BILLINGS WHEELER, IV VS. ANNA WHEELER (FM-20-0882-05, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4383-16T1
BILLINGS WHEELER, IV,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANNA WHEELER,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted May 16, 2018 – Decided June 28, 2018
Before Judges Currier and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Union
County, Docket No. FM-20-0882-05.
Judith L. Rosenthal, attorney for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
In this matrimonial matter, defendant Anna Wheeler appeals
from the May 5, 2017 post-judgment order denying her application
to compel her ex-husband to maintain a life insurance policy for
her benefit despite her remarriage and the termination of her
former husband's alimony obligation. Because we find, under the
circumstances existing here, the reasonable evidence in the record
supports the trial judge's ruling that the obligation to maintain
life insurance for the benefit of defendant was connected to the
alimony requirement, we affirm.
The parties were divorced in 2007 after a twenty-seven-year
marriage. The amended Judgment of Divorce (AJOD) provides:
1. Effective February 1, 2007, plaintiff
shall pay to defendant permanent alimony
in the amount of $50,000 per year, or
$4,166 per month. Alimony shall
terminate upon defendant's remarriage or
the death of either party.
2. Plaintiff shall maintain life insurance
coverage in the amount of $250,000 with
defendant designated as beneficiary, and
shall provide proof of the existence of
this coverage on an annual basis.
After plaintiff, Billings Wheeler IV, failed to provide
defendant with proof of insurance coverage, she filed a motion to
compel compliance with the insurance provision. The motion was
granted, and plaintiff obtained a life insurance policy in August
2007, naming defendant as the sole beneficiary. The parties also
executed a consent order that required the insurer to inform
defendant of any changes to, or lapse in, the coverage.
Despite these orders, defendant learned that plaintiff had
allowed the policy to lapse. Further motion practice led to a
second consent order, requiring plaintiff to again name defendant
as the beneficiary under a new policy.
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After defendant remarried in March 2014, she notified
defendant of her changed status and the alimony obligation was
terminated. She continued, however, to contact the insurer
annually to confirm the existence of plaintiff's life insurance
policy. When she made her call in 2017, defendant learned
plaintiff had replaced her with his girlfriend as the beneficiary
on the policy.
Defendant moved to compel plaintiff to comply with the AJOD
and maintain her as the beneficiary; plaintiff cross-moved to
terminate the life insurance obligation. After oral argument, the
Family Part judge found a reasonable interpretation of the AJOD
was that the "life insurance is connected with the payment of
alimony, and when the alimony obligation ceases, the obligation
to maintain the life insurance on behalf of the spouse ends also."
The judge denied defendant's motion and terminated the life
insurance obligation.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial judge erred in
terminating the life insurance obligation. She also asserts the
court was biased against her and failed to accord her due process.
After a careful review of the record, we discern no merit to
defendant's contentions of bias and lack of due process. It is
evident the judge read the parties' submissions, was versed in the
applicable statutes and case law, and permitted defendant's
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counsel the opportunity to make her arguments in support of her
application.
In addressing the life insurance obligation, it is a
commonplace provision in a property settlement agreement or
judgment of divorce to require life insurance as security for
support payments in the event of the premature demise of the
obligor. See, e.g., Konczyk v. Konczyk, 367 N.J. Super. 551, 556
(Ch. Div. 2003), aff'd, 367 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 2004);
Boardman v. Boardman, 314 N.J. Super. 340, 344 (App. Div. 1998);
Davis v. Davis, 184 N.J. Super. 430, 436-38 (App. Div. 1982).
Plaintiff complied with his alimony obligation until
defendant remarried in March 2014. Alimony was terminated
thereafter pursuant to the parties' own agreement. See also
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25. Now remarried, defendant does not allege she
is dependent on plaintiff for support and has not demonstrated the
parties intended plaintiff to continue to support her in the form
of a life insurance benefit following her remarriage to another
man.
The purpose of life insurance in a divorce agreement setting
— to assure a sufficient fund for the payor's support obligations
should he or she predecease that responsibility – has been
satisfied here. Plaintiff fulfilled his alimony obligation until
defendant remarried, resulting in the termination of alimony. The
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need for protection also ended when the alimony was no longer due.
As we have stated: "Generally, an obligation to maintain insurance
and the entitlement of the insured's former spouse . . . to the
proceeds will not survive the satisfaction of the obligation the
insurance was intended to secure." Konczyk, 367 N.J. Super. at
562 (quoting 22 Causes of Action § 463, § 2).
Affirmed.
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