PMG NEW JERSEY II, LLC VS. 133 COLONIA, LLC (L-3903-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4235-16T2
    PMG NEW JERSEY II, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    133 COLONIA, LLC, and ZONING
    BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE
    TOWNSHIP OF WOODBRIDGE,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ————————————————
    Argued December 20, 2018 – Decided July 22, 2019
    Before Judges Simonelli, Whipple and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-3903-16.
    Bernard M. Riley argued the cause for appellant
    (Gasiorowski & Holobinko, attorneys; Ronald S.
    Gasiorowski, on the briefs).
    Timothy M. Casey argued the cause for respondent
    Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Township of
    Woodbridge (Russo & Casey, attorneys; Timothy M.
    Casey, of counsel and on the brief).
    James M. Turteltaub argued the cause for respondent
    133 Colonia, LLC (Carlin & Ward, PC, attorneys;
    James M. Turteltaub, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In this prerogative writs matter, plaintiff PMG New Jersey II, LLC (PMG)
    appeals from the May 1, 2017 Law Division judgment dismissing its complaint
    and affirming the resolution of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board) of the
    Township of Woodbridge (Township) granting defendant 133 Colonia LLC
    (Colonia) preliminary and final site plan and use and bulk variance approval to
    redevelop its property. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    I.
    Colonia's property is physically located near mile-marker 133 northbound
    on the Garden State Parkway (GSP) and is accessible only from the GSP. The
    property is unique property, as it was located in the R-40 low-density residential
    zone, but is surrounded entirely by property owned and controlled by the New
    Jersey Turnpike Authority (Authority) with an emergency access road from the
    property to local roads that is blocked by a locked gate. The site contains a Shell
    gasoline station canopy, eight gasoline-refueling pumps, convenience store and
    an unutilized repair garage. The site has been a service area for the traveling
    public on the GSP since 1954, and thus predates the adoption of the Township's
    A-4235-16T2
    2
    Land Use and Development Ordinance and is a valid pre-existing
    nonconforming use.
    PMG owns adjoining property at the service area that is nearly identical
    in size to Colonia's property and is also located in the R-40 zone. PMG's
    property contains an Exxon gas station with six multi-product dispensers, a 2748
    square foot building containing a convenience store, a Subway fast food
    restaurant and thirteen parking spaces.
    In 2014, Colonia filed an application with the Board for preliminary and
    final site plan approval to demolish the improvements and redevelop the site
    with a 2450 square foot building containing a 1225 square foot mini-
    mart/convenience store and a 1225 square foot Dunkin' Donuts restaurant with
    a drive-through lane and window. Colonia also sought to increase the size of
    the gasoline station canopy, increase the number of gas refueling pumps to
    thirteen, and add an employee kiosk to the gasoline refueling area. Fourteen
    parking spaces would be created, leading to thirty-six holding areas for vehicles
    when considering the capacity for nine cars in the drive through and thirteen
    cars at the gasoline refueling pumps. In addition, Colonia proposed to pay for
    the Authority to construct a twenty-foot wall between the site and neighboring
    residences to reduce the impact on those residences.
    A-4235-16T2
    3
    Colonia also proposed to remove the existing gasoline storage tanks and
    replace them with modern, double-walled fiberglass tanks. As part of the tank
    replacement, Colonia would perform any necessary soil remediation and replace
    the existing metal fill caps with fiberglass caps to reduce the sound the public
    claimed was emitted when the tanks were being filled.
    Because the convenience store, Dunkin' Donuts and gasoline station were
    non-permitted uses in the R-40 zone, Colonia applied for three use variances
    under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1).1 Colonia applied for a use variance under
    N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(2),2 as the sale of fuel was a non-permitted use it sought
    to expand. Colonia also applied for several bulk variances under N.J.S.A.
    40:55D-70(c) regarding setbacks, landscaping area, prohibitions against signs,
    and lot size.
    1
    N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) provides that "for special reasons, [a board of
    adjustment shall have the power to] grant a variance to allow departure from
    regulations pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 to -68.6] to permit . . . a use or
    principal structure in a district restricted against such use or principal
    structure[.]"
    2
    N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(2) provides that "for special reasons, [a board of
    adjustment shall have the power to] grant a variance to allow departure from
    regulations pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 to -68.6] to permit . . . an expansion
    of a nonconforming use[.]"
    A-4235-16T2
    4
    The Board held public hearings on May 7, 2015, June 18, 2015, September
    24, 2015, October 8, 2015, and December 3, 2015. On May 7, 2015, Colonia's
    expert licensed engineer, John Palus, testified to the details of the application,
    and its expert professional traffic engineer, Nicholas Verderese, testified to the
    traffic conditions and the impact of the proposed plan. The Board then heard
    questions and comments from the public about the close proximity of the site to
    residences and a high school, issues with parking and fencing surrounding the
    site, and increases in noise and light.
    On June 18, 2015, Palus testified in response to the questions and
    comments. John McDonough, a professional planner, also testified in support
    of the requested "d" and "c" variances and addressed how the plan satisfied the
    criteria under the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163.
    The Board then heard questions and comments from the public.
    On September 24, 2015, Palus, McDonough and Verderese responded to
    the questions and comments and testified as to changes made to the plan. That
    same day, PMG's expert professional planner, Andrew Thomas, and expert
    traffic engineer, Lee Klein, testified in opposition to the application. The Board
    then heard questions and comments from the public.
    A-4235-16T2
    5
    On October 8, 2015, Thomas continued his testimony, specifically as to
    why the plan did not satisfy the criteria under the MLUL, and was cross-
    examined. The Board then heard questions and comments from the public.
    At the hearing on December 3, 2015, the Authority's attorney presented
    the Authority's objection to the proposed twenty-foot wall. The Board adjourned
    further testimony to afford Colonia the opportunity to revise the plan in response
    to the Authority's objection.
    At the final hearing on February 4, 2016, McDonough and Thomas
    testified to the revisions made to the plan in response to the Authority's
    objection. Colonia reduced the size of the fencing to eight feet to run behind the
    site and up to the neighboring residences, and proposed to erect an eight-foot
    fence, along with a landscaping buffer, between the residences and the site to
    ameliorate the impacts the use will have on the adjoining neighborhood. The
    landscaping buffer would be in the form of planted trees, around fourteen feet
    high, to help soften the look of the fence and the sound from the property.
    Because the maximum height for front and side yard fences in the R-40 zone
    was four and six feet, respectively, the fences required height variances. The
    Board then heard questions and comments from the public.
    A-4235-16T2
    6
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board granted Colonia's application
    with conditions, including that the Authority approve the plan, which it did. On
    May 19, 2016, the Board adopted a comprehensive resolution, identifying each
    of the variances requested, detailing the evidence presented, and setting forth its
    findings, analysis, and reasons for approving the application and granting the
    variances. The Board rejected the testimony of PMG's experts, finding their
    opinions were net opinions unsupported by any relevant facts. In contrast, the
    Board found that Colonia's experts were credible witnesses and their testimony
    supported the Board's findings that:
    (1) approval of the application will not substantially
    impact the purpose and intent of the Master Plan and
    Zoning Ordinance;
    (2) the property is unique and particularly suited for
    the proposed use;
    (3) the application as proposed and amended will
    operate in a safe and efficient manner from an
    engineering point of view, and addressed all of the
    concerns of the Board's engineering expert;
    (4) the existing conditions are outdated and not
    properly oriented and the replacement of the existing
    structures will improve the site and its functionality;
    (5) the removal and replacement           of the existing
    underground storage tanks will            accelerate the
    remediation of any contamination on       the site thereby
    providing a benefit to the site and the   community as a
    A-4235-16T2
    7
    whole, and Colonia's agreement to retrofit the new
    tanks with fiberglass lids to attenuate any noise during
    deliveries of fuel to the site was a benefit to the site and
    surrounding properties;
    (6) the proposed fencing will in conjunction with the
    additional landscaping provide a buffer to the adjoining
    residential properties, which is an improvement over
    existing conditions on the site;
    (7) the site will function efficiently and safely with
    the proposed drive-through element from an
    engineering, planning and traffic engineering
    perspective;
    (8) the site has been designed to provide for safe and
    efficient vehicle circulation including fuel trucks
    making deliveries to the site;
    (9) the proposed parking provides more than
    adequate parking for the site, any change in traffic
    generated will be imperceptible, and the site would
    continue to function at a level acceptable according to
    industry standards;
    (10) the application advances N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 in
    that the site is particularly suited for the proposed use,
    as it is one of eight service areas on the GSP and has
    existed at the location for over sixty years serving the
    motoring public and therefore general welfare with no
    impact on the surrounding residential uses;
    (11) the site is an appropriate location for the
    proposed drive-through consistent with N.J.S.A.
    40:55D-2(g);
    (12) Colonia established that the application advances
    N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(i), as it will replace the existing site
    A-4235-16T2
    8
    with a new more contemporary look for the site, and
    advances N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(m), as it is an efficient use
    of land by redeveloping the site which was preferable
    to finding a new location;
    (13) the promotion of the free flow of traffic on the
    site and operation in a safer and efficient manner
    advances N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(h);
    (14) the application advances N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(c), as
    it provides adequate light and space with the proposed
    improvements to the rear setbacks, the improved
    substantial landscaping and evergreen buffering of the
    residential uses; and
    (15) the application advances the purposes of zoning
    in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(d), as the site is designated as a
    PA-1 zone where redevelopment is encouraged.
    The Board concluded that Colonia established special reasons justifying
    approval of the application and requested "d" variances, and that the location of
    the site on the GSP, while in the R-40 zone, is not likely to be developed for a
    use permitted in that zone.
    The Board also concluded it could grant the requested "c" variances, as
    the benefits outweighed the detriments and Colonia established the relief
    requested as a flexible "c" as well as a (c)(1) hardship variance due to the depth
    of the property. The Board also found the application was reconciled with the
    Master Plan, which emphasizes the importance of a stable viable commercial
    A-4235-16T2
    9
    base and encouraging development proximate to major highways, and proposing
    the redevelopment of the site on the GSP was consistent with the Master Plan.
    Thereafter, on June 29, 2016, the Township adopted Ordinance 16-38,
    which rezoned Colonia's and PMG's properties to the B-3 Highway Business
    Zone. Ordinance 16-38 was codified into the Township's Land Use Ordinance
    § 150-35. Ordinance § 150-35A states that the B-3 zone is designed "to provide
    areas for retail sales and services to accommodate the traveling public . . . and
    to provide highway-oriented commercial uses in the proper location." Under
    Ordinance § 150-35C(1), "[d]rive-in, drive-through, fast-food and take-out
    restaurants[,]"and "[r]etail stores, large format" are permitted principal uses in
    the B-3 zone. Ordinance § 150C(2) permits several conditional uses, including
    "[a]utomotive . . . service" and "[a]ll conditional uses permitted in the B-1
    [Neighboring Business] Zone." "Automotive gasoline stations" are conditional
    uses permitted in the B-1 zone. Ordinance § 150-35 also has bulk requirements
    for the B-3 zone, including minimum lot sizes, setbacks, coverages, and building
    heights.
    On July 11, 2016, PMG filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs,
    challenging the Board's decision. At a hearing before the trial court, PMG
    argued, in part, that the Board's approval of the "d" variances for the non-
    A-4235-16T2
    10
    permitted commercial uses in the R-40 zone was arbitrary and invalid because
    Colonia's proofs failed to demonstrate a proper basis for the "d" variances with
    numerous "c" variances. PMG argued that Colonia's failure to include the
    Authority's emergency access road in its public notice to property owners within
    200 feet of the Authority's property was a fatal jurisdictional defect warranting
    reversal of the Board's approval of Colonia's application. PMG further argued
    the Board's resolution failed to detail and support the positive and negative
    criteria for the "d" variances, as required by Medici v. BPR Co., 
    107 N.J. 1
    , 14-
    15 (1987).
    In a May 1, 2017 written decision, the trial judge affirmed the Board's
    resolution and dismissed PMG's complaint with prejudice. The court concluded
    the Board's findings were well-supported by the record and the decision
    conformed with the provisions of the MLUL, specifically N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
    70(d).
    The court also found it was appropriate to consider the time of decision
    rule,3 as the Township had amended its zoning ordinance to change the zoning
    3
    Under the time of decision rule, "a decision concerning a land use application
    would be based on the municipal ordinance as it existed at the time the
    application or appeal was being decided." Jai Sai Ram, LLC v. Planning/Zoning
    Bd., 
    446 N.J. Super. 338
    , 343 (App. Div. 2016).
    A-4235-16T2
    11
    district in which the site was located from R-40 to B-3, and the B-3 zone
    permitted gasoline stations and retail stores and fast food restaurants. The court
    stated that remanding the application back to the Board and requiring Colonia
    to reapply would result in the "same conclusions rendered by the Board here."
    The court rejected PMG's assertion that Colonia's public notice was
    deficient, finding the "Authority may not have received notice as a property
    owner within 200 feet of the [p]roperty, but it did have actual notice of the
    application evidenced by the appearance of its attorney to confirm its agreement
    to the proposal." The court further found that Colonia relied on the list provided
    by the Township with respect to the notices, and the Authority did not fall under
    the independent notice requirement of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(f).
    Lastly, the court determined that PMG had waived its arguments regarding
    the validity of the "c" variances by not addressing them. Nevertheless, the court
    addressed the merits and found that "such bulk regulations are generally
    subsumed in the grant of a (d)(1) variance. The bulk regulations applicable to a
    development in the [R-40] residential zone have no relationship to the
    development of a commercial enterprise." This appeal followed.
    A-4235-16T2
    12
    II.
    A.
    PMG reiterates that the Board's decision to approve the "d" variances with
    numerous "c" variances was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable because
    Colonia's proofs failed to demonstrate a proper basis for the "d" variances for
    the four non-permitted uses on the site. We disagree.
    "[T]he role of a judge in reviewing a local variance determination is solely
    to ascertain whether the action of the board is arbitrary." Kenwood Assocs. v.
    Bd. of Adjustment, 
    141 N.J. Super. 1
    , 4 (App. Div. 1976). "[The judge] cannot
    substitute his [or her] own judgment for that of the municipal board invested
    with the power and duty to pass upon the application." Ibid.; see also Advance
    at Branchburg II, LLC v. Twp. of Branchburg Bd. of Adjustment, 433 N.J.
    Super. 247, 253 (App. Div. 2013). "The board of adjustment weighs the facts
    and the zoning considerations, pro and con, and will be sustained if its decision
    comports with the statutory criteria and is founded in adequate evidence."
    Mahler v. Bd. of Adjustment, 
    94 N.J. Super. 173
    , 185-86 (App. Div. 1967). We
    apply the same standard of review as the trial court. Grubbs v. Slothower, 
    389 N.J. Super. 377
    , 382-83 (App. Div. 2007).
    A-4235-16T2
    13
    "The action of the board is presumed to be valid." Kenwood, 141 N.J.
    Super. at 4.      "[L]ocal officials 'who are thoroughly familiar with their
    community's characteristics and interests and are the proper representatives of
    its people are undoubtedly the best equipped to pass initially on such
    applications for variance.'" 
    Medici, 107 N.J. at 14-15
    (quoting Kramer v. Bd.
    of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 
    45 N.J. 268
    , 296 (1965)). Only a showing by the
    plaintiff of "clear and compelling evidence" may overcome this presumption.
    Spring Lake Hotel & Guest House Assoc. v. Borough of Spring Lake, 199 N.J.
    Super. 201, 210 (App. Div. 1985); see also Dome Realty, Inc. v. City of
    Paterson, 
    83 N.J. 212
    , 235 (1980) ("courts place a heavy burden on the
    proponents of invalidity"). Applying the above standards, we discern no reason
    to reverse.
    Under the MLUL, a zoning board of adjustment has the power to grant a
    variance to permit, among other things, "(1) a use or principal structure in a
    district restricted against such use or principal structure, [and] (2) an expansion
    of a nonconforming use[.]" N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d). To justify a "d" variance,
    an applicant must fit within at least one of the three "special reasons" categories
    set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d):
    (1) where the proposed use inherently serves the public
    good, such as a school, hospital or public housing
    A-4235-16T2
    14
    facility; (2) where the property owner would suffer
    undue hardship if compelled to use the property in
    conformity with the permitted uses in the zone; and (3)
    where the use would serve the general welfare because
    the proposed site is particularly suitable for the
    proposed use.
    [Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    233 N.J. 546
    , 553 n.3 (2018) (quoting Nuckel v. Borough of
    Little Ferry Planning Bd., 
    208 N.J. 95
    , 102 (2011)).]
    These "special reasons" are often referred to as the "positive criteria." Sica v.
    Bd. of Adjustment, 
    127 N.J. 152
    , 156 (1992).
    "'Undue hardship' in the form of 'economic inutility' has also been
    acknowledged to constitute a special reason to support a use variance." Anfuso
    v. Seeley, 
    243 N.J. Super. 349
    , 371 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting 
    Medici, 107 N.J. at 17
    n.9). What constitutes "economic inutility" sufficient to grant a use
    variance has been described as: "whether the . . . restriction, viewing the
    property in the setting of its environment, is so unreasonable as to constitute an
    arbitrary and capricious interference with the basic right of private property."
    
    Ibid. (quoting Brandon v.
    Bd. of Comm'rs, 
    124 N.J.L. 135
    , 150 (Sup. Ct. 1940)).
    In addition, "'[u]nique suitability' is a well-established category of special
    reasons." 
    Id. at 372
    (quoting Ward v. Scott, 
    16 N.J. 16
    , 22 (1954)). The court
    in Medici noted that, "unique" is synonymous with "particular"; thus proof is
    A-4235-16T2
    15
    only required of "'particular' suitability to sustain a finding of special 
    reasons." 107 N.J. at 9
    n.4.
    The Board found there were special reasons sufficient to grant the "d"
    variances, specifically: (1) the site was particularly suited for the proposed use;
    (2) the public would benefit from the environmental remediation attendant with
    the updating of the underground fuel storage tanks; (3) the use of the land would
    be efficient because it would be replacing the existing fuel station with an
    updated one rather than building on a completely new site; (4) the improved
    landscaping would provide a buffer to the surrounding residences that was not
    previously there; and (5) the site is not likely to be developed for a use permitted
    in an R-40 zone.
    The record amply supports these findings. For example, McDonough,
    who testified to the positive criteria, said that "the only real permitted use here
    is an estate home, which I think we can all agree from a practical reality
    standpoint would never happen at this particular location." He also testified that
    even if a home was going to be built on the lot, the "site is undersized in terms
    of the zoning requirements for the zone . . . 18,000 square feet, whereas 40,000
    square feet is what is required under the [zone]. Essentially you would get a
    house half the size of the estates that are there."
    A-4235-16T2
    16
    The Board explicitly found the property was unique and, based on the
    testimony of Palus and McDonough, found it to be particularly suited for the
    proposed use. This finding is supported by sufficient evidence in the record.
    Palus testified that the only public access to the property leads to and from the
    GSP. McDonough testified that "the promotion of the general welfare is served
    because the site is particularly suitable for the use by virtue of its context, again
    being one of only eight service areas along the [GSP].                The property's
    fundamental purpose is to serve travelers and the motoring public." McDonough
    also testified:
    the site is particularly suitable by virtue of its condition.
    The property has been serving the motoring public for
    [sixty] years. Its connection is completely related to the
    [GSP] and not to the residential uses that are behind it,
    both from a physical connectivity standpoint and a
    visual standpoint as well. It is oriented towards the
    Parkway and connected to the Parkway.
    As such, the record amply supported the Board's finding that Colonia satisfied
    the positive criteria for the "d" variances.
    However, before granting a "d" variance, there must be "a showing that
    such variance or other relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the
    public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the
    zone plan and zoning ordinance." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70. These two requirements
    A-4235-16T2
    17
    are referred to as the "negative criteria." 
    Sica, 127 N.J. at 159
    . Where the
    proposed use "is not one that inherently serves the public good," 
    Medici, 107 N.J. at 4
    , the applicant is required to prove, and the Board required to find, that
    the negative criteria have been satisfied by "an enhanced quality of proof." Price
    v. Himeji, LLC, 
    214 N.J. 263
    , 286 (2013) (quoting 
    Medici, 107 N.J. at 4
    ).
    To satisfy the first negative criteria, the Board "must evaluate the impact
    of the proposed use variance upon the adjacent properties and determine whether
    or not it will cause such damage to the character of the neighborhood as to
    constitute 'substantial detriment to the public good.'" 
    Medici, 107 N.J. at 22
    n.12 (quoting Yahnel v. Bd. of Adjustment, 
    79 N.J. Super. 509
    , 519 (App. Div.
    1963)). For commercial uses, "any benefit to the general welfare derives not
    from the use itself but from the development of a site in the community that is
    particularly appropriate for that very enterprise." 
    Id. at 18.
    As previously stated, the Board found the site is particularly suited for the
    proposed use, and thus this supports a finding under the first of the negative
    criteria. In addition, the testimony supports a finding that the proposed use will
    not cause damage to the character of the neighborhood and will, in fact, improve
    the neighborhood. The site contained a gasoline station with an unused repair
    garage. As Colonia represented, a number of the proposed improvements would
    A-4235-16T2
    18
    "improve the situation, not only from what [the] project is going to cause, but
    the existing conditions today" and were added to the plan "to try to respond to
    the comments . . . and the understanding of what some of the concerns of the
    neighbors were."
    For example, the lighting was visible under the present conditions and the
    proposed plan included planting trees to address the impact of the lights of the
    gasoline station on the nearby residences. Further, the site had no soundproofing
    to reduce its impact on the neighborhood and the proposed plan included sound
    attenuating fencing. The Authority's access road had been a problem for the
    adjoining residences because it was not always kept locked and would
    sometimes be used to access the gasoline. Under the plan, the access road will
    be kept locked and secure. Moreover, the proposed plan included environmental
    remediation efforts and improvements to storm water drainage. As such, the
    record clearly established that Colonia satisfied the first of the negative criteria
    under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 based on an enhanced quality of proofs.
    "The proof required for the second of the negative criteria must reconcile
    the grant of the variance for the specific project at the designated site with the
    municipality's contrary determination about the permitted uses as expressed
    through its zoning ordinance." 
    Himeji, 214 N.J. at 286
    . The nature of these
    A-4235-16T2
    19
    proofs depends on the specific circumstances of the case. 
    Medici, 107 N.J. at 21
    n.11.
    The Board found that
    based on the testimony of [Colonia's] witnesses, its
    knowledge of the neighborhood and review of the plan
    submitted and all of the evidence submitted by all
    parties that approval of the application will not
    substantially impact the purpose and intent of the
    Master Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Township of
    Woodbridge.
    The Board found that "the purpose of zoning . . . is . . . advance[d] by the
    application as the site is designated a PA-1 zone [where] redevelopment is
    encouraged." The Board also found that:
    the approval of the application is reconciled with the
    master plan which emphasizes the importance of a
    stable viable commercial base and encouraging
    commercial development proximate to major highways.
    The [B]oard finds the application proposing the
    redevelopment of the site on the [GSP] consistent with
    the [M]aster [P]lan.
    Lastly, the Board found that Colonia established that the plan advanced the
    purposes set forth in the MLUL, specifically N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 (c), (d), (g), (h),
    (i) and (m).
    The record amply supports these findings. McDonough testified that,
    "[t]he [S]tate plan designates this site as a PA-[1] zone, which is the highest
    A-4235-16T2
    20
    targeted growth zone in the state where redevelopment is encouraged. And our
    [S]tate law has found that advancement of state policy is in the public interest
    and a special reason." He also testified:
    the relief can be granted without substantial impairment
    to the zone plan, certain[ly] the [M]aster [P]lan goal
    that emphasizes over and over the importance of a
    stable, viable commercial base is a recurring theme that
    we see in that 2009 [M]aster [P]lan. Your goals and
    objectives that are specifically advanced include "to
    attract retailers," "to expand the tax base," and "to
    encourage commercial development proximate to
    major highway corridors."
    PMG's witnesses testified in opposition to the application, but only one of
    these witnesses, 4 Thomas, actually testified in any capacity to the applicability
    of the positive and negative criteria. For instance, Thomas testified to potential
    issues with volume of traffic, delivery vehicles, the amount of parking available,
    and potential issues caused by having a gasoline refueling tanker present at the
    site while other cars and trucks are present. He also opined that the site was not
    particularly suitable for the proposed use because having multiple uses on the
    site would be "a very intense use," and "the number of uses that we are talking
    4
    Klein testified to his concerns regarding the amount of parking available, the
    amount of predicted traffic through the site, and the drive-through. He offered
    no testimony as to whether the proposed plan did or did not satisfy the positive
    or negative criteria.
    A-4235-16T2
    21
    about is really typical of a larger service area on the [GSP]." He testified that
    the alternative was not to overbuild the site.
    Thomas also testified he did not believe the proposed plan satisfied the
    positive criteria under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 due to "the size of the site and the
    number of uses[.]" He also did not believe the plan satisfied the negative criteria
    because in his "opinion the variances if granted would cause substantial
    detriment to the intent and purpose of the zoning ordinances, and the variances
    being requested will cause a substantial detriment to the public good, including
    the site itself and the surrounding neighborhood."
    The Board rejected the testimony of Thomas and Klein, finding they
    rendered "net opinions unsupported by any relevant facts."          PMG has not
    challenged this determination, and even if it had done so, "it is well settled that
    the Board 'has the choice of accepting or rejecting the testimony of witnesses.
    Where reasonably made, such choice is conclusive on appeal.'" 
    Kramer, 45 N.J. at 288
    (quoting Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera, 
    59 N.J. Super. 189
    , 201 (App.
    Div. 1960)). Because PMG has not shown the Board's decision to reject its
    experts' testimony was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, the Board's
    rejection is conclusive on appeal.
    A-4235-16T2
    22
    The proofs on which the Board judged the negative criteria were squarely
    in favor of granting the "d" variances. Because Colonia established both the
    positive and negative criteria required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, we discern no
    reason to reverse the Board's grant of the "d" variances.
    B.
    While not explicitly argued, implied in PMG's argument regarding the "d"
    variances is an argument that the Board should not have granted the requested
    "c" variances.
    Under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1), the Board has the power to grant a bulk
    variance where
    (a) by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness or
    shape of a specific piece of property, or (b) by reason
    of exceptional topographic conditions or physical
    features uniquely affecting a specific piece of property,
    or (c) by reason of an extraordinary and exceptional
    situation uniquely affecting a specific piece of property
    or the structures lawfully existing thereon, the strict
    application of any regulation . . . would result in
    peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to, or
    exceptional and undue hardship upon, the developer of
    such property, grant, upon an application or an appeal
    relating to such property, a variance from such strict
    application of such regulation so as to relieve such
    difficulties or hardship[.]
    A-4235-16T2
    23
    Colonia requested a number of bulk variances regarding issues such as setbacks,
    landscaping area, prohibitions against signs, and lot size. McDonough testified
    in support of these "c" variances, stating that:
    in terms of the setbacks, it is impractical or impossible
    to meet any setback requirement on this property. You
    have a front yard setback requirement of [seventy-five]
    feet. You have a rear yard setback requirement of
    [seventy-five] feet. That adds up to 150 feet. The lot
    is only 100 feet deep. So, no matter what you do on
    this property, you need a bulk variance.
    McDonough testified that regarding each of the "c" variances, Colonia was
    "looking for setbacks that relate closely to that which is there now and also relate
    closely to what was approved on the other side of the street." In similar fashion,
    he explained why each of the other "c" variances requested were warranted.
    The court stated at the beginning of the hearing:
    when you have a "d" variance, "c" variances . . . in most
    cases are subsumed into the application for the use
    variance. And I say that, because the example I usually
    give happens to deal with a . . . gasoline service station.
    So, for example . . . if you have a residential zone as
    you do here, and you want to put a gasoline service
    station into the residential zone it doesn't make sense to
    apply the residential bulk variances to a gasoline
    service station. More parking is required, different
    circulation patterns are required, buffers are required,
    things of that nature. And . . . I need you to address that
    issue.
    A-4235-16T2
    24
    However, PMG never addressed the issue of whether the "c" variances are
    subsumed in the "d" variances or whether the "c" variances were invalid. Thus,
    the court found, and we agree, PMG had waived its arguments. Nevertheless,
    the court then stated, "it is important to note that such bulk regulations are
    generally subsumed in the grant of a (d)(1) variance. The bulk regulations
    applicable to a development in the [R-40] residential zone have no relationship
    to the development of a commercial enterprise." The court found the issues
    raised by the "c" variances "are issues to be considered by the Board in
    considering the use proposed" and "are considered along with the site plan
    review to determine that, along with the prosed use, the proposed plan provides
    for an efficient and safe design."
    The court's determination was correct.        Generally, "c" variances are
    subsumed in an appropriate "d" variance. See Puleio v. N. Brunswick Twp. Bd.
    of Adjustment, 
    375 N.J. Super. 613
    , 621 (App. Div. 2005); 
    Himeji, 214 N.J. at 301
    ("As noted by the Zoning Board, the Appellate Division has observed that
    '[a] Zoning Board, in considering a "use" variance, must then consider the
    overall site design[,]' with the result that, 'the "c" variances are subsumed in the
    "d" variance.'" (quoting 
    Puleio, 375 N.J. Super. at 621
    ) (alteration in original)).
    Specifically, we stated in Puleio that "an application for a gasoline service
    A-4235-16T2
    25
    station in a residential zone should not be held to the bulk requirements of the
    residential zone. Lot area requirements and front and side yard setbacks for a
    residence were not contemplated to be made applicable to a service 
    station." 375 N.J. Super. at 621
    .
    McDonough's testimony established the necessity for the requested "c"
    variances, which the Board found to be credible. Moreover, PMG does not
    specifically argue the Board's grant of the "c" variances was an arbitrary and
    invalid decision and provides no authority to support a reversal on this ground.
    Accordingly, we discern no reason to reverse the Board's grant of the requested
    "c" variances.
    III.
    PMG argues that the trial court's application of the time of decision rule
    voids the approved (d)(1) variances and requires a remand to the Board because
    the B-3 zone requires a (d)(3)5 conditional use variance for the gasoline station
    and drive-through Dunkin' Donuts. We reject this contention.
    5
    N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) permits a board of adjustment to grant a variance
    for a "deviation from a specification or standard pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
    67] pertaining solely to a conditional use[.]"
    A-4235-16T2
    26
    "The time of decision rule required that zoning boards and reviewing
    courts 'apply the statute in effect at the time of the [land-use application]
    decision.'" 
    Dunbar, 233 N.J. at 560
    (alteration in original) (quoting Pizzo Mantin
    Grp. v. Twp. of Randolph, 
    137 N.J. 216
    , 235 (1994)). "The time of decision
    rule allowed municipalities to 'change . . . land-use ordinances after an
    application ha[d] been filed, even "in direct response to the application."'" 
    Ibid. (alteration in original)
    (quoting Pizzo Mantin 
    Grp., 137 N.J. at 235
    ).
    The time of application rule (TOA Rule), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5, replaced
    the time of decision rule.       
    Dunbar, 233 N.J. at 560
    . "The Legislature
    acknowledged that the time of decision rule had produced 'inequitable results,
    such as when an applicant has expended considerable amounts of money for
    professional services and documentation that becomes unusable after [an]
    ordinance has been amended.'" 
    Ibid. (quoting A. Housing
    & Local Gov't Comm.
    Statement to A. 437 (2010)).
    In order to 'effectively prohibit[] municipalities from
    responding to an application for development by
    changing the law to frustrate that application,' the
    Legislature adopted the TOA Rule:
    Notwithstanding any provision of law to
    the    contrary,    those     development
    regulations which are in effect on the date
    of submission of an application for
    development shall govern the review of
    A-4235-16T2
    27
    that application for development and any
    decision made with regard to that
    application     for    development.      Any
    provisions of an ordinance, except those
    relating to health and public safety, that are
    adopted subsequent to the date of
    submission of an application for
    development, shall not be applicable to that
    application for development.
    [
    Ibid. (alteration in original)
    (citation omitted) (quoting
    N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5).]
    In Jai Sai Ram, 
    LLC, 446 N.J. Super. at 345
    , we concluded the TOA Rule
    does not apply where the local zoning is amended to
    specifically permit the use which is the subject of a
    variance application. In that situation, the variance is
    no longer necessary, and it would be absurd, as well as
    contrary to the Legislature's purpose, to hold the
    applicant to the less favorable standards of the pre-
    existing ordinance.
    Likewise, where, as here, there is a pending appeal
    challenging the grant of the variance, the appeal
    becomes moot by virtue of the amendment specifically
    permitting the use. The dispute is moot because, even
    if we were to decide the appeal in appellants' favor, the
    applicant could proceed with the project without the
    variance.
    The B-3 zoning was more favorable to Colonia, as "[d]rive-in, drive-
    through, fast-food and take-out restaurants[,]" "[r]etail stores, large format[,]"
    and "[a]utomotive . . . service" are permitted principal uses. Thus, the plan no
    longer requires a "d" variance for the convenience store and drive-through
    A-4235-16T2
    28
    Dunkin' Donuts. PMG's challenge to the Board's decision to grant the requested
    "d" variances is thus moot. See Jai Sai Ram, 
    LLC, 446 N.J. Super. at 345
    .
    In addition, a gasoline station is a permitted conditional use in the B-3
    zone. A (d)(3) variance would be required for any deviation from the standards
    for this conditional use. However, the standard to obtain a (d)(3) variance for a
    deviation from the standards for a conditional use is less stringent than required
    for a (d)(1) variance. See 
    Dunbar, 233 N.J. at 552
    . A (d)(1) variance is granted
    for a use that is prohibited in the zone, whereas a (d)(3) variance is granted for
    a conditional use that is "neither prohibited throughout the zone nor permitted
    at every location in the zone; rather, it is permitted at those locations in the zone
    where the use meets the conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance." Coventry
    Square, Inc. v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    138 N.J. 285
    , 298-99
    (1994) (citing N.J.S.A. 40:55D-67). Although both (d)(1) and (d)(3) variances
    require a showing of special reasons for approval, the bar is lower for a (d)(3)
    variance because the use is not prohibited. TSI E. Brunswick, LLC v. Zoning
    Bd. of Adjustment, 
    215 N.J. 26
    , 43 (2013). The special reasons required for a
    (d)(3) variance requires proof sufficient to demonstrate the site will
    accommodate the problems associated with the use even though the proposal
    A-4235-16T2
    29
    does not comply with the zone requirements for that use. Coventry Square, 
    Inc., 138 N.J. at 298-99
    .
    We are satisfied that the trial court correctly determined it would be a
    waste of time to remand this matter to the Board for review under the B-3 zone.
    The record amply supports the Board's grant of the more stringent (d)(1)
    variances, and the convenience store, Dunkin' Donuts and gasoline station are
    now permitted uses in the B-3 zone. As a practical matter, remanding to the
    Board to consider a (d)(3) variance would only result in a new application that
    would ultimately result in a grant of approval of Colonia's application. See Jai
    Sai Ram, 
    LLC, 446 N.J. Super. at 345
    .
    IV.
    PMG reiterates that Colonia's failure to include the Authority's access
    road in its public notice to property owners within 200 feet of the Authority's
    property was a fatal jurisdictional defect warranting reversal of the Board's
    approval of Colonia's application.
    As an initial note, the court misinterpreted PMG's claim regarding the
    allegedly defective notice. The court misread PMG's complaint as asserting that
    the Authority itself was required to receive notice of the application. The court
    then concluded the Authority had actual notice as evidenced by its appearance
    A-4235-16T2
    30
    at the public hearings. And Colonia relied on the Township's provision of a list
    of property owners. As such, the court's findings on this issue was error.
    However, this error is not grounds for reversal.
    PMG argues the plan's proposed improvements to structures and
    conditions on the Authority's land were subject to the requirements of the MLUL
    and that homeowners within 200 feet were entitled to notice under N.J.S.A.
    40:55D-12(b). This argument is without merit, as the Authority is not required
    to abide by local zoning restrictions. Town of Bloomfield v. N.J. Highway
    Auth., 
    18 N.J. 237
    , 249 (1955). "[T]he [GSP] legislation was intended to and
    does immunize fully the Authority's proper operations from the restrictiv e
    provisions of the local zoning ordinances of . . . the . . . communities along the
    Parkway's route." 
    Ibid. PMG relies on
    Nuckel and Angel v. Board of Adjustment, 
    109 N.J. Super. 194
    (App. Div. 1970), to support its contention that the access road is an
    accessory use to Colonia's site, and thus the plan incorporated the Authority's
    land and brought the improvements under the auspices of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
    12(b).
    In Nuckel, the defendant proposed to build a hotel on a lot and provide
    access to the hotel by constructing a driveway which would encroach on a corner
    A-4235-16T2
    31
    of an adjacent lot, which was owned by the same principals who proposed the
    construction of the 
    hotel. 208 N.J. at 97
    . The Supreme Court did not distinguish
    between the entities who owned each lot and who would be performing the
    construction when it held that a (d)(1) variance was required to build the
    driveway which would provide access to the hotel. 
    Id. at 105-06.
    In Angel, the plaintiffs purchased a lot containing a trailer park, which
    operated as a pre-existing, nonconforming use, and then purchased two
    additional lots adjacent to the trailer 
    park. 109 N.J. Super. at 195-96
    . They
    applied for and were denied permission to build driveways permitting ingress
    and egress from the park on these two adjacent lots. 
    Id. at 196.
    When the
    plaintiffs constructed the driveways, notwithstanding the denial, the building
    inspector found them in violation of the zoning ordinances. 
    Ibid. We found that
    the driveways, since they were a means of access to the trailer park, were an
    expansion of the pre-existing nonconforming use and required a variance. 
    Id. at 198-99.
    Similarly, in Wolf v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 
    79 N.J. Super. 546
    ,
    549 (App. Div. 1963), a restaurant sought to pave a portion of its lot, which was
    zoned as residential and on which a restaurant existed as a pre-existing,
    nonconforming use. We found the parking lot was to be "used as a means of
    A-4235-16T2
    32
    access to, or for the parking of vehicles of patrons of, a business, is in a use
    accessorial to the business and thus is itself in legal contemplation being used
    for the business purpose in question." 
    Id. at 550-51.
    As the land being paved
    was previously not used for parking, a variance was required. 
    Id. at 551.
    These cases are distinguishable. First, Colonia has no ownership interest
    in or any control over the Authority's land. Instead, Colonia entered into a
    contractual agreement with the Authority under which the Authority would
    perform the work to make several improvements and upgrades to existing
    conditions on its property and Colonia would pay for it.        In addition, the
    Authority's approval was a necessary condition of site plan approval.
    Second, despite PMG making it sound like Colonia was constructing this
    access road from scratch, the access road was already in existence and the
    application only sought to make certain improvements to it. As we stated in
    Wolf,
    [i]f [the defendant] was using all of the land it now
    proposes to pave for parking cars when the zoning
    ordinance was adopted, its use is a valid nonconforming
    use and it may pave it for present use as such. Paving
    of an existing parking area would not constitute an
    illegal extension of a legal nonconforming use for that
    purpose[.]
    [79 N.J. Super. at 551.]
    A-4235-16T2
    33
    Colonia's application sought to only replace and upgrade the current fencing,
    buffer zones, and gate securing the access road leading to the adjacent residential
    area. As such, this would not necessarily be considered an expansion of a non-
    conforming pre-existing use, even if the MLUL was made applicable to the
    Authority's land under the present circumstances.
    Lastly, PMG makes unsubstantiated claims that some property owners did
    not receive the proper notice under the MLUL.           However, under N.J.S.A.
    40:55D-12(c),
    the administrative officer of a municipality shall,
    within seven days, make and certify a list . . . of names
    and addresses of owners to whom the applicant is
    required to give notice . . . . The applicant shall be
    entitled to rely upon the information contained in such
    list, and failure to give notice to any owner . . . not on
    the list shall not invalidate any hearing or proceeding.
    Colonia relied, as it was entitled, on the list the Township provided. If any
    property owner who was entitled to notice did not receive notice, this is
    insufficient to invalidate the granting of the application.
    V.
    Lastly, PMG argues the Board's resolution is insufficient and invalid
    because it failed to detail and support the positive and negative criteria. We
    have considered this argument in light of the record and applicable legal
    A-4235-16T2
    34
    principles and conclude it is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
    written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). However, we make the following brief
    comments.
    In making factual findings, the board is obligated to
    consider all the evidence in the case rather than merely
    to accept as factual every statement made by its own
    planning consultant. Moreover, the board must explain
    how its findings support its ultimate legal conclusions.
    [Morris Cty. Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Twp., 
    228 N.J. Super. 635
    , 647 (Law Div. 1988).]
    There is no requirement that the Board list every single piece of evidence it
    reviewed and cite every single factual statement it found in its decision. Rather,
    the standard of review is whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the
    record to support the Board's findings, and we will not disturb a Board's factual
    findings unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. 
    Medici, 107 N.J. at 23
    ;
    Fallone Props., L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 
    369 N.J. Super. 552
    ,
    560-61 (App. Div. 2004).
    The Board's resolution was adequate. It specified all of the exhibits and
    which portions of testimony the Board relied upon to make its factual findings
    and set forth the evidence and factual findings in detail. The Board made factual
    findings after considering all the evidence presented and explained how its
    findings supported its ultimate legal conclusion.
    A-4235-16T2
    35
    Affirmed.
    A-4235-16T2
    36