [JUDGE] CAN
    NO LONGER BE IMPARTIAL AS THE
    PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS TO . . . DUE PROCESS WERE
    VIOLATED WHEN THE JUDGE REFUSED TO
    CONSIDER EVIDENCE OR HOLD ORAL
    HEARINGS      THAT       DOCUMENTS       THE
    A-0404-17T1
    3
    DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED ACTS OF DOMESTIC
    VIOLENCE.
    We are unpersuaded by these arguments and affirm.
    Although her supporting certification raised twenty-one requests for
    relief, plaintiff's first notice of motion sought only an adjustment of child
    support payments, changes to the parties' custody and visitation arrangements,
    enforcement of litigant's rights, a change of venue, and to set aside sections of
    the marital settlement agreement incorporated in the judgment of divorce.
    Addressing that first motion, the trial court judge noted "many items of relief
    embodied within [plaintiff's] certification . . . were not included in the [n]otice
    of [m]otion" and, due to this omission, were not going to be considered.
    Nonetheless, the judge did address each request set forth in plaintiff's
    certification and denied them all. We review only those issues which are the
    subject of this appeal. C.f. Lombardi v. Masso, 
    207 N.J. 517
    , 542 (2011) ("[We]
    confine ourselves to the original summary judgment record because that is the
    limited issue before us.").
    The judge found plaintiff failed to establish that a change to the terms of
    the marital settlement agreement – which he found was freely and voluntarily
    agreed to by the parties – was warranted and that plaintiff failed to attempt
    mediating the disputed issues as required by the agreement. In denying the
    A-0404-17T1
    4
    request to modify child support, the judge concluded plaintiff failed to
    demonstrate that there had been a significant change in circumstances, see Lepis
    v. Lepis, 
    83 N.J. 139
    , 157 (1980), and submit a case information statement, Rule
    5:5-2. The judge also found plaintiff showed neither that the visitation terms of
    the marital settlement agreement required modification to address the needs of
    the child nor a significant change in circumstances. And the judge denied
    plaintiff's request for a change of venue to Union County based on her allegation
    that defendant – a police officer employed by the City of Garfield – had undue
    influence in proceedings venued in Bergen County, finding defendant was
    unknown to the court except for his involvement in litigated matters before the
    court.
    Plaintiff's second notice of motion also sought an adjustment of child
    support payments, changes to the parties' visitation arrangement, enforcement
    of litigant's rights, and a change of venue; she additionally requested an
    "emergency hearing to order a new parenting time evaluation"1 and the recusal
    of the trial court judge. Plaintiff's certification in support of the second motion
    listed nineteen requests for relief.
    1
    Plaintiff's request for emergent relief was denied on June 30, 2017. Plaintiff
    has not appealed from that order.
    A-0404-17T1
    5
    The judge again ruled that the requests set forth in plaintiff's certification ,
    but not included in her notice of motion, would not be considered. He ruled
    only on plaintiff's motion for recusal, modification of parenting time and change
    of venue; for reasons which we discuss in detail, he denied all requested relief.
    Parenting Time
    Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in denying her request for a change in
    parenting time because she demonstrated changed circumstances. She explains
    that the parties' son was diagnosed with cognitive and speech developmental
    delays necessitating his enrollment in a five-day-per-week program. Plaintiff
    avers the current back-to-back overnight weekday parenting time schedule,
    which requires the child to be transported from defendant's home in Garfield to
    school in Cranford, is not in the child's best interests.         She maintains an
    evidentiary hearing was required "to evaluate the issues raised by [plaintiff] that
    the child's teachers and social workers who treat the child report that the child
    is having difficulty adapting to changing environments and the frequent [trips]
    between households is putting undue stress on the child, [a]ffecting his
    emotional and cognitive development."
    The primary consideration in a case involving parenting time is the best
    interests of the child. V.C. v. M.J.B., 
    163 N.J. 200
    , 227-28 (2000); Kinsella v.
    A-0404-17T1
    6
    Kinsella, 
    150 N.J. 276
    , 317 (1997). The best-interests standard focuses on the
    "safety, happiness, physical, mental and moral welfare of the child."         See
    Fantony v. Fantony, 
    21 N.J. 525
    , 536 (1956). Although "New Jersey has long
    espoused a policy favoring the use of consensual agreements to resolve marital
    controversies," Konzelman v. Konzelman, 
    158 N.J. 185
    , 193 (1999), parenting
    time orders are subject to modification at any time "upon a showing of a material
    change in circumstances," Hoy v. Willis, 
    165 N.J. Super. 265
    , 275-76 (App. Div.
    1978). The party seeking a modification has the burden to show it is warranted.
    Mastropole v. Mastropole, 
    181 N.J. Super. 130
    , 136 (App. Div. 1981).
    We agree with the trial court judge that plaintiff did not meet her burden.
    Plaintiff's certification and supporting documents do not provide a link between
    any emotional and cognitive difficulties the parties' son may be having and the
    current parenting time arrangement. The New Jersey Early Intervention System
    Initial Evaluation/Assessment Summary submitted by plaintiff in support of the
    motion states only that "Mom report[ed] changes in [the child's] behavior after
    spending overnights at his dad's as he tends to be quieter and the transitio n to
    school (separating) is more difficult." Plaintiff may have met her burden if she
    submitted a like opinion by a learning specialist or other trained professional
    with knowledge of the child's circumstances that tethered the parenting time
    A-0404-17T1
    7
    arrangements to the child's delayed developmental progress. See Dorfman v.
    Dorfman, 
    315 N.J. Super. 511
    , 518 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that detailed and
    documented evidence demonstrating behavioral problems with the child
    necessitated at least an investigation of the problem).        Her submissions,
    however, do not raise a “genuine and substantial factual dispute regarding the
    welfare” of the child to necessitate a hearing to resolve the issue. Hand v. Hand,
    
    391 N.J. Super. 102
    , 105 (App. Div. 2007); see also Lepis, 
    83 N.J. at 159
    (holding “a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as
    to a material fact before a hearing is necessary” so that courts are not obligated
    to hold hearings on every modification application).
    Although we do not discern that the judge decided the issue, we do not
    perceive any merit in plaintiff's contention that defendant's continued acts of
    domestic violence required an evidentiary hearing regarding her request to
    change the parenting time arrangement.          Evidence of domestic violence
    affecting the safety of the child may establish a prima facie case requiring an
    evidentiary hearing to assess whether the acts affect the welfare of the child.
    See R.K. v. F.K., 
    437 N.J. Super. 58
    , 66-67 (App. Div. 2014); Hand, 
    391 N.J. Super. at 105-06
    . But all of plaintiff's allegations of domestic violence involve
    harassing emails sent by defendant to her personal email account. Regardless
    A-0404-17T1
    8
    of whether these qualify as "domestic violence" under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a),
    there is no evidence the child was exposed to them. Moreover there is no
    evidence as to how the acts impact on the parenting time arrangement. The
    record supports the trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's parenting-time-
    modification motion.
    Child Support
    Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by denying her request for a
    modification of the parties' child support agreement because she demonstrated
    changed circumstances and by denying her request for a retroactive increase
    because she proved that defendant misrepresented his income when negotiating
    the marital settlement agreement.2        Plaintiff proffers several changed
    circumstances she contends warrant the child support modification:          her
    remarriage; the birth of two children unrelated to the defendant; the child's
    commencement of the five-days-per-week program; and defendant's recent
    promotion leading to an increased salary and his purchase of an investment
    property.
    2
    Plaintiff does not contest the denial of her first motion for child support
    modification for which she did not submit a case information statement as
    required by Rule 5:5-2.
    A-0404-17T1
    9
    The party seeking modification of support payments has the burden of
    showing changed circumstances; a prima facie showing requires "a
    demonstration that the child's needs have increased to an extent for which the
    original arrangement does not provide." Lepis, 
    83 N.J. at 157
    . Child support is
    for the benefit of the child, not the parent. Ordukaya v. Brown, 
    357 N.J. Super. 231
    , 241 (App. Div. 2003). Thus, plaintiff's remarriage and the birth of her other
    children are irrelevant to establishing a change of circumstances. Further,
    plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the child's financial needs increased because
    of his enrollment in the program. There is no evidence of any costs associated
    with the program. Nor do we see any evidence that the parties' child care costs
    were impacted by the child's enrollment.
    In furtherance of her argument that defendant misrepresented his income
    at the time of the agreement was negotiated, plaintiff alleges that "false,
    misleading, and incomplete financial evidence" was submitted by the defendant
    prior to enactment of the agreement.           These assertions of deliberate
    misrepresentations of his gross income are belied by documentary evidence she
    included in her appendix. Defendant's 2014 W-2 statement listed his yearly
    income as $134,190, the exact amount he then listed on the case information
    statement submitted in 2015 during negotiations.         None of the financial
    A-0404-17T1
    10
    documents plaintiff submitted as evidence supports the assertion that defendant
    misrepresented income prior to enactment of the parties' agreement.
    Although the trial court judge did not set forth any findings of fact or legal
    conclusions when denying plaintiff's child support requests in his decision on
    the second motion – which, unlike the first motion, was supported by a case
    information statement – there is no evidence in the record to support plaintiff's
    claim that she established a change of circumstances to warrant a modification.
    Nor is there any evidence to support her prayer for a retroactive modification of
    child support. Inasmuch as plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of
    change circumstances, she was not entitled to defendant's financial information.
    Welch v. Welch, 
    401 N.J. Super. 438
    , 444 (Ch. Div. 2008); see R. 5:5-1(d); see
    also Major v. Maguire, 
    224 N.J. 1
    , 23 (2016) (citing Welch with approval).
    Change of Venue
    It has long been held that motions for change of venue "are addressed to
    the sound discretion of the court." State v. Collins, 
    2 N.J. 406
    , 411 (1949).
    Recognizing that a court's exercise of discretion "must be neither arbitrary,
    vague nor fanciful and must be in consonance with well established principles
    of law . . . [t]he exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on review unless
    it has been clearly abused." 
    Ibid.
    A-0404-17T1
    11
    We analyze plaintiff's challenge to the trial court judge's denial of her
    motion to change venue to the Union vicinage under Rule 4:3-3(a) which, in
    pertinent part, permits a change of venue:
    (1) if the venue is not laid in accordance with [Rule]
    4:3-2; or
    (2) if there is a substantial doubt that a fair and impartial
    trial can be had in the county where venue is laid; or
    (3) for the convenience of parties and witnesses in the
    interest of justice; or
    (4) in Family Part post-judgment motions, if both
    parties reside outside the county of original venue and
    application is made to the court by either party to
    change venue to a county where one of the parties now
    resides.
    Although the trial court judge quoted the holdings of four cases, the only
    finding the judge made in denying plaintiff's motion was, "under [Rule] 4:3-
    3(a)(4), [defendant was] "still a resident of Bergen County."               The judge
    mentioned section (a)(1) in his ruling but plaintiff's current arguments pertain
    only to the last three sections of the Rule. The judge's limited factual finding
    and plaintiff's muddled merits brief and appendix do not provide sufficient
    information for us to ascertain what was argued to the trial court. We will,
    however, address all three facets of plaintiff's argument.
    A-0404-17T1
    12
    As an initial matter, the judge's finding that defendant resides in Bergen
    County eliminates section (a)(4) as a ground for a venue change.
    Next, under section (a)(3) and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, "a
    court may decline jurisdiction where there is available another forum where trial
    will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice." Gore v.
    U.S. Steel Corp., 
    15 N.J. 301
    , 305 (1954). Plaintiff claims that the child and
    witnesses, including "the child's teachers, social workers, religious leaders and
    doctors" who would be called "in a new custody evaluation and at trial, all live
    closer to the Union County courts." We see nothing in the record that identifies
    any such witnesses or substantiates their alleged connection to Union County.
    Further, a change of venue need not be granted to alleviate witnesses' travel
    inconvenience. See Diodato v. Camden Cty. Park Comm., 
    136 N.J. Super. 324
    (App. Div. 1975).
    We do not find any support in the record for plaintiff's contention that
    venue should be changed to Union County under the forum non conveniens
    doctrine because of prior acts of domestic violence, which plaintiff asserts are
    "likely to continue in the future." As we already observed, plaintiff's only
    allegations of domestic violence involve harassing emails sent by defendant to
    her personal email account. The record reveals defendant is not subject to a
    A-0404-17T1
    13
    restraining order; the parties agreed to a consent order providing civil restraints.
    In ruling on plaintiff's first motion seeking enforcement of litigant's rights, the
    trial court judge found plaintiff did not submit proof of any violations of that
    order and did not demonstrate any recent act by defendant, only "pre-divorce
    issues and issues litigated" in a prior final restraining order hearing. Indeed, in
    her merits brief – in a point that conflates arguments about the court's failure to:
    consider allegations of continued domestic violence, hold defendant in contempt
    for violating the consent order and consider "this evidence" in evaluating
    plaintiff's parenting time modification request – plaintiff argues that she "should
    have been permitted to submit evidence of past violations of the civil restraints,
    not because those violations were per se acts of domestic violence, but because
    the past violations support the claim that the defendant engaged in acts of
    harassment by making communications with the purpose to alarm or seriously
    annoy." As the trial court judge found, no proofs were submitted; nothing in the
    record supports plaintiff's argument that she was prohibited from presenting
    same.
    Plaintiff argues defendant's "social and professional status and substantial
    political connections and influence as a public employee of Bergen County,"
    occasioned by his many years of service as a police officer in Garfield, created
    A-0404-17T1
    14
    the appearance of bias, requiring a venue change under Rule 4:3-3(a). The trial
    court judge did not address this issue in ruling on the second motion. He did,
    however, deny plaintiff's first motion to change venue, finding "[w]hile . . .
    plaintiff imagines [defendant] is well known and a powerful figure in Bergen
    County, other than being a party to this case and a prior [d]omestic [v]iolence
    action, he is unknown to the [c]ourt."
    We note that defendant is not employed by Bergen County; he is a
    municipal police officer. The judge's determination that no evidence supports
    plaintiff's contention that defendant exerts such influence in Bergen County that
    "there is a substantial doubt that a fair and impartial trial can be had" there was
    supported by the record. We see no basis upon which a change of venue should
    be based.
    Recusal
    The trial court judge denied plaintiff's recusal motion, concluding:
    The assertion by the plaintiff does not include any
    specific reasons for recusal, [and] does not cite to any
    verifiable actions by the [c]ourt by way of presentation
    of a transcript.     [Plaintiff] asserts that at some
    unspecified time, she observed the [c]ourt "high five"
    the defendant in a hall, an assertion which is
    categorically denied, and fails to submit any
    independent verification of this assertion.
    A-0404-17T1
    15
    Any motion seeking a judge's disqualification is, "at least in the first
    instance, entrusted to the 'sound discretion' of the trial judge whose recusal is
    sought." Panitch v. Panitch, 
    339 N.J. Super. 63
    , 66 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting
    Magill v. Casel, 
    238 N.J. Super. 57
    , 63 (App. Div. 1990)). "Judges shall
    disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality or the
    appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Code of
    Judicial Conduct, R. 3.17(B); see also R. 1:12-1. It is, nonetheless, "improper
    for a judge to withdraw from a case upon a mere suggestion that he is
    disqualified 'unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by him to exist or is
    shown to be true in fact.'" Panitch, 338 N.J. Super. at 66-67 (quoting Hundred
    E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 
    212 N.J. Super. 350
    , 358 (App. Div.
    1986)). And while "'it is not necessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of
    the court' to establish an appearance of impropriety," there must be an
    "'objectively reasonable' belief that the proceedings were unfair." DeNike v.
    Cupo, 
    196 N.J. 502
    , 517 (2008) (quoting State v. Marshall, 
    148 N.J. 89
    , 279
    (1997)).
    Plaintiff contends there is "evidence detailing prior unethical and/or
    illegal conduct" by the judge against other litigants. As the trial court judge
    found, however, plaintiff points to no specific, verifiable actions by the judge to
    A-0404-17T1
    16
    support this assertion.      Although plaintiff alleged the judge "high-fived"
    defendant in a hall, thus showing bias, she provided no independent proof of this
    conduct which was "categorically denied" by the judge. Plaintiff further alleged
    the judge made sarcastic and demeaning references and labeled her requests for
    relief as "prayers," thus requiring recusal. Judges and lawyers often refer to
    requests for relief as prayers. 3
    Plaintiff also avers the judge refused to hold an evidentiary hearing,
    concluded plaintiff's allegations were unsupported by evidence and that his
    rulings showed undue favoritism. We perceive no "'objectively reasonable'
    belief that the proceedings were unfair." DeNike, 
    196 N.J. at 517
     (quoting
    Marshall, 
    148 N.J. at 279
    ). "[B]ias is not established by the fact that a litigant
    is disappointed in a court's ruling on an issue." Marshall, 
    148 N.J. at 186
    .
    The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the recusal motion.
    We determine plaintiff's argument that recusal was compelled because a former
    Bergen County prosecutor joined the law firm hired by defendant while an
    investigation into defendant's conduct as a police officer by the prosecutor's
    office was ongoing, to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this
    3
    A "prayer for relief" is defined as "A request addressed to the court and
    appearing at the end of a pleading[] . . . . Often shortened to prayer." Black's
    Law Dictionary, 1213 (8th ed. 1999).
    A-0404-17T1
    17
    opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Defendant's counsel's alleged conflict involves
    none of the tenets impacting on the judge's decision. See R. 1:12-1.
    Domestic Violence
    To the extent we have not addressed plaintiff's contentions regarding
    allegations of domestic violence, we again note a restraining order has not been
    granted and plaintiff admitted she did not submit evidence that defendant
    violated the civil restraints in place, violations which she conceded were not per
    se acts of domestic violence. Plaintiff's requests that we determine whether
    "defendant's recent contact and communications were meant to alarm or did
    alarm or seriously annoy" her and grant a restraining order, are not cognizable
    on appeal. Any victim of domestic violence is entitled to file a complaint with
    "the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court in conformity
    with the Rules of Court." 4 N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(a). Plaintiff may avail herself of
    that process if justified.
    4
    "On weekends, holidays and other times when the court is closed, a victim
    may [also] file a complaint before . . . a municipal court judge who shall be
    assigned to accept complaints and issue emergency, ex parte relief in the form
    of temporary restraining orders pursuant to this act." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(a).
    A-0404-17T1
    18
    Failure to Address Requests for Relief
    A court is required, "by an opinion or memorandum decision, either
    written or oral, [to] find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon . . . on
    every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right." R. 1:7-
    4(a). Plaintiff, citing to that Rule, argues we "should reverse the judge[']s
    decision to deny proper consideration of the requested items of relief by [her] in
    her [n]otice of [m]otion based on the inadequacy of the [judge's] findings and
    conclusions."
    In her first notice of motion, plaintiff did not, as required by Rule 1:6-
    2(a), set forth the grounds upon which each prayer for relief that she set forth in
    her certification supporting that motion was made or the nature of the relief she
    sought. Nevertheless, the trial court judge did address prayers which were set
    forth only in plaintiff's certification, albeit, at times, tersely.
    The judge addressed only three of plaintiff's claims made in her second
    motion although the notice of motion set forth six prayers. Although some of
    the other claims were addressed in the judge's first decision, the better course
    would have been to follow suit and address the all six claims in the second
    decision.
    A-0404-17T1
    19
    Neither the litigants nor we are well-served by an opinion lacking
    analysis. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Checchio, 
    335 N.J. Super. 495
    , 498 (App.
    Div. 2000). Appellate review is impeded, if not precluded, when a trial court
    does not specifically address arguments properly made by a movant. A decision
    that identifies a movant's contentions fosters appellate review and ensures the
    parties – particularly, self-represented litigants – that their requests were heard.
    Nonetheless, as we have determined, the record does not support
    plaintiff's second-motion claims that were not addressed: for an adjustment of
    child support, changes to the visitation arrangement or enforcement of litigant's
    rights. After reviewing that record, we see no reason to disturb the trial court's
    denial of both plaintiff's motions.
    Affirmed.
    A-0404-17T1
    20