North Jersey Media Group Inc., D/B/A Community News Vs. , 447 N.J. Super. 182 ( 2016 )


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  •                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2393-13T3
    NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP INC.,
    d/b/a COMMUNITY NEWS,                 APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                 August 31, 2016
    v.                                      APPELLATE DIVISION
    BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S
    OFFICE and FRANK PUCCIO, in
    his capacity as Custodian of
    Records for the BERGEN COUNTY
    PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Argued November 17, 2015 – Decided August 31, 2016
    Before Judges Fisher, Espinosa and Rothstadt.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-
    6741-13.
    Jennifer A. Borg, General Counsel, argued the
    cause for appellant (North Jersey Media Group,
    Inc., attorneys; Ms. Borg, of counsel and on
    the briefs; Robert D. Thompson and Bobby D.
    Conner, on the briefs).
    John M. Carbone argued the cause for
    respondents (Carbone and Faasse, attorneys;
    Mr. Carbone, of counsel and on the brief;
    Frank T. Puccio, on the brief).
    Thomas J. Cafferty argued the cause for amici
    curiae The Reporters Committee for Freedom of
    the Press and 25 Media Organizations (Gibbons
    PC, and Bruce D. Brown of the Massachusetts
    and District of Columbia bars, admitted pro
    hac vice, attorneys; Mr. Cafferty, of counsel
    and on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    ESPINOSA, J.A.D.
    This    matter   concerns   a   news   organization's   request   for
    records from a prosecutor's office regarding a person who was not
    charged with any crime pursuant to the Open Public Records Act
    (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, and the common law right of
    access.     The prosecutor's office declined to confirm or deny the
    existence of responsive records.
    In this matter of first impression, we must determine whether
    the prosecutor's response was permissible under OPRA and the common
    law or a violation thereof.       For the reasons set forth below, we
    hold that an agency may "neither confirm nor deny" the existence
    of records in response to an OPRA request when the agency (1)
    relies upon an exemption authorized by OPRA that would itself
    preclude the agency from acknowledging the existence of such
    documents and (2) presents a sufficient basis for the court to
    determine that the claimed exemption applies.          In this case, we
    conclude that records relating to a person who has not been
    arrested or charged with an offense are entitled to confidentiality
    based   upon   long-established      judicial   precedent.    Therefore,
    pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b), an exemption exists under OPRA
    2
    A-2393-13T3
    that precludes a custodian of records from disclosing whether such
    records exist in response to an OPRA request.      We further conclude
    that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) made a sufficient
    showing to avail itself of this exemption and that access is also
    properly denied under the common law right of access.
    I.
    Plaintiff, North Jersey Media Group, Inc., d/b/a Community
    News (NJMG), appeals from an order that dismissed its complaint
    against defendants, BCPO and its custodian of records, Frank
    Puccio, alleging a violation of OPRA and the common law right of
    access.   One of NJMG's reporters1 made an OPRA request to the BCPO
    "[i]n   furtherance   of   the   newsgathering   process"   for   records
    concerning a person who had not been charged with any crime, whom
    we shall refer to as A.B.C.      The following records were requested:
    1.   All law enforcement reports filed against
    or involving [A.B.C.] from January 1, 2003 to
    present.
    2.   All complaints and/or reports (verbal or
    written) made to law enforcement officials
    concerning [A.B.C.] from January 1, 2003 to
    present, including, but not limited to, his
    work   at   [three   designated   places   of
    employment.]
    3.   Recordings and/or transcripts of 911
    calls and/or non-emergency calls made between
    1
    According to its complaint, NJMG publishes two daily newspapers,
    two websites and nearly forty weekly newspapers, including
    Community News.
    3
    A-2393-13T3
    January 1,   2003   and   present   related   to
    [A.B.C.]
    4.   Written communications (e.g. emails and
    letters) to, from and/or between:
    a.   BCPO and [A.B.C.]
    b.   BCPO and [A.B.C.'s] attorney
    c.   [A.B.C.'s employer]/Any
    representatives or
    affiliates . . . .
    BCPO responded to this request by letter that stated in part:
    You have requested records related to
    someone who has neither been arrested nor
    charged with committing an offense.         In
    essence, this amounts to inquiring whether a
    person who has neither been arrested nor
    charged with committing an offense is, or has
    been, the subject of an investigation.     The
    [BCPO] will neither confirm nor deny whether
    an individual who has neither been charged nor
    arrested is, or has been, the subject of an
    investigation.     Law enforcement agencies
    routinely   receive   allegations   that   are
    determined to be unprovable, unfounded or
    untrue.    Identifying the target of such
    allegations could unfairly subject that
    individual to irreparable harm and subject
    this office and its employees to civil
    liability and professional discipline. It is
    for this reason, among others, that grand jury
    proceedings are conducted in secret.      More
    instructively, even when a crime has been
    committed, [OPRA] does not require a law
    enforcement agency to name suspects. When no
    arrest has been made, OPRA only requires a law
    enforcement agency to disclose "the type of
    crime, time, location and type of weapon, if
    any."   N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3b.   By not including
    the names of suspects in the list of items to
    be disclosed, the Legislature wisely chose to
    protect suspects who may be exonerated without
    being charged from the public scorn and stigma
    4
    A-2393-13T3
    that can arise from being the target of a
    criminal investigation.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    BCPO defended its refusal to confirm or deny the existence
    of such records:
    To suggest that a law enforcement agency must
    confirm or deny that someone is or has been
    has been [sic] the subject of an investigation
    even when no crime may have occurred by
    stating   that   records    related  to   that
    individual are exempt from disclosure because
    they are criminal investigatory records is to
    create   precisely   the   problem  that   the
    Legislature sought to avoid in enacting
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3b. Nothing in OPRA suggests
    such an unjust result and fundamental fairness
    prohibits it.
    BCPO also wrote to the Government Records Council (GRC),
    seeking "both an advisory opinion and review/appeal" that would
    affirm the denial of access to the records sought, grant access
    to the records, or find "a clear and specific exemption from
    release of the records sought."       In support of its denial of
    access,   BCPO   reviewed   authorities   for   the   proposition   that
    information received by law enforcement authorities concerning
    possible criminal activities should be treated as confidential and
    privileged against disclosure and cited both the New Jersey Rules
    of Professional Conduct for Attorneys and the right to privacy
    guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution.
    5
    A-2393-13T3
    Following BCPO's request for review by the GRC, NJMG filed
    an order to show cause and verified complaint, asserting its
    statutory prerogative to have the denial of access adjudicated by
    the Superior Court, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, and seeking declaratory
    judgment that BCPO violated OPRA and the common law right of
    access.   The complaint also asked the court to require BCPO to
    submit a Vaughn index, in which the custodian of records identifies
    responsive documents and the exemptions it claims warrant non-
    disclosure.   Vaughn v. Rosen, 
    484 F.2d 820
    , 826-27 (D.C. Cir.
    1973), cert. denied, 
    415 U.S. 977
    , 
    94 S. Ct. 1564
    , 
    39 L. Ed. 2d 873
    (1974); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
    758 F.3d 436
    , 438 (2d Cir. 2014); Minier v. CIA, 
    88 F.3d 79
    , 803-04
    (9th Cir. 1996).
    The Bergen County Prosecutor, John L. Molinelli, submitted a
    certification that stated, in part:
    2.   I invoke and utilize all available
    privileges and exemptions to bar the release
    of the documents requested herein, including,
    but not limited to, criminal investigatory
    records,   confidential,   privacy   and   as
    otherwise permitted under the laws of the
    State of New Jersey.
    . . . .
    4.   In   this   instance  and   in   others
    previously, unless an arrest has been made,
    charges are filed or a grand jury indictment
    is returned, I, as the Bergen County
    Prosecutor, will not respond to an inquiry
    about the receipt or possession of documents
    6
    A-2393-13T3
    or the existence or non-existence         of   a
    criminal investigation.
    5.   I believe this position is necessary and
    proper due to the constraints placed upon me
    by   the  Rules   of  Professional   Conduct;
    particularly RPC 3.6 and 3.8.
    6.   Many times, when allegations contained in
    a letter or other communication are received
    by this office and are investigated, the
    allegations are found to be untrue or its
    [sic] determined that the allegations cannot
    be proven or the actions of the person
    implicated do not rise to a level of criminal
    conduct.
    7.   Disclosing, confirming or identifying
    the subject or content of such allegations as
    communicated would unfairly subject that
    person to irreparable harm and possibly raise
    against the [BCPO] a tort action by the person
    so identified for false light claims and civil
    liability.
    8.   When a reporter seeks such confirmation
    as a result of a tip, communication from the
    individual making the allegations, or an
    undisclosed, "off the record," not for
    attribution or deep throat source, it should
    not be the Prosecutor giving veracity,
    notoriety, approbation or confirming the issue
    for the press.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    BCPO later submitted, ex parte, documents described by the
    trial judge as "a sealed envelope containing a certification of
    [the custodian of records], including a two page Vaughn Index and
    a second sealed envelope containing copies of what defendants
    assert to be the criminal investigatory records."   The trial judge
    7
    A-2393-13T3
    declined to examine the documents or Vaughn index because they
    were submitted under seal.2
    The trial judge denied the relief sought and dismissed NJMG's
    complaint.       In his written opinion, the judge rejected BCPO's
    contention       that   the   criminal     investigatory       record    exemption
    applied "because the record is void of any evidence of a pending
    investigation."         Addressing BCPO's argument that disclosure would
    violate     individual      privacy    rights,     the   judge   considered      and
    weighed the factors relevant to a determination whether the need
    for disclosure outweighs individual privacy concerns.                   See Burnett
    v. Cnty. of Bergen, 
    198 N.J. 408
    , 427 (2009); Doe v. Poritz, 
    142 N.J. 1
    ,   88    (1995).      He     concluded,    "records     related    to   the
    investigation of an individual that has not been arrested [or]
    charged with a crime generally must not be disclosed as privacy
    concerns outweigh the public's need for the information."                  Turning
    to NJMG's claim that disclosure was required based upon the common
    law right of access, the judge considered and weighed the factors
    identified in 
    Loigman, supra
    , 102 N.J. at 113, and concluded access
    to such records was not warranted under the common law right of
    2
    The stated reason for the judge's decision not to review the
    Vaughn index submitted under seal was that he was not provided
    with any authority that permitted an in camera submission of the
    index. The Supreme Court has recognized that, in rare cases, an
    in camera submission is appropriate. Loigman v. Kimmelman, 
    102 N.J. 98
    , 111 (1986).
    8
    A-2393-13T3
    access because "disclosure of the requested information [would be]
    an unreasonable invasion of individual privacy."
    NJMG raises a number of arguments in its appeal.          First, NJMG
    challenges the trial court's interpretation of OPRA, contending
    the court created a new exemption for the denial of access to
    public records that is: not articulated in OPRA, inconsistent with
    its plain language; renders statutory provisions, i.e., N.J.S.A.
    47:1A-3(b)    and   N.J.S.A.   47:1A-8,    meaningless;    and    shifts   the
    burden of proof from the public agency to the requestor of public
    records.     NJMG argues further that, because defendants failed to
    certify facts to support their contention that requested records
    related to a person who had not been charged with a crime, the
    trial court relied upon an insufficient record and defendants
    failed to satisfy their burden of proof, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.                 NJMG
    also contends the trial court erred in misapplying the factors
    identified in Burnett and Loigman and in failing to require a
    Vaughn index or conduct an in camera review.           Finally, NJMG argues
    the trial court erred in holding that its OPRA request implicates
    personal privacy rights protected by the New Jersey Constitution
    because this argument was not properly raised in the trial court.
    BCPO   argues   the   trial    court   relied   upon   existing    statutory
    exemptions, did not create a new exemption under OPRA, and properly
    weighed relevant facts and authorities.
    9
    A-2393-13T3
    We granted amicus curiae status to The Reporters Committee
    for Freedom of the Press and twenty-five media organizations.3                In
    addition to joining NJMG's arguments, amici argue the response to
    neither confirm nor deny the existence of responsive documents,
    which has been permitted in response to requests for records under
    the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552, has been
    overused and abused and should not be permitted in response to an
    OPRA request.
    In light of our conclusion that the refusal to confirm or
    deny the existence of records relating to a person who has not
    been    charged   with   an   offense    falls    within   an   exemption    to
    disclosure authorized by OPRA, we need not reach NJMG's remaining
    arguments.
    II.
    The trial judge's determination that plaintiff's OPRA request
    was    properly   denied   and   the    legal    conclusion     regarding   the
    appropriate exemption are both legal issues subject to de novo
    3
    Advance Publications, Inc., American Society of News Editors,
    The Asbury Park Press, The Associated Press, Association of
    Alternative Newsmedia, The Center for Investigative Reporting,
    Courier News, Courier Post, The Daily Journal, Daily Record, Dow
    Jones & Company, Inc., Home News Tribune, Investigative Reporters
    and Editors, Investigative Reporting Workshop at American
    University, National Newspaper Association, The National Press
    Club, National Press Photographers Association, New Jersey Press
    Association, The New York Times Company, News Corp, The Newspaper
    Guild – CWA, NYP Holdings, Inc., Online News Association, Time
    Inc., and Tully Center for Free Speech.
    10
    A-2393-13T3
    review.    N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 
    441 N.J. Super. 70
    , 89-90 (App. Div. 2015); K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd.
    of Educ., 
    423 N.J. Super. 337
    , 349 (App. Div. 2011), certif.
    denied, 
    210 N.J. 108
    (2012).            Our review of the determination
    regarding the common law right of access is de novo as well.
    Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 
    421 N.J. Super. 489
    , 497 (App. Div. 2011).           We note further, "appeals
    are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions, oral
    decisions, informal written decisions, or reasons given for the
    ultimate conclusion."         Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 
    168 N.J. 191
    , 199 (2001).      Thus, although we reach the same conclusion as
    the trial court, we do so for different reasons.
    A.
    The Legislature's stated purpose in enacting OPRA was to make
    government     records   "readily      accessible"    to     the   public     "with
    certain exceptions, for the protection of the public interest."
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.      OPRA directs that "all government records shall
    be   subject    to   public   access    unless   exempt,"       and    that   "any
    limitations on the right of access . . . shall be construed in
    favor of the public's right of access."              
    Ibid. The goal of
    such
    ready access is to promote good government.                "With broad public
    access    to   information    about    how   state   and     local    governments
    operate, citizens and the media can play a watchful role in curbing
    11
    A-2393-13T3
    wasteful government spending and guarding against corruption and
    misconduct."   
    Burnett, supra
    , 198 N.J. at 414.    The public's right
    to disclosure is not, however, absolute.         Kovalcik v. Somerset
    Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, 
    206 N.J. 581
    , 588 (2011); Educ. Law
    Ctr. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 
    198 N.J. 274
    , 284 (2009).
    OPRA provides that, upon receipt of a written request for
    access, the custodian "shall grant access to a government record
    or deny a request for access to a government record."          N.J.S.A.
    47:1A-5(i).    N.J.S.A.   47:1A-5(g)   sets    forth   the   custodian's
    obligations upon receipt of an OPRA request.       The custodian must
    "promptly comply with a request" and, if "unable to comply . . .
    shall indicate the specific basis therefor on the request form and
    promptly return it to the requestor."         Ibid.; see also Gannett
    N.J. Partners, LP v. Cnty. of Middlesex, 
    379 N.J. Super. 205
    , 215
    (App. Div. 2005).   A public agency that denies access bears "the
    burden of proving that the denial of access is authorized by law."
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.   The custodian may not rely upon "conclusory and
    generalized allegations of exemptions," but must provide specific
    reasons for withholding documents.     Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
    N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 
    423 N.J. Super. 140
    , 162 (App.
    Div. 2011) (quoting 
    Loigman, supra
    , 102 N.J. at 110).
    12
    A-2393-13T3
    B.
    From   the   outset,      BCPO     declined      to    confirm   or    deny    the
    existence of responsive records and set forth its rationale for
    maintaining the confidentiality of information relating to "an
    individual who has neither been charged nor arrested . . . or has
    been[] the subject of an investigation."                   NJMG has characterized
    this as a "novel basis for denial."                   However, BCPO's response
    conforms to Standard 1.5(a), Contacts with the Public During the
    Investigative     Process,     of   the    ABA      Standards   on    Prosecutorial
    Investigations,        which   states     that,      with    limited,      enumerated
    exceptions, "[t]he prosecutor should neither confirm nor deny the
    existence   of    an    investigation,         or   reveal    the    status   of    the
    investigation,         nor     release         information      concerning          the
    investigation."        ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecutorial
    Investigations § 1.5(a) (3d ed. 2014).
    This noncommittal response has come to be known as a Glomar
    response and had its origin in Phillippi v. CIA, 
    546 F.2d 1009
    (D.C. Cir. 1976).       The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responded
    to a FOIA request for records pertaining to the Hughes Glomar
    Explorer, an oceanic vessel publicly listed as a privately owned
    research ship that was allegedly owned by the federal government.
    
    Id. at 1011.
          The CIA asserted, "in the interest of national
    security, involvement by the U.S. Government in the activities
    13
    A-2393-13T3
    which are the subject matter of [the plaintiff's] request can
    neither be confirmed nor denied," claiming that the "existence or
    nonexistence of the requested records was itself a classified fact
    exempt from disclosure under . . . FOIA."       
    Id. at 1012.
        The
    precise issue we face here – whether the public agency may decline
    to confirm or deny the existence of records – was not decided by
    the Phillippi court because the requestor in that case did not
    contend the government could never make such a claim based on
    national security considerations.    
    Ibid. However, by 2009,
    when the Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit announced it was joining its sister circuits in holding
    the Glomar doctrine available to agencies responding to FOIA
    requests, the court noted the doctrine was "well settled as a
    proper response to a FOIA request."     Wilner v. NSA, 
    592 F.3d 60
    ,
    68 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
    562 U.S. 828
    , 
    131 S. Ct. 387
    , 
    178 L. Ed. 2d 24
    (2010).   The court recognized the Glomar response as
    "the only way in which an agency may assert that a particular FOIA
    statutory exemption covers the 'existence or nonexistence of the
    requested records' in a case in which a plaintiff seeks such
    records."   
    Ibid. (citation omitted). The
    court emphasized that the availability of the Glomar
    response depended upon a showing that the conventional response
    to a FOIA inquiry "would cause harm cognizable under a [] FOIA
    14
    A-2393-13T3
    exception."   
    Ibid. (alteration in original)
    (quoting Gardels v.
    CIA, 
    689 F.2d 1100
    , 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
    To properly employ the Glomar response to a
    FOIA request, an agency must "tether" its
    refusal to respond to one of the nine FOIA
    exemptions — in other words, "a government
    agency may . . . refuse to confirm or deny the
    existence of certain records . . . if the FOIA
    exemption    would    itself   preclude    the
    acknowledgment of such documents."
    
    [Wilner, supra
    , 592 F.3d at 68 (emphasis
    added) (first citation omitted) (quoting
    
    Minier, supra
    , 88 F.3d at 800).]
    Because the "existence or nonexistence of a record" must be "a
    fact exempt from disclosure under" the exception relied upon, a
    Glomar response is unavailable if "the existence or nonexistence
    of the particular records covered . . . has been officially and
    publicly disclosed."       
    Wilner, supra
    , 592 F.3d at 70.
    As is the case when an agency denies access under OPRA, see
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, the agency that relies upon a Glomar response
    must prove the applicability of a specific exemption.                  Wilner,
    
    supra, 592 F.3d at 68
    ; Pipko v. CIA, 
    312 F. Supp. 2d 669
    , 679
    (D.N.J. 2003).      The agency may satisfy this burden by submitting
    an    affidavit     that    "describe[s]       the     justifications        for
    nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate[s] that
    the   information    withheld   logically      falls   within   the    claimed
    exemptions,   and     show[s]    that    the    justifications        are    not
    15
    A-2393-13T3
    controverted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of
    [] bad faith."       Hunt v. CIA, 
    981 F.2d 1116
    , 1119 (9th Cir. 1992).
    An example of the judicial analysis required to determine
    whether a Glomar response is appropriate is found in People for
    the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. National Institutes of Health,
    
    745 F.3d 535
    (D.C. Cir. 2014).               A number of FOIA requests were
    made    to   the    National      Institutes    of   Health   (NIH)      regarding
    investigations of animal abuse at a university research lab.                    
    Id. at 538.
         One of these requests was for "materials related to all
    [NIH] investigations into complaints . . . regarding" three named
    researchers at the lab.           
    Id. at 539.
         The exemption at issue was
    5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(C) (Exemption 7(C)), which, the court
    stated, supports such a response for "'records or information
    compiled for law enforcement purposes' . . . . if acknowledgment
    of     responsive    documents      'could     reasonably     be    expected     to
    constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.'"                   
    Id. at 541
    (citation omitted).           Noting the "substantial privacy interest
    held by the targets of law-enforcement investigations," 
    ibid. (citation omitted), the
    court found a Glomar response appropriate
    "as to any documents that would confirm the existence of an
    investigation into the three named researchers."               
    Id. at 544.
    However,     the   court    viewed    the   FOIA   request   to    be   more
    expansive, requiring consideration of whether a Glomar response
    16
    A-2393-13T3
    was   available    for    another    category     of   responsive    documents
    subsumed within the request. The court concluded a Glomar response
    would not be justified under Exemption 7(C) for "documents showing
    that NIH responded to complaints about the three researchers by
    conducting an investigation that did not target the researchers
    themselves."      
    Id. at 544.
        As to that category of documents, the
    purpose served by Exemption 7(C) was not defeated by an admission
    that responsive documents existed and so, the availability of the
    Glomar response was tailored accordingly. See also Nation Magazine
    v. U.S. Customs Serv., 
    71 F.3d 885
    , 887-88 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (in
    reviewing FOIA request for records relating to offers made by H.
    Ross Perot to assist the Customs Service in drug interdiction
    efforts, the court rejected the agency's claim that Exemption 7(C)
    permitted   a   Glomar    response    to   all   requests    for   information
    regarding third persons in its investigative files).
    C.
    Consequently,      we   must   determine    whether    the    refusal    to
    confirm or deny the existence of responsive records is an available
    response to an OPRA request.              NJMG asserts that a refusal to
    confirm   or    deny   the    existence    of   responsive   records    is    not
    permitted under OPRA.         In NJMG's view, OPRA strictly limits the
    response an agency may make to a request for records, imposing an
    obligation to identify responsive records in every case as a
    17
    A-2393-13T3
    prerequisite to identifying the exemption relied upon.   Like FOIA,
    there is no language in OPRA that explicitly permits an agency to
    decline to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records.4
    Although we note the absence of specific statutory authorization
    posed no obstacle to the adoption of the Glomar doctrine in either
    federal caselaw or in New York, see Matter of Abdur-Rashid v. New
    York City Police Dep't, 
    140 A.D.3d 419
    (N.Y. App. Div. 2016), our
    concern is whether this response is permitted under OPRA.
    Our role in interpreting a statute is to discern and give
    effect to the Legislature's intent.    DiProspero v. Penn, 
    183 N.J. 477
    , 492 (2005).   The plain language of the statute is "the best
    indicator" of legislative intent.     In re Plan for the Abolition
    of the Council on Affordable Hous., 
    214 N.J. 444
    , 467 (2013).     "If
    the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then
    [the] interpretive process is over."    Richardson v. Bd. of Trs.,
    Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 
    192 N.J. 189
    , 195 (2007).     When "a
    literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result,
    contrary to public policy," or "would lead to results inconsistent
    with the overall purpose of the statute," such interpretations
    4
    Our research has revealed one statute that expressly permits
    such a response. Indiana's Access to Public Records Act permits
    a state agency to "[r]efuse to confirm or deny the existence of
    the record" under certain circumstances if the agency considers
    the request to be for a record excepted from disclosure.   Ind.
    Code Ann. § 5-14-3-4.4(a)(2).
    18
    A-2393-13T3
    should be rejected in favor of the spirit of the law.                   Hubbard v.
    Reed, 
    168 N.J. 387
    , 392-93 (2001) (citation omitted); Turner v.
    First Union Nat'l Bank, 
    162 N.J. 75
    , 84 (1999).                When the language
    does not yield an unambiguous interpretation, we continue the
    process to discern legislative intent, interpreting statutory
    language "in accordance with common sense" and may "consider the
    entire legislative scheme of which a particular provision is but
    a part."    Morristown Assocs. v. Grant Oil Co., 
    220 N.J. 360
    , 380
    (2015).     We may also turn to extrinsic evidence, "including
    legislative      history,     committee    reports,      and    contemporaneous
    construction."      
    DiProspero, supra
    , 183 N.J. at 492-93 (citation
    omitted); see also 
    Burnett, supra
    , 198 N.J. at 421.                     There are
    many    tools    available    for   our   analysis,      but    only    one   goal.
    "Regardless of the materials relied upon and the analytical tools
    employed, in the final analysis, courts should seek to effectuate
    the fundamental purpose for which the legislation was enacted."
    In re Young, 
    202 N.J. 50
    , 64 (2010) (citation omitted).
    As we have noted, the obligation imposed upon the custodian
    of public records is to "promptly comply with a request" or, if
    "unable to comply," to "indicate the specific basis therefor on
    the    request   form   and   promptly     return   it    to    the    requestor."
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g); see also Gannett N.J. 
    Partners, supra
    , 379
    N.J. Super. at 215.         Other than providing a "specific basis" for
    19
    A-2393-13T3
    the inability to comply, the statute establishes no inflexible
    requirements for a non-compliance response.      Whether an agency
    denies access to identified records or declines to confirm or deny
    responsive records exist, its reply falls within the category of
    "unable to comply" and is subject to review under that standard.
    Therefore, we discern no impediment to the availability of a Glomar
    response under OPRA's plain language.
    We also reject the interpretation urged by NJMG that the
    submission of a Vaughn index is required in all cases in which the
    agency does not comply with a request.      Neither OPRA nor FOIA
    calls for the production of a Vaughn index in every case in which
    access is denied.    Although the use of such a log has become
    customary, courts that have considered this issue have cautioned
    that the production and review of a Vaughn index is not appropriate
    in every case.    Federal courts have ruled that, when an agency
    submits a Glomar response supported by an affidavit that is
    "sufficient to establish that the requested documents should not
    be disclosed, a Vaughn index is not required."   
    Minier, supra
    , 88
    F.3d at 804.     The rationale is that "acknowledging even the
    existence of certain records would reveal information entitled to
    be protected."   N.Y. Times 
    Co., supra
    , 758 F.3d at 438 n.3.
    By way of example, in 
    Wilner, supra
    , 
    592 F.3d 60
    , the question
    was whether the National Security Agency's Glomar response was
    20
    A-2393-13T3
    properly rooted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3) (Exemption 3), an
    exemption that states FOIA does not apply to matters exempted from
    disclosure by other statutes under specified conditions.5                       The
    court found a Vaughn index was unnecessary because this exemption
    "depends   less    on   the   detailed      factual    contents    of    specific
    documents"   and   thus   "the   sole       issue   for   decision      [was]   the
    existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld
    material within the statute's coverage."              
    Wilner, supra
    , 592 F.3d
    at 72 (quoting Ass'n of Retired R.R. Workers v. U.S. R.R. Ret.
    Bd., 
    830 F.2d 331
    , 336 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also 
    Vaughn, supra
    ,
    484 F.2d at 826-27 (acknowledging that the specificity of the
    index need not "contain factual descriptions that if made public
    would compromise the secret nature of the information"); ACLU v.
    FBI, 
    59 F. Supp. 3d 584
    , 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 
    Pipko, supra
    , 312
    F. Supp. 2d at 680.
    D.
    We next turn to NJMG's argument that the only available
    exemptions   to    disclosure    are     those      enumerated    as    protected
    categories within the four corners of OPRA.                NJMG's argument is
    belied by the very statutory provisions it cites for support.
    5
    Exemption 3 is similar to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b). However, because
    the OPRA provision recognizes privileges established by judicial
    decision and other means, it is broader in scope than Exemption
    3.
    21
    A-2393-13T3
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 explicitly recognizes that records may be
    exempt from public access based upon authorities other than the
    exemptions enumerated within OPRA:
    [A]ll government records shall be subject to
    public access unless exempt from such access
    by: [OPRA] as amended and supplemented; any
    other statute; resolution of either or both
    houses   of   the   Legislature;    regulation
    promulgated under the authority of any statute
    or Executive Order of the Governor; Executive
    Order of the Governor; Rules of Court; any
    federal law, federal regulation, or federal
    order.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    Moreover,    N.J.S.A.     47:1A-9      codifies   the    Legislature's
    unambiguous   intent   that   OPRA   not   abrogate   or    erode   existing
    exemptions to public access:
    a. The provisions of [OPRA] shall not abrogate
    any exemption of a public record or government
    record from public access heretofore made
    pursuant to [the Right-to-Know Law, N.J.S.A.
    47:1A-1 to -4]; any other statute; resolution
    of either or both Houses of the Legislature;
    regulation promulgated under the authority of
    any statute or Executive Order of the
    Governor; Executive Order of the Governor;
    Rules of Court; any federal law; federal
    regulation; or federal order.
    b. The provisions of [OPRA] shall not abrogate
    or   erode  any   executive   or   legislative
    privilege   or   grant    of   confidentiality
    heretofore established or recognized by the
    Constitution of this State, statute, court
    rule or judicial case law, which privilege or
    grant of confidentiality may duly be claimed
    to restrict public access to a public record
    or government record.
    22
    A-2393-13T3
    [(Emphasis added).]
    Directly   applying   OPRA's     language,   the   Supreme   Court
    recognized exemptions for documents protected by the attorney-
    client privilege and the work-product doctrine. O'Boyle v. Borough
    of Longport, 
    218 N.J. 168
    , 185 (2014).     See also Mason v. City of
    Hoboken, 
    196 N.J. 51
    , 65 (2008); Slaughter v. Gov't Records
    Council, 
    413 N.J. Super. 544
    , 550 (App. Div. 2010) (stating it was
    "clear that an exemption from a right of public access to a
    government record can be established" by both administrative rule
    and by an executive order of the Governor), certif. denied, 
    208 N.J. 372
    (2011).
    Therefore, the plain language of the statute as well as
    judicial precedent make it clear that an exemption is statutorily
    recognized by OPRA if it is established by any of the authorities
    enumerated in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 or -9.
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b) has three requirements for a grant of
    confidentiality to shield a record from disclosure under OPRA.
    First, there must be a grant of confidentiality established or
    recognized by any of the enumerated authorities.          Second, the
    nature of the privilege must provide a reasonable basis for the
    restriction of public access to the record.       Third, the privilege
    must have been established or recognized prior to the enactment
    of OPRA.   All three requirements are met as to the confidentiality
    23
    A-2393-13T3
    of information regarding a person who has not been arrested or
    charged with an offense.
    Long before the enactment of OPRA, the confidentiality of
    information law enforcement authorities receive regarding possible
    criminal activity was recognized in our caselaw.
    The receipt by appropriate law enforcement
    officials of information concerning the
    existence or occurrence of criminal activities
    is critical to the uncovering and the
    prosecution of criminal offenses, and is thus
    crucial to effective law enforcement. In order
    that the flow of such information be not
    impeded or cut off, the law has long treated
    the information as confidential and privileged
    against    disclosure,    thereby    protecting
    witness security, the State's relationship
    with its informants and witnesses, and other
    confidential    relationships,    among   other
    things.
    [State v. Marshall, 
    148 N.J. 89
    , 273 (1997)
    (emphasis added) (citation omitted).]
    "Confidentiality is vital not only because it serves to
    protect government sources of information, but also because it
    enhances   the   effectiveness   of    investigative   techniques      and
    procedures."     Nero v. Hyland, 
    76 N.J. 213
    , 225 (1978).        "[E]ven
    inactive investigatory files may have to be kept confidential in
    order to convince citizens that they may safely confide in law
    enforcement officials."       
    Ibid. (citation omitted). See
    also
    
    Loigman, supra
    , 102 N.J. at 107-08 (recognizing "a high degree of
    confidentiality"    in   investigative   materials   relating   to   "the
    24
    A-2393-13T3
    government's      need     to    conduct    such   affairs       with   skill,     with
    sensitivity to the privacy interests involved, and in an atmosphere
    of confidentiality that encourages the utmost candor"); State v.
    Kearney, 
    109 N.J. Super. 502
    , 506 (Law Div. 1970).
    In   sum,       before     OPRA   was     enacted,     judicial       decisions
    recognized the need to maintain "a high degree of confidentiality"
    for records regarding a person who has not been arrested or
    charged.   The confidentiality accorded such information promotes
    both the integrity and effectiveness of law enforcement efforts
    for the benefit of the public at large.                  In addition, the grant
    of confidentiality protects the privacy interest of the individual
    who, lacking an opportunity to challenge allegations in court,
    would face irremediable public condemnation.                     The need and scope
    of confidentiality recognized in our courts' decisions "may duly
    be   claimed     to    restrict    public     access    to   a   public    record    or
    government record."         N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b).         We therefore hold that,
    pursuant    to        N.J.S.A.    47:1A-9(b),      an    exemption        exists    for
    information received or maintained by law enforcement agencies
    regarding a person who has not been arrested or charged with an
    offense.
    E.
    BCPO did not specifically identify N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b) as the
    source of the exemption that shields the records sought here.                        We
    25
    A-2393-13T3
    therefore   turn    to     the   question   whether   BCPO's   response
    "describe[d] the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably
    specific detail, demonstrat[ing] that the information withheld
    logically falls within" the exemption.       See 
    Hunt, supra
    , 981 F.2d
    at 1119.
    OPRA requires the custodian of records to "indicate the
    specific basis" for an inability to comply with an OPRA request.
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g).       An agency denying access should identify
    applicable statutory provisions to facilitate judicial review.
    However, the mere recitation of an applicable exemption will
    generally be insufficient because the custodian may not rely upon
    "conclusory and generalized allegations of exemptions."          Newark
    Morning 
    Ledger, supra
    , 423 N.J. Super. at 162 (citation omitted).
    The sufficiency of the response is measured against whether the
    proffered reasons prove the applicability of a specific exemption.
    See Wilner, 
    supra, 592 F.3d at 68
    .
    In this case, we are mindful that the person whose privacy
    would be irreparably invaded had no opportunity to press the case
    against disclosure.       See Gannett N.J. 
    Partners, supra
    , 379 N.J.
    Super. at 214-15.        We also note that, although the concept of
    protecting such information is long-standing and the response
    given here conforms to accepted standards of prosecutorial ethics,
    the precise issue of what exemption applies to protect this
    26
    A-2393-13T3
    information has not been addressed before.                Therefore, under the
    circumstances of this case, we consider the totality of BCPO's
    response to discern whether the reasons given for its refusal to
    confirm or deny the existence of responsive records logically fall
    within the exemption authorized by N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b).6
    Aside   from   N.J.S.A.     47:1A-3(b),       BCPO   did    not   explicitly
    identify other exemptions contained within OPRA that supported its
    rationale for declining to confirm or deny the existence of records
    here.      The   certification    submitted        in   opposition     to    NJMG's
    complaint stated the "privileges and exemptions" available to bar
    access included "criminal investigatory records, confidential,
    [and]   privacy."      In   addition,        the   certification       cited      the
    constraints imposed upon a prosecutor by the Rules of Professional
    Conduct.
    In    its   initial    response    to    NJMG's      OPRA   request,       BCPO
    identified the request as seeking records "related to someone who
    has neither been arrested nor charged with committing an offense,"
    amounting to an inquiry whether the person "is, or has been, the
    subject of an investigation."           The response stated BCPO would
    6
    It remains the burden of the custodian to show that the denial
    of access is properly grounded in an exemption authorized by OPRA.
    We do not intend that our review of exemptions not explicitly
    identified by BCPO should in any way relieve a custodian of public
    records from that burden or impose an obligation upon courts to
    sift through OPRA to determine if an appropriate exemption exists
    based upon the facts revealed.
    27
    A-2393-13T3
    "neither confirm nor deny whether an individual who has neither
    been charged nor arrested is, or has been, the subject of an
    investigation," and explained:
    Law enforcement agencies routinely receive
    allegations   that  are   determined  to   be
    unprovable, unfounded or untrue. Identifying
    the target of such allegations could unfairly
    subject that individual to irreparable harm
    and subject this office and its employees to
    civil liability and professional discipline.
    BCPO's response identified the irreparable harm suffered by
    a person who has been the subject of unproven allegations of
    criminal   wrongdoing.     We     are   satisfied    that,   under    the
    circumstances here, the reasons BCPO provided for declining to
    confirm or deny the existence of responsive records adequately
    invoke and logically fall within the relevant exemption.
    F.
    BCPO's   response   fairly   implicated   the    general   privacy
    provision, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, the criminal investigatory record
    exemption, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, and the investigation in process
    exemption, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3.      For the sake of completeness, we
    review these exemptions to explain why they do not provide a basis
    for the exemption we recognize under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b).
    We begin with the threshold requirement for a Glomar response.
    For an exemption to serve as a basis for a Glomar response, the
    28
    A-2393-13T3
    exemption itself must preclude the acknowledgment that responsive
    documents exist.    See Wilner, 
    supra, 592 F.3d at 68
    .
    A "criminal investigatory record" is defined as "a record
    which is not required by law to be made, maintained or kept on
    file that is held by a law enforcement agency which pertains to
    any   criminal     investigation   or   related   civil   enforcement
    proceeding."     N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.    The agency relying upon this
    exemption must present sufficient facts to show: (1) the existence
    of a criminal investigation or related proceeding and (2) that the
    responsive records "pertain" to that proceeding.      Therefore, the
    agency that seeks to prove the applicability of this exemption
    must, as a preliminary step, acknowledge that responsive records
    exist.
    The "investigation in process" exemption, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3,
    shields records that "pertain to an investigation in progress by
    any public agency" if such access is "inimical to the public
    interest." See, e.g., Courier News v. Hunterdon Cnty. Prosecutor's
    Office, 
    358 N.J. Super. 373
    , 380 n.5 (App. Div. 2003) (rejecting
    claim that access to a 911 tape one year after a homicide fell
    within the "investigation in progress" exemption).    This provision
    also depends upon proof that a criminal investigation exists.
    The proofs necessary for the "criminal investigatory records"
    and "investigation in progress" exemptions cannot be reconciled
    29
    A-2393-13T3
    with the fact that the "existence or nonexistence of a record"
    must be "a fact exempt from disclosure under" an exemption relied
    upon for a Glomar response.      Therefore, neither exemption provides
    a statutorily recognized authority for a Glomar response.
    BCPO also relies upon RPC 3.8(f), which states:
    [E]xcept for statements that are necessary to
    inform the public of the nature and extent of
    the prosecutor’s action and that serve a
    legitimate   law   enforcement   purpose,   [a
    prosecutor   shall]   refrain    from   making
    extrajudicial comments that have a substantial
    likelihood of heightening public condemnation
    of the accused . . . .
    This proscription has the force of court rule pursuant to
    Rule 1:14.      However, the RPC fails to satisfy the other criteria
    for the exemption.        A prohibition against making extrajudicial
    comments that could prejudice an accused is designed to curb
    prosecutorial misconduct.        Because the RPC does not reference
    records or, more particularly, records relating to an uncharged
    suspect,   it    cannot   be   said   to   establish   or   recognize   the
    confidentiality of public records maintained by the prosecutor as
    to persons who have never been charged with an offense.          Moreover,
    the RPC did not become effective until 2004, after the enactment
    of OPRA.     Therefore, it cannot provide a basis for an exemption
    under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b).
    BCPO also cited both the constitutional guarantee of privacy,
    N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1; see 
    Doe, supra
    , 142 N.J. at 89, and the
    30
    A-2393-13T3
    privacy provision of OPRA, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, as grounds for the
    denial of access.        In light of our conclusion that access may be
    denied based upon the exemption contained in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b),
    resolution   of    the    constitutional    question    is    not    "absolutely
    imperative in the disposition of the litigation" and "should not
    be reached."      
    Burnett, supra
    , 198 N.J. at 420.
    The general privacy provision contained in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1
    states "a public agency has a responsibility and an obligation to
    safeguard from public access a citizen's personal information with
    which it has been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate
    the citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy."                   See 
    Burnett, supra
    , 198 N.J. at 422-23 (emphasis added) (recognizing this
    privacy clause as a substantive provision of OPRA).                      Although
    "personal information" is not defined, OPRA does identify specific
    categories of information that either should not be disclosed or
    should be redacted from records that are disclosed.                    See, e.g.,
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(a) (requiring the redaction of "any information
    which discloses the social security number, credit card number,
    unlisted    telephone      number,   or   driver   license     number     of   any
    person").    The privacy provision has been found to require denial
    of access to social security numbers, 
    Burnett, supra
    , 198 N.J. at
    428, and the names and telephone numbers of persons called from
    government-issued        telephones.      Livecchia    v.    Borough    of   Mount
    31
    A-2393-13T3
    Arlington, 
    421 N.J. Super. 24
    , 29 (App. Div. 2011).                 It is not
    applicable   to    the     settlement      of   a   sexual   harassment     and
    discrimination lawsuit against a county, Asbury Park Press v.
    Cnty. of Monmouth, 
    201 N.J. 5
    , 6 (2010);            motor vehicle recordings
    from mobile video recorders in police vehicles, Paff v. Ocean
    Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, ___ N.J. Super.            ____, ____ (App. Div.
    June 30, 2016) (slip op. at 39-41); and the destination locations
    of calls placed from government-issued telephones, 
    Livecchia, supra
    , 421 N.J. Super. at 29.
    It is unnecessary for us to determine the full scope of the
    privacy provision.       However, in considering whether this provision
    satisfied the requirement for exemption here pursuant to N.J.S.A.
    47:1A-9(b), we discern a common thread in these privacy provision
    cases: the protected information is personal in the sense that it
    provides identifying information about a person that originates
    with the individual and is "entrusted" to the government.                    We
    therefore conclude that the basis for withholding the records
    sought here does not logically fall within this exemption.
    G.
    We have considered the argument of amici that the application
    of the Glomar doctrine in federal courts has undermined the
    overarching goal of ready public access by obstructing judicial
    scrutiny.    Our    review     of   federal     caselaw   reveals   that    any
    32
    A-2393-13T3
    infringement upon the scope of judicial review is attributable to
    clearly articulated congressional intent rather than inherent
    flaws in the doctrine itself.
    When   evaluating    a    Glomar   response,   federal   courts   must
    "accord 'substantial weight' to the agency's affidavits."         Wilner,
    
    supra, 592 F.3d at 68
    (alterations in original) (quoting 
    Minier, supra
    , 88 F.3d at 800).       This standard of deference has its origin
    in the 1974 amendments to 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) which, Congress
    made clear, were intended to override the Supreme Court's holding
    in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 
    410 U.S. 73
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 827
    , 
    35 L. Ed. 2d 119
    (1973), regarding the in camera review of
    classified documents.     Congress overrode President Ford's veto of
    the 1974 amendments to FOIA to do so.         Military Audit Project v.
    Casey, 
    656 F.2d 724
    , 738 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1981).        The Senate report
    states:
    [T]he Executive departments responsible for
    national defense and foreign policy matters
    have unique insights into what adverse affects
    [sic] might occur as a result of public
    disclosure of a particular classified record.
    Accordingly, the conferees expect that Federal
    courts, in making de novo determinations in
    section 552(b)(1) cases under the Freedom of
    Information law, will accord substantial
    weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the
    details of the classified status of the
    disputed record.
    [S.Rep.No. 93-1200 (1974), as reprinted in,
    1974   U.S.C.C.A.N.  6285,  6290  (emphasis
    added).]
    33
    A-2393-13T3
    Because no corresponding limitation upon judicial review exists
    in OPRA or is suggested by the legislative history, our review of
    Glomar responses will not be burdened by such a directive.
    III.
    Finally, we turn to NJMG's argument that the denial of access
    here violated its common law right to access.         OPRA explicitly
    does not "limit[] the common law right of access to a government
    record,   including    criminal   investigatory   records    of    a    law
    enforcement agency."     N.J.S.A. 47:1A-8; see also N.J.S.A. 47:1A-
    1.   The definition of a public record under the common law 7 is
    broader than that contained in OPRA.       Bergen Cnty. Improvement
    Auth. v. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc., 
    370 N.J. Super. 504
    , 509-10
    (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    182 N.J. 143
    (2004).           However, the
    right to access common law records is a qualified one, Newark
    Morning 
    Ledger, supra
    , 423 N.J. Super. at 171, and the showing a
    requestor must make to gain access is greater than that required
    under OPRA.   
    Mason, supra
    , 196 N.J. at 67-68.
    In Keddie, the Supreme Court identified three predicates for
    the common law right to access public records: "(1) the records
    7
    Under common law, a government record "is one that is made by
    a public official in the exercise of his or her public function,
    either because the record was required or directed by law to be
    made or kept, or because it was filed in a public office." Keddie
    v. Rutgers, 
    148 N.J. 36
    , 49 (1997).
    34
    A-2393-13T3
    must be common law public documents; (2) the person seeking access
    must 'establish an interest in the subject matter of the material';
    and (3) the citizen's right to access 'must be balanced against
    the State's interest in preventing 
    disclosure.'" 148 N.J. at 50
    (citations omitted).
    The trial court here found the first two Keddie requirements
    satisfied, a conclusion BCPO does not challenge on appeal.      NJMG's
    primary challenge to the trial court's analysis is that, because
    BCPO declined to confirm or deny the existence of responsive
    records, there was no factual record to support the trial judge's
    conclusions.    We disagree.
    After making the determinations required by Keddie, "a court
    must balance the plaintiff's interest in the information against
    the public interest in confidentiality of the documents, including
    a consideration of whether the 'demand for inspection is premised
    upon a purpose [that] tends to advance or further a wholesome
    public interest or a legitimate private interest.'"            S. N.J.
    Newspapers, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 
    141 N.J. 56
    , 72 (1995)
    (alteration    in   original)   (citation   omitted).   The   balancing
    required calls for consideration of:
    (1) the extent to which disclosure will impede
    agency functions by discouraging citizens from
    providing information to the government; (2)
    the effect disclosure may have upon persons
    who have given such information, and whether
    they did so in reliance that their identities
    35
    A-2393-13T3
    would not be disclosed; (3) the extent to
    which    agency    self-evaluation,    program
    improvement, or other decision making will be
    chilled by disclosure; (4) the degree to which
    the information sought includes factual data
    as   opposed    to   evaluative   reports   of
    policymakers; (5) whether any findings of
    public misconduct have been insufficiently
    corrected by remedial measures instituted by
    the investigative agency; and (6) whether any
    agency    disciplinary     or    investigatory
    proceedings have arisen that may circumscribe
    the individual's asserted need for the
    materials.
    [
    Loigman, supra
    , 102 N.J. at 113.]
    These factors are largely irrelevant here.   The nature of the
    records sought and the response given by BCPO call for flexibility
    in the balancing process employed.   See Atl. City Convention Ctr.
    Auth. v. S. Jersey Publ. Co., 
    135 N.J. 53
    , 60 (1994) (citation
    omitted) (noting the balancing process is "flexible and adaptable
    to different circumstances and sensitive to the fact that the
    requirements of confidentiality are greater in some situations
    than in others").
    NJMG's argument that the record is insufficient because BCPO
    has not certified to facts that would warrant non-disclosure
    ignores the context its OPRA request gave to the analysis.       "In
    furtherance of the newsgathering process," NJMG sought reports
    "filed against or involving" A.B.C., "complaints . . . made to law
    enforcement officials concerning" A.B.C., and "[r]ecordings . . .
    of 911 calls . . . related to" A.B.C.   The unmistakable import of
    36
    A-2393-13T3
    the request was to seek records regarding criminal allegations
    against A.B.C.   BCPO's refusal to confirm or deny the existence
    of such records directly responded to that request, noting the
    request was one for records relating to a person who was not
    arrested or charged with an offense.   Such information has been
    long acknowledged to enjoy a high degree of confidentiality.
    It is obvious that, in order to protect the confidentiality
    of persons who have been the subject of investigation but not
    charged with any offense, the prosecutor must respond to requests
    for such records uniformly.   To deny records exist in some cases
    and to issue no denial in others would implicitly confirm the
    existence of records in a particular case, entirely defeating any
    effort to protect the confidentiality interest at stake.         See
    Daily Journal v. Police Dept. of City of Vineland, 
    351 N.J. Super. 110
    , 128-29 (App. Div.) (citation omitted) (stating disclosure of
    the names of individuals mentioned in grand jury presentment would
    be "tantamount to an accusation" without "furnish[ing a] forum for
    a denial," depriving the individual of "the right to answer and
    to appeal"), certif. denied, 
    174 N.J. 364
    (2002).   The record here
    was sufficient to identify the issue joined by the request and the
    response and permit a determination as to whether access was
    required by the common law.
    37
    A-2393-13T3
    Where   "reasons   for   maintaining   a   high   degree    of
    confidentiality in the public records are present, even when the
    citizen asserts a public interest in the information, more than
    [the] citizen's status and good faith are necessary to call for
    production of the documents."    
    Loigman, supra
    , 102 N.J. at 105-
    06.   That high degree of confidentiality applies here.       After
    considering the arguments advanced by NJMG, we conclude the common
    law right of access did not require BCPO to disclose whether or
    not records responsive to its request existed.
    Affirmed.
    38
    A-2393-13T3