MARJORIE JONES VS. BOARD OF REVIEW(BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3382-15T3
MARJORIE JONES,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR and MARKETREACH,
INC.,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
Submitted June 1, 2017 – Decided June 21, 2017
Before Judges Lihotz and O'Connor.
On appeal from the Board of Review,
Department of Labor, Docket No. 011,591.
Marjorie Jones, appellant pro se.
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton
Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Tasha M. Bradt, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Marjorie Jones appeals from the final decision of
respondent Board of Review (Board), which affirmed the decision
issued after a telephonic hearing by an Appeal Tribunal. The
Tribunal affirmed the decision of a Deputy Director (Deputy) of
the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance, who
denied appellant unemployment compensation benefits. We affirm.
We discern the following from the record. From November
16, 2011 to August 13, 2013, appellant worked as a telephone
executive or "lead generator" for MarketReach, Inc. (employer).
After finding another position, appellant resigned on July 30,
2013, providing the employer thirty days notice. However, on
August 13, 2013, appellant abruptly quit and walked off of the
premises. At the time of her resignation, appellant was paid
$10.50 per hour, plus commissions. Factoring in her
commissions, she earned on average $11 per hour.
When her new position did not commence in October 2013 as
anticipated, appellant applied for unemployment benefits. The
Deputy denied appellant's application on the ground she failed
to disclose her reason for resigning from the job; therefore,
the Deputy found appellant did not demonstrate she resigned for
good cause attributable to the work, see N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
Appellant appealed the Deputy's determination to an Appeal
Tribunal. Following a telephone hearing, the Tribunal affirmed
the Deputy, but for modifying the date appellant was
disqualified from benefits.
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During the hearing, appellant claimed the employer's
records stated she began to work on December 5, 2011, when in
fact her position started on November 16, 2011. Appellant
believed the employer derived some illegal gain from having the
wrong start date included in its records. The Tribunal found no
evidence to support her claim the employer engaged in any
illegal or unethical conduct, and determined the appellant left
her position voluntarily without good cause attributable to the
work. See ibid.
The Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision and an
appeal ensued. While that appeal was pending, we granted
appellant's motion to supplement the record, and determined to
remand the matter to the Board for its reconsideration in light
of the supplemental material. On remand, the Board reopened the
matter, set aside its prior decision, and remanded the matter to
the Appeal Tribunal for a new hearing and decision.
At the second hearing before the Appeal Tribunal, appellant
again claimed she was justified in leaving MarketReach, Inc.,
contending the employer had engaged in illegal or fraudulent
conduct. Appellant also stated she resigned because she feared
the employer's wrongful acts might implicate her.
In support of her contentions, appellant produced a
contract between the employer and Mercer County showing Mercer
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County agreed to provide "On-The-Job" (OTJ) training benefits to
the employer to train appellant. The contract states the
training period is thirteen weeks, and that the "OTJ Start Date"
is December 5, 2011 and the "OTJ End Date" March 5, 2012."1 The
contract does not state – and the employer does not dispute –
appellant commenced her employment with MarketReach, Inc., on
November 16, 2011.
Appellant also asserted she was forced to quit two weeks
before her planned resignation date of August 30, 2011, because
the employer requested she train new employees who were to take
over her job duties when she left. She claimed the time
required to train others kept her from performing other tasks
that may have yielded her a commission. She did not provide
evidence of the amount in commissions she would have earned had
she not been requested by the employer to train the new
employees.
The Appeal Tribunal denied appellant benefits. Citing
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), the Tribunal found she voluntarily left her
position with MarketReach, Inc., without good cause attributable
to the work and, thus, was disqualified from receiving benefits.
The Tribunal found appellant's testimony "unclear and
1
In fact, the contract states the "OTJ End Date" is March 5,
2011, but the "11" in "2011" is crossed out and a "12" inserted
by hand. This hand-written correction is initialed.
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unconvincing," and appellant's supplemental evidence did not
show the employer engaged in any fraudulent, illegal, or
unethical activity. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded
appellant did not have good cause attributable to the work to
resign from her position. The Board affirmed the Appeal
Tribunal's decision, and this appeal ensued.
On appeal, appellant's principal contention is she was
forced to resign because the employer made her "unknowingly
complicit by falsifying official government documents for
financial gain." She also asserts she was forced to abruptly
quit on August 13, 2013 when the employer took away "financial
work opportunities."
Our review of an administrative agency decision is limited.
Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "In reviewing
the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation
proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same
conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but
rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon
the proofs." Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J.
Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "If the Board's factual
findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we]
are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of
Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). "Unless . . . the agency's
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action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's
ruling should not be disturbed." Ibid.
After carefully reviewing the record and the parties'
briefs, we conclude petitioner's contentions are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following comments.
It is obvious the contract between the employer and Mercer
County approving the employer for OTJ training benefits does not
state appellant commenced employment on December 5, 2011. The
latter date clearly refers to the day the thirteen-week OTJ
training period was to commence, not when appellant started
employment with MarketReach, Inc. There is no evidence or any
reasonable basis to believe the employer engaged in any illegal
or unethical conduct, let alone any conduct that implicated
appellant in any way. Because its factual findings are
supported by sufficient credible evidence, we affirm the Board's
decision.
Affirmed.
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