State of New Jersey v. Robert L. Evans , 449 N.J. Super. 66 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0489-14T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
February 28, 2017
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
ROBERT L. EVANS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
Argued June 1, 2016 – Decided February 28, 2017
Before Judges Fisher, Espinosa and Rothstadt.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Cumberland County, Indictment
No. 12-05-0572.
Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
Ms. McLane, of counsel and on the briefs).
Elizabeth K. Tornese, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer
Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor,
attorney; Ms. Tornese, of counsel and on the
brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ESPINOSA, J.A.D.
Defendant was arrested – not for a crime – but on a warrant
for failure to pay a $6.50 traffic fine, and subjected to a strip
search. In N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1, the Legislature established
requirements, designed to provide greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment, that must be satisfied before a strip search may
be conducted under such circumstances. See, State v. Hayes, 327
N.J. Super. 373, 381 (App. Div. 2000). In the absence of a warrant
or consent, the statute prohibits a strip search of a person who
has been "detained or arrested for commission of an offense other
than a crime" unless the search is based on probable cause and "a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement." N.J.S.A.
2A:161A-1(b). Guidelines issued by the Attorney General's Office 1
set forth even more exacting criteria to be satisfied before a
strip search is conducted.
In this appeal, we consider the application of the "plain
feel" exception to the warrant requirement, Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993);
State v. Jackson, 276 N.J. Super. 626, 628 (App. Div. 1994), to
the strip search that was conducted. For the reasons that follow,
we conclude the plain feel exception did not apply and, further,
1
New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General's
Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures
for Police Officers (July 1995) (the Attorney General Guidelines
or the Guidelines) can be located at:
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/3strpsch.pdf.
2
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that the seizure of drugs from defendant's person was not
objectively reasonable. We also reverse defendant's convictions
and remand for a hearing to determine whether the search of an
automobile pursuant to a search warrant was sufficiently free of
taint from the unlawful search and seizure.
I.
Defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant for failure
to pay a $6.50 fine. In the search incident to arrest, the officer
seized approximately $2,000 from defendant's person, observed a
bulge in the groin area of defendant's pants and manipulated the
bulge. Defendant was taken to the police station where he was
subjected to a strip search. The strip search resulted in the
recovery of two rocks of crack cocaine totaling 0.56 ounces and
nine bags of heroin containing approximately 0.018 grams each. A
search warrant was obtained for the car defendant had been driving.
Execution of that warrant resulted in the seizure of a gun and
hollow nose bullets.
After defendant's motion to suppress evidence was denied, a
jury convicted him of second-degree unlawful possession of a
firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), (count one); third-degree possession
of a controlled dangerous substance (heroin and cocaine), N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(1), (counts two and three); second-degree possession
with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance
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(cocaine), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2), (count four); third-degree
possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous
substance (heroin), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) (count five); fourth-
degree possession of hollow nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)
(count six); second-degree possession of a firearm during a
controlled dangerous substances offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a)
(count seven); and second-degree certain persons possession of a
firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1), (count eight). After appropriate
mergers, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of forty
years with a twenty-year period of parole ineligibility.
Defendant appeals from the denial of his suppression motion,
his judgment of conviction and his sentence, raising the following
arguments for our consideration:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
DRUGS FOUND ON HIS PERSON AND THE
GUN FOUND IN THE CAR. U.S. CONST.
AMEND. IV, XIV; N.J. CONST. ART. 1,
PARA. 7.
A. THE DRUGS MUST BE
SUPPRESSED.
B. THE GUN MUST BE
SUPPRESSED.
POINT II
THE EXPERT'S TESITMONY [SIC] WHICH
WAS NOT HELPFUL AND EMBRACED THE
ULTIMATE ISSUE, COMBINED WITH THE
4
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COURT'S INADEQUATE EXPERT WITNESS
JURY INSTRUCTIONS DEPRIVED
DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW. (Not
Raised Below).
A. INTRODUCTION.
B. THE STATE'S EXPERT
OVERSTEPPED THE LIMITS OF ODOM[2] AND
HIS ULTIMATE ISSUE TESTIMONY
SEVERELY PREJUDICED THE DEFENSE.
C. THE USE OF THE
HYPOTHETICAL WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE
IT DID NOT ASSIST THE JURY AND THE
RISK OF UNDUE PREJUDICE FAR
OUTWEIGHED ANY PROBATIVE VALUE.
D. THE STATE'S EXPERT SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO TESTIFY
THAT DRUG DEALERS CARRY GUNS BECAUSE
IT WAS NOT HELPFUL TO THE JURY AND
INTERFERED WITH THE JURY'S ABILITY
TO SEPARATELY CONSIDER THE DRUG
POSSESSION AND GUN POSSESSION
CHARGES.
E. THE STATE'S EXPERT
IMPROPERLY INTRODUCED IRRELEVANT
AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY
IMPLYING THAT DEFENDANT WAS A MID-
TO UPPER-ECHELON DEALER WHERE THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT
OPINION.
F. CONCLUSION.
POINT III
IT WAS PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT TO
FALSELY CLAIM THAT THE EXPERT HAD
OPINED THAT DEFENDANT'S MONEY WAS
2
State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65 (1989).
5
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FROM THE SALE OF DRUGS. (Partially
Raised Below).
POINT IV
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY
THE COURT'S MANAGEMENT OF VOIR DIRE,
WHICH MAY HAVE HAD A CHILLING EFFECT
ON THE JURORS' WILLINGNESS TO SPEAK
FREELY. N.J. CONST. ART. 1, PARAS.
9, 10.
POINT V
THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS
DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT VI
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE
AND MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE
COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT ANY
YARBOUGH[3] ANALYSIS, FAILED TO
ADDRESS MITIGATING FACTORS, ENGAGED
IN IMPERMISSIBLE DOUBLE COUNTING,
AND IMPOSED THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE ON
ALL COUNTS.
A. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY
IMPOSED A CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE ON
COUNT EIGHT.
B. THE COURT FAILED TO
ADDRESS ANY MITIGATING FACTORS
REQUESTED BY THE DEFENSE.
C. THE COURT ENGAGED IN
IMPERMISSIBLE DOUBLE COUNTING BY
IMPOSING AN EXTENDED TERM AND THE
MAXIMUM LEGAL SENTENCE.
3
State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986)
6
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D. THE SENTENCE IS
MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.
Defendant raised the following argument in a
supplemental pro se brief:
THE COURT ERRED AND DENIED APPELLANT
A FAIR TRIAL, UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
UNDER ARTICLE I, PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE
NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION, WHEN THE
TRIAL COURT FORCED APPELLANT TO
STAND TRIAL IN RESTRAINTS.
DEFENDANT'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL WAS VIO[]LATED WHEN HE
WAS COMPELLED AT TRIAL TO APPEAR
BEFORE THE JURY WITH HIS FEET
SHACKLED.
We reverse the denial of defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence seized from his person and the convictions that depend
upon that evidence: counts two, three, four, five and seven. We
also reverse defendant's convictions for: possession of a firearm
(count one), possession of hollow nose bullets (count six) and
certain persons weapons possession (count eight) and remand for
the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether the
search warrant obtained for the search of the automobile is free
of the taint from the unlawful strip search. As a result, we need
not address the arguments presented in Points II and VI. The
arguments raised in Points III, IV and V lack sufficient merit to
warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
7
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II.
The facts elicited at the suppression hearing can be
summarized as follows.
Officer Felipe Laboy of the Vineland Police Department
testified he performed a "warrant check" on an irregular basis to
see what new warrants had been issued and did so at the beginning
of his shift on January 4, 2012. He prepared a list of the names
of persons with outstanding warrants, which included defendant.
He did not know the reason for the warrant for defendant.4
While on patrol that evening, Laboy observed defendant5 drive
onto the west side of the Days Inn property and back into a parking
stall. When defendant saw the officers on the property, he pulled
out of the parking stall and drove away. Laboy and his partner
followed defendant to pull him over and place him under arrest for
the warrant. Defendant was not under investigation for any offense
at that time. However, it was Laboy's intention to issue a summons
for trespassing if defendant did not have a room at the Days Inn.
4
On cross-examination at trial, Laboy was presented with the
warrant and confirmed that the warrant was a traffic warrant,
rather than a criminal warrant, issued on May 26, 2010, for $6.50.
5
Laboy testified he knew defendant and was aware he had been
arrested for burglary and possession of marijuana in July 2011.
8
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After placing defendant under arrest, Laboy confirmed there
was an active warrant for him. He did not, however, determine
what the warrant was for.
Laboy proceeded to search defendant. He testified, "It wasn’t
a patdown search; it was an actual search. It was a search
incident to arrest." He recovered "a little over $2,000" from
defendant's pocket. Laboy observed a bulge in defendant's pants.
When defendant stated he did not know what the bulge was, Laboy
felt the bulge in defendant's groin area and manipulated it. He
was questioned about the bulge as follows:
Q. Can you describe what, if anything, you
felt?
A. It felt like a rocklike substance.
Q. Now, prior to arresting Mr. Evans, did
you have any information that he was
carrying drugs on him? In fact, did you
pull him over for drugs that evening?
A. No.
Q. Now, when you felt those rocklike
substances, what if anything did you
believe that was?
A. Crack cocaine.
[(Emphasis added).]
Laboy's testimony reveals little about the size or shape of
the bulge he manipulated and the drugs he recovered:
Q. And can you describe what was recovered
from that area?
9
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A. He had two bags -- two bags which
consisted -- which contained a rocklike
substance. And he had nine baggies which
were tied together in a rubber band. And
each baggie consisted of a wax paper bag
with a powdery substance inside the bag.
Q. So this was a larger item that was there?
A. No. No, they were about maybe this big.
Q. The heroin?
A. Yeah, the heroin is not big at all.
Because the bulge was located between defendant's underwear
and his pants, retrieval of the item was likely to entail exposing
some of defendant's underwear. Laboy understood the search would
then be considered a strip search and that he required permission
from a station house commander. He received that consent from
Sergeant Landi, who had arrived at the scene. Laboy also called
for a K-9 unit before leaving to transport defendant to the police
station.
At the station, Laboy unbuckled defendant's pants and reached
down to his groin area where he recovered two bags containing a
rocklike substance and nine baggies containing a powdery substance
that were tied together. Laboy was asked again about what he
perceived the discovery to be:
Q. And what did you suspect those items to
be once you saw them?
A. Crack cocaine and heroin.
10
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[(Emphasis added).]
Laboy could not recall if he learned the reason for the
outstanding warrant for defendant before or after the strip search.
He was unable to say whether he made any effort to determine
whether the warrant was for an indictable offense or a disorderly
persons offense, let alone the failure to pay a traffic fine. He
testified he did not really care what the warrant was for; his
"main focus" was to retrieve the items from defendant's groin
area.
A summons was issued to defendant for trespassing based upon
his driving onto the Days Inn property. The police department had
an established procedure to follow regarding suspected
trespassers. Laboy testified he followed that procedure; his
report did not corroborate that. Laboy was unable to state with
certainty that there were any "No Trespassing" signs in the front
of the motel. The manager of the motel testified there were none
in front and that she would not have called police if a driver
merely drove onto the property and departed.
Laboy obtained a search warrant for the vehicle. No drugs
were recovered. Instead, a loaded .38 revolver with hollow nose
ammunition was seized from the glove compartment.
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine and
heroin, the motion judge found Laboy had probable cause to conduct
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a traffic stop and arrest defendant on the outstanding warrant.
The judge found credible Laboy's testimony that he "found a bulge
close to the defendant's groin, between his pants and the
underwear, that felt like a rock-like substance," and "immediately
recognized that the rock-like substance, based on his training and
experience of numerous times feeling the same type of material
. . . was crack cocaine." (Emphasis added).
As to the strip search, the court held probable cause existed
due to "the totality of the circumstances that arose during the
lawful search[] incident to arrest." Those circumstances included
Laboy's "knowledge of defendant's prior drug activity" and the
discovery of "a large amount of money" on the defendant. The
judge found the "plain feel" exception to the warrant requirement
was satisfied and therefore, Laboy "was permitted to request a
strip search." Noting the strip search was conducted after
permission was granted by the station commander the trial judge
erroneously concluded the search was "conducted in accordance with
the Attorney General's guidelines."6
6
The trial judge was apparently referring to Section III of the
Guidelines, which governs the procedures to be followed in
conducting a strip search. Section III(A) states a strip search
must be conducted by a "person of same sex . . . in private . . .
under sanitary conditions, and . . . in a professional and
dignified manner, and [when in] custodial confinement, conducted
in accordance with Department of Corrections regulations."
Guidelines, supra, Section III(A). As we discuss, infra, Section
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III.
"The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591;
151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 505 (2001); see also State v. Gonzales, 227
N.J. 77, 104 (2016) (stating "a standard of objective
reasonableness governs the validity of searches and seizures under
both our Federal and State Constitutions"); State v. Watts, 223
N.J. 503, 514-15 (2015); State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 476
(2015); State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 1030, 104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984). We
conduct a fact-sensitive review of each phase of the encounter
between police and suspect, "consider[ing] the circumstances
facing the officers who had to make on-the-spot decisions in a
fluid situation." Watts, supra, 223 N.J. at 514. We uphold those
factual findings of the trial judge that are "supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record," State v. Elders, 192
N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (citation omitted), and are not bound to
accept findings that are "clearly mistaken" based on our
independent review of the record, id. at 244. Issues of law are
reviewed de novo. See Watts, supra, 223 N.J. at 516.
II of the Guidelines establishes prerequisites that must be
satisfied before a strip search is permitted and which were not
satisfied here.
13
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"[A] single encounter may escalate from 'inquiry' to 'stop'
to 'arrest' so that the criteria for each category must be applied
as the situation shades off from one category to the other." State
v. Harris, 384 N.J. Super. 29, 45 (App. Div.) (quoting State v.
Alexander, 191 N.J. Super. 573, 577 (App. Div. 1983), certif.
denied, 96 N.J. 267 (1984)), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 357 (2006).
Thus, an encounter that begins with a valid arrest or investigative
stop may lead to a seizure that will be suppressed because the
officer has unreasonably expanded the permissible scope of an
otherwise valid search. See, e.g., State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16,
28-32 (2010) (concluding the officer unreasonably expanded the
permissible scope of the search when he lifted defendant's shirt
after conducting a proper investigative stop and protective
patdown); Harris, supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 48-49 (finding
officers' initial approach of defendant, request that he spit out
the substance in his mouth, arrest and search incident to arrest
were reasonable, but concluding officers lacked probable cause to
believe there were additional drugs hidden in other body parts to
justify a strip search).
Because the search required to remove the object from
defendant's clothing required "the removal or rearrangement of
clothing for the purpose of visual inspection of the person's
undergarments," it fell within the definition of a strip search,
14
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N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-3, and was subject to the requirements of N.J.S.A.
2A:161A-1. The statute "is prophylactic, designed to protect
citizens from an intrusive and degrading invasion of privacy."
Hayes, supra, 327 N.J. Super. at 384. We have observed that this
statute "was adopted to provide greater protection than is afforded
by the Fourth Amendment," noting that "a statute providing rights
coextensive with constitutional protections would be superfluous."
Id. at 381; see also Harris, supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 49.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1,
[a] person who has been detained or arrested
for commission of an offense other than a
crime shall not be subjected to a strip search
unless:
a. The search is authorized by a warrant or
consent;
b. The search is based on probable cause that
a weapon, controlled dangerous
substance . . . or evidence of a crime will
be found and a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement exists; or
c. The person is lawfully confined in a
municipal detention facility or an adult
county correctional facility and the search
is based on a reasonable suspicion that a
weapon, controlled dangerous substance . . .
or contraband, as defined by the Department
of Corrections, will be found, and the search
is authorized pursuant to regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections.
[(Emphasis added).]
15
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Therefore, the statutory criteria that had to be met for a
strip search under the circumstances here were: probable cause and
the application of a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1(b). It is undisputed that Officer
Laboy had probable cause to believe defendant was concealing
contraband upon touching the bulge in defendant's groin area. We
therefore proceed to analyze whether a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement applied and whether it was objectively
reasonable to conduct a strip search under the circumstances here.
A.
The search in this case was one incident to arrest, which may
not be relied upon as the recognized exception to the warrant
requirement to satisfy the second criteria of subsection 2A:161A-
1(b). Hayes, supra, 327 N.J. Super. at 378. In Hayes, we reasoned,
"the strip search statute's protections are triggered by an arrest.
An arrest alone, therefore, cannot be both the event invoking the
protections as well as the event nullifying them." Ibid. We also
rejected the State's contention that the lack of sufficient time
to obtain a warrant "and the likelihood that the defendant would
continue to conceal or otherwise dispose of the evidence creates
an exigency justifying a warrantless search under [N.J.S.A.
2A:161A-1(b)]." Ibid. We noted that if this contention were
accepted, "it would effectively nullify the statutory protection
16
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afforded to persons detained or arrested for non-criminal
offenses." Ibid.
The State argues that the "plain feel" exception to the
warrant requirement applied here, constituting a "recognized
exception to the warrant requirement." Defendant contends the
plain feel exception "is not properly understood as an exception
to the warrant requirement" and therefore cannot be a foundation
for the "substantial additional intrusion" of a strip search. He
argues further that even if accepted as an exception to the warrant
requirement, the application of a plain feel exception in strip
search cases would nullify the protections of the strip search
statute because "any time an officer felt what he suspected to be
drugs during a pat down, he would automatically be justified in
conducting a strip search."
Contrary to defendant's assertion, one year after the Supreme
Court decided Dickerson, this court adopted the plain touch
exception to the warrant requirement, holding:
If a police officer lawfully pats down a
suspect's outer clothing and feels an object
whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no
invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that
already authorized by the officer's search for
weapons; if the object is contraband, its
warrantless seizure would be justified by the
same practical considerations that inhere in
the plain view context.
17
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[Jackson, supra, 276 N.J. Super. at 630-31
(quoting Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at 375-
76, 113 S. Ct. at 2137, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 346
(1993)).]
We explained that the plain feel exception is "a corollary
to the plain view doctrine,"7 and thus the same public policy
concerns undergirding the plain view exception applied. See id.
at 628, 630-31; see also State v. Toth, 321 N.J. Super. 609, 615
(App. Div. 1999) (stating "[t]here is no reason in law, logic, or
policy that would justify a different analysis when analyzing
plain feel matters"), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 531 (2000); State
v. Cargill, 312 N.J. Super. 13, 17 (App. Div.) (finding "plain
touch" exception to warrant requirement applied), certif. denied,
156 N.J. 408 (1998).
To be sure, the application of the plain feel exception as a
gateway to strip searches conjures concerns regarding the
nullification of the very protections N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1 was
7
In Gonzales, supra, 227 N.J. at 90, 95-97, our Supreme Court
reviewed the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under
Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, discarded
the prior requirement that evidence be discovered inadvertently
to conform to federal jurisprudence, id. at 99-100, and identified
the following criteria for its application: "the officer must
lawfully be in the area where he observed and seized the
incriminating item or contraband, and it must be immediately
apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime." Id. at 101
(emphasis added).
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designed to afford.8 It bears noting that "the reasonableness of
a search is determined 'by assessing, on the one hand, the degree
to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.'" Knights, supra, 534 U.S. at
118-119, 122 S. Ct. at 591; 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505 (quoting Wyoming
v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300, 143 L. Ed.
2d 408, 414 (1999)).
We are guided by the Supreme Court's application of the plain
feel doctrine in Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at 366, 113 S. Ct. at
2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 334, a case that did not entail the
significant intrusion of a strip search but only the admissibility
of contraband detected during a patdown search conducted pursuant
to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968). No weapons were recovered but, the Court noted, "the
8
In Hayes, supra, 327 N.J. Super. at 378, our concern regarding
the nullification of the strip search statute's protections
extended to our consideration of section 1(c) of the statute. We
concluded, "an investigative detention to permit the police to
search for outstanding arrest warrants, regardless of the time it
takes, does not render a suspect 'lawfully confined' within the
meaning of section 1c of the statute." Id. at 383; see also Anne
Bowen Poulin, The Plain Feel Doctrine and the Evolution of the
Fourth Amendment, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 741, 742 (1997) ("Whether the
'plain feel' exception under Dickerson encourages more invasive
but unfruitful searches is an elusive and troublesome question.").
19
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officer conducting the search did take an interest in a small lump
in respondent's nylon jacket." Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at 369,
113 S. Ct. at 2133, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 341. The officer testified
that after feeling the "small lump," he "examined it with [his]
fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in
cellophane." Ibid.
The Court reaffirmed the principle that officers conducting
a protective patdown search for weapons may seize contraband
detected during that search "so long as the officers' search stays
within the bounds marked by Terry." Id. at 373, 113 S. Ct. at
2136, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 344. However, the Court also emphasized
that, for the plain feel exception to apply, the incriminating
character of the object must be "immediately apparent." Ibid.
If a police officer lawfully pats down a
suspect's outer clothing and feels an object
whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no
invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that
already authorized by the officer's search for
weapons; if the object is contraband, its
warrantless seizure would be justified by the
same practical considerations that inhere in
the plain-view context.
[Id. at 375-76, 113 S. Ct. at 2137, 124 L. Ed.
2d at 346 (emphasis added).]
Applying these principles, the Court concluded the seizure
of the cocaine from the respondent's pocket could not be justified
under the plain feel doctrine:
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[T]he officer's continued exploration of
respondent's pocket after having concluded
that it contained no weapon was unrelated to
"the sole justification of the search [under
Terry:] . . . the protection of the police
officer and others nearby." It therefore
amounted to the sort of evidentiary search
that Terry expressly refused to authorize, and
that we have condemned in subsequent cases.
[Id. at 378, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39, 124 L. Ed.
2d at 347-48 (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).]
Similarly, we find the record here does not support an
application of the plain feel doctrine.9
A threshold requirement for the application of the plain feel
exception is that the character of the contraband be "immediately
apparent." See id. at 375, 113 S. Ct. at 2137, 124 L. Ed. 2d at
345. Although the trial judge made this finding, that conclusion
is not supported by the record. Laboy never testified it was
"immediately apparent" to him that the bulge concealed drugs.
Laboy stated he felt the bulge in defendant's groin area and
manipulated it. He said the bulge "felt like a rocklike substance"
and that when he felt the rocklike substance, he "believe[d]" it
was "[c]rack cocaine." When he viewed the substances retrieved,
he "suspect[ed]" them to be "[c]rack cocaine and heroin."
9
Therefore, we need not address the issue raised by defendant -
that the plain feel exception should not be available to justify
a strip search under N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1.
21
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We recognize that the line between "immediately apparent" and
"probable cause" is easily blurred. Given the significant
intrusion of a strip search, the authority provided by N.J.S.A.
2A:161A-1 should not turn on whether the officer utters the correct
talismanic words. Rather than making a conclusory statement, the
officer should articulate specific facts that support his
assertion that the nature of the contraband was immediately
apparent.
By way of example, both our court and the Supreme Court found
the plain feel doctrine applicable when the officer conducting a
lawful search "feels an object whose contour or mass makes its
identity immediately apparent." Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at
375, 113 S. Ct. at 2137, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 345; Jackson, supra, 276
N.J. Super. at 630-31. The size and shape of the contraband can
be independently assessed by the court's inspection of the physical
evidence and give credence to or cast doubt upon the officer's
assertion that its identity was "immediately apparent" with a mere
touch. See Poulin, supra, at 787-88. The officer's knowledge
that the arrestee has concealed drugs on his person in the past
may also contribute to the officer's immediate realization that
the bulge he touched was drugs. See Harris, supra, 384 N.J. Super.
at 48-49; Hayes, supra, 327 N.J. Super. at 378.
22
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The record here fails to provide details to support a finding
that the character of the bulge was immediately apparent. Although
the location of the bulge here was a fact that gave cause for
suspicion, see Harris, supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 47-48, there was
no known history that defendant had concealed drugs on his person.
Defendant was not under investigation for any drug activity and
the only testimony regarding drugs was that defendant had possessed
marijuana in the past. The record also fails to establish that
the size of the bulge was remarkable in any way. Indeed, Laboy
testified that the heroin "was not that big."
More important, the manipulation of the bulge cannot be
divorced from the tactile information that formed the basis for
Laboy's belief that the bulge was drugs. In Dickerson, supra, 508
U.S. at 378, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 347-48, the
Supreme Court rejected the application of the plain feel exception
because the officer exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop
when he manipulated the bulge after concluding it was not a weapon.
Here, too, the perception that the bulge concealed drugs was made
after the bulge was manipulated, not upon a mere touch in which
the nature of the concealed object was immediately apparent. The
threshold requirement of the plain feel exception to the warrant
exception was not met.
23
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We therefore conclude that the plain feel doctrine does not
apply here to satisfy the statutory criteria for a strip search,
N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1(b), and that to do so under the circumstances
here would place the protections afforded by that statute in
jeopardy. See Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at 378, 113 S. Ct. at
2138, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 347 (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
748, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1547; 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 518 (1983) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (noting the danger that an officer executing a
valid search "will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by
a warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant
to rummage and seize at will"); Hayes, supra, 327 N.J. Super. at
378.
B.
Based upon our review of the record, we also conclude the
drugs seized from defendant's person must be suppressed because
the police conduct was not objectively reasonable.
A factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of
the search is the basis for the arrest "in light of 'the facts
known to the law enforcement officer at the time of the search.'"
State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 47 (2011) (quoting Bruzzese, supra,
94 N.J. at 221). Laboy testified that, at the time of defendant's
arrest, defendant was not under investigation for any crime and
24
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he was not stopped with the expectation that he had drugs in his
possession.
Although the basis for the warrant was unknown, the fact it
was for a failure to pay a $6.50 fine was knowable. Laboy testified
he remained at the scene with defendant for ten to fifteen minutes
before transporting him to the police station. While at the scene,
he confirmed that the warrant remained active, called for a K-9
unit and for his station commander, who arrived at the scene and
gave his authorization for a strip search before Laboy left with
defendant. No reason was offered as to why the basis for the
active warrant was not determined then or at any time before the
strip search.
When officers have probable cause to believe that evidence
exists and will only be recovered through a strip search, the
mechanics for effecting the strip search will entail transporting
the suspect to a secure location where the search may be conducted
in compliance with Section III of the Attorney General Guidelines.
This procedure will necessarily require additional time to
complete and the suspect will be under police observation
throughout. As a result, it would appear that, barring exceptional
circumstances, the arrestee will have scant opportunity to destroy
or discard evidence undetected by police.
25
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We also find it significant to our assessment that the
officers failed to comply with the Attorney General's Guidelines
for strip searches. As the chief law enforcement officer of this
State, the Attorney General is authorized to provide for "uniform
and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the
administration of criminal justice throughout the State," N.J.S.A.
52:17B-98, and explicitly authorized to issue guidelines
applicable to the strip search conducted here. N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-
8b. The Attorney General Guidelines govern the performance of
strip and body cavity searches for both the non-indictable offenses
covered by N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1 and for crimes. The Guidelines are
"binding and enforceable on local law enforcement agencies."
O'Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 383 (App. Div.
2009) (citing In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 442-43 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85 (2001)).
The Attorney General Guidelines do not dictate the
disposition of the issue at hand but they merit our consideration
in determining whether the police conduct here was objectively
reasonable. See State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446, 457-58 (2002)
(criticizing officers' failure to follow established police
procedure for determining whether defendant was lawfully on the
premises and concluding police lacked probable cause to arrest for
defiant trespass).
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The Guidelines establish more exacting requirements for a
strip search than those established by N.J.S.A. 2A:161-1A. When,
as here, the person is detained or arrested without custodial
confinement,10 and there are no exigent circumstances,11 the
requirements for a strip search are:
(1) Search warrant or consent, and
(2) Authorized by officer in charge of the
station house.
[Guidelines, supra, Section II(A)(1)(a).]
Therefore, while N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1(b) would permit a strip
search upon a finding of probable cause and a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement, the Attorney General Guidelines
10
Custodial confinement pertains to N.J.S.A. 2A:161-1A(c). The
State does not contend that this subsection applies here and it
is evident that subsection (c) does not apply. See Hayes, supra,
327 N.J. Super. at 383.
11
When there are exigent circumstances, the Guidelines permit
the strip search of an arrestee if the following exist:
(1) Probable cause to believe that the person
is concealing a weapon, contraband or
evidence of crime, and
(2) Exigent circumstances prevent obtaining
a search warrant or approval of officer
in charge.
[Guidelines, supra, Section II(A)(1)(b).]
The State does not contend that the failure to obtain a warrant
for the strip search was excused by exigent circumstances.
27
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completely eliminate subsection (b) as a basis for permitting a
strip search in the absence of exigent circumstances. Stated
simply, the officers here had to obtain a warrant for the strip
search in order to comply with the Attorney General's Guidelines.
We also note that the justification for plain feel as an
exception to the warrant requirement is based in part on "the
realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such
circumstances would often be impracticable and would do little to
promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment." Dickerson, supra,
508 U.S. at 375, 113 S. Ct. at 2137, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 345-46. We
find that justification absent here. There were no exigent
circumstances. There was sufficient time to obtain a K-9 reaction
to the vehicle defendant was driving. The defendant was detained
at the arrest scene for ten to fifteen minutes and then had to be
transported to the police station before any strip search could
be conducted. Although the record is unclear as to when the search
warrant for the vehicle was obtained, the officers did obtain a
search warrant for the automobile. Therefore, the facts do not
suggest it was impracticable to resort to a neutral magistrate.
And, comparing the levels of intrusion occasioned by an automobile
search and a strip search, reason fails to reconcile how the
objectives of the Fourth Amendment are served by permitting a
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warrantless strip search when a warrant to search an automobile
was obtainable and obtained.
In sum, the record fails to establish that the plain feel
exception to the warrant requirement justifies the warrantless
strip search here. Further, our assessment of the totality of the
circumstances leads us to conclude the search was not objectively
reasonable. Therefore, the drugs seized from defendant's person
must be suppressed and the convictions based upon that seizure,
counts two, three, four, five and seven, are reversed.
IV.
As a result, defendant's remaining convictions arise from the
seizure of a handgun and hollow nose bullets from the automobile,
counts one, six and eight. Our review of the record leads us to
conclude these convictions may not be left undisturbed.
A.
The handgun and bullets were seized from the automobile
following a search authorized by a search warrant. Defendant
argues this evidence must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous
tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.
Ct. 407, 417 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 (1963). The State counters
defendant's argument by submitting the seizure from the automobile
was made pursuant to a valid search warrant and should not be
suppressed.
29
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"The exclusionary rule generally bars the State from
introducing into evidence the 'fruits' of an unconstitutional
search or seizure." State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 412-13 (2012)
(citing Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 485, 83 S. Ct. at 416, 9 L.
Ed. 2d at 454). In determining whether the evidence seized from
the automobile must be suppressed, the issue is whether that
seizure "was a product of the 'exploitation of [the primary]
illegality'" — the unlawful strip search — "or of 'means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint' . . . ." Id. at 413 (alteration in original) (quoting Wong
Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d at
455).
We recognize that a search warrant is presumed to be valid
and that our "role is not to determine anew whether there was
probable cause for issuance of the warrant, but rather, whether
there is evidence to support the finding made by the warrant-
issuing judge." State v. Chippero, 201 N.J. 14, 20-21 (2009).
The record here does not permit us to perform that function.
The affidavit in support of the search warrant is not included in
the record and it is unclear when the warrant was sought,
specifically – whether it was before or after the strip search.
The minimal evidence regarding the K-9 sniff procedure is
unilluminating:
30
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Q [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, Officer, at some
point K-9 was called to the scene; is that
correct?
A [LABOY]: That's correct.
Q: Were you present at the scene when K-9 was
called? Who – . . .
A: Yeah, I called them. I was at the scene
when I called them.
Q: Okay. And was – did K-9 arrive at the
scene when you were there? . . .
A: From what I can – from what I can remember,
no. [H]e was already taken to the station.
Sergeant Landi arrived on scene. I explained
to Sergeant Landi the situation. He gave
consent to strip search [defendant]. I took
[defendant] back to the station. Sergeant
Landi briefed the K-9 officers on what we were
doing.
Q. So in short, [defendant] was not at the
scene when the K-9 came in?
A. That's correct. . . .
Q. And because of that, you procured a search
warrant; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And no drugs were found from the -- from
the car, though; right?
A. Not that I recall; no.
Q. Okay. But it was a positive hit for drugs
that the K-9 g[ot]; right?
A. That is correct.
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On this record, we cannot discern to what degree the affidavit
relied upon the illegal strip search.
We therefore remand this issue to the trial court to determine
whether the seizure from the automobile "was a product of the
'exploitation of [the primary] illegality'" — the unlawful strip
search — "or of 'means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.'" Shaw, supra, 213 N.J. at 413 (quoting
Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d
at 455).
B.
The trial was suffused with evidence that related only to the
possession of drugs we have now suppressed. That evidence included
the prejudicial use of a hypothetical to the State's expert in
"general narcotics trafficking, packaging, values, distribution
and law enforcement interdiction of narcotics," opinion testimony
that is now prohibited pursuant to State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410,
429 (2016). The net effect is that a trial that may have been
properly conducted to determine defendant's guilt on the weapons
offenses, depending on the validity of the search warrant, was
weighted down to a substantial degree by evidence that had the
capacity to prejudice defendant. Based upon the facts and
circumstances of this case, we conclude that defendant is entitled
32
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to a new trial on counts one, six and eight and therefore reverse
his convictions on those counts.
V.
Finally, we address the argument raised in defendant's pro
se supplemental brief that he was denied a fair trial because his
feet were shackled and chained to the floor by his ankles on the
second day of trial. The court, defense counsel and defendant
engaged in the following colloquy:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -- see that he is chained.
His foot is chained. I'm -- I want to make
sure to put that on the record. We didn't do
that last time.
[DEFENDANT]: You have murderers in here that
don't even be fucking chained.
[SHERIFF'S OFFICER]: Judge, we have that on
once the jury is picked. We always do that.
Every single trial, we've done that, sir.
[THE COURT]: The -- you're talking about
security. I do not interfere on what's
actually necessary with the Sheriff's rules
about security. That's not something that I
can do with ease.
So the issue is that in -- so that the
record is reasonably clear, the practice is
with an incarcerated Defendant, the Sheriff
has a shackle on the ankle to, I guess, hook
in the floor that is not visible to the jury.
. . .
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I guess that's one
of my objections that, you know, he's
obviously tethered. The jury, they're going
to be able to see that he has a chain.
33
A-0489-14T1
[THE COURT]: I've tried any number of cases.
They're not able to see it. What we do is,
so that we don't have a problem, is when the
-- as the jury's walking in, I tell them
everybody remain seated, and you lawyers don't
get up like you usually do for the jury. . . .
And then when the jury leaves, I always say,
everyone remain seated while the jury leaves
the room. Don't you lawyers get up because
that way, [defendant] doesn't have to get up
or look as if he's being disrespectful.
A trial court "may not require a defendant to appear before
the jury in restraints absent compelling reasons." State v.
Artwell, 177 N.J. 526, 534 (2003). Despite this "sharply limited"
discretion, State v. Damon, 286 N.J. Super. 492, 499 (App. Div.
1996) (quoting State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. 159, 164 (App.
Div. 1965)), a court may exercise its discretion to order
restraints "when a defendant exhibits violent conduct at the time
of trial or threatens escape" or under "other circumstances," such
as when "defendant's character, reputation, or criminal record may
indicate a need for physical restraints." State v. Mance, 300
N.J. Super. 37, 50-51 (App. Div. 1997).
The record fails to show any independent finding by the trial
judge that defendant's conduct in the courtroom or other
circumstances suggested a need for physical restraints. The fact
that it is the sheriff's practice to shackle incarcerated
defendants during trial is wholly insufficient as a substitute for
such a finding. In light of our decision, reversing defendant's
34
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convictions, we need not determine whether defendant was
prejudiced by this error.
Reversed and remanded for additional proceedings as set forth
in this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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