IN RE THE DISCIPLINARY ACTION OF MERRITT CARR (L-4686-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5330-17T1
    IN RE THE DISCIPLINARY
    ACTION OF MERRITT CARR.
    ____________________________
    Argued August 13, 2019 – Decided August 21, 2019
    Before Judges Sumners and Moynihan.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-4686-16.
    Kyle J. Trent argued the cause for appellant Borough of
    Glen Ridge (Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro &
    Murphy, PC, attorneys; Arthur R. Thibault, Jr., of
    counsel and on the brief; Kyle J. Trent, on the brief).
    Joshua H. Reinitz argued the cause for respondent
    Merritt Carr (Iacullo Martino, LLC, attorneys; Joshua
    H. Reinitz and Anthony J. Iacullo, of counsel and on
    the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    The Borough of Glen Ridge appeals from the trial court's order reducing
    the Borough Administrator's twenty-day suspension of Merritt Carr from his
    position as a Borough police sergeant, following a departmental disciplinary
    hearing, to a twenty-four hour suspension. The Borough argues the "trial court
    failed to consider or address" certain charges leveled against Carr or "to consider
    his guilt on those charges when assessing the penalty"; and "failed to provide
    analysis as to the basis for" reducing the penalty.    We agree and remand this
    matter, once again, to the Law Division.
    We previously remanded this case to the trial court because in its prior
    decision finding the Borough proved "by a preponderance of the evidence that
    . . . Carr neglected his duty, failed to perform duties, failed to supervise a
    subordinate officer, and engaged in conduct unbecoming a public employee," it
    did not correlate its findings to the elements of each charge and analyze whether
    the substantiated charges warranted the twenty-day suspension which the trial
    court then upheld. In re Disciplinary Action of Carr, No. A-3987-16 (App. Div.
    May 4, 2018).
    The preliminary notice of disciplinary action (PNDA) listed both the
    departmental and statutory charges lodged against Carr:
    1. DEPARTMENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS:
    a. 2.32.140W Violation of rules 3:7F & 3:8B-3[1]
    1
    The charge set forth in section 2.32.140W specifically provides: "Violating
    any of the rules and regulations governing the department or any administrative
    A-5330-17T1
    2
    b. 2.32.140M Neglect of Duty
    c. 2.32.140J Incompetency
    2. VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147
    a.   Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee;
    b.   Neglect of Duty;
    c.   Failure to Supervise; and
    d.   Failure to Perform Duties.
    rule or regulation promulgated by the public safety committee or the mayor and
    council." Departmental Rule 3:7F provides:
    ASSISTING SUBORDINATES. A SUPERVISORY
    OFFICER   SHALL     HAVE     A  WORKING
    KNOWLEDGE      OF    THE    DUTIES  AND
    RESPONSIBILITIES OF HIS SUBORDINATES. HE
    SHALL OBSERVE CONTACTS MADE WITH THE
    PUBLIC BY HIS SUBORDINATES AND BE
    AVAILABLE      FOR      ASSISTANCE    OR
    INSTRUCTION AS MAY BE REQUIRED. A FIELD
    SUPERVISORY OFFICER SHALL RESPOND TO
    CALLS OF SERIOUS EMERGENCIES, FELONIES
    IN PROGRESS, ASSAULTS AND OTHERS,
    UNLESS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN A POLICE
    INCIDENT.    HE SHOULD OBSERVE THE
    CONDUCT OF THE ASSIGNED PERSONNEL AND
    TAKE ACTIVE CHARGE WHEN NECESSARY.
    Departmental Rule 3:8B-3 provides the squad sergeant's responsibilities
    include:     "DIRECT[ING] SUBORDINATES IN THE PROPER
    PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES AND ENSUR[ING] THAT THEY ARE
    PROPERLY OBEYING AND CARRYING OUT CURRENT POLICIES AND
    PROCEDURES."
    A-5330-17T1
    3
    In its oral decision after remand, the trial court concluded Carr violated
    Departmental Rules 3:7F and 3:8B-3. The court found Carr, as sergeant, ordered
    an officer who had never done so without accompaniment, to take a statement
    from a domestic violence victim and prepare a concomitant report. Despite
    knowing the officer's level of inexperience, Carr watched a football game on a
    break-room television instead of directly observing the officer's actions or
    correcting the many errors the officer made in taking the victim's statement thus
    violating Departmental Rule 3:7F. The court also concluded Carr violated
    Departmental Rule 3:8B-3 based on numerous errors committed in the
    preparation of a temporary restraining order (TRO): "boxes . . . checked that
    [should not] have been" and provisions granting possession of a Pennsylvania
    residence to the victim and a search warrant of another Pennsylvania residence
    – despite Carr being advised by a municipal court judge that provisions
    concerning properties outside the jurisdiction of New Jersey courts should not
    be included in the TRO. Further evidence of that violation included the failure
    to: address the elements of terroristic threats, the predicate offense for the TRO,
    in the victim's statement; collect, or even mention in the report, text messages
    possessed by the victim evidencing the predicate offense; mention in the report
    the search warrant for weapons, a police-department computer-database check
    A-5330-17T1
    4
    of the domestic violence suspect, and Carr's actions in connection with the
    investigation. The trial court did not find sufficient evidence that proved the
    incompetency charge under Regulation 2.32.140J. 2 We find no reason to disturb
    those findings which are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the
    record. In re Disciplinary Procedures of Phillips, 
    117 N.J. 567
    , 581 (1990)
    In its remand decision, the trial court did not address the charged neglect
    of duty violation under Regulation 2.32.140M and the four statutory charges
    under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147: conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of
    duty, failure to supervise and failure to perform duties. Although the court, in
    its first decision, determined Carr "neglected his duty, failed to perform duties,
    failed to supervise a subordinate officer, and engaged in conduct unbecoming a
    public employee," In re Disciplinary Action of Carr, slip op. at 2-3, it did not
    incorporate those findings, and explain them, in the remand decision.
    We recognize that many of the trial court's current findings could well
    support a determination that Carr violated the provisions the trial court did not
    address. It is the role of the trial court, however, to conduct a de novo review
    of the proceedings before the original tribunal – here, the Borough Administrator
    2
    The court not only considered the incompetency charge that was set forth in
    the PNDA, but the other portions of the regulation not set forth therein: "lack
    of energy and incapacity, mental or physical."
    A-5330-17T1
    5
    – "to ensure that a neutral, unbiased forum will review disciplinary convictions."
    
    Phillips, 117 N.J. at 580
    . Our role in reviewing that de novo proceeding is
    limited. 
    Id. at 579.
    Our "function on appeal is not to make new factual findings
    but simply to decide whether there was adequate evidence before the [] [c]ourt
    to justify its finding of guilt." 
    Ibid. (first alteration in
    original) (quoting State
    v. Johnson, 
    42 N.J. 146
    , 161 (1964)). Therefore, "unless the appellate tribunal
    finds that the decision below was 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable' or
    '[un]supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole,' the de
    novo findings should not be disturbed." 
    Ibid. (alteration in original)
    (quoting
    Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980)).
    We are thus compelled to remand this matter to the trial court for its
    consideration of the unaddressed charges.        We decline to exercise original
    jurisdiction because further fact-finding must be completed. Price v. Himeji,
    LLC, 
    214 N.J. 263
    , 294 (2013). We also reject Carr's argument that the trial
    court's failure to address those charges infers that they "did not merit discussion
    and should be deemed dismissed." As we explained in our prior decision on this
    matter, "Rule 1:7-4(a) requires a court to not only find facts, but to 'state its
    conclusions of law thereon.'" In re Disciplinary Action of Carr, slip op. at 3
    (quoting R. 1:7-4(a)). Further, it would be inappropriate to infer what the trial
    A-5330-17T1
    6
    court found from a barren record, especially considering its prior uncorrelated
    finding that Carr violated the now-unaddressed regulatory and statutory charges.
    If any or all of those unaddressed charges are deemed proved by the trial
    court, it should assess the penalty in light of those found violations and explain
    its reasons – much as it did, contrary to the Borough's argument, in its oral
    remand decision – so an appellate court would be able to determine "whether
    the 'punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all of the
    circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness,'" In re Stallworth,
    
    208 N.J. 182
    , 195 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 
    191 N.J. 474
    , 484 (2007)). The
    trial court should recognize that on de novo review, a court may "alter a sanction
    imposed by an administrative agency only 'when necessary to bring the agency's
    action into conformity with its delegated authority. The [c]ourt has no power to
    act independently as an administrative tribunal or to substitute its judgment for
    that of the agency.'" In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 28 (2007) (quoting In re Polk,
    
    90 N.J. 550
    , 578 (1982)). Our Supreme Court has "cautioned, courts should take
    care not to substitute their own views of whether a particular penalty is correct
    for those of the body charged with making that decision." 
    Carter, 191 N.J. at 486
    . Of course, the trial court should well-explain any deviation from its prior
    decision.
    A-5330-17T1
    7
    Remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    A-5330-17T1
    8