CATHY MITCHELL VS. GERALD SKEY (L-0486-12, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1657-14T2
    CATHY MITCHELL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    GERALD SKEY, S. BHATTACHARYA,
    SKEY BHATTACHARYA LAW FIRM,1
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ———————————————————————————————
    Argued telephonically         January     17,   2017    –
    Decided May 12, 2017
    Before Judges Lihotz, Hoffman and O'Connor.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-
    0486-12.
    Cathy Mitchell, appellant, argued the cause
    pro se.
    Patrick J. McCormick argued the cause for
    respondents (Hardin, Kundla, McKeon & Poletto,
    P.A., attorneys; Mr. McCormick, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    1    W.S. Gerald Skey improperly plead as "Gerald Skey", Supti
    Bhattacharya improperly plead as "S. Bhattacharya" and Skey &
    Bhattacharya, LLC, improperly plead as "Skey Bhattacharya Law
    Firm".
    Plaintiff Cathy Mitchell appeals from the December 1, 2014
    Law Division order, which granted the summary judgment dismissal
    of her legal malpractice action against defendants W.S. Gerald
    Skey, and the law firm of Skey & Bhattacharya, LLC (collectively
    defendants). Plaintiff's complaint alleged defendants negligently
    represented her in the divorce proceedings she initiated against
    her   husband,     Richard   Miller.        The   Law    Division   dismissed
    plaintiff's complaint because she failed to provide a report from
    an expert who would testify as to the applicable standard of care,
    and   explain    how   defendants   deviated      from   that   standard   with
    resulting harm to plaintiff.          Following our review of the record
    and the parties' briefs, we affirm.
    I.
    We begin with a brief summary of the underlying divorce
    litigation      between   plaintiff     and   her    now   former    husband. 2
    Plaintiff and Miller are both practicing attorneys.              They married
    in October 1993, and had two children, born in 1995 and 1999;
    Miller also had two emancipated children from a prior marriage.
    The parties maintained an affluent lifestyle, including luxury
    2   Our opinion entered on plaintiff's appeal from her divorce
    proceedings contains a more detailed account of the divorce
    litigation. See Mitchell v. Miller, No. A-3756-12 (App. Div. June
    11, 2015).
    2                              A-1657-14T2
    vehicles, international family vacations, frequent Broadway shows,
    and country club memberships.
    The   parties    worked   together      for   the   majority     of   their
    marriage, moving together into various positions, including in-
    house counsel with a sporting goods manufacturer, various law
    firms throughout New Jersey and New York, and their own law firm.
    Financial documents showed they earned roughly equal salaries
    throughout the marriage. In 2009, plaintiff received earned income
    of $136,044 while defendant received earned income of $149,937.
    Plaintiff filed for divorce in September 2009.                  Originally
    scheduled for August 9, 2010, the trial was adjourned several
    times for various reasons, including plaintiff changing attorneys
    three times before trial due to alleged misconduct and conflicts.
    Trial finally commenced in February 2011 before a Family Part
    judge, with Skey serving as plaintiff's trial counsel.               During the
    first   week   of   trial,   the   parties    entered    into   an   agreement
    resolving custody and parenting time issues.3
    Trial lasted thirteen days.        After the tenth day, plaintiff
    sought an adjournment in order to change attorneys again, asserting
    3   In a certification, Skey said his representation of plaintiff
    began in November 2010, after plaintiff's third attorney filed a
    motion to withdraw.   Skey said he focused his discovery on the
    issue of custody.      He claimed that by the time he began
    representing plaintiff, all financial discovery had been
    completed.
    3                             A-1657-14T2
    a   conflict     with   Skey    because   of     his    conduct,    which      she
    characterized as misconduct and cognitive problems.                     The trial
    judge   denied    plaintiff's     application,    and     noted   she    had   not
    witnessed Skey exhibit any cognitive difficulties or misconduct.
    The judge concluded that substitution of counsel at that late
    stage would cause undue delay and unfair prejudice to Miller.
    The judge nevertheless offered plaintiff three options: to
    continue with Skey as trial counsel; to represent herself, as an
    attorney admitted to practice in New Jersey; or to obtain a new
    attorney post-trial to prepare a written summation on her behalf.
    When plaintiff refused to choose one of these options, the judge
    ordered Skey to continue as trial counsel for plaintiff.
    At the conclusion of trial testimony, counsel gave their oral
    summations on April 13, 2011.         Nearly two years later, on March
    8, 2013, the trial judge issued a Final Judgment of Divorce (FJOD),
    accompanied by a seventy-one-page written opinion.                 In pertinent
    part, the judge distributed the marital assets equally, and denied
    plaintiff's      requests   for    alimony,    child     support,       and    fee-
    shifting.4     The judge found plaintiff's testimony suspect, noting
    she often evaded questions by answering "I don't know[,]" or "I
    can't remember[,]" sometimes even before the attorney had finished
    4   Defendant appealed, and we affirmed.               
    Mitchell, supra
    , (slip
    op. at 1).
    4                                             A-1657-14T2
    asking the question.       The judge further stated she had not "seen
    one instance of behavior during trial or numerous conferences in
    chambers and via telephonic conferences" that caused her concern
    regarding Skey's ability to represent plaintiff.             Rather, she
    believed that plaintiff raised the issue because it was "clear
    that plaintiff simply did not like how the trial was going."
    In February 2012, over a year before the Family Part judge
    issued   her   decision,   plaintiff   filed   this   malpractice   action
    against defendants.5       Plaintiff alleged Skey failed to depose
    Miller until a week before the start of the divorce trial; failed
    to obtain Miller's bank records until the middle of trial; failed
    to obtain Miller's billing records because Skey waited until the
    middle of trial to subpoena them, only to have the subpoena quashed
    by the court; and failed to properly prepare materials, witnesses,
    and other evidence to allow for the possibility of settlement
    under "favorable terms."
    In April 2012, plaintiff filed an affidavit of merit (AOM).
    Following a May 2012 hearing, the court deemed the AOM insufficient
    and gave plaintiff sixty days to file a new one.               Plaintiff
    thereafter filed a second AOM.
    On August 8, 2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
    5    Plaintiff's complaint also named Skey's law partner, Supti
    Bhattacharya, as a defendant.
    5                            A-1657-14T2
    plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, challenging the sufficiency
    of the replacement AOM.     On September 28, 2012, the court granted
    the motion as to Bhattacharya only — because the replacement AOM
    did not address her — but denied the motion as to Skey and his law
    firm.
    In January 2013, the remaining defendants filed a motion to
    dismiss   plaintiff's   complaint   without    prejudice   based   on   her
    failure to provide discovery.       The same month, plaintiff filed a
    motion to compel certain depositions.         In April 2013, defendants
    filed a motion to set a deadline for furnishing expert reports.
    In mid-May 2013, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as
    to liability only.      On June 14, 2013, defendants filed a motion
    for summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to serve a report
    from a legal malpractice expert.          Unexplainably, these motions
    went undecided, and the case lay dormant until June 12, 2014, when
    defendants   renewed    their   summary    judgment   motion   based      on
    plaintiff's failure to provide an expert report.
    On June 27, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for a stay, or in
    the alternative, for an extension of the discovery period to permit
    her to serve an expert report.        On October 20, 2014, plaintiff
    filed a motion to extend discovery and for an additional sixty
    days to file her expert report.
    On October 28, 2014, the court denied both summary judgment
    6                                  A-1657-14T2
    motions as well as plaintiff's motion for a stay.             The court also
    denied plaintiff's motion to compel depositions and defendants'
    motion   to   dismiss   the   complaint   without    prejudice,    and    gave
    plaintiff until December 1, 2014, to serve her expert report.              The
    court entered corresponding orders the same date, including an
    order directing that any depositions sought by plaintiff not occur
    until she served answers to interrogatories, responded to certain
    document requests, and submitted to a deposition; an order denying
    defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice; an
    order    denying   plaintiff's    motion    for     summary    judgment    on
    liability; an order denying plaintiff's motion for a stay pending
    the decision by the Appellate Division in the divorce action; and
    an order denying plaintiff's motion for a protective order and to
    quash defendants' subpoena of the divorce case file held by a non-
    party company, New Jersey Legal.
    On December 1, 2014, after plaintiff failed to serve her
    expert's report, the motion court issued an oral decision granting
    defendants' motion for summary judgment.             The court entered a
    corresponding order and dismissed plaintiff's complaint the same
    day.    This appeal followed.6
    6  In addition to the December 1, 2014 dismissal order, plaintiff
    also appeals from the October 28, 2014 orders denying plaintiff's
    motions.
    7                             A-1657-14T2
    II.
    Review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo, and we
    apply the same legal standard as the trial court.                     Nicholas v.
    Mynster,    
    213 N.J. 463
    ,   477-78   (2013).          Summary   judgment    is
    appropriate       where    "the    pleadings,       depositions,      answers     to
    interrogatories      and    admissions        on    file,    together   with     the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to
    a judgment or order as a matter of law."               R. 4:46-2(c).
    When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material
    fact, we must consider "whether the competent evidential materials
    presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to
    resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving
    party."    Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540
    (1995).     We    afford    no    deference    to    the    trial   court's    legal
    conclusions.      
    Nicholas, supra
    , 213 N.J. at 478.
    Plaintiff contends no expert was required in this case because
    Skey's negligence was obvious and a matter of common knowledge,
    such that a juror of average intelligence could understand.                       We
    disagree.    Plaintiff's malpractice claim was sufficiently complex
    to require expert testimony regarding the accepted standard of
    care and how Skey allegedly failed to meet that standard.
    8                                     A-1657-14T2
    Plaintiff told the court at the October 2014 hearing that her
    "expert report would be about everything."   By "everything," she
    apparently was referring to the alleged conflict of interest that
    arose when Skey agreed to continue to represent her after she had
    notified him of her intention to file a malpractice action against
    him because he allegedly failed to timely obtain Miller's billing
    and bank records.    Plaintiff also argues that Skey committed
    malpractice by not sending information to a forensic accountant
    she had retained.
    In denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment at the
    October 28, 2014 hearing, the motion court stated:
    There are cases that are so obvious. They're
    few   and    far   between,    especially   in
    professional malpractice . . . . You know,
    an attorney takes money to file a complaint
    and just never files the complaint or blows
    the statute of limitations . . . but that's
    not this case. . . .      This case has more
    nuances to it. . . . It's not even whether
    or not, or why subpoenas weren't sent earlier,
    or things that weren't requested, whether an
    adversary promised something and didn't live
    up to that promise, . . . so I don't think
    it's . . . such a clear cut case of . . .
    alleged attorney malpractice, that it would
    fall into the rule that does require expert
    testimony.
    Also, there does need to be the issue of
    causation . . . .       You have to have a
    connection between the causation [sic].
    Now I'm not saying you can't prove that,
    but you would need expert testimony in this
    type    of    a    case   to    prove    that
    9                              A-1657-14T2
    . . . . So, again, you don't have an expert
    on proximate causation.    You don't have an
    expert on whether or not . . . this was
    malpractice for Mr. Skey if he decided not to
    use a certain expert . . . or not to question
    your ex-husband in a certain manner.     That
    would all require an expert.
    Generally, the admission or exclusion of expert testimony is
    committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.                         Townsend
    v. Pierre, 
    221 N.J. 36
    , 52 (2015). In reviewing a summary judgment
    determination based on an evidentiary issue, like the trial court,
    we must first identify the evidentiary issue and then make the
    summary judgment determination.               
    Id. at 53.
    The   usual     principles      of     negligence     apply    to    a     legal
    malpractice action.          Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 
    145 N.J. 395
    , 416
    (1996).        Thus, a plaintiff must establish by competent proof an
    attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care upon the
    attorney, breach of that duty, and proximate causation.                             
    Ibid. Generally, a lawyer
      is    required    to    exercise   the       degree      of
    reasonable       knowledge      and   experience       that   lawyers    of   ordinary
    ability and skill possess and exercise. Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg,
    Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone, P.C. v. Ezekwo, 345 N.J.
    Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2001).                That obligation encompasses "the
    taking of any steps reasonably necessary in the proper handling"
    of   a    case,       including   the    duty    of    investigating     the       facts,
    formulating a litigation strategy and filing within a reasonable
    10                                        A-1657-14T2
    time anything necessary to effectuate recovery.     Kranz v. Tiger,
    
    390 N.J. Super. 135
    , 147 (App. Div.) (quoting Passanante v.
    Yormark, 
    138 N.J. Super. 233
    , 239 (App. Div. 1975), certif. denied,
    
    70 N.J. 144
    (1976)), certif. denied, 
    192 N.J. 294
    (2007).
    The AOM Statute (AMS), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, requires a
    plaintiff in a legal malpractice action to file an affidavit of
    merit. However, an AOM is not required in a case where the "common
    knowledge" doctrine applies and obviates the need for expert
    testimony to establish a deviation from the standard of care.
    Hubbard v. Reed, 
    168 N.J. 387
    , 390 (2001); Bender v. Walgreen E.
    Co., 
    399 N.J. Super. 584
    , 590 (App. Div. 2008).       The doctrine
    applies where jurors' common knowledge as lay persons is sufficient
    to enable them, using ordinary understanding and experience, to
    determine a defendant's negligence without the benefit of an
    expert's specialized knowledge.     
    Bender, supra
    , 399 N.J. Super.
    at 590.    Such a situation is where the carelessness of the
    defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence
    and ordinary experience.   
    Ibid. One of the
    requirements for the admission of expert testimony
    is that the intended testimony must concern a subject matter beyond
    the ken of the average juror.      State v. Kelly, 
    97 N.J. 178
    , 208
    (1984).   Generally, expert testimony is required in cases of
    professional malpractice where the matter to be addressed is so
    11                              A-1657-14T2
    esoteric that the average juror cannot form a valid judgment as
    to whether the conduct of the professional was reasonable. Sommers
    v. McKinney, 
    287 N.J. Super. 1
    , 10 (App. Div. 1996).              However,
    depending on the facts of a given case, a layperson's common
    knowledge may be sufficient to permit a finding that the duty of
    care had been breached.        
    Ibid. Generally, because the
    duties a lawyer owes his or her client
    are not known by the average juror, expert testimony is required
    to set forth that duty and explain the breach.                 Buchanan v.
    Leonard, 
    428 N.J. Super. 277
    , 288 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    213 N.J. 534
    (2013).      However, in "rare cases," expert testimony is
    not required in a legal malpractice action where the duty of care
    to the client is so basic that it may be determined by the court
    as a matter of law.     
    Ibid. In addition, expert
    testimony may not
    be required to establish proximate cause in a legal malpractice
    case    where   the   causal    relationship   between   the    attorney's
    malpractice and the client's loss is so obvious that the trier of
    fact can resolve the issue as a matter of common knowledge.
    
    Sommers, supra
    , 287 N.J. Super. at 11.
    "A common thread runs through these cases, namely none of
    them required the trier of fact to evaluate an attorney's legal
    judgment concerning a complex legal issue." Brach, 
    Eichler, supra
    ,
    345 N.J. Super. at 13.     New Jersey courts have dispensed with the
    12                                A-1657-14T2
    expert   testimony       requirement        where   attorneys   have       failed    to
    fulfill the most basic of responsibilities, such as failing to
    submit   a   legal      argument,     not    properly   recording      a    bond    and
    mortgage, and letting the statute of limitations run.                      
    Id. at 12-
    13.
    In 
    Buchanan, supra
    , 428 N.J. Super. at 280-82, the plaintiff
    had been sued for legal malpractice and sought coverage from his
    insurer.     The insurer denied coverage after the attorney assigned
    to defend the plaintiff in the malpractice matter informed the
    insurer the plaintiff committed bankruptcy fraud.                      
    Id. at 283.
    The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action, and the court
    determined that the plaintiff was, in fact, entitled to coverage.
    
    Ibid. The plaintiff then
    filed a malpractice action against the
    attorney and firm that had represented him in the underlying
    malpractice action.           
    Ibid. In granting the
    defendants' motion for
    summary judgment, the trial court determined that the plaintiff
    was required to provide an expert report, and had not done so.
    
    Id. at 284.
           On appeal, the defendants argued that the defendant
    attorney     had    merely      provided     the    insurer   with   his     "candid
    assessment"        of   the    plaintiff's     potential      liability      in     the
    underlying lawsuit.           
    Id. at 289.
         The plaintiff argued that the
    attorney violated his duty to provide him with undivided loyalty.
    13                                      A-1657-14T2
    
    Ibid. Faced with these
    arguments, we held that without the
    assistance of expert evidence, a jury would not have been able to
    determine the duty of care that applied.           
    Ibid. In Brizak v.
    Needle, 
    239 N.J. Super. 415
    , 417-18 (App. Div.),
    certif. denied, 
    122 N.J. 164
    (1990), the plaintiff alleged that
    her attorney had committed malpractice because he failed to file
    a medical malpractice action prior to the expiration of the statute
    of limitations.       The attorney maintained that he did not believe
    there was a limitations problem because he thought that the claim
    would not accrue until the plaintiff found a doctor who believed
    her treatment had been malpractice.          
    Id. at 425.
    We held that the plaintiff was not required to produce an
    expert in support of her claim because there was no need for an
    expert to "refute defendant's obviously incorrect belief that the
    limitations period did not begin to run until an expert medical
    opinion was obtained."         
    Id. at 429.
        Moreover, the evidence in
    support    of   the    claim      "was    within   the   grasp   of    common
    understanding."        
    Id. at 431.
        This   evidence   included     the
    defendant's failure to obtain the medical opinion of someone with
    the appropriate expertise who would be willing to testify, and his
    failure to obtain x-rays and office records. 
    Id. at 432.
    However,
    the court added:
    We do        not want to leave the wrong
    impression.        Although expert opinion is not
    14                                  A-1657-14T2
    necessary to establish the negligence of a[n]
    . . . attorney who fails to conduct any
    investigation of his client's claim, where the
    attorney has undertaken some investigation, a
    jury will rarely be able to evaluate its
    adequacy without the aid of expert legal
    opinion. We are convinced that this is one
    of those rare cases. We nevertheless caution
    that a plaintiff's attorney who litigates a
    legal malpractice claim without the opinion
    testimony of a legal expert unnecessarily
    exposes his client to a serious risk of
    dismissal.
    [Ibid.]
    In Aldrich v. Hawrylo, 
    281 N.J. Super. 201
    , 204 (App. Div.
    1995), appeal dismissed, 
    146 N.J. 493
    (1996), the plaintiffs
    claimed that their attorneys committed malpractice by advising
    against disclosing to a purchaser the existence of a setback
    restriction, imposed as a condition of a variance grant, because
    the restriction was invalid.               We reversed the trial court's
    determination that expert testimony was not needed.                
    Id. at 213-
    15.     We held that because the attorneys conducted an extensive
    investigation into the question prior to rendering their opinion,
    a     jury   could   not   properly   evaluate       the    adequacy   of   the
    investigation or the opinion without the aid of expert legal
    testimony.     
    Id. at 214.
    In Brach, 
    Eichler, supra
    , 345 N.J. Super. at 11, 14, the
    defendant     physician    sought     to     raise   a     legal   malpractice
    counterclaim in an action brought against him to recover unpaid
    15                                     A-1657-14T2
    legal fees.    She alleged her former attorneys failed to file, or
    delayed filing, certain lawsuits.         
    Id. at 11.
         The trial court
    denied her request because she failed to supply an expert report.
    
    Id. at 11-15.
          We affirmed because the issues raised by the
    counterclaim    were     matters     of   "analysis,   opinion,        [and]
    interpretation."      
    Id. at 15.
    In 
    Sommers, supra
    , 287 N.J. Super. at 5, a tax assessor
    brought an action to affirm her tenured status and to receive back
    pay.     The case settled during trial, with the plaintiff tax
    assessor receiving back pay but surrendering her tenure claim.
    
    Ibid. The plaintiff then
    brought a malpractice action against her
    trial attorney alleging inadequate case preparation, failure to
    communicate    more    favorable    settlement   offers    to   her,    and
    misrepresentation of the strength of the municipality's proofs on
    the tenure issue.     
    Id. at 7.
       As a result of this malpractice, the
    plaintiff claimed she accepted an inadequate settlement.           
    Id. at 8.
    The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant
    attorney because the plaintiff failed to produce an expert to
    establish the standard of care and breach of that standard.              
    Id. at 9.
      We reversed the entry of summary judgment, stating:
    Stripped to its essentials, plaintiff
    asserts that she accepted a settlement offer
    far inferior to one previously tendered
    because her attorney inadequately prepared the
    16                                   A-1657-14T2
    case, failed to submit a legal argument to
    support her tenure claim and misrepresented
    the state of the case to her. These issues
    do not require a jury to speculate whether
    [the attorney] selected the appropriate
    authorities to advance plaintiff's legal
    position or to evaluate [the attorney's]
    judgment in recommending a settlement offer
    to her. Rather plaintiff asserts that no work
    was done to advance her case and that [the
    attorney] knew the shortcomings of the
    Borough's case but misrepresented the strength
    of its defense to her back pay claim to induce
    her to settle the case and collect his fee.
    . . . .
    We conclude that [the plaintiff] was not
    required to have an expert opine that [the
    attorney] should have briefed an issue and
    that the failure to do so was a breach of that
    duty to plaintiff. Similarly, [the plaintiff]
    was not obliged to have an expert opine that
    [the attorney] was required to report the
    settlement    discussion     accurately    and
    recommend a disposition of the case based upon
    an   accurate   rendition  of   each   party's
    positions. Furthermore, [the plaintiff] was
    not required to produce an expert to opine
    that, if she had been told that the town had
    no defense to her back pay claim, she would
    have changed her settlement position.
    [Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted).]
    The appeal under review is not one where an attorney did no
    work and made misrepresentations to plaintiff, as in Sommers, nor
    where an attorney failed to file an action in time because of an
    "obviously incorrect belief" regarding the statute of limitations,
    as in Brizak.   Rather, Skey's alleged failure to obtain billing
    and banking records in a timely manner, is more akin to the
    17                          A-1657-14T2
    question of the adequacy of an investigation, as in Aldrich, and
    the alleged conflict of interest is similar to the divided loyalty
    charge in Buchanan.
    Therefore, we conclude plaintiff's malpractice allegation was
    not so "readily apparent" and the alleged breach of the duty of
    care not so "basic" as to warrant holding that the trial court
    erred in determining this was not one of those "rare cases" where
    an expert was not required.              In addition, to the extent Skey
    continued to represent plaintiff after she advised she intended
    to file a malpractice action against him constituted a basis for
    her claim, such allegation raises a relatively "complex legal
    issue," not amenable to determination without the assistance of
    expert testimony.
    Our conclusion that plaintiff was required to provide expert
    testimony   to   prove    her   legal     malpractice    case     renders    moot
    plaintiff's    appeal    of   the    denial   of   her   motion    for   summary
    judgment.     Plaintiff's remaining appellate arguments, including
    her challenge to the other orders entered on October 28, 2014,
    lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
    R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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