GEORGE HORTA VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES (PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1608-17T2
    GEORGE HORTA,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
    PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
    RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    Argued March 4, 2019 – Decided April 2, 2019
    Before Judges Fasciale and Rose.
    On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public
    Employees' Retirement System, Department of the
    Treasury, PERS No. 2-10-274950 .
    Samuel M. Gaylord argued the cause for appellant
    (Gaylord Popp, LLC, attorneys; Samuel M. Gaylord, on
    the brief).
    Stephanie Kozic, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
    General, attorney; Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Stephanie Kozic, on the
    brief.)
    PER CURIAM
    Petitioner George Horta appeals from an October 19, 2017 final decision
    of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Public Employees' Retirement System
    (PERS), denying his application for accidental disability retirement benefits
    pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43. We affirm.
    Because the evidence adduced at the two-day hearing1 is set forth at length
    in the ALJ's initial decision, we need not discuss it in detail. 2 In sum, on
    December 15, 2010, petitioner slipped and fell on ice before commencing a
    snowplowing job for the County of Mercer, his employer of three years. In
    addition to snowplowing, petitioner's position as a "laborer 1" included
    1
    The hearing was conducted on two nonconsecutive days in February and
    March 2014 before another ALJ (initial ALJ), who retired prior to completing
    an initial decision. Thereafter, the matter was assigned to the present ALJ who
    reviewed the record and filed the initial decision.
    2
    Petitioner's statement of facts discusses only his testimony, completely
    omitting any discussion of his expert's testimony, the medical records introduced
    in evidence, and the Board's evidence. Such an incomplete, one-sided
    presentation violates Rule 2:6-2(a)(5), which requires the appellant's statement
    of facts set forth the facts "material to the issues on appeal" and "incorporat[e]
    all pertinent evidence." Petitioner's appendix omits the report of the Board's
    expert, a violation of Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)(I), which requires that appellant's
    appendix include those documents on which respondent is likely to rely.
    A-1608-17T2
    2
    unloading supply trucks, lugging ladders, carrying wood and using power tools.
    Prior to his employment with the County, petitioner worked as a painter and
    contractor. According to petitioner, his neck and shoulders were injured in the
    incident.
    Immediately following the incident, petitioner was treated and released in
    the emergency room. Thereafter, petitioner's treatment included cervical facet
    injections and epidural shots until his neck surgery approximately one year after
    the incident. The surgery was performed by Dr. Steven B. Kirschner and
    involved "a total disc replacement at the level C5-C6." Petitioner then received
    physical therapy to his neck and shoulders, but ceased treatments six or seven
    months later, claiming therapy did not "work[] for him."
    Petitioner never returned to work after the incident. In May 2012, he
    applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. In November 2012, the
    Board denied the application, finding instead petitioner qualified for service
    retirement benefits. See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-47 (permitting retirement based on
    age). Petitioner appealed and the Board transmitted the matter to the Office of
    Administrative Law.
    At the hearing before the initial ALJ, petitioner testified and presented the
    testimony of his expert, Dr. David Weiss; the Board presented the testimony of
    A-1608-17T2
    3
    its expert, Dr. Gregory S. Maslow. Both parties moved into evidence numerous
    documents, including reports of medical professionals who treated petitioner. 3
    The primary issue in the case was whether the injuries directly caused petitioner
    to become permanently disabled.         Notably, both experts acknowledged
    petitioner's March 2011 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) tests revealed,
    among other things, "disc degeneration" and "age-related changes."
    The evidence required the ALJ to determine which medical expert was
    more credible. After carefully parsing the evidence supporting each expert's
    opinion, the ALJ determined Dr. Maslow's testimony "outweigh[ed]" the
    testimony of Dr. Weiss. Among other factors, the ALJ considered "whether the
    expert's opinion [found] support in the records from other physicians and the
    information upon which the expert has based his report."
    The ALJ elaborated:
    The medical records show that [petitioner] has
    degenerative, age-related spinal changes, and has had
    [those changes] for some time. He was treated in 2009
    for lumbar back pain, and a May 15, 2009, MRI found
    3
    Because the medical professionals who authored the reports did not testify,
    their reports and opinions are hearsay, but are admissible in administrative
    proceedings as long as there is "a residuum of legal and competent evidence in
    the record to support [them]." Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 
    109 N.J. 575
    , 599
    (1988).
    A-1608-17T2
    4
    disc herniation at the L4-L5 level plus degenerative
    disc disease of the lower back. . . . He received no
    further treatment for his lower back after 2009. Then,
    a little more than a year later, he suffered the December
    2010 fall. The early-2011 MRI of his neck and upper
    back revealed either bulges or herniations involving
    five discs. Additionally, [petitioner] was treated for
    two other significant problems—surgery to repair a
    rotator-cuff tear and hand-injury repairs in 2008.
    ....
    Despite the multiple degenerative changes,
    [petitioner] was largely asymptomatic before he fell.
    But he was treated about a little more than a year before
    for his lower back, about which he has not complained
    since. With regard to causation, the fall set off a
    treating cycle that nonetheless led to constant
    complaints of pain.
    The ALJ thus determined the incident "aggravated a pre-existing
    condition[,]" but petitioner failed to prove "that aggravation result[ed] in
    complete and total disability." Ultimately, the ALJ concluded Dr. Maslow's
    opinion carried more weight because it was based on his subjective testing of
    petitioner's pain level. In particular, "Dr. Maslow found normal range of motion
    when he personally moved . . . petitioner around, and found everything else to
    be normal—with the sole exception of when petitioner [did] adduction for
    himself, [which is] when [petitioner] reported significant pain." Conversely, Dr.
    Kirschner's post-surgery report, which Dr. Weiss relied upon, "was based on
    A-1608-17T2
    5
    [petitioner's] complaints and the functional-capacity evaluation, which also
    relates to the patient's behavior."
    Dr. Maslow's testimony, as summarized by the ALJ underscores her
    findings. Specifically,
    Dr. Maslow explained that the range-of-motion
    test is partially subjective and partially objective. In a
    neck examination, tenderness is a subjective finding,
    because it relies on the patient's self-reporting of
    discomfort. Spasm, on the other hand, is objective
    because it is externally observable. In Dr. Maslow's
    view, subjective findings are not as useful in making
    decisions or diagnoses as are objective findings. Here,
    Dr. Maslow said, the primary issue in evaluating the
    presence of a disability is determining whether pain in
    the neck is also causing pain or numbness to radiate
    down in the shoulder, arm, or hand, which would
    indicate that a nerve is being impinged, resulting in
    nerve irritation, radiculitis, or radiculopathy . . . . That
    testing was negative, and Dr. Maslow performed a
    number of confirmatory tests.
    Further, Dr. Maslow "performed a careful examination of the shoulders."
    Notably, "[p]etitioner did not have shoulder-muscle tenderness, nor shoulder-
    muscle spasm." The results of Dr. Maslow's "strength testing of the rotator cuff
    was normal for both shoulders, no impingement was found, and there was
    nothing wrong with the biceps tendon."
    A-1608-17T2
    6
    The Board adopted the ALJ's initial decision, which affirmed the Board's
    November 2012 decision denying petitioner's application for accidental
    disability benefits. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, petitioner claims the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard
    because he was required to prove only that the 2010 incident was a "substantial
    contributing cause," and not the direct cause of his "permanent disability," and
    thus disqualification on the basis of a "pre-existing condition" was erroneous.
    Petitioner also claims the Board's decision was not supported by sufficient
    credible evidence in the record.
    We have considered these contentions in light of the record and applicable
    legal principles, and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant
    discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Pursuant to our "limited"
    standard of review, Russo v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement
    System, 
    206 N.J. 14
    , 27 (2011), we affirm substantially for the reasons
    expressed in the ALJ's comprehensive written decision, which "is supported by
    sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole." R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). In
    doing so, we determine the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable. Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 
    337 N.J. Super. 52
    , 56
    (App. Div. 2001). We add only the following brief comments.
    A-1608-17T2
    7
    Petitioner claims that he met the five-part test for accidental disability
    retirement benefits established by our Supreme Court in Richardson v. Board of
    Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 
    192 N.J. 189
    , 212-13 (2007).
    However, the first prong of the Richardson test requires an applicant to
    demonstrate that he is totally and permanently disabled. 
    Id. at 212
    . If an
    applicant fails to meet his burden under the first prong of the analysis, there is
    no entitlement to accidental disability retirement benefits.
    Here, the ALJ made credibility determinations after thoroughly reviewing
    the contradictory testimony provided by Drs. Weiss and Maslow on the issue of
    petitioner's permanent and total disability. We find no error in the Board's
    deference to the ALJ's credibility determinations regarding the experts'
    testimony. The significance accorded to an expert's opinion is weighed in the
    context of the expert's explanation of the foundation for his opinion, and the
    facts upon which he relies to form that opinion. See State v. Townsend, 
    186 N.J. 473
    , 494-95 (2006); Ocean Cty. v. Landolfo, 
    132 N.J. Super. 523
    , 528 (App.
    Div. 1975). The ALJ determined Dr. Maslow's opinion was based on objective
    testing and, as such, his opinion was more credible than that of Dr. Weiss.
    Because the Board accepted the ALJ's determination that petitioner was
    not disabled, consideration of the "direct result" or the proximate cause prong
    A-1608-17T2
    8
    of the Richardson analysis was unnecessary. The record in this case contains
    sufficient credible evidence to support the Board's conclusion that petitioner was
    not disabled. Because we affirm the Board's decision that petitioner failed to
    prove he was totally and permanently disabled, we need not address the issue of
    causation.
    Affirmed.
    A-1608-17T2
    9