Citizens United Reciprocal Exchange v. Northern Nj ( 2016 )


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  •                   NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0945-14T2
    CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                      APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    May 6, 2016
    v.
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    NORTHERN NJ ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    __________________________________________
    Argued December 8, 2015 – Decided May 6, 2016
    Before Judges Hoffman, Leone and Whipple.1
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket
    No. L-2901-14.
    Sonya Lopez-Bright argued the cause for
    appellant (Bright & Sponder, attorneys; Evan
    D. Haggerty, of counsel and on the briefs).
    Kimberly A. Kopp argued the cause for
    respondent   (Massood  &   Bronsnick,   LLC,
    attorneys; Michael T. Madaio, of counsel and
    on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    LEONE, J.A.D.
    Plaintiff    Citizens     United     Reciprocal     Exchange       (CURE)
    appeals   from   the   Law   Division's    September    11,   2014      order,
    1
    Judge Whipple did not participate in oral argument.                She joins
    the opinion with counsel's consent. R. 2:13-2(b).
    dismissing        as    untimely     CURE's      summary      action    challenging       a
    personal injury protection (PIP) arbitration award.                              We hold
    that if a party files an application to modify under N.J.S.A.
    2A:23A-12(d), or an application to modify or clarify under the
    rules of the PIP dispute resolution organization, a party must
    file any summary action "within 30 days after receipt of" the
    order granting or denying the application.                            N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-
    13(a).      Accordingly, we affirm.
    I.
    The    following      facts     are   taken      from     the    documents    filed
    before the Law Division and the Dispute Resolution Professional
    (DRP).2      In 2009,       a passenger in a vehicle insured by CURE
    sustained personal injuries in an accident.                       Defendant Northern
    NJ Orthopedic Specialists (Orthopedic) performed spinal surgery
    on   the    passenger      in   2011.       Orthopedic        submitted    a    bill    for
    $89,266 to CURE, which initially denied the claim.
    Orthopedic         made   a    demand      for    PIP      arbitration       to   be
    conducted     by       Forthright    Solutions      (Forthright).              Orthopedic
    claimed     PIP    benefits     of   $55,410.29.           On   April    8,    2013,    the
    2
    "Dispute Resolution Professional" is the title for the
    arbitrator used in the PIP arbitration statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
    5.1, and the PIP arbitration regulations, N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 to -
    5.12. See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.2. In N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a),
    the arbitrator is referred to as an "umpire." We use both terms
    to encompass the DRP here.
    2                                    A-0945-14T2
    Forthright     DRP    granted      Orthopedic          $16,433.05,       together     with
    counsel fees, costs, and interest.
    Orthopedic filed a summary action in the Law Division.                            The
    court     entered    a    consent       judgment        vacating       the   award      and
    remanding to Forthright, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c)(5),
    so the DRP could consider certain evidence.
    After     a    second      hearing,       the      DRP    awarded      Orthopedic
    $31,939.99, plus additional counsel fees.                        The new award was
    sent to the parties by Forthright's letter dated March 31, 2014.
    Thirty-five        days    later,    on     May    5,    2014,     CURE    made    an
    application for "clarification/modification," asking Forthright
    for "clarification" of the award "pursuant to Forthright Rule
    24(a)."        Forthright        Rule      24     is     entitled        "Modification/
    Clarification of Award."            Rule 24(a) provides that a party may
    submit    a   request     to    "clarify    the    Award."         The    rule   further
    provides that: "[a]ny party may make the request by written
    application . . . received by Forthright within 35 days after
    the   date    of    Forthright's        letter     sending      the      Award   to     the
    parties"; "[a]ll other parties may submit a response to the
    request . . . within 45 days after the date of Forthright's
    letter sending the Award to the parties"; and "[t]he DRP shall
    3                                     A-0945-14T2
    issue an Order within 35 days of Forthright's submission [of the
    request and any responses] to the DRP."3
    The    DRP     denied   CURE's    application     for   clarification,
    finding    the    issues   were   "sufficiently   addressed."     Both     the
    DRP's   "Clarification       Denied   Order,"   and   Forthright's    letter
    sending it to the parties, were dated June 20, 2014.            Forty-five
    days later, on August 4, 2014, CURE filed in the Law Division a
    complaint and a request for an order to show cause, asking that
    the DRP's award be vacated under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13.
    On September 11, 2014, Judge Thomas F. Brogan ruled that
    "N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) required [CURE] to file the Order to Show
    Cause and complaint within 30 days of the date [CURE] received
    the Modification/Clarification Denied Order instead of within 45
    days of the date [CURE] received the Modification/Clarification
    Denied Order."      Because CURE filed beyond thirty days, the court
    dismissed CURE's filings with prejudice.              CURE filed an appeal
    to this court.
    3
    Forthright, New Jersey No-Fault PIP Arbitration Rules, at 14-15
    (eff.        April       15,       2013),        http://www.nj-no-
    fault.com/users/nj/resources/NJ%20PIP%20Arbitration%20Rules%20-
    %20Amended%20April%2015%20%202013.pdf.    Forthright Rule 25 also
    allows the parties to "appeal an Award or an Order granting
    dismissal to a panel of 3 designated DRPs." 
    Id. at 15.
    Because
    no such appeal was taken here, Forthright Rule 25 is not before
    us.
    4                             A-0945-14T2
    II.
    Orthopedic contends CURE is barred from appealing to this
    court by the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act
    (APDRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -19.                          Under the APDRA, a party to
    the    arbitration          may    "commence          a    summary     application         in    the
    Superior Court for its vacation, modification or correction."
    N.J.S.A.          2A:23A-13(a).            "Upon          the    granting      of     an      order
    confirming,         modifying       or    correcting            an   award,   a     judgment      or
    decree       shall     be   entered       by     the      [trial]     court[.]"        N.J.S.A.
    2A:23A-18(b).          N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) then provides: "There shall
    be no further appeal or review of the judgment or decree."
    Our Supreme Court upheld N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) in Mt. Hope
    Dev. Assocs. v. Mt. Hope Waterpower Project, L.P., 
    154 N.J. 141
    ,
    148-52 (1998).              The Court ruled that "the language of APDRA
    unmistakably informs parties that by utilizing its procedures
    they    are       waiving       [their]    right"         to    appeal    beyond     the      trial
    court, and that such a waiver generally must be enforced.                                        
    Id. at 148.
           However,        the    Court    recognized          there   may     be    "'rare
    circumstances' grounded in public policy that might compel . . .
    limited appellate review."                 
    Id. at 152.
    We have held that N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) "does not bar our
    review       of    .   .    .     the    judge's          dismissal      of   the    action       on
    timeliness grounds."                    Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garden State
    5                                        A-0945-14T2
    Surgical    Ctr.,     L.L.C.,         413    N.J.     Super.    513,     517    (App.      Div.
    2010).     Thus, we have the "authority to examine . . . the order
    dismissing the complaint as untimely."                       
    Id. at 521-24
    (reversing
    the Law Division's dismissal "insofar as it was based on the
    time-bar contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a)").
    Such review is particularly appropriate here because "[t]he
    unsettled questions of statutory interpretation" here have "yet
    to   be   resolved     in    a    published          opinion,"    and     "[t]he       repeat
    players in the PIP system — claimants, insurers, DRPs, lawyers,
    and trial judges — all can benefit from definitive precedential
    guidance."       Kimba Med. Supply v. Allstate Ins. Co., 431 N.J.
    Super. 463, 482-83 (App. Div. 2013), certif. granted, 
    217 N.J. 286
    ,   certif.      dism'd       as    improvidently         granted,     
    223 N.J. 347
    (2014).        Accordingly,           we    address    and     resolve    the       statutory
    timeliness issues raised by CURE's appeal.
    III.
    Under    the   PIP    arbitration             statute,    N.J.S.A.       39:6A-5.1,
    "'[d]isputes between an insurer and a claimant as to whether
    benefits are due under the PIP                       [arbitration] statute may be
    resolved,      at     the    election          of     either     party,        by     binding
    arbitration or by civil litigation.'"                    Kimba Med. 
    Supply, supra
    ,
    431 N.J. Super. at 467 (citation omitted).                       "The Legislature has
    empowered the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to designate
    6                                     A-0945-14T2
    an organization to serve as an arbitration forum for such PIP
    disputes, where the parties have elected that procedure."                        
    Id. at 467-68
       (citing    N.J.S.A.     39:6A-5.1(b));       see    also    N.J.A.C.
    11:3-5.3(a).       "The organization that presently serves in that
    capacity is Forthright[.]"           Kimba Med. 
    Supply, supra
    , 431 N.J.
    Super. at 468.
    "The Legislature has further authorized the Commissioner to
    adopt   rules      and   regulations     for     the   conduct     of     such   PIP
    arbitration proceedings."        
    Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(b)).
    "The Commissioner has duly adopted such regulations, which are
    codified      at   N.J.A.C.   11:3-5.1      to    -5.12."         
    Ibid. "[T]he Commissioner has
    incorporated aspects of the APDRA to govern PIP
    arbitrations in the designated forum."                 
    Ibid. In particular, effective
    January 2013, N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(g) provides:
    The final determination of the dispute
    resolution professional shall be binding
    upon    the   parties,    but   subject    to
    clarification/modification and/or appeal as
    provided by the rules of the dispute
    resolution organization, and/or vacation,
    modification or correction by the Superior
    Court in an action filed pursuant to
    N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13 for review of the award.
    N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a), the key provision here, provides:
    A   party  to   an   alternative   resolution
    proceeding   shall    commence   a    summary
    application in the Superior Court for its
    vacation, modification or correction within
    45 days after the award is delivered to the
    applicant, or within 30 days after receipt
    7                                  A-0945-14T2
    of an award modified pursuant to subsection
    d. of section 12 of this act,[4] unless the
    parties shall extend the time in writing.
    The award of the umpire shall become final
    unless the action is commenced as required
    by this subsection.
    [(emphasis and footnote added).]
    Thus, under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a), "[a]fter the award is
    delivered   by   the   umpire,   the       parties   have   forty-five   days
    (thirty days if the award is modified) to commence a summary
    action in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court to vacate,
    correct, or modify the award."             Mt. Hope Dev. 
    Assocs., supra
    ,
    154 N.J. at 146.5      However, CURE's appeal raises two unsettled
    issues in the statutory construction of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a).
    First, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) "does not reveal the amount of
    time a party has to challenge an award when an application to
    modify has been denied."     Liberty Mut. Ins. 
    Co., supra
    , 413 N.J.
    Super. at 523.      Second, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) does not reveal
    4
    Subsection 12(d) provides that, "[o]n written application of a
    party to the umpire within 20 days after delivery of the award
    to the applicant, the umpire may modify the award upon the
    grounds stated in subsection e. of section 13 of this act."
    N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(e).
    5
    When Mount Hope was decided, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-19 provided that
    such summary actions "shall be heard in the Chancery Division."
    L. 1987 c. 54, § 19.    That requirement was later removed when
    N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-19 was amended to provide that such summary
    actions "shall be heard in accordance with any rules adopted by
    the New Jersey Supreme Court." L. 2005 c. 338 § 1. Pursuant to
    the Rules of Court, the parties here filed in the Law Division.
    See R. 4:3-1(a).
    8                            A-0945-14T2
    the amount of time a party has to challenge an award when the
    application to modify is made not pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-
    12(d), but pursuant to the rules adopted by the organization.
    "It     is     well    settled     that      the    goal     of   statutory
    interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature's
    intent."      Cashin v. Bello, 
    223 N.J. 328
    , 335 (2015).                 "'In most
    instances,      the    best   indicator       of   that   intent    is   the    plain
    language chosen by the Legislature.'"                 
    Ibid. (citation omitted). We
       "must   read    words   'with[in]       their   context'     and   give    them
    'their generally accepted meaning.'"                   
    Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1).
          "Statutory language is to be interpreted 'in a common
    sense manner to accomplish the legislative purpose.'"                     State v.
    Olivero, 
    221 N.J. 632
    , 639 (2015) (quoting N.E.R.I. Corp. v.
    N.J. Highway Auth., 
    147 N.J. 223
    , 236 (1996)).                     "When a statute
    is ambiguous as written, however, a court may consider extrinsic
    sources, including 'legislative history, committee reports, and
    contemporaneous construction.'"               
    Cashin, supra
    , 223 N.J. at 335-
    36.
    "As with all issues of statutory construction, our review
    in this matter is de novo."             
    Id. at 335.
           We must hew to that
    standard of review.
    9                                A-0945-14T2
    A.
    The    first    unsettled   issue    concerns       the    applicable    time
    period    under    N.J.S.A.   2A:23A-13(a)      after    the    denial     of    an
    application to modify an award under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d) (a
    "12(d) application").         N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) clearly addresses
    two scenarios.      First, if no party files a 12(d) application, a
    party must file a summary action challenging the award "within
    45 days after the award is delivered to the applicant."                     
    Ibid. Second, if a
    party files a 12(d) application, and the umpire
    issues a modified award, a party must file a summary action
    challenging the modified award "within 30 days after receipt of
    an award modified pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d)]."                     
    Ibid. However, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a)
        does    not     address    the     third
    scenario where a party files a 12(d) application, and the umpire
    issues an order denying modification of the award.
    CURE argues that N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) allowed it to file
    its summary action within forty-five days of its receipt of the
    DRP's Clarification Denied Order, but that order is not "the
    award."    
    Ibid. Orthopedics argues that
    N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a)
    required CURE to file its summary action within thirty days of
    its receipt of the Clarification Denied Order, but that order is
    10                                   A-0945-14T2
    not    "an     award   modified     pursuant    to    [N.J.S.A.     2A:23A-12(d)]."
    Ibid.6
    We find N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) to be ambiguous regarding the
    time to commence a summary action in the third scenario where
    the umpire issues an order denying modification of the award.
    Unfortunately,         the   legislative   history        of   N.J.S.A.    2A:23A-13
    does     not     directly     address    that     issue.        "The      Draftsman's
    Legislative        History,         reprinted        at    N.J.S.A.        2A:23A-13,
    specifically       notes     that    subsection      13(a)     of   the    APDRA   was
    derived from N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7 to -8, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7511, and 7
    U.L.A. § 12(b)" of the Uniform Arbitration Act (1956).                          Kimba
    Med. 
    Supply, supra
    , 431 N.J. Super. at 485 n.11.                    However, those
    provisions shed no light on this issue.
    6
    A third, alternative interpretation would require CURE to file
    its summary action within forty-five days of its receipt of the
    original award.   That interpretation would require a party to
    commence a summary action in court even though a party's 12(d)
    application could still be pending before the umpire.    A 12(d)
    application must be made "within 20 days after delivery of the
    award to the applicant"; "objection to modification must be
    served . . . within 10 days of receipt of the notice" of the
    application; and "[t]he umpire shall dispose of any application
    . . . within 30 days after either written objection to
    modification has been served or the time for serving an
    objection has expired, whichever is earlier." N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-
    12(d). We decline to interpret N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) to require
    simultaneous and possibly unnecessary court proceedings while
    the case is still before and may be resolved by the umpire. "A
    statute should be considered in light of its surrounding
    provisions," and "should not be construed in a way that would
    produce an absurd result." In re Expungement Petition of J.S.,
    
    223 N.J. 54
    , 72-73 (2015).
    11                                  A-0945-14T2
    We find guidance from the general purpose of the APDRA,
    which emphasizes the need for expedition both in the dispute
    resolution     process       and     in    any       judicial     review.         The    APDRA
    emphasizes     that    it     seeks       "the       expeditious       resolution       of   the
    alternative resolution proceedings," N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-3(a), (b),
    and that judicial review of awards "shall be summary in nature
    and    expedited,"     N.J.S.A.       2A:23A-19;          see    also    N.J.S.A.       2A:23-
    13(b).     Indeed, the Legislature directed that "[t]his act shall
    be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose of
    allowing parties by agreement to have resolution of factual and
    legal issues in accordance with informal proceedings and limited
    judicial review in an expedited manner."                        N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-19.
    Moreover, in enacting the APDRA, the Legislature repeatedly
    stressed that "[t]he purpose of this bill . . . is to establish
    an efficient and expeditious procedure for the resolution of
    civil    disputes,"         and    that     the       bill   contemplated         "expedited
    summary    review     to     the   Chancery          Division     of    Superior    Court."
    Sponsor's Statement Appended to Assemb. B. No. A296, at 12-13
    (Jan. 14, 1986); Assemb. Judiciary Comm. Statement to Assemb. B.
    No.    A296,   at     1-2    (June        16,    1986);      Senate      Judiciary       Comm.
    Statement to Assemb. B. No. A296, at 1-2 (Oct. 27, 1986); see
    also     Draftsman's        Legis.    History,          reprinted        before     N.J.S.A.
    2A:23A-1.      The Governor agreed that the APDRA was "intended to
    12                                  A-0945-14T2
    provide a speedier and less expensive process for resolution of
    disputes," and that "reviews of umpire rulings by the Superior
    Court   are   to   be    expedited."        Governor's    Reconsideration      and
    Recommendation Statement to Assemb. B. No. 296, at 1 (Jan. 7,
    1987), reprinted at N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1.                 See also Mt. Hope Dev.
    
    Assocs., supra
    , 154 N.J. at 145, 148.
    We    give     great   weight     to    the   Legislature's    emphasis     on
    expediting such proceedings, and its instruction to construe the
    APDRA to effectuate its remedial purpose of proceeding "in an
    expedited manner."         N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-19.         That purpose is better
    served by construing N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) to require a party to
    file a summary action within thirty days of its receipt of an
    order denying its 12(d) application.
    That      construction     also    better      fits   the   most    plausible
    reasons why the Legislature may have chosen to require a party
    to file a summary action "within 45 days after the award is
    delivered     to   the     applicant"       if    no   party    files   a   12(d)
    application, while requiring a party to file a summary action
    "within 30 days after receipt of an award modified pursuant to
    [a 12(d) application]."        N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a).           The Legislature
    thus mandated filing within the shorter period when a party has
    delayed the proceedings by filing a 12(d) application to modify
    the original award, and when a party thus has had a longer
    13                            A-0945-14T2
    period to become familiar with the original award's terms, some
    of which may remain in force in the modified award.                      Similarly,
    when a party files an unsuccessful 12(d) application, the party
    has delayed the proceedings, and has had a longer period to
    become familiar with the original award's terms, all of which
    remain in force.        Such a party should similarly have to file any
    summary action within thirty days.
    Accordingly, we hold that if a party files an application
    to modify under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d) which is denied, a party
    must file any summary action "within 30 days after receipt of"
    the order denying modification.           See N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a).
    B.
    The     second   unsettled    issue        concerns    the   applicable      time
    period   under    N.J.S.A.     2A:23A-13(a)        where    a    party    files    an
    application for modification/clarification of a PIP award by the
    DRP under the rules of the organization, here Forthright.
    A    PIP    dispute    resolution     organization          must   provide    the
    Commissioner     with     "a   dispute        resolution    plan,      which   shall
    include procedures and rules governing the dispute resolution
    process."      N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(b).           The procedures and rules are
    intended "to ensure adherence to the standards of performance
    set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 and 5.2 and [N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1
    to -5.12]."       N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.3(d)(1).             The organization must
    14                                A-0945-14T2
    maintain, periodically review, and publish its rules, and must
    make   them     available      to    the    parties,      which    must       follow    them
    during the proceedings.              N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(a)(3), (a)(6), (b),
    (b)(5);       see   also     N.J.A.C.       11:3-5.2.         N.J.A.C.        11:3-5.6(g)
    provides       that      "[t]he     final        determination      of    the     dispute
    resolution professional shall be . . . subject to clarification/
    modification        and/or    appeal       as    provided    by   the    rules    of     the
    dispute resolution organization[.]"
    Here, Forthright's Rules have been repeatedly approved by
    the Commissioner.7           Because Forthright Rule 24 allows a party to
    request modification or clarification of an award by the DRP, it
    serves a comparable purpose as N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d) serves in
    APDRA proceedings.            Thus, it is appropriate to apply the same
    construction        of    N.J.S.A.       2A:23A-13(a)       to    applications         under
    Forthright Rule 24 as applied to 12(d) applications.                             Applying
    that   construction        serves     the       APDRA's     interest     in    expedition
    discussed above.
    That     construction        is     also      "consistent       with     the     [PIP
    arbitration] statute's overall purpose to . . . expedite the
    decision of claims."              N.J. Healthcare Coal. v. N.J. Dep't of
    Banking & Ins., 
    440 N.J. Super. 129
    , 144 (App. Div. 2015).                              "The
    7
    See Forthright, New Jersey No-Fault, http://www.nj-no-fault.com
    (last visited April 22, 2016) (attaching the Commissioner's
    approvals).
    15                                A-0945-14T2
    evident    purpose    of       [N.J.S.A.       39:6A-5.1]       is       to   establish         an
    expeditious     non-judicial          procedure       for   resolving          any    dispute
    regarding the payment of PIP benefits, in furtherance of the No-
    Fault   Act's    objectives       of    facilitating        'prompt           and   efficient
    provision of benefits for all accident injury victims[.]'"                                 Endo
    Surgi Ctr., P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
    391 N.J. Super. 588
    ,
    594 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos.,
    
    86 N.J. 100
    , 105, 107 (1981)).8
    Accordingly,        we   hold     that    the    thirty-day         deadline        under
    N.J.S.A.      2A:23A-13(a)       and    N.J.A.C.      11:3-5.6(g)             for    filing      a
    summary action in a PIP arbitration also applies when a party
    has filed an application for modification or clarification under
    the   rules    of   the    organization.          Thus,     if       a    party      files      an
    application      under     Forthright      Rule       24,   a    party        must       file   a
    summary    action    "within       30    days     after     receipt           of    an    award
    8
    Moreover, the alternative interpretation discussed in our
    earlier footnote is even more absurd in the context of PIP
    arbitration.   As set forth above, the time periods for filing
    and resolving an application under Forthright Rule 24 are longer
    than those in N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d). Thus, requiring a party to
    commence a summary action within forty-five days of its receipt
    of the original award would be even more likely to compel a
    party to commence a summary action while a party's application
    under Forthright Rule 24 was still pending before the DRP. "'A
    premature entanglement of the judiciary in PIP arbitrations
    would run at cross purposes with the legislative goal,'" and
    contravene   the   "strong   public   policy  against   judicial
    intervention in ongoing PIP arbitration proceedings."   Allstate
    N.J. Ins. Co. v. Neurology Pain Assocs., 
    418 N.J. Super. 246
    ,
    261 (App. Div. 2011) (citations omitted).
    16                                         A-0945-14T2
    modified    [or    clarified]        pursuant     to"   Forthright      Rule     24,    or
    receipt of the order denying clarification or modification.                            See
    N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a).9
    Here, CURE did not commence its summary action in the Law
    Division within thirty days after receipt of the DRP's order
    denying    clarification.            Rather,     it   filed    its    summary       action
    forty-five days later.            Thus, CURE's time to commence a summary
    action "had already expired and the DRP's decision had become
    final by the time it filed the present action."                              Orthopaedic
    Assocs. v. Dep't of Banking & Ins., 
    405 N.J. Super. 54
    , 66 (App.
    Div. 2009).       Therefore, the Law Division properly dismissed with
    prejudice CURE's         complaint and request for an order to show
    cause.    See 
    ibid. CURE argues that
      it    acted      in   good    faith    in    filing    its
    summary action on the forty-fifth day after the denial of its
    modification/clarification             application.            However,       CURE     has
    offered     no    reason    why      it     delayed     filing       until    the     last
    conceivable       day,   despite      our     earlier    warning       that     N.J.S.A.
    9
    This will generally give the party more time than a litigant
    receives under the Rules of Court, which merely toll the "[t]he
    running of the [forty-five-day] time for taking an appeal"
    during the pendency of a timely application for reconsideration;
    after the denial of the application, the litigant must file an
    appeal within "the remaining time."    R. 2:4-3(b); see also R.
    2:4-1.   In any event, CURE concedes that "there is no such
    tolling" provision here, and "the outcome of this matter is
    dictated by N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a)."
    17                                  A-0945-14T2
    2A:23A-13(a) "does not reveal the amount of time a party has to
    challenge   an   award   when   an   application   to   modify   has   been
    denied."    Liberty Mut. Ins. 
    Co., supra
    , 413 N.J. Super. at 523.
    In any event, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) specifically provides that
    "[t]he award of the umpire shall become final unless the action
    is commenced as required by this subsection."             That statutory
    language is clear, and we must follow it.
    Affirmed.
    18                           A-0945-14T2