L.M.P. VS. HIGH POINT REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-0108-16, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1111-17T1
    L.M.P.,1
    Plaintiff- Appellant,
    v.
    HIGH POINT REGIONAL HIGH
    SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION,
    SUPERINTENDENT SCOTT RIPLEY,
    and JONATHAN TALLAMY,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ______________________________
    Submitted March 27, 2019 – Decided May 6, 2019
    Before Judges Koblitz, Currier and Mayer.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Sussex County, Docket No. L-0108-16.
    George T. Daggett, attorney for appellant.
    Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys for respondents
    (Eric L. Harrison, of counsel and on the brief;
    Ashley E. Malandre, on the brief).
    1
    We use initials to preserve plaintiff's confidentiality.
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff appeals from the October 17, 2017 order granting defendants'
    motion for summary judgment regarding her complaint brought under The New
    Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8 (CEPA).
    Because plaintiff did not establish a prima facie adverse employment cause of
    action, we affirm.
    Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 23, 2016 alleging a hostile work
    environment, constructive discharge and violation of CEPA. She began working
    as a special education teacher at High Point Regional High School (High Point)
    around 1991. She transferred to the multiple disabilities (MD) program in 2011,
    a lateral move with no change in contract or salary.
    Plaintiff's deposition revealed the following.      In 2012, she began
    complaining on behalf of her students about perceived violations of the
    Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 12101
     to 12213, and the
    New Jersey Special Education Code, N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1 to -10, including a lack
    of preparation for life beyond high school or home instruction, and no choice of
    school hours.   Plaintiff reported to Superintendent Scott Ripley, Principal
    Jonathan Tallamy (defendants), the Director of Special Education and the case
    manager closely associated with the MD program, "several times" that the
    A-1111-17T1
    2
    school was "violating the law." In summer 2013, plaintiff was removed from
    teaching the extended school year (ESY) program, where she was previously
    assigned for the entire summer. She did not file a formal grievance regarding
    the ESY program because it was not contractually guaranteed.           Only two
    teachers were assigned to the program for ten days each that summer.
    During the 2013 to 2014 school year, plaintiff again complained about a
    lack of transition services for her students, pointing to a program that formerly
    allowed students to visit Sussex County Association of Retarded Citizens
    (SCARC) to prepare for transitioning out of high school. After successfully
    advocating on behalf of her students, she enrolled three students in a transition
    program. Later, plaintiff received notice that another student seeking transition
    services was not eligible because she used a feeding tube. After plaintiff spoke
    out, the student was enrolled in the SCARC transition program.
    In summer 2014, plaintiff was assigned to only ten days of the ESY
    program. She alleges she was deprived of a $2500 stipend as a result. Other
    teachers were similarly assigned to either ten or fewer days of the ESY program.
    During the 2014 to 2015 school year, as occurred with other teachers,
    plaintiff's sixth period class transitioned into a "supervisory" period, and
    plaintiff's stipend for teaching during this period was eliminated. She did not
    A-1111-17T1
    3
    file a formal grievance regarding the sixth period class because it was not
    contractually guaranteed.
    In January 2015, plaintiff sought a residency waiver to continue teaching
    at the high school, required because she planned to move to Pennsylvania. She
    needed a "critical need letter" from a superintendent, principal or board member.
    When she asked Ripley to write such a letter on her behalf, he said he was
    uncomfortable doing so because it was his understanding that such letters were
    to be reserved for "extreme and acute concerns."
    Plaintiff contacted a board member, who then contacted Ripley on her
    behalf. The following day, Ripley called plaintiff to his office for a meeting.
    Plaintiff brought a union representative with her to the meeting. At the meeting,
    Ripley began to yell at her, which caused plaintiff great consternation. Plaintiff
    testified that after Ripley left the room, she was "visibly shaken" and "thought
    [she] was having a panic attack." Plaintiff was told to go home and her doctor
    prescribed Xanax.
    Plaintiff received a letter of apology from the union president, and then
    an email from Ripley stating he would write the critical need letter. In February
    2015, Ripley wrote the letter and plaintiff received a residency waiver.
    A-1111-17T1
    4
    Shortly thereafter, one of plaintiff's students died, and Ripley "[gave]
    [plaintiff] a hard time about" attending the funeral because she had used up her
    personal days. She was the only one of her colleagues to receive delayed
    approval to attend.
    In March 2015, Ripley announced he would be recommending to the board
    that the MD program "should be eliminated as it was no longer sustainable." 2
    Many members of the public attended an April 2015 board meeting to speak out
    against elimination of the program. In May 2015, the district "began exploring
    other options including the outsourcing of the program," which Ripley believed
    "could be a sustainable option."
    Plaintiff was assigned as a special education teacher for the 2015 to 2016
    school year, and given a schedule of classes she had not taught "for a number of
    years." Plaintiff did not file a formal grievance regarding the change. Within a
    few hours of receiving the schedule, she attempted suicide by overdosing on her
    medication3 and drinking two glasses of wine. Plaintiff was diagnosed with
    2
    Ripley alleged an analysis of the MD program showed it cost about $100,000
    per student and only three students were enrolled.
    3
    Plaintiff testified she was on multiple medications, which cause memory loss.
    She stated she has trouble "processing" and "us[ing] the right words."
    A-1111-17T1
    5
    post-traumatic stress disorder, manic depression disorder, anxiety, fibromyalgia,
    neuropathy, and a stroke. A few days later, on June 16, 2015, plaintiff filed a
    disability retirement application, indicating she could no longer work due to the
    death of her student. 4
    After negotiations for outsourcing the MD program fell through, the
    district "pursued an alternative plan, which ultimately included keeping the
    program within the [d]istrict." Ripley certified he was never made aware of
    plaintiff's complaints and that "as a tenured employee, [plaintiff] would have
    continued to be employed with no reduction in salary regardless of the destiny
    of the MD program."
    On November 13, 2015, plaintiff's disability retirement application was
    denied. On February 23, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging a hostile work
    environment, constructive discharge and violation of CEPA. She alleged she
    4
    Plaintiff's application states: "The death of my student changed my life
    forever. I was admitted to an outpatient psychiatric hospital for suicidal
    thoughts and intentions to hurt school administrators who did not care that I just
    lost a daughter. . . . I have recurring nightmares about killing the administrators
    who failed to give me time to grieve; for example, not giving me time off for
    her funeral. Within hours of her death, the administration notified me that next
    year's program was being disbanded. . . . I am on heavy psychotropic
    medication. I cannot concentrate, my memory is a blur, I can't complete simple
    tasks, nor can I be left alone. I pray that with months or even years of mental
    health treatment that I can become useful."
    A-1111-17T1
    6
    suffered a loss of $8000 due to the elimination of her sixth period class , and
    $2500 due to the reduction of her ESY assignment.
    The court initially granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in
    part only, explaining:
    The cause of [p]laintiff's retirement is unclear. It could
    mostly be related to the tragedy of losing her student, it
    could be related to the alleged rude way her superiors
    treated her, it c[ould] be related to the threatened loss
    of the MD program, and it could be mostly related to
    something else. [This] is an issue of material fact with
    respect to the cause of [p]laintiff's departure, so
    summary judgment is not appropriate.
    The motion court nonetheless granted summary judgment regarding
    plaintiff's claims relating to her sixth period class and reduction of days in the
    ESY program, because they were time-barred by the one-year statute of
    limitations.    See N.J.S.A. 34:19-5.       The court concluded the doctrine of
    continuing violation did not apply. See Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
    158 N.J. 263
    , 271-74 (1999) (where a plaintiff establishes a continual pattern of adverse
    action, a trial court may toll the statute of limitations until the adverse action
    ceases); see also Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 
    174 N.J. 1
    , 21
    (2002) (distinguishing between "a pattern or series of acts, any one of which
    may not be actionable as a discrete act, but when viewed cumulatively constitute
    A-1111-17T1
    7
    a hostile work environment," which will trigger the doctrine, and "discrete acts
    of discriminatory conduct," which will not). The court stated:
    Plaintiff translates each claim into a dollar amount and
    aggregates the dollar amounts to contribute to her total
    demand for damages, but each alleged discriminatory
    action would be discrete because [p]laintiff ties an
    identifiable amount of money to each action and each
    action could stand alone without the need to establish a
    pattern. Plaintiff's loss of pay, loss of her sixth-period
    class, and loss of days to work in the [ESY] program
    are each discrete actions and are time-barred from the
    instant litigation.
    Upon reconsideration, the motion court ultimately granted summary
    judgment to defendants as to the entire complaint, concluding plaintiff failed to
    establish the third requirement under Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 
    177 N.J. 451
    , 462
    (2003), which requires a showing that an adverse employment action was taken:
    Plaintiff fails to prove a prima facie case under CEPA
    because she fails to prove the third prong of the test.
    See N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.               Although [p]laintiff's
    motivations for retiring are unclear, none of the
    motivations are sufficient to make her departure
    actionable under CEPA. Neither the alleged rude way
    her superiors treated her nor the threatened loss of the
    MD program are formal disciplinary actions having
    [an] effect on either compensation or job rank, or
    actions "virtually equivalent to discharge."            See
    [Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn, 
    347 N.J. Super. 350
    ,
    360 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Zamboni v. Stamler, 
    847 F.2d 73
    , 82 (3d Cir. 1988))]. Even though . . . Ripley
    . . . incorrectly said that [p]laintiff would not be able to
    work in the MD [p]rogram, [p]laintiff still had a job, in
    A-1111-17T1
    8
    a position as a teacher, the same title she previously
    held at the same salary. The threatened loss of the MD
    program is not a completed action. See [Klein v.
    University of Medicine and Dentistry of N.J., 
    377 N.J. Super. 28
    , 46 (App. Div. 2005)]. There is no dispute
    that no [b]oard resolution was ever passed to either
    outsource or eliminate the program. Additionally, the
    claim that Ripley initially refused to sign a critical
    needs letter for [p]laintiff is not a completed act, as
    Ripley eventually signed the letter, and even shows that
    Ripley eventually remedied the situation. See [Beasley
    v. Passaic County, 
    377 N.J. Super. 585
    , 607 (App. Div.
    2005)]. Similarly, although Ripley initially did not
    provide leave for [p]laintiff to attend the funeral of a
    student, he eventually remedied the situation by
    allowing her to use leave time. See [ibid.] Therefore,
    there was no completed action which could be deemed
    an adverse employment action.
    The motion court also rejected plaintiff's argument that she was
    constructively discharged, reasoning that Ripley advising plaintiff the MD
    program was eliminated does not rise to the level of "knowingly permit[ting]
    conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable
    person subject to them would resign." See Shepherd, 
    174 N.J. at 27-28
     (quoting
    Muench v. Township of Haddon, 
    255 N.J. Super. 288
    , 302 (App. Div. 1992)).
    "The only completed act that is not time barred, is the time Ripley allegedly
    yelled at [p]laintiff, and called her 'unprofessional.' This act by itself is not
    sufficient to show a pattern of retaliatory acts. See [Beasley, 
    377 N.J. Super. at 609
    ]."
    A-1111-17T1
    9
    We review a trial court's summary judgment disposition de novo based
    upon an independent review of the motion record, and applying the same
    standard as the trial court. Townsend v. Pierre, 
    221 N.J. 36
    , 59 (2015). A court
    should grant summary judgment if the record establishes there is "no genuine
    issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to
    a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46–2(c). We "review the facts in
    the light most favorable to" the non-moving party. DiProspero v. Penn, 
    183 N.J. 477
    , 482 (2005) (citing R. 4:46-2(c)).
    Plaintiff argues she was tricked into retirement when defendants changed
    the terms of her employment by assigning her to teach classes she had not taught
    recently. Plaintiff argues the language of N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e), "other adverse
    employment action taken against an employee," is inclusive of plaintiff's class
    reassignment.
    Pursuant to CEPA:
    An employer shall not take any retaliatory action
    against an employee because the employee does any of
    the following:
    a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or
    to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the
    employer, or another employer, with whom there is a
    business relationship, that the employee reasonably
    believes:
    A-1111-17T1
    10
    (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation
    promulgated pursuant to law . . . or
    (2) is fraudulent or criminal . . . ;
    b. Provides information to, or testifies before, any
    public body conducting an investigation, hearing or
    inquiry into any violation of law, or a rule or regulation
    promulgated pursuant to law by the employer . . . or
    c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity,
    policy or practice which the employee reasonably
    believes:
    (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation
    promulgated pursuant to law . . . ;
    (2) is fraudulent or criminal . . . or
    (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public
    policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare
    or protection of the environment.
    [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.]
    To bring a claim under CEPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
    (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her
    employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or
    regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear
    mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a
    "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-
    3(c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken
    against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists
    between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse
    employment action.
    [Dzwonar, 
    177 N.J. at 462
    .]
    A-1111-17T1
    11
    Retaliatory action is defined as "discharge, suspension or demotion of an
    employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the
    terms and conditions of employment." N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e). Adverse action
    must be "virtually equivalent to discharge." Hancock, 
    347 N.J. Super. at 360
    (quoting Zamboni, 
    847 F.2d at 82
    ). Additionally, "'[r]etaliatory action' does not
    encompass action taken to effectuate the 'discharge, suspension or demotion,'"
    but rather "speaks in terms of completed action." Keelan v. Bell Commc'ns
    Research, 
    289 N.J. Super. 531
    , 539 (App. Div. 1996). Our Supreme Court
    explained:
    What constitutes an "adverse employment action" must
    be viewed in light of the broad remedial purpose of
    CEPA, and our charge to liberally construe the statute
    to deter workplace reprisals against an employee
    speaking out against a company's illicit or unethical
    activities. Cast in that light, an "adverse employment
    action" is taken against an employee engaged in
    protected activity when an employer targets him for
    reprisals -- making false accusations of misconduct,
    giving negative performance reviews, issuing an
    unwarranted suspension, and requiring pretextual
    mental-health evaluations -- causing the employee to
    suffer a mental breakdown and rendering him unfit for
    continued employment.
    [Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 
    206 N.J. 243
    ,
    257-58 (2011).]
    A-1111-17T1
    12
    The parties agree plaintiff has met the first two requirements of CEPA.
    See Dzwonar, 
    177 N.J. at 462
    . Plaintiff did not meet the third requirement,
    adverse employment action, despite her contention that defendants assigned her
    to teach classes she had not taught in a number of years, because such action is
    not "virtually equivalent to discharge." See Hancock, 
    347 N.J. Super. at 360
    (quoting Zamboni, 
    847 F.2d at 82
    ). Viewing the facts in a light most favorable
    to plaintiff, although plaintiff was treated for mental conditions after Ripley
    yelled at her, defendants did not engage in "making false accusations of
    misconduct, giving negative performance reviews, issuing an unwarranted
    suspension, and requiring pretextual mental-health evaluations." Donelson, 
    206 N.J. at 258
    . To the contrary, Ripley ultimately remedied the situation by writing
    the critical need letter, vouching for plaintiff as a "valuable employee," which
    allowed her to obtain a residency waiver. Moreover, plaintiff did not file a
    formal grievance regarding her schedule. See Shepherd, 
    174 N.J. at 29
     (granting
    the defendants summary judgment where the plaintiff did not "do all that was
    reasonably necessary to remain employed, an additional consideration in this
    setting"). Plaintiff's argument that she was constructively discharged because
    Ripley led her to believe the MD program was eliminated does not rise to the
    level of "knowingly permit[ting] conditions of discrimination in employment so
    A-1111-17T1
    13
    intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign." See 
    id. at 27-28
     (quoting Muench, 
    255 N.J. Super. at 302
    ). Plaintiff failed to show that
    adverse employment action was taken against her by defendants. See Dzwonar,
    
    177 N.J. at 462
    .
    Plaintiff also argues "even if actions complained of were time-barred, that
    does not mean that they are not evidential. N.J.R.E. 404(b) allows evidence of
    other 'wrongs' to prove 'motive opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
    knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are
    relevant to a material issue in dispute.'"   Plaintiff argues her hostile work
    environment and constructive discharge claims require a court to consider the
    "entire time period," citing Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 
    177 N.J. 434
    , 447
    (2003).
    As the motion judge found, the facts here are distinguishable from those
    in Green, where the Court found a "continual, cumulative pattern of tortious
    conduct" sufficient to trigger the doctrine of continuing violation regarding the
    plaintiff's hostile work environment claim. See 
    id. at 446-47
    . Plaintiff was
    successful in her advocacy on behalf of her students, and was treated similarly
    to other teachers with regard to her employment assignments.
    A-1111-17T1
    14
    After a thorough review of the record, we affirm substantially for the
    reasons articulated by the motion judge.
    Affirmed.
    A-1111-17T1
    15