TYLER CHAINAY VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3832-17T2
TYLER CHAINAY,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted October 18, 2019 – Decided December 5, 2019
Before Judges Ostrer and Susswein.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Tyler Chainay, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Christopher Josephson, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff-Appellant, Tyler Chainay, a state prison inmate, appeals from a
final agency decision finding him guilty of assaulting a corrections officer and
imposing disciplinary sanctions. We affirm the agency decision, which is
supported by sufficient credible evidence.
On March 1, 2018, Chainay was incarcerated at the Albert C. Wagner
Youth Correctional facility. Senior Corrections Officer Gonzalez was escorting
inmates to the kitchen when plaintiff approached him, rolled up his sleeves, and
raised his arms. The officer instructed Chainay to lower his arms and to keep
them at his sides. Chainay disobeyed the instruction and told the officer "we
'bout to get right." Chainay then pushed the officer, precipitating a wrestling
tussle. A second officer, Officer Bellavance, witnessed the pushing encounter,
sounded an alert, and assisted in restraining defendant.
The disciplinary hearing originally was scheduled for March 2, 2018, but
was postponed because Chainay had requested video evidence and witness
statements. The disciplinary hearing was eventually held on March 8, 2018, at
which Chainay put on a defense with the assistance of substitute counsel.
Chainay declined the opportunity to cross examine Officer Gonzales.
The hearing officer found Officer Gonzalez to be credible and found
Chainay guilty of committing an assault in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4 -
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4.1(a)(1)(ii). He was sanctioned to 365 days of administrative segregation, a
365-day loss of commutation time, and a 30-day loss of recreation privileges.
After an administrative appeal, the Assistant Superintendent affirmed both the
finding of guilt and the sanctions imposed.
Chainay contends on appeal that insufficient credible evidence was
presented to support the hearing officer's finding that Chainay assaulted Officer
Gonzales. He also contends that he was deprived of his right to present witness
statements on his behalf and his right to review and present surveillance video
that, according to him, would show that he was the victim, not perpetrator, of an
assault.
The scope of our review of a Department of Corrections determination
that an inmate committed a disciplinary infraction is limited. A final agency
decision is entitled to a deferential standard of review. An appellate court may
reverse a decision of an administrative agency only if it is "arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable, or if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the
record as a whole." P.F. v. N.J. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 139 N.J.
522, 529–30 (1995). Agency actions are presumed valid and reasonable, and
the plaintiff bears the burden to overcome this presumption. Bergen Pines Cty.
Hosp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456, 477 (1984).
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Generally,
[c]ourts can intervene only in those rare circumstances
in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with
its statutory mission or other state policy. Although
sometimes phrased in terms of a search for arbitrary or
unreasonable action, the judicial role is generally
restricted to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency's
action violates express or implied legislative policies,
that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the
record contains substantial evidence to support the
findings on which the agency bases its action; and (3)
whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts,
the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that
could not reasonably have been made on a showing of
the relevant factors.
[In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996) (citing
Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562
(1963)).]
Furthermore, it is well settled that a reviewing court cannot substitute its
own judgment in place of the agency judgment, even if the court would have
reached a different result. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citing In
re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). This is particularly true when, as in this
instance, we are reviewing an issue related to an agency's special "expertise and
superior knowledge of a particular field." Id. at 195 (quoting In re Herrmann,
192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).
An adjudication of guilt of an institutional infraction must be supported
by substantial evidence. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). Substantial evidence is "such
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App.
Div. 2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)).
We have reviewed the record on appeal in light of the applicable legal
standards and conclude that Chainay's contentions lack sufficient merit to
warrant extensive discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). With
respect to his contention that he was denied the right to present witness
statements, the record shows that all four persons he identified as witnesses gave
statements in which they claimed to have no knowledge of the incident.
With respect to his contention concerning purportedly exculpatory
surveillance video, the record shows that no such evidence exists because the
area where the assault occurred is not covered by a surveillance camera. This
situation is substantially similar to the one presented in Ramirez v. Department
of Corrections where we held that, "[w]e are satisfied that [the inmate's] due
process right to present documentary evidence was fully protected by the
hearing officer's efforts to accommodate [the inmate's] request for what was
determined to be a non-existent videotape of the incident." 382 N.J. Super. 18,
22 (App. Div. 2005).
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In sum, we conclude that Chainay was afforded the procedural rights and
protections due to him under Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525–46 (1975), that
the finding that he was guilty of assaulting an officer is supported by substantial
credible evidence, and that the disciplinary sanctions that were imposed on that
substantiated infraction were not arbitrary and capricious.
Affirmed.
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